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Finalising this thesis took more than originally expected. When I started 
this research in February 2010, my original intention was to critically explore 
issues surrounding the justiciability of ESC rights in the African Continent, in 
particular, if and whether courts could play a meaningful role in the eff ective 
realisation of ESC rights and thereby contribute to the fi ght against poverty and 
marginalisation aff ecting the bulk of population in the Continent. However, 
half-way between my research, I realised that, at the fundamental level, the 
problem of the realisation of ESC rights is not unique to the African Continent: 
it is the problem of every continent and legal system although the degree varies. 
Th is led me to substantially revise the research project and expand the scope of 
investigation. I was able to fi nish the major theoretical discussions and the review 
of the case law of the four international human rights systems (African, Inter-
American, European and UN) in the remaining two years of my research period 
at the University of Groningen. Meanwhile, in May 2013, I had to return to my 
family and give company to my wife for the next six months awaiting the arrival 
of our third child, Shalom. Although I kept working on the research specially on 
the case law, I was not as eff ective as my time in Groningen for diff erent reasons. 
When I returned to Groningen at the end of November 2013, I was only left  with 
two months to fi nalise the entire research project but it was already obvious to me 
that more time was actually needed. Th us, having fi nished my research time at the 
University of Groningen, I returned to Jimma University Law School to resume my 
teaching position at the end of January 2014. But no sooner than my arrival at the 
Law School, I was given the task to coordinate and develop an LL.M curriculum 
for the specialisation in Human Rights and Criminal Law. I was also appointed as 
a deputy director of the School’s Legal Aid Centre (LAC) which was responsible 
for providing free legal aid to the vulnerable members of the community such as 
the poor, children, women, persons with disabilities and the elderly (the position 
I held until September 2015). Th is meant that from March through July 2014 I 
was fully engaged in researching and developing the curriculum (together with 
few colleagues at the School) and in the works of the LAC. I had only spent a 
marginal time working on my dissertation during this time. Meanwhile, the LL.M 
specialisation program started accepting students since July 2014 for the summer 
programme and October 2014 for the regular programme. Th is also meant that I 
had to be responsible for the large share of teaching activities particularly for the 
human rights and international law components of the programme as there were 
Acknowledgments
vi Intersentia
only very few of us who could lecture postgraduate courses in the School, the 
problem which to my knowledge remained a critical challenge even at the time 
I left  the University in October 2019. Interestingly, by the time I left , the School 
had already graduated its fi ft h batch and has been struggling to cope with the 
growing number of students and high demand for the programme. My promotor, 
Professor dr. Marcel Brus, had the opportunity to give a class and public lecture 
during his summer visit to Ethiopia in 2015. Having realised the stagnation in my 
project, my dear and kind promotors, Professor dr. Marcel Brus and Professor 
dr. Gijs Vonk, helped me to retreat from the busy workload in Jimma to have 
time in Groningen as a visiting researcher. I had a valuable time from mid-
February through mid-June 2015 to focus on my research project. It was during 
this time that I was able to write the draft  outline and contents of the Part two of 
the study. From October 2015 through May 2018, I had to assume an additional 
academic responsibility at Jimma University as the coordinator of research and 
postgraduate studies of the College of Law and Governance. Th is was meant that 
for the next three years I barely had the time to work on the dissertation. Th is 
led me to resign from all of my academic responsibilities except class lectures. 
Th e fi rst major revision of the entire thesis was accomplished between August 
and December 2018. Th e second and fi nal revision was accomplished between 
April and December 2019. I am more than sure that had it not been for the 
encouragement of my promotors and the perseverance of my wife, Hirut Adnew, 
this project would not have come this far. I particularly promised my supervisors 
several broken deadlines but they were only humans with me. Especially during 
the last part of the revision, my fi rst promotor Professor Marcel Brus bore the 
lion’s share of the burden in reading through diff erent versions of the thesis and 
providing feedbacks as well as in translating the thesis summary to Samenvatting. 
I owe both of my dearest supervisors the deepest of my gratitude, not just for 
their academic supervision but also for their kindness, patience and humanity 
during this diffi  cult process of the journey. I am very grateful for all members 
of the scientifi c (assessment) committee, Professor B.C.A. Toebes, Professor M. 
Ssenyonjo and Professor P.C. Westerman for their role and comments on the 
manuscript. I am also grateful to the University of Groningen for giving me the 
position as a PhD Researcher through Ubbo Emmius Scholarship scheme from 
February 2010 through January 2014. My summer course at Upsala University 
(Sweden) on Method and Methods in Legal Science and at Abo Academy (Finland) 
on Intensive Course on Justiciability of ESC Rights (through a valuable fi nancial 
support from the Finish Foreign Ministry) had signifi cant contributions to my 
research project. My philosophy course on ‘Global Justice’ at the University of 
Groningen helped me to appreciate the problem of ESC rights from a wider 
perspective. I had also a wonderful company from Marlies, Kirsten, Andre, 
Birgit, Antenor, Etienne, Esther, Wouter, Michiel, Mentko, Hans, Fitsum, Tadesse 
and many of the colleagues and friends at the University of Groningen during my 
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time in Groningen. Th e special cooperation and assistance of the people at the 
International Service Desk of the University is quite amazing. My special thanks 
also go to the staff s of the Groningen Graduate School of Law, in particular, Joop, 
Barbara, Marjolijn and Anita for their relentless assistance till the end of my 
research project. I would never forget the many times Marlies and I debated on 
the issues of human dignity, ESC rights and social justice, at times all the way 
from Amsterdam to Groningen. I continue to cherish the Groningen memory 
with Etienne Revebana and his family who remains to be a dear family. Matthias 
Olthar was and continues to be my dearest Dutch brother. I shared and enjoyed 
a lot of life’s beauty and mystery with brother Matthias. I would like to say thank 
you to all of my companions at the University of Groningen. My dear wife Hirut 
Adnew and our three wonderful children, Daniel, Phares and Shalom, endured 
the pain of my absence and workload at the time they needed me most. Th ey 




Th is dissertation is dedicated to my dear wife, Hirut Adnew, and to Daniel,  Phares 
and Shalom.
It is also dedicated to all members of humanity around the globe who continue to 
endure an unnecessary socioeconomic exclusion, discrimination, marginalisation 
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1.1. HUMAN RIGHTS BEYOND DIVIDE
As seen over the last several decades, the discourse on the nature and implications 
of ESC rights has been fraught with intense philosophical, political-ideological 
and cultural and practical controversies.1 In fact, a close look at academic 
literature reveals that such important notions as fundamental, basic, inherent, 
constitutional and negative rights are oft en employed with the intention to 
diminish the normative essence and signifi cance of ESC rights as human rights.2 
Although there are major progresses especially with respect to defending the 
1 See for instance, Stephen P Marks, ‘Th e Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into 
Categories’ (2009) 24 Maryland Journal of International Law 209; JK Patnaik, ‘Human, Rights: 
Th e Concept and Perspectives: A Th ird World View’ (2004) 65 Th e Indian Journal of Political 
Science 499; Rhoda E Howard and Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political 
Regimes’ (1986) 80 Th e American Political Science Review 801; Grace Y Kao, Grounding Human 
Rights in a Pluralist World (Georgetown University Press 2011); Ari Kohen, In Defense of Human 
Rights: A Non-Religious Grounding in a Pluralistic World (Routledge 2007); Eric A Posner, 
‘Human Welfare, Not Human Rights’ (2008); David Ingram, ‘Between Political Liberalism and 
Postnational Cosmopolitanism : Toward an Alternative Th eory of Human Rights’ (2003) 31 
Political Th eory 359; Gerald C MacCallum, Jr., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’ (1967) 76 Th e 
Philosophical Review 312; Robert Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (1996) 9 Ratio 
Juris 209; Robert Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ in AJ Menéndez and EO 
Eriksen (eds), Arguing Fundamental Rights (SAGE Publications, Inc 2006).
2 See generally, J Narain, ‘Human and Fundamental Rights: What Are Th ey About?’ (1993) 
XV Th e Liverpool Law Review; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1); 
EW Vierdag, ‘Some Remarks about Special Features of Human Rights Treaties’ (1994) 25 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 119; Posner (n 1); James Griffi  n, ‘Welfare Rights’ 
(2000) 4 Th e Journal of Ethics 27; Charles R Beitz, Th e Idea of Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); EW Vierdag, ‘Th e Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 69; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Th e Myth of Rights: Th e Purposes and 
Limits of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press); David Kelley, A Life of One’s Own: 
Individual Rights and the Welfare State (Cato Institute 1998); Maurice Cranstson, What Are 
Human Rights? (Th e Bodley Head Ltd 1973). But see Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, 
Affl  uence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton University Press 1996); Massimo La 
Torre, ‘Nine Critiques to Alexy’s Th eory of Fundamental Rights’ in AJ Menéndez and EO 
Eriksen (eds), Arguing Fundamental Rights (Springer 2006); Paul Brest, ‘Th e Fundamental 
Rights Controversy: Th e Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship’ 
(1981) 90 Th e Yale Law Journal 1063; C Michael Macmillan, ‘Social versus Political Rights’ 
(1986) 19 Canadian Journal of Political Science 283.
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signifi cance of ESC rights using comparative arguments from civil and political 
rights3, the controversy surrounding the normative foundation and practical 
signifi cance of ESC rights for a given political society has not yet settled. In all 
this, the central point of contention revolves around two fundamental normative 
questions: fi rst, whether or not ESC rights could be justifi ed on the same normative 
(moral) argument and principle as civil and political rights and, second, the 
normative signifi cance or implications of ESC rights in practice.4
In relation to the fi rst question, generally, diff erent authors suggest the 
principle of autonomy or human dignity as a foundation (justifi cation) of civil 
3 Th ere are now numerous publications defending the justiciability of ESC rights. Th e following 
are just few examples: Shue (n 2); Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘Th e Nature and Scope 
of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156; Nsongurua J Udombana, ‘Social 
Rights Are Human Rights: Actualizing the Rights to Work and Social Security in Africa’ 
(2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 181; Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan 
Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd Revise, Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers 2001); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (paperback, Oxford University Press 
2001); John Squires, Malcolm Langford and Bret Th iele (eds), Th e Road to a Remedy: Current 
Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNSW Press 2005); Malcolm 
Langford and Aoife Nolan (eds), Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Legal 
Practioners Dossier) (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 2006); Malcolm 
Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2008); Alan Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (Th e 
University of Chicago Press 1996); Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: 
Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2010); Nihal Jayawickrama, Th e 
Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge University Press 2002); Fons Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and 
Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Intersentia 2006); Mónica Feria Tinta, 
‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of 
Protection of Human Rights : Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 29 Human 
Rights Quarterly 431; Obiajulu Nnamuchi, ‘Kleptocracy and Its Many Faces: Th e Challenges 
of Justiciability of the Right to Health Care in Nigeria’ (2008) 52 Journal of African Law 1; 
Christian Courtis, ‘Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Comparative Experiences of Justiciability’ (2008); Eibe Riedel, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ in Catarina Krause and Martin Scheinin (ed), International Protection of Human 
Rights: A Textbook (Abo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights 2009); Ida Elisabeth 
Koch, ‘Th e Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of InternationalLaw 
3; Michael J Dennis and David P Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: Should Th ere Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights 
to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 Th e American Journal of International Law 
462; Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford University Press 
2014); Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 
(Hart Publishing 2009); Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (Juta 2010); Mashood Baderin and Robert Mccorquodale (eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University Press 2007).
4 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1); Robert Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional 
Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (paperback, Oxford University Press 2010); Augestin 
J Menendez and Erik O Eriksen (eds), Constitutional Rights through Discourse: On Robert 
Alexy’s Legal Th eory – European and Th eoretical Perspectives, ARENA Report No.9/2004 
(ARENA 2004); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Shue (n 2).
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and political rights.5 It is generally accepted that those falling within the category 
of civil and political rights are considered as rights essentially connected with 
and hence fl owing from the nature of human beings. Th is is to say that civil and 
political rights are inherent in or intrinsically associated with the moral fact of 
being human and hence are regarded as inherent (inalienable, real, fundamental 
or basic) human rights. But many seriously doubt if this is equally true with 
respect to ESC rights. Some authors categorically reject the idea that ESC 
rights are inherent human rights.6 It is obvious that to say ESC rights are not 
inherent human rights means they lack the essential character of being real and 
universal human rights. Th us, for some, ESC rights should best be described as 
welfare rights or programs for their existence and realisation are essentially the 
function of (or contingent up on) the nature of the political culture, availability 
of material resources and the existence of specifi c government policies to that 
eff ect.7 Th is also means that ESC rights are not moral (human) rights which can 
be justifi ed on the basis of the kind of moral arguments and principles suggested 
in connection with civil and political rights. If so, then, they cannot be regarded 
as urgent and compelling human rights as such.8 Although some support the idea 
that ESC rights equally fl ow from human dignity, they fail to show the necessary 
connection between human dignity and ESC rights, that is, in what sense ESC 
5 For more on this, see Chapters three and four below. See generally, Gerald Dworkin, Th e 
Th eory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press); Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and 
Human Rights’ (n 1); Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 
2002) (n 4); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Michael Meyer, ‘Th e Simple Dignity of 
Sentient Life : Speciesism and Human Dignity’ (2001) 32 Journal of Social Philosophy 115; 
George Kateb, Human Dignity (Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, 
2011); Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77 American Journal 
of International Law 848; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?’ 
(2013); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights: Th e 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley’ 
(2009) 09–50.
6 See Vierdag, ‘Th e Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 2); Vierdag, ‘Some Remarks about Special Features 
of Human Rights Treaties’ (n 2); Aryeh Neier, Th e International Human Rights Movement: A 
History (Princeton University Press 2012); Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the 
Struggle for Rights (Public Aff airs 2003); Posner (n 1); Griffi  n (n 2); James Griffi  n, On Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2008); Cranstson (n 2); Kelley (n 2).
7 Th is is true of welfare benefi ts and programs of the welfarist states; the classical example 
during our time (of government orientation) is the health and social security benefi ts under 
Obama Administration (and Democrats-controlled Congress) and the subsequent threat to 
amend or totally undue those benefi ts under the Trump Administration (and Republican-
controlled Congress); further example is the withdrawal of several unemployment benefi ts 
following the 2008 economic recession and the resultant austerity measures adopted by, in 
particular, many Eurozone countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
8 See particularly, Louis Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 1582; 
Shue (n 2) 13ff  (discussing the nature of moral rights). Hence, in essence, human (moral) 
rights cannot be seen as contingent (situation-dependent) but rather compelling or coercive 
trumping all types of considerations or requiring weighty justifi cations to the contrary. See 
particularly Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury Academic 1997) chapt 7.
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rights are inherent rights and how the normative idea of human dignity gives rise 
to their justifi cation.9
Th e second problem concerns the practical implications or signifi cance of 
ESC rights. Even though this problem remains to be the most critical stumbling 
block of the entire human rights system10, it is particularly so in relation to 
the realisation of ESC rights.11 In particular, the controversy over the practical 
implications of ESC rights is well-captured in the so-called justiciability debate 
over the past decades.12 Many proponents of ESC rights sincerely hoped that 
9 Many authors on ESC rights oft en make reference to their importance for the protection of 
human dignity and argue this in connection with the merits of civil and political rights. Th is 
is however quite diff erent from a foundational argument. It is one thing to say that ESC rights 
are important. It is quite a diff erent thing to say that human dignity is the ultimate normative 
foundation of ESC rights. Oft en these two are confl ated in literature dealing with ESC rights 
eff ectively leaving the foundational argument merely at the rhetorical level.
10 See generally Wade M Cole, ‘Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the 
Eff ectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, 1981–2007’ (2014) 117 American Journal of Sociology 
1131; Edwin Egede, ‘Bringing Human Rights Home : An Examination of the Domestication of 
Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria’ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 249; Ryan Goodman and 
Derek Jinks, ‘Measuring the Eff ects of Human Rights Treaties’ (2003) 14 European Journal 
of International Law; Courtney Hillebrecht, ‘Rethinking Compliance: Th e Challenges and 
Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals’ (2009) 1 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 362; Daniel W. Hill Jr., ‘Estimating the Eff ects of Human 
Rights Treaties on State Behavior’ (2010) 72 Th e Journal of Politics 1161; Oona A Hathaway, 
‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Diff erence?’ (2002) 111 Th e Yale Law Journal 1935; Eric 
Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ 
(2005) 49 Journal of Confl ict Resolution 925.
11 Robert E Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the 
“Maximum Available Resources “to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 
16 Human Rights Quarterly 693; Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Practical Issues Faced by Human Rights Organization’ (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 63; K (Katarina) Tomasevski, ‘Unasked Questions about Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 
(1998–2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S. Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson’ (2005) 
27 Human Rights Quarterly 709; Sital Kalantry, ‘Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights Using Indicators : A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR’ 
(2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 253; Mary Robinson, ‘Advancing Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Th e Way Forward’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 866; ‘Elements for an 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Analytical Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque (UN Doc. E/
CN.4/2006/WG.23/2)’; Amrei Muller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 557; Riedel, Giacca and Golay (n 3); 
Alston and Quinn (n 3).
12 James L Cavallaro and Emily J Schaff er, ‘Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation 
of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas’ (2004) 56 Hastings Law Journal 217; Kent 
Roach, ‘Th e Challenges of Craft ing Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights’ in 
Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008); Tara J Melish, ‘Rethinking the “Less 
as More” Th esis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the 
Americas’ (2006) 39 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 1; James L. Cavallaro 
& Emily Schaff er, ‘Rejoinder: Justice before Justiciability: Inter-American Litigation and 
Social Change’ (2006) 39 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 345; Tara J Melish, 
‘Counter-Rejoinder: Justice Vs. Justiciability?: Normative Neutrality and Technical Precision, 
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articulation of some generic human rights obligations (both for civil and political 
rights and ESC rights) in terms of, for instance, the obligation to respect, protect, 
promote, fulfi l, etc. would signifi cantly take away the ambiguity (elasticity or 
impossibility) charge oft en voiced against the normative contents of ESC rights 
and the corresponding State obligations and that this articulation would, in 
turn, help in ensuring greater (or increasing) accountability of the States for the 
realisation of these rights.13
the Role of the Lawyer in Supranational Social Rights Litigation’ (2006) 39 N.Y.U. Journal of 
International Law and Politics 385; Shadrack BO Gutto, ‘Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of 
Implementing/ Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa’ (1998) 4 Buff alo Human 
Rights Law Review 79; Tinta (n 3); Koch (n 3); Dennis and Stewart (n 3); Squires, Langford 
and Th iele (n 3); Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare 
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press 2008); David Landau, 
‘Th e Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 401; 
Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell (eds), Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: Th e Role of 
Judges in Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Interights 2004); Abdullahi 
An-Na’im, ‘To Affi  rm the Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ in Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell (eds), Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: 
Th e Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Interights 2004); Lord 
Lester and Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Th e Eff ective Protection of Socio-Economic Rights’ in Yash 
Ghai and Jill Cottrell (eds), Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: Th e Role of Judges in 
Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Interights 2004); S Muralidhar, ‘Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: An Indian Response to the Justiciability Debate’’ in Yash Ghai 
and Jill Cottrell (eds), Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: Th e Role of Judges in 
Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Interights 2004); Langford (n 3).
13 Th is, in turn, is born out of the long debate as to the human rights nature of ESC rights. 
Th us, the need for the articulation of concrete obligations ensuing from ESC rights is seen 
as viable strategy to defend their status as human rights. Th is project is fi rst championed by 
Henry Shue followed by other scholars as Asbjorn Eide and Matthew Craven and this was 
later fully embraced by human rights tribunals as the UN CESCR and the AfCoHPR. See 
Shue (n 2) arguing that the eff ective realisation of all human rights entails the obligation to 
avoid deprivation, to protect against deprivation and to aid the deprived. Th is formed the 
theoretical basis for the current obligation to respect, protect, fulfi l, etc. now widely used in 
international human rights law. See also A Chapman and S Russel (eds), Core Obligations: 
Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002); Courtis 
(n 3); Magdalena Sepulveda, Th e Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003); Luisa Cabal, Mónica Roa and 
Lilian Sepúlveda-oliva, ‘What Role Can International Litigation Play in the Promotion and 
Advancement of Reproductive Rights in Latin America?’ (2003) 7 Health and Human Rights 
50; Kitty Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Th eoretical and Procedural Aspects (Intersentia 1999); Victor Dankwa, Cees 
Flinterman and Scott Leckie, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705; Coomans (n 
3); Jackbeth K Mapulanga-Hulston, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (2002) 6 International Journal of Human Rights 29; Eide, Krause and Rosas 
(n 3); Dennis and Stewart (n 3); Riedel (n 3); Riedel, Giacca and Golay (n 3); Baderin and 
Mccorquodale (n 3); Tara Melish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-
American Human Rights System : A Manual on Presenting Claims (2002); Alston and Quinn 
(n 3); Shue (n 2); Langford (n 3). For the normative developments of ESC rights adjudication 
by national courts, see generally Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (n 3); S Liebenberg, ‘South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on 
Socio-Economic Rights: An Eff ective Tool in Challenging Poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy 
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However, the empirical reality of ESC rights seen over the last several decades 
is rather depressing.14 Although some progresses have been made in terms of the 
legal and judicial recognition of ESC rights, the proportion of individuals and 
groups of individuals suff ering from such social evils as chronic poverty, hunger, 
homelessness, social exclusion, marginalisation, discrimination, displacement, 
unemployment as well as from lack of access to health care, education, social 
security and safe and potable water are steadily increasing at an alarming rate.15 
In this regard, the empirical evidence is abound. Just to state few of them, over a 
decade ago, the WHO African Regional Report documented facts about the state 
of maternal health care in Africa. It stated that ‘Millions of women, new-borns and 
children in Africa are dying from preventable causes every year. Millions more 
suff er ill-health or disability related to pregnancy and child birth. African women 
risk deaths to give life and their off spring have the smallest survival chances in 
the world.’16 Unfortunately, there is little evidence that this hard fact has changed 
over the last decade. To the contrary, it can be said that the Ebola crisis which 
continues to claim tens of thousands of lives since its outbreak in 2015, the mass 
exodus of migration (mostly originating from Africa) crossing to Europe or 
being stranded in Libyan detention facilities or sinking into the Mediterranean 
& Development 159; Anashri Pillay, ‘Revisiting the Indian Experience of Economic and Social 
Rights Adjudication: Th e Need for a Principled Approach to Judicial Activism and Restraint’ 
(2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 385; Muralidhar (n 12); Coomans 
(n 3); Courtis (n 3); Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial 
Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University 
Press 2008); Langford (n 3). For principles developed through soft laws, see also Th e Limburg 
Principle on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (1986); Th e Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (1997). And for CESCR’s intervention in this debate, see particularly its 
General Comment No. 3: Th e Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art.  2, para. 1, of the 
Covenant), adopted in Fift h Session (1990). See also CESCR General Comment No. 9: Th e 
Domestic Application of the Covenant, adopted in its Nineteenth Session (1998); CESCR 
General Comment No. 14: Th e Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12), 
adopted in its Twenty-second Session (2000).
14 See particularly Landau (n 12) (discussing the practice of ESC rights litigation); but see Mark 
Tushnet, ‘A Response to David Landau’ (Opinio Juris) <opiniojuris.org/2012/01/23/hilj_
tushnet-responds-to-landau/> accessed 13  September 2017 (reacting to Landau’s criticism); 
See also Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks, ‘Introduction’ in Varun Gauri and Daniel M 
Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in 
the Developing World (2008); Jonathan Berger, ‘Litigating for Social Justice in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education’ in Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks (eds), 
Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (Cambridge University Press 2008).
15 See GA Mosissa, ‘Ensuring the Realization of the Right to Health through the African Union 
(AU) System: A Review of Its Normative, Policy and Institutional Frameworks’ in B Toebes 
and others (eds), Th e Right to Health: A Multi-Country Study of Law, Policy and Practice (TMC 
Asser Press 2014) 45–47 (where I have tried to summarise some relevant empirical facts drawn 
from reports of global and regional institutions like WHO, UNDP and FAO).
16 See Th e Health of the People: the African Regional Health Report (WHO 2006) 17; See also 
Th e World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care, Now More Th an Ever (WHO 2008).
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Sea, the HIV/AIDS infections constantly increasing at an alarming rate coupled 
with unacceptably high level of unemployment rate once again confi rmed the 
still fragile nature of the Africa’s Continent and its socioeconomic and political 
systems. It is also evident that, of FAO’s staggering yearly report concerning 
millions of individuals going to bed hungry every day, the Global South, Africa in 
particular, takes the lion’s share.
In fact, the embodiment or personifi cation of the state of abject poverty 
specially striking the African Continent and beyond was best expressed by the 
situation of the young Tunisian university graduate setting himself on fi re, out 
of desperation due to lack of socio-economic opportunity and remedy resulting 
from systemic (structural) failure in his country. Th at the case was not an isolated 
incident was immediately attested by the waves of protest that have since been 
shaking the near-total Arab world – the so-called Arab Spring. And, despite the 
presence of even deeper levels of poverty in most African countries, protests of 
similar kinds were initially forcefully suppressed by the respective governments. 
Nevertheless, popular demands for changes towards democratic rule and social 
justice were later able to overpower the suppressive attempts as recently seen in 
countries like Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Th e same was also true in several 
Latin American countries including in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Venezuela 
where people were constantly protesting against the widening socioeconomic 
inequalities and lack of social justice in their respective countries. Furthermore, the 
so-called occupy movements in major Western cities like New York, Amsterdam, 
Paris and London following the 2008 economic crisis and the subsequent large 
fi nancial bailout of big companies were also expressions of similar socioeconomic 
problems disproportionately aff ecting those parts of the populations who became 
unemployed and poor as the result of the crisis.
Th ese facts are not mere facts or fact-fi ctions. Th ey are facts about the day-
to-day lived experiences of real human lives. As such they have compelling 
moral and legal implications. Above all, they directly point to the relevance or 
irrelevance of normative guarantees enshrined in mushrooms of international 
(global, regional and sub-regional) human rights instruments, the human rights 
to economic, social and cultural rights, and the corresponding legal obligations 
of the States in realising these rights.
Indeed, it is worth recognising that the practical implications of ESC rights 
are, generally speaking, directly connected to the resource capacity of the States. 
It needs no evidence that, today, a sizable part of the world population lives in poor 
and fragile economies. For instance, many African and Asian countries host a large 
proportion of population stricken by extreme poverty and disease, in addition 
to the broken infrastructure and the rule of law aff ecting these continents. Th e 
governments of these regions in their part oft en complain in one way or another 
that they are unfairly expected to live up to higher standards of legal obligations 
which is incompatible with the level of socioeconomic developments in their 
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respective countries. However, the problem of resource scarcity and its direct 
impact on the realisation of ESC rights is not only the problem of developing 
and least developing nations. For instance, following the 2008 economic crisis, 
several Eurozone countries have been forced to adopt severe austerity measures 
which in practical terms meant the withdrawal of socioeconomic support 
programs benefi ting the most vulnerable parts of their society; this was justifi ed 
on the ground that such programs are not aff ordable for countries worst hit by 
the economic recession. Th is, in turn, seems to confi rm the old argument that 
ESC rights are essentially contingent and programmatic and hence the reason for 
providing them as state’s directive policy principles as enshrined in most modern 
constitutions. In other words, it gives the impression that they are not inherent 
and hence automatically enforceable human rights but rather contingent welfare 
programs which a given government may at its own discretion choose to provide 
to certain individuals but depending particularly on the fi nancial aff ordability 
and sustainability of such programs.17 Th is also seems to be the main reason why, 
17 Among several publications on this point, See generally Daniel Edmiston, ‘Welfare, Austerity 
and Social Citizenship in the UK’ (2017) 16 Social Policy and Society 261; Aoife Nolan (ed), 
Economic and Social Rights aft er the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 
2014); Aldo Caliari, ‘Human Rights Law: How Has It Been Relevant to Austerity and Debt 
Crises?’ (2016) 110 American Society of International Law Proceedings 129; Isabel Ortiz and 
others, ‘Th e Decade of Adjustment: A Review of Austerity Trends 2010–2020 in 187 Countries’ 
(2008); Daniel Edmiston, Ruth Patrick and Kayleigh Garthwaite, ‘Austerity, Welfare and Social 
Citizenship’ (2017) 16 Social Policy and Society 253; Elizabeth Dowler and Hannah Lambie-
Mumford, ‘Introduction: Hunger, Food and Social Policy in Austerity’ (2015) 14 Social Policy 
and Society 411; Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘Th e Economics of the Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some 
Human Rights Arguments’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 193; Lutz Oette, ‘Austerity 
and the Limits of Policy-Induced Suff ering: What Role for the Prohibition of Torture and 
Other Ill-Treatment?’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 669; James Crotty, ‘Th e Great 
Austerity War: What Caused the US Defi cit Crisis and Who Should Pay to Fix It?’ (2012) 36 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 79; Joe Wills and Ben TC Warwick, ‘Contesting Austerity: 
Th e Potential and Pitfalls of Socioeconomic Rights’ (2016) 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 629; David Bilchitz, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine: A 
Rejoinder to Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou’ (2014) 12 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (I.CON) 747; David Bilchitz, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis, 
and Legal Doctrine’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON) 710; 
Ignacio Saiz, ‘Rights in Recession? Challenges for Economic and Social Rights Enforcement 
in Times of Crisis’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 277; Khalid Koser, ‘Th e Impact 
of the Global Financial Crisis on International Migration’ (2010) 11 Th e Whitehead Journal 
of Diplomacy and International Relations; Lillian M Langford, ‘Th e Other Euro Crisis: 
Rights Violations Under the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU 
Solidarity’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 217; Riedel, Giacca and Golay (n 3); Mary 
Dowell-Jones, ‘Th e Sovereign Bond Markets and Socio-Economic Rights: Understanding the 
Challenge of Austerity’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford 
University Press 2014); Sally-Anne Way, Nicholas Lusiani and Ignacio Saiz, ‘Economic and 
Social Rights in the “Great Recession”: Towards a Human Rights-Centred Economic Policy in 
Times of Crisis’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford University 
Press 2014); Sandra Ratjen and Manav Satija, ‘Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural 
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in spite of the wealth of academic literature urging the judicial institutions to give 
equal consideration to ESC rights issues, the breadth and depth of jurisprudence 
from across jurisdictions lack some level of comprehension and penetration 
especially given the number of years that has been passed since the International 
Bill of Rights providing for ESC rights came into eff ect and the intensity of the 
pressing social issues at hand in the world today. Even in countries where courts 
have been willing to entertain ESC rights claims, the eff ectiveness of the current 
structure of ESC rights litigation has been seriously doubted particularly with 
respect to redressing the root causes of socioeconomic injustices within a given 
system.18 Th is all leads us to pause and ask if there is any point in recognising ESC 
rights as human rights in international law. Th is is the major question behind this 
study as clearly stated below.
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the light of the foregoing background contexts and problems, this dissertation 
seeks to raise and examine the following central research question. What 
normative justifi cation can be provided for economic, social and cultural human 
rights (ESC rights) guaranteed under international law and how can or should this 
justifi cation impact the State obligations emerging from these rights? Th is central 
research question can, however, be broken-down into the following specifi c sub-
questions:
– Whether and in what manner human dignity provides a viable normative 
justifi cation for economic, social and cultural human rights guaranteed in 
international law?
– What concrete legal obligations of the State party fl ow from these rights and 
how are these obligations refl ected in the jurisprudence of international human 
rights monitoring bodies from across jurisdictions?
In the process of answering these questions, the study also seeks to provide 
answers to the question concerning the kind of legal obligations the State party 
Rights for All’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford University 
Press 2014). See particularly CESCR General Comment No. 3: the Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant), adopted in Fift h Session (1990) (stating that the 
State’s obligation to realise ESC rights for vulnerable persons is a matter of priority during dire 
economic crisis).
18 Landau’s interesting article on the reality of social rights litigation is one of the eye-opening 
publication showing the limited impact of ESC rights litigation for the poor. Landau (n 12). 
Gauri and Brinks’ edited volume on Courting Social Justice is also signifi cant in this regard 
in which they, in substance, doubted the eff ectiveness of formal litigation for the protection 
of fundamental ESC rights of vulnerable persons oft en disadvantaged by structural injustices. 
See Gauri and Brinks (n 14); Gauri and Brinks (n 13). See also Berger (n 14).
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bears towards vulnerable persons in the context of ESC rights. Th ese questions 
indeed signify complex theoretical and legal debates surrounding the normative 
status and implications of ESC rights as human rights. Th ey are questions born out 
of the current limitations and lack of substantive progress in both the academic 
debate and the enforcement of ESC rights in practice. Unless these questions are 
addressed in a principled and coherent manner, the academic discourse on the 
idea of ESC rights as human rights would not have any meaningful practical-
legal eff ect. Th is is so because the substantive signifi cance of ESC rights as human 
rights essentially depends on the justifi cations for compelling State obligations 
particularly towards those persons who are deprived of essential material 
conditions of life required to live a dignifi ed human life in a political society. 
To this end, the study seeks to provide a detailed theoretical and jurisprudential 
argument and evidence concerning the nature and implications of ESC rights.
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Th e main objectives of this research are re-examining and providing a fresh 
perspective on the normative justifi cation, and eff ective implementation of ESC 
rights in practice; that is, clarifying how we should understand the normative 
foundation and nature of these rights, and the concrete legal implications ensuing 
therefrom both generally and in the specifi c context of vulnerable persons. 
Th is dissertation is accordingly aimed at re-examining in detail the nature, 
justifi cation and scope of State party’s legal obligations fl owing from ESC rights 
guaranteed in international law. In order to achieve these objectives, the study 
takes the following important steps in the respective order. Th e fi rst is examining 
the diff erent conceptions of human rights and their implications on ESC rights 
as human rights. Th e second is taking a brief excursion into the existing major 
human rights theories. Th e third step is analysing in detail if and in what sense 
the principle of human dignity can and should be considered as the normative 
foundation of ESC rights. Th e fi nal step is analysing the concrete legal obligations 
fl owing from these rights.
Addressing the theoretical and legal questions raised above requires us to 
primarily re-conceptualise and re-constitute the very idea and justifi cation of 
human rights. Th is is especially based on the understanding that many of the 
disagreements concerning human rights are essentially rooted in the unnecessary 
abstraction or over-idealisation of both the concept and foundation of human 
rights.19 As such, this study seeks to argue for a more robust and practical 
19 A recent critical challenge against philosophical abstraction of human rights comes from 
Benjamin Gregg who proposed to reject the universal metaphysical (and theological) 
conception of human rights and instead off ered to justify human rights as socially constructed 
cultural (local) phenomena. See Benjamin Gregg, Human Rights as Social Construction 
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conception and theory of human rights consistent with their basic functions and 
raison d’être in a political society.20 Th e systematic discussion of the existing 
concept and conceptions of human rights and the underlying theories of human 
rights is therefore needed in order to show their limitations or gaps in helping 
us to fully capture the nature and function of human rights in a political society 
and, therewith, the need to come up with an alternative viable conception and 
theory of human rights that explains in a coherent and holistic manner what 
human rights are and what they are for. To this end, the researcher relies more on 
practical arguments than abstract philosophical analysis of the notion of human 
rights and human dignity.21 Although abstract metaphysical arguments about 
human rights and their justifi cation are interesting intellectual exercises, this 
research seeks to emphasise the primacy (primary importance) of the practical 
and social essence (both in terms of their origin and justifi cation) of the idea and 
implications of human rights, for which abstract metaphysical arguments may 
not always be readily available.22 Accordingly, it aims to propose and defend the 
social conception of human rights which, in turn, seeks to show and argue that 
the idea of human rights is born out of humanity’s need to respond to practical 
social necessities aff ecting the life of individuals and groups of individuals in a 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). See also René Wolfsteller and Benjamin Gregg, ‘A Realistic 
Utopia? Critical Analyses of the Human Rights State in Th eory and Deployment: Guest Editors’ 
Introduction’ (2017) 21 Th e International Journal of Human Rights 219; René Wolfsteller, ‘Th e 
Institutionalisation of Human Rights Reconceived: Th e Human Rights State as a Sociological 
“Ideal Type”’ (2017) 21 Th e International Journal of Human Rights 230; Benjamin Gregg, ‘Th e 
Human Rights State: Th eoretical Challenges, Empirical Deployments: Reply to My Critics’ 
(2017) 21 Th e International Journal of Human Rights 359.
20 See particularly Jurgen Habermas, ‘Th e Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia 
of Human Rights’ (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 466ff .; see also Jürgen Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William 
Rehg) (Polity Press 1996) chapters 3 & 4 (reconstructing system of law and rights as practical 
normative principles for the regulation of practical social relationships). See also Chapter 
3.4 below. Th e discussion under this section seeks to show that the original conception and 
hence historical root of human rights shows that the idea of human rights was developed as 
a normative language (instrument) of struggle against various forms of socioeconomic and 
political problems as indignation, exclusion, poverty and oppression. For instance, the principal 
targets of the 17th and 18th C philosophical discourses and the landmark legal documents 
issued during these periods were the then existing unfavourable socioeconomic, political and 
cultural institutions undermining the equal standing of humanity. Th e abstraction of the idea 
of human rights as being concerned with the inner citadel of human being poorly dissociated 
from the biological or physical aspect of being a human person is only a later development.
21 See Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss, ‘Introduction to a Conversation’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle 
Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007) p.5; Habermas, 
‘Th e Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ (n 20). Th us, as 
Malpas and Lickiss interestingly put, ‘Dignity is not an idea abstracted from human action, but 
has life only in the actual relations between human beings. Dignity is, in the end, evident only 
in the concreteness of human life and practice, and the extent to which our life and practice 
can be seen as enabling of human dignity is perhaps the best measure of its humanity’. Ibid. 
See also Chapters 2 and 4 below.
22 See particularly Chapter 2 below.
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political society. Th e history of human rights proves that it is coined as a language 
of struggle against various forms of socioeconomic and political oppressions.23 
Th us, using the social conception of human rights as a thought framework, this 
research seeks to advance the view that human rights are rooted in or originates 
from the practical and complex social relations that human beings constitute 
between themselves and their environment. Th at is, it seeks to develop arguments 
whereby human rights are conceived as normative principles constructed by 
human beings themselves with the view to provide practical solutions to specifi c 
life-questions of social, economic, cultural and political nature facing human 
beings in the process of living together as a political society24; in short, the 
view of human rights as practical normative ideals framed as tools of resistance 
against diff erent forms of injustices, discrimination, exclusion, marginalisation 
and oppression: as tools (language) of struggle questing for the dignity of human 
being in a political society.25 Th is entire endeavour, it is assumed, is based on or at 
23 See particularly Habermas, ‘Th e Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of 
Human Rights’ (n 20) 466ff .; see also Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions 
to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) chapters 3 & 4 
(reconstructing system of law and rights as practical normative principles for the regulation of 
practical social relationships). See also Chapter 3.4 below.
24 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and 
Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20); David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept 
of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discurse (Kluwer Law International 2002); Milton Lewis, 
‘A Brief History of Human Dignity: Idea and Application’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss 
(eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007); Stephen Riley, ‘Human 
Dignity: Comparative and Conceptual Debates’ (2010) 6 International Journal of Law in Context 
117. Th us, following particularly Lewis and Riley, it is possible to note the historical evolution 
of the idea and value of human dignity and rights from the earlier narrow, exclusionary and 
discriminatory conception to a more robust modern equalised, universalised and generalised 
(abstract or idealised) conception. Behind this signifi cant historical development lies the 
progressive self-awareness and as such self-idealisation of humanity over the course of time and 
hence the need to defend and promote human life and values both against and in the specifi c 
context of social, political, cultural, intellectual and economic environment. Riley states that 
‘Th e ‘being’ of dignity lies ultimately in human eff orts to discern what is distinctive, and what 
is good, in humans, with dignity sitting at the intersection of metaphysical, anthropological, 
moral, legal and political discourses of human self-perception’. ibid. And Lewis put this 
same idea as follows. ‘Since the Enlightenment and the great Revolutions of the 17th and 18th 
centuries (English, American, and French), democratization and universalization of the right 
to dignity has proceeded. Indeed, central to modernity is the rejection of political and moral 
hierarchies as normative ideals. Western societies over the last three centuries have come 
to give full political and moral status to non-noble and property-less men, non-Christians, 
women, and non-whites. Th is process culminated in the Universal Declaration of 1948 when 
equal moral status was accorded all human beings.’ ibid (also citing Y. Arieli ibid).
25 Habermas, ‘Th e Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ (n 
20); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and 
Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 29ff  (arguing that the substance of fundamental moral 
rights is concerned with guaranteeing individuals against various kinds of standard threats); 
Shue (n 2); Sen (n 3) chapter 4 &5 (discussing poverty as question of capability deprivation and 
hence as being the practical question of freedom). Th us, social deprivations, oppressions and 
exclusions are at the epicentre of the development of the idea of human rights whereas ideal 
metaphysical arguments are only the consequent phenomena.
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least have to do with the intrinsic moral value attributed to humanity (that is, to 
human life in general) and the general moral obligations (of humanity) to respect, 
protect, preserve and promote the welfare of humanity as a whole.26
In the modern human rights discourse, this intrinsic moral value of humanity 
is referred to as human dignity.27 Th is value is oft en associated with the moral 
aspect of being human. However, having carefully examined its essence and 
implications in detail, this research argues that human dignity is a value that 
should be construed as pertaining both to the biological (physical) and moral 
aspect of being human and, hence, as justifying an unconditional respect for the 
inherent biological and moral needs of humanity. Th is ideal of unconditional 
respect then forms the basis for requiring the State and other relevant actors to 
realise both the moral and material conditions needed to live a dignifi ed human 
life. Th is approach will assist in clarifying that the various kinds of human rights 
recognised at international and national level are nothing but the concretisation 
of what it means to respect the inherent value of humanity in the practical sense 
of the term: that is, whether referred to as civil, political, economic, social or 
cultural rights, all human rights are specifi cations or articulations of the principle 
of human dignity.28 In turn, this understanding will helps us to eff ectively reject 
the categorisation arguments associated with the traditional conceptions and 
theories of human rights.29
Following from this, this research will then aim to show that the problem of ESC 
rights is not the problem of justifi cation but rather the problem of implementation 
in practice. Th is problem, in turn, arises from two basic factors, leaving aside the 
ideological objections to their status as human rights. First, it arises from the fact 
that the practical realisation of ESC rights involves very complex and, at times, 
diffi  cult policy choices that States have to make concerning the allocation of 
resources and responsibilities, and the prioritisation and balancing of competing 
interests in the society.30 Second, the abstract human rights discourse has not 
26 Th is argument is developed in Chapter 3.4 below.
27 Daniel P Sulmasy, ‘Human Dignity and Human Worth’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss 
(eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007); Alexy, A Th eory of 
Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) (discussing the moral idea); 
Kateb (n 5); Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Harvard University Press 2012); 
Michael Rosen, ‘Dignty: Th e Case Against’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding 
Human Dignity (Proceedings of the British Academiy No. 92) (Oxford University Press 2013).
28 Chapter 4 below.
29 Mary Neal, ‘Respect for Human Dignity as “Substantive Basic Norm”’ (2014) 10 International 
Journal of Law in Context 26; Stephen L Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’ (1977) 88 Ethics 
36; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Th e Meaning of “ Life ”: Dignity and the Right to Life in International 
Human Rights Treaties’ [2012] Human Rights Law Review 1; Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional 
Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4).
30 Here I am not suggesting that there is an irreconcilable confl ict between individual and 
collective interests as oft en suggested by traditional human rights theories. For more on 
this, see generally, Carol C Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology Individuality and Community in 
Marx’s Th eory of Social Reality (MIT Press 1978); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); 
Robert Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International 
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yet produced a clear and concrete legal framework developed on the basis of the 
principle of human dignity which could guide the States parties in their eff orts 
to implement ESC rights in practice. For instance, the practical implications of 
ESC rights for the States parties in fragile or poor economic conditions is still 
not clear. Th is problem even becomes more complicated if seen in the light of the 
rights of several socioeconomically vulnerable persons (and group of persons) 
such as persons with disabilities and those lacking basic minimum income 
indispensable to meet the material conditions of life.31 Even the proponents of 
the justiciability of ESC rights could not so far develop concrete and coherent 
obligations which can be regarded as legitimate and compelling on the States 
parties.32 Th erefore, it is the main trust of this study that if the above questions 
Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON) 572; Basek Cali, ‘Balancing Human Rights? Problems 
with Methodological Weights, Scales and Proportions’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 
251; Alastair Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 289; Denise 
Meyerson, ‘Why Courts Should Not Balance Rights against the Public Interest’ (2007) 31 
Melbourne University Law Review 801; Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive 
Rights and Negative Duties (Oxford University Press 2008). I rather take the view that both 
individual and collective interests have substantive relationships as they are both justifi ed on 
the basis of the same overarching normative principle as will be seen in the next chapters. 
In this regard, I follow the approach of, inter alia, Jeff  Malpas, ‘Human Dignity and Human 
Being’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation 
(Springer 2007); Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology Individuality and Community in Marx’s Th eory 
of Social Reality; Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Joseph Raz, Th e Morality of Freedom 
(Paperback, Clarendon Press 1986); Fredman; Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] 
(Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4).
31 Nolan (n 17); ‘Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis (Issue Paper Published 
by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights)’; ‘Th e Impact of the Economic 
Crisis and Austerity Measures on Human Rights in Europe: Feasibility Study (Doc. No. 
CDDH(2015)R84 Addendum IV, Steering Comittee for Human Rights (CDDH), 84th Meeting, 
7–11 December 2015)’; Dowell-Jones, ‘Th e Economics of the Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some 
Human Rights Arguments’ (n 17); Koser (n 17); ‘Dialogue between Judges: “Implementing the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis” (Seminar, 25 January 
2013)’ (2013); Ratjen and Satija (n 17); Way, Lusiani and Saiz (n 17); Edmiston, Patrick and 
Garthwaite (n 17); Edmiston (n 17); Wills and Warwick (n 17); Saiz (n 17); Dowler and Lambie-
Mumford (n 17); ‘Report on Austerity Measures and Economic and Social Rights (A Report of 
UNOHCHR Submitted Persuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/141)’.
32 Th ere are of course several attempts in this direction. Th e most important ones are the 
contributions of such scholars as Henry Shue, Asbjorn Eide, Ida Koch and the general 
comments of the UN ESCR whereby the ESC rights obligations of the State are stated in terms 
of the obligation to respect, protect, fulfi l (facilitate, promote and provide). See Shue (n 2); 
Asbjorn Eide, ‘Th e World of Human Rights: As Seen from a Small, Industrialized Country’ 
(1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 246; Eide, Krause and Rosas (n 3); Ida Elisabeth 
Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: Th e Protection of Socio-Economic Demands under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2009); Koch (n 3); 
‘Elements for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Analytical Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque 
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/WG.23/2)’ (n 11); Riedel (n 3); Alston and Quinn (n 3); Ssenyonjo (n 3). 
Despite these attempts, the problem of the realisation of ESC rights, in particular, the absence 
of concrete legal standards to measure their legal enforcement, remains to be one of the critical 
problems of international human rights law. See Saiz (n 17); Gauri and Brinks (n 14); Landau 
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are addressed successfully, the overall arguments and approaches of this research 
will help us to bring coherence to our understanding of the justifi cation, nature 
and implications of ESC rights as inherent human rights. As such, it will 
contribute to the development of academic debates regarding the content and 
scope of protections and the concrete State obligations fl owing from ESC rights 
regime. In particular, this research is conducted with the aim of providing a 
fresh perspective on their essence as inherent human rights and certain specifi c 
normative frameworks useful to analyse their practical-legal signifi cance in a 
coherent manner.
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In an endeavour to provide answers to the above questions, the study adopted 
two levels of analytical approaches. At the fi rst level, it has attempted to examine 
the theoretical problems aff ecting the eff ective realisation of ESC rights. Th us, 
the discussion in Part one has focused, on the one hand, on analysing how 
diff erent conceptions and theories of human rights have undermined the status 
of ESC rights and, on the other hand, on proposing an alternative perspective 
and justifi cation which better explains their essence as inherent human rights. 
It has particularly made an in-depth analysis of how the principle of human 
dignity functions as the substantive justifi cation of ESC rights and the practical 
normative demands that it signifi es for the realisation of the material conditions 
of life guaranteed through ESC rights regime. To this end, the discussion drew 
on academic writings available in the fi eld of legal theory, international human 
rights law and other relevant disciplines such as philosophy (especially moral and 
political philosophy) and international relations. Th is is however not to suggest 
that this research is an interdisciplinary inquiry. Reference to non-legal academic 
writing is rather justifi ed on the fact that many of the issues in human rights 
discourse in general and those raised above are essentially cross-cutting in nature. 
Th erefore, the researcher used perspectives from other relevant disciplines in 
order to have a comprehensive understanding of the issues under investigation 
and to come to a reasonable conclusion. In this regard, while an eff ort was made 
to exhaust all relevant major writings related to the topic (as long as they are 
available in English), the choice of the literature in this Part was guided especially 
by the particular orientation of this inquiry: that is, paying due regard to those 
academic writings which focus on and promote the practical understanding of 
the conception, justifi cation and function of human rights, as opposed to those 
emphasising on abstract metaphysical arguments. In substance, the discussion 
(n 12); Edward Anderson and Marta Foresti, ‘Assessing Compliance : Th e Challenges for 
Economic and Social Rights’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 469; Roach (n 12); 
Gutto (n 12).
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in this Part has clarifi ed how we should conceive the normative essence and 
justifi cation of ESC rights and their practical imports in the light of the principle 
of human dignity.
At the second level, the study then tried to assess the normative meaning and 
requirements of the principle of human dignity in the light of international ESC 
rights jurisprudence and hence the concrete and compelling legal obligations 
the State bears in the realisation of ESC rights as a matter of respect for the 
inherent value of human being. So, the discussion in Part Two has attempted to 
give substance to (concretise) what respecting human dignity, that is, ensuring a 
dignifi ed human life entails in the legal sense of the term in the specifi c context 
of ESC rights. To this end, this research has adopted an inductive approach to 
analysing international ESC rights jurisprudence. A detailed explanation of the 
technics employed in the selection and analysis of the cases will be provided in 
the introduction to Part two of the study. Just to provide a general highlight here, 
the researcher has fi rst undertaken a painstaking review of ESC rights case law of 
the four international human rights systems (European, African, Inter-American 
and the UN human rights systems) with the view to identify the general patterns of 
approach each takes when adjudicating ESC rights claims and the issues thereof. 
Th en, these approaches were thematised and restated in terms of specifi c legal 
principles and systematically analysed. Th e discussion of the case law was also 
substantiated with relevant soft -laws, thematic reports and general comments. In 
this regard, the principal approach of the study was to analyse all ESC rights cases 
available before all international monitoring bodies. However, when this became 
practically impossible to manage due to the number of the cases dealt with by 
specifi c bodies (in particular the ECtHR), or when they are found to be repetitive 
and bring no substantive change to the already established jurisprudence, the 
emphasis was placed on the landmark cases and on recent judgments of the 
tribunal concerned. Moreover, a practical limitation for reviewing the cases 
especially in relation to the European and Inter-American human rights systems 
was that some of the cases are decided in languages other than English and that 
the English translation is sometimes not (readily) available. Th e researcher has 
tried to mitigate the gaps this might create in the overall analysis of this work by 
using the summaries provided by the respective organs if found to be available.
1.5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
Th is research is divided in to two parts. Part one, which consists of three chapters, 
is concerned with basic theoretical issues relating to the normative status of ESC 
rights. Chapter two will identify and discuss two major conceptions of the notion 
and implications of human rights: the hierarchical and dichotomised conceptions. 
In doing so, the discussion in this Chapter has two main purposes. First, it tries 
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to show how both the hierarchical and dichotomised conceptions of human 
rights deny ESC rights of any normative relevance. Having shown the critical 
limitations in these two conceptions, the Chapter then goes on to introduce a 
counter argument against these views particularly by drawing on MacCallum’s 
and Alexy’s interesting discussions arguing that (human) rights and freedoms 
essentially signify a triadic – three-point – normative relationships.33 At the core 
of the triadic conception of human rights is an intuitive ideal of a free human 
being, that is, what it practically means to be free or unfree, to have or be deprived 
of human rights for a human being living in a political society regardless of the 
source and nature of the unfreedom or deprivation.34 Accordingly, it will be 
explained that the triadic conception of human rights introduces an interesting 
and alternative perspective to both the hierarchical and dichotomised views 
of human rights. Alexy succinctly summarises the central thesis of the triadic 
conception of human rights as follows. For him, ‘liberty is not an object in the 
same way as a hat is,’35 that is, it does not refer to a relationship between a human 
being and an object, as opposed to what is oft en depicted in the rights-discourse.36 
It rather and always signifi es practical human relationships.37 In other words, 
when we talk about the liberty or the rights of human being, it is always in terms 
of his or her relationship with other fellow human being defi ned by and in the 
context of certain underlying normative principles and frameworks.38 Th is, in 
turn, perfectly goes with the social conception of human rights advanced in this 
research.
Chapter three then goes on to examine the problem of the conception of human 
rights in the light of the existing major theories of human rights.39 Th e purpose 
33 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1); Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) 
(n 4); see also William H Hay, Rex Martin and Marcus Singer, ‘Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr. 1985–
1987’ (1987) 61 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 383.
34 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4); MacCallum, 
Jr. (n 1). Cf. UN GA Res 421(V) Section E.
35 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139.
36 In fact, for MacCallum, this picture in the traditional conception arises when one of the 
variables is not mentioned in the statement. MacCallum, Jr. (n 1); Amartya Sen, ‘Elements of 
a Th eory of Human Rights’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 315; Jeremy Waldron (ed), 
‘Nonsense upon Stilts’: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (with Introductory and 
Concluding Essays by Jeremy Waldron) (Methuen 1987).
37 Th is point is well argued by Alexy. ‘Of course,’ says Alexy, ‘one can speak of the liberty that 
someone has, in the same way as the one can speak of the hat they have. But the idea of 
“having” in the case of liberty does not consist of a relation of possession between a person 
and an object. It would therefore seem appropriate to think of liberty as a quality which can 
be associated with persons, objects and society.’ See Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights 
[1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139.
38 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1); Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 
2002) (n 4); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded E, Columbia University Press 2005).
39 Leo Strauss, Natural Rights and History [1953] (5th Impres, Th e University of Chicago Press 
1965); See particularly Carol C Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation 
in Politics, Economy and Society (Cambridge University Press 1988) 4–18 (summarising 
central arguments in liberal, socialist and discourse theories of human rights). Brian Bix, 
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of this Chapter is not providing a detailed discussion of the theories but rather 
to identify and state their major limitations in justifying a comprehensive idea 
of human rights.40 Having done this, the second-half of the Chapter then tries to 
develop an alternative justifi cation of human rights using the idea of the social 
conception of human rights which, in substance, seeks to present and defend the 
idea of human rights as being rooted in and concerned with practical social relations 
constantly evolving with the history and progression of humanity.41 In other 
words, it essentially doubts the possibility of constructing an abstract metaphysical 
justifi cation of human rights suggested by the traditional theories, and rather 
argues for human rights to be understood as the practical social idea developed 
over a course of time through conscious intellectual endeavour especially aimed 
at introducing morality to society’s complex social relations.42 Th is will ultimately 
lead us to the understanding that human rights have fundamental social functions 
holding together both the individual and collective interests as an undivided whole, 
as opposed to what has been suggested through traditional human rights theories.43
Jurispridence: Th eory and Context (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012); John Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011); Ellen Frankel Paul, Jr Fred 
D. Miller and Jeff rey Paul (eds), Natural Rights Liberalism from Locke to Nozick (Cambridge 
University Press 2005); C Fred Alford, Narrative, Nature, and the Natural Law: From Aquinas 
to International Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press 2006); See generally Nigel E Simmonds, Central 
Issues in Jurisprudence (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013); Robert P George (ed), Natural Law 
Th eory: Contemporary Essays (Clarendon Press 1992); Ellen Frankel Paul, Jr Fred D. Miller and 
Jeff rey Paul (eds), Natural Law and Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 
2001); Ana Marta Gonzalez, Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Law: Natural Law as a 
Limiting Concept (Ashgate 2008); Viktor J Vanberg, ‘Liberal Constitutionalism, Constitutional 
Liberalism and Democracy’ (2011) 22 Const Polit Econ 1; Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 
20); Robert Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ in Augestin J Menendez and 
Erik O Eriksen (eds), Constitutional Rights through Discourse: On Robert Alexy’s Legal Th eory 
– European and Th eoretical Perspectives, ARENA Report No.9/2004 (ARENA 2004).
40 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and 
Society (n 39).
41 See particularly Chapter 3.4 below.
42 Kretzmer and Klein (n 24); Yehoshua Arieli, ‘On the Necessary and Suffi  cient Conditions for 
the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights’ in David Kretzmer 
and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer 
Law International 2002); Joern Eckert, ‘Th e Legal Roots of Human Dignity in Germany’ in 
David Kretzemer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002). Th e spirit of the idea of human rights as refl ective 
of humanity’s progression is well-captured by Eckert, Arieli and Klein et al while discussing 
the notion of human dignity in contemporary human rights discourse. Th us, following Eckert 
et al, the progression over the course of time has led to what they call ‘fundamental rethinking’ 
of society and social institutions during intellectual revolutions of the 16th century and the 
following. In this way, we can also say that the 20th century UN project as well fi ts into this 
thinking: an intellectual project concerned with adding some form of morality and decency to 
both national and international relations of states and state-individuals at national treatment.
43 See for instance Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, 
Economy and Society (n 39); Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology Individuality and Community in 
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Chapter four will provide an in-depth examination of the idea of human 
dignity as the normative foundation of human rights. In particular, it investigates 
and seeks to provide an answer to the question whether ESC rights can be justifi ed 
on the same normative principle as civil and political rights; that is, whether they 
can be established as inherent and universally valid human rights signifying 
compelling State obligations, as opposed to the current perception that they are 
mere discretionary and contingent programmatic benefi ts essentially linked 
to the resource capacity of the State and the political will of the government 
concerned. To this end, the Chapter begins with the exploration of the notion 
of dignity in the historical-philosophical discourse and usage so as to uncover 
its deeper normative meaning and implications for the modern idea of human 
rights. Th e discussion will show that historically the term dignity had two 
principal connotations (fi rst, as signifying rank or status and, later, as describing 
the inherent value of humanity) but the core normative meaning essentially 
associated with it, the ideal of respect, remained the same over the course of time 
and that it is this very same ideal that underlies its signifi cance as the normative 
foundation of inherent and universally valid human rights. Th is is also to say 
that without this ideal of respect the notion of dignity would be of no use at all 
both in general moral and human rights discourse. Th us, it will be seen that the 
principle of human dignity particularly signifi es the moral idea that, as the bearer 
of inherent and unconditional moral value, humanity ought to be treated with 
due and proper respect. Th at is, in essence, it entails an unconditional respect for 
the inherent moral value of human being.44
However, the question will arise: to what aspect of human being will this 
respect be due? Th is question will arise because in an intuitive and practical 
sense, human beings have both the biological (physical) and moral existence and 
that, as it will be seen below, the central arguments of the traditional theories 
essentially associate the question of rights and freedoms with the moral aspect of 
being human (and hence primacy to the so-called civil and political rights). But a 
close look at its core practical meaning reveals that the principle of human dignity 
asserts due and proper respect for both the biological and moral aspect of being 
Marx’s Th eory of Social Reality (n 30); Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 39); John 
Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Th eory (Oxford University Press 1998); John 
Finnis, Reason in Action: Collected Essay: Volume I (Oxford University Press 2011). Per Finnis, 
Aquinas’s approach expressly recognises the mutuality between individuality and collectivity 
as he conceives rights as an object of justice wherein respecting the rights of individuals is seen 
as the substantive element of respecting the common good.
44 See Chapters 4.2 through 4.4 below. See also Neal (n 29); Erin Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, 
Constititions, and the Worth of Human Person (with Foreword by Aharn Barak) (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2013); Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity (Kantsudien 2011); Kateb (n 
5); Malpas (n 30); Riley (n 24); Paulus Kaufmann and others (eds), Humilation, Degradation, 
Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated (Springer 2011); William A Parent, ‘Constitutional 
Values and Human Dignity’ in Michael J Meyer and William A Parent (eds), Th e Constitution 
of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Cornell University Press 1992).
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human and hence does not admit such categorisation approach to the nature of 
humanity.45
In addition, Chapter four also discusses the implications of the diff erent 
usage of the principle of human dignity being invoked in diff erent contexts. 
Th us, it will argue that the diff erent usage of the idea of dignity in diff erent 
contexts expresses an ‘infl orescence’46 of its core normative meaning through 
diff erent ‘family of terms’ or ‘dignity-languages’47 which, in turn, establishes 
its conceptual richness. Th e discussion also reveals that the principle of human 
dignity possesses a relational and dynamic characteristic feature which goes well 
with the conception of human rights as emerging from practical social relations. 
Th us, it will be seen that the principle of human dignity not only implies but, in 
fact, requires the existence of dynamic and mutual relationships between human 
beings. Th is relational nature of the principle is expressed through its demand 
on everyone to be attentive to the inherent moral and biological needs of every 
person indispensable to live a dignifi ed human life. Th erefore, the principle of 
respect for the inherent value of human being specifi cally entails ensuring those 
moral and material conditions of life required to live a dignifi ed human life.
Having examined all this in abstract, Chapter four will also assess the 
general normative (legal) functions attached to the principle of human dignity 
in international positive law and few national jurisdictions. Th is has two 
main purposes. First, it will provide a concise assessment of how the abstract 
understanding of the principle of human dignity has been applied in international 
positive law and jurisprudence. Second, it will lay a groundwork for the detailed 
examination of ESC rights jurisprudence in Part two.
Part two of the study turns to discussing the specifi c legal implications of the 
principle of human dignity in the context of ESC rights; that is, what the State 
should legally do in order to adhere to the normative demands of the principle of 
human dignity. To this end, Part two makes an in-depth and systematic analysis 
of international ESC rights case law. Based on the extensive review of international 
ESC rights case law, this Part argues that the State’s core legal obligation to respect 
and ensure the material conditions of life consists of two principal elements. Th e 
fi rst one is the procedural element which requires the State to ensure the due 
process guarantees indispensable for the eff ective protection of the basic material 
conditions of life. In relation to this, three basic procedural principles are identifi ed 
and discussed: participation, access to justice and accountability. Th e second one is 
the substantive element which requires the State to secure the essential minimum 
material conditions required to live a dignifi ed human life. Th is, in turn, treads 
on four core substantive human rights principles: dignifi ed life, equality and 
45 Th is argument is examined in detail under Chapter 4 (especially Chapt. 4.4 through 4.7) 
below.
46 Th is term is borrowed from Sulmasy (n 27).
47 Adopted from Parent (n 44).
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non-discrimination, and the protection of individuals against (socioeconomic 
conditions of) vulnerability. Th e introductory section of Part two will provide 
a more detailed explanation of the reasons for focusing on these principles. But 
in selecting and formulating these procedural and substantive principles from 
each of the international ESC rights cases reviewed, the researcher was primarily 
guided by this question: what (background reason) led the monitoring bodies 
to arrive at the declaration of violation or no-violation of the right(s) under 
question. Th is was then refi ned and analysed using relevant soft -laws (resolutions, 
general comments, case digests and guidelines), available (thematic) reports and 
academic writings. In substance, Part two will show that these seven principles 
essentially give specifi c meaning (substance) to the State’s generic legal obligation 
to respect the principle of human dignity in the context of ESC rights. Th at is, 
they are core procedural and substantive entitlements which the State is legally 
bound to ensure for every person within its jurisdiction in the realisation of ESC 
rights. Th ey are also fundamental human rights principles and values creating 
unity and synergy between the approaches of diff erent international human 
rights monitoring bodies dealing with ESC rights claims. Th e discussion in Part 
two is accordingly organised around these seven principles. Th e fi ve chapters in 
this Part will make a detailed examination of the contents and implications of 
each of these principles turn-by- turn but it can be said from the outset that, 
in the context of ESC rights, the State’s generic obligation to respect and ensure 
the material conditions required to live a dignifi ed human life essentially entails 
guaranteeing, at the very least, these procedural and substantive elements both 
in law and in practice. Th is, in turn, means providing adequate and functioning 
domestic mechanisms through which (group of) individuals can meaningfully 
participate in the decision-making processes aff ecting their vital ESC rights and 
interests (Chapter fi ve); ensuring access to eff ective remedy against violations 
of their ESC rights (Chapter six); holding the State and its agents accountable 
for their actions or omissions obstructing the eff ective realisation of ESC rights 
(Chapter seven); directly providing indispensable material conditions for those 
who are unable to secure for themselves (Chapter eight); and ensuring free, full 
and eff ective enjoyment of ESC rights for, above all, all vulnerable persons on 
the basis of equality and non-discrimination and as a matter of priority (Chapter 
nine).
Overall, this research seeks to show and defend that ESC rights constitute the 
essential integral elements of a dignifi ed human life which the State must secure 
for everyone as a matter of the legal obligation to respect and ensure respect for 
the inherent life and value of human being.

PART ONE
THE CONCEPTIONS AND 




THE CONCEPTIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS
2.1. INTRODUCTION
As indicated in Chapter one, the review of diff erent academic writings reveals that 
there are varying conceptions of human rights in human rights discourse. Th ere 
seems to be two basic problems behind the existence of the various conceptions 
of human rights. One underlying problem has by and large to do with the 
disagreement on the notion and implications of human rights. Th is problem is 
further complicated by the usage of various qualitative terms as ‘fundamental’, 
‘basic’, ‘legal’, ‘constitutional’ and ‘human’ in association with the term ‘right’ 
which, in turn, suggest in one way or another the existence of diff erent ‘classes’ 
or categories of human rights both in terms of their normative essence and 
hierarchical importance. Th e other problem concerns the disagreement on the 
normative justifi cation of human rights. Both of these problems are essentially 
interlinked but, for ease of discussion, the fi rst problem is discussed in this Chapter 
and the second problem will be addressed in the next Chapter. It has almost 
become a conventional wisdom that no two academics can have a similar view 
of the notion and implications of human rights.48 Th is problem has signifi cantly 
48 As many have for long been engaged in the extensive discussion of the concept of ‘rights’, it 
is not necessary to repeat the same here except indirectly when it is so relevant for the issue 
under consideration. See generally Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty (eds), Th e Meanings 
of Rights: Th e Philosophy and Social Th eory of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 
2014); Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), Th e Cambridge Companion to Human Rights 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2012); Michael Freeman, ‘Th e Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 491; Michael Freeman, Human Rights: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach (Polity Press 2002); Mordecai Roshwald, ‘Th e Concept of 
Human Rights’ (1959) 19 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 354; Louis Henkin, ‘Th e 
Universality of the Concept of Human Rights’ (1989) 506 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 10; Christine Chwaszcza, ‘Th e Concept of Rights in Contemporary 
Human Rights Discourse’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 333; George W Rainbolt, Th e Concept of Rights 
(Springer 2006); RR Fennessy, Burke, Paine, and the Rights of Man: A Diff erence of Political 
Opinion (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 1963); Waldron, ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’: Bentham, Burke 
and Marx on the Rights of Man (with Introductory and Concluding Essays by Jeremy Waldron) 
(n 36); Richard Schmitt, An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy: A Question-Based 
Approach (Rowman & Littlefi eld Pub 2009); John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: 
A Conteporary Introduction (Routledge 2002).
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inhibited the progress of academic discourse on human rights both generally 
and in relation to ESC rights. Th e discussion in this Chapter has accordingly 
two main objectives. First, it reviews the diff erent conceptions of human rights 
and their implications on the normative status and signifi cance of ESC rights. 
To this end, it identifi es and discusses two major conceptions of human rights 
underlying the classifi cation of human rights into diff erent categories or classes: 
the hierarchal and dichotomised conceptions. It particularly examines the bases 
and limitations of these conceptions in explaining the holistic idea of human 
rights. Second, it provides a counter-argument against these views by relying on 
a more comprehensive and better alternative conception of human rights, the 
triadic conception put forward by MacCallum and Alexy.
2.2. THE HIERARCHICAL CONCEPTION
Th e hierarchical conception of human rights is essentially rooted in or fl ows 
from the legal positivist (constitutionalist) view of the legal system whereby the 
constitution is considered to be the basic law and at the highest apex in the hierarchy 
of laws within a given legal system. Some even go to the extent of claiming that the 
national constitution is hierarchically superior to international law.49 Roughly, 
the basic argument behind this view stems from the abstract idea of sovereignty. 
In one sense, the constitution (oft en proclaimed through a constituent assembly, 
the highest law-making organ of a given country, direct popular referendum 
or through the combination of these two legislative processes) is regarded as 
the expression of the sovereign will of the people which the government must 
respect and realise in the exercise of its subsidiary legislative and administrative 
powers. In another sense, the constitution is also regarded as an expression of 
the sovereign will of the state and its people which must be respected by all other 
external (international) actors. Th e constitutional rights theorists draw on this 
view to argue that those rights recognised in the constitution (constitutional 
rights) are the fundamental (basic) and most important of all rights recognised in 
the legal system. Th is, in short, means that the medium of the recognition a given 
right determines its normative status and signifi cance. For instance, if human 
rights are not given an express constitutional recognition, then, they are regarded 
as less fundamental or important than those enshrined in the constitution50; 
if human rights are not given any express legislative recognition within a legal 
system, then, they won’t have any practical legal eff ect whatsoever, so it seems. 
Many of the arguments against the status and implications of ESC rights (the 
49 It is notable that this argument basically underlies the essence of the debate between the 
monist and dualist approach to international law.
50 Gerald L Neuman, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance’ 
(2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1863; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 39).
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view that considers them as non-basic, additive, welfare or programmatic 
rights) essentially fl ows from this constitutionalist-positivist conception as these 
rights are seldom recognised as fundamental human rights in the subsidiary 
legislations, let alone in the constitution.51 Th erefore, it must be assessed if there 
is any valid justifi cation behind the hierarchical conception of human rights and 
the normative implications attached thereto particularly in relation to ESC rights. 
In making my arguments under this section, I particularly focus on two relevant 
publications, one by Robert Alexy and the other by Gerald Neuman, for they 
clearly expose the problem behind the hierarchical conceptions of human rights.
Robert Alexy, who has extensively published on52, inter alia, constitutional 
rights and discourse-theoretical justifi cation of human rights, suggests that 
there are important diff erences between the notion of ‘fundamental rights’, 
‘constitutional rights’ and ‘human rights’.53 For Alexy, there are three concepts 
of fundamental rights: formal, substantial and procedural.54 ‘A formal concept is 
employed if fundamental rights are defi ned as rights contained in a constitution 
or in a certain part of it, or if the rights in question are classifi ed by a constitution 
as fundamental rights, or if they are endowed by the constitution with special 
protection’. Th e formal concept thus concerns the status and nature of protection 
endowed to certain rights regarded as ‘fundamental rights’ by a constitution.55 
Th e procedural concept, on the other hand, concerns the institutional dimension 
of fundamental rights. As Alexy states,
Th is concept mirrors the institutional problem of transforming human rights into 
positive law. Incorporating human rights into a constitution and granting a court 
the power of judicial review with respect to all state authority is to limit the power 
of parliament. In this respect, fundamental rights are an expression of distrust in 
the democratic process. Th ey are, at the same time, both the basis and boundary 
of democracy. Corresponding to this, there is a procedural concept of fundamental 
rights holding that fundamental rights are so important that the decision to protect 
them cannot be left  to simple parliamentary majorities.56
51 Vierdag, ‘Some Remarks about Special Features of Human Rights Treaties’ (n 2); Neier, Taking 
Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights (n 6); Cranstson (n 2); Neier, Th e International 
Human Rights Movement: A History (n 6); Aryeh Neier, ‘Social and Economic Rights: A 
Critique’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief; Vierdag, ‘Th e Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 2); M Bossuyt, ‘Th e Legal 
Distinction between Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1975) 
8 Human Rights Journal 783; M Bossuyt, ‘International Human Rights Systems: Strengths and 
Weaknesses’ in K Mahoney and P Mahoney (eds), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Global Challenge (Martinus Nijhoff  1993); Kelley (n 2); Posner (n 1); Griffi  n (n 2).
52 For quick summary of Alexy’s publications, Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: Th e 
Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012).
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Th us, the procedural concept specifi cally deals with the nature of institutional 
protections that fundamental rights (must) have in a legal system. It especially 
determines the nature of constraints to which the legislative and executive 
branches of government should be subjected to in making decisions aff ecting 
fundamental rights.
However, it interesting to note that both the formal and procedural concepts 
do not provide the reason why certain rights are or should be considered as 
fundamental rights, nor do they provide the reason why they should be accorded a 
special protection, for this is the function of the substantial concept of fundamental 
rights. Per Alexy, ‘a substantial concept of a fundamental right must include 
criteria that go above and beyond the fact that a right is mentioned, listed, or 
guaranteed in a constitution’.57 Th at is, it goes further than the formal expression 
and nature of the institutional protection aff orded to fundamental rights within a 
given legal, especially constitutional system; and by this Alexy is in fact speaking 
about a normative (philosophical) theory underlying his notion of fundamental 
rights. Th is is clear, for instance, from his criticism of the substantial concept of 
fundamental rights defended by such authors as Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff  
who, according to Alexy, argued that ‘the only genuine fundamental rights are 
defensive rights of citizens against the state’.58 Alexy rejected this view arguing 
that it merely represents a narrow libertarian conception of fundamental rights. 
For him, defensive rights certainly constitute part and parcel of the substantial 
conception of fundamental rights, but there are also strong justifi cations to argue 
that this conception must include equally genuine and signifi cant rights as ‘[p]
rotective rights, rights to organization and procedure, and social rights’.59 Th is 
expansion of a narrow concept of a fundamental right to a more comprehensive 
substantial conception, Alexy argues, requires a criterion but for him ‘only one 
criterion seems to be adequate to defi ne a substantial concept of fundamental 
rights. It is the concept of human rights.’60
Th ere is indeed a scenario in which the concept of human rights and 
fundamental rights becomes coextensive, that is, when both mean one and the 
same thing for all legal and practical purposes. But this occurs if and only if 
the whole catalogue of human rights, that is, when all (following Alexy’s own 
classifi cation) defensive rights, protective rights, the right to organisation and 
procedure and social rights are given the highest status (in the sense of the formal 
concept) and at the same time aff orded a special protection (in the sense of the 
57 Ibid 16.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. Th us, Alexy clearly departs from the traditional categorisation of human rights into civil 
and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and group rights. He instead adopts 
defensive rights, protective rights, right to organisation and procedure and social rights. For 
more details on his approach, see Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian 
Rivers, 2002) (n 4).
60 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 16.
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procedural concept) in a given constitution. In other words, this becomes true 
only when the formal and procedural concept of fundamental rights is equivalent 
to the formal and procedural concept of human rights. But it is possible that in 
a legal system, a given human right may be classifi ed as a fundamental right, 
another as an ordinary right and still another as a mere programmatic right 
(directive policy principles) without any regard to the fact that all human rights 
fl ow from the same underlying normative principle. Th is, in turn, means that 
Alexy’s concept of fundamental right is not always coextensive with that of human 
rights. In his view, a right becomes a fundamental right only if it is accorded a 
highest place in the ladder of hierarchy and at the same time aff orded a special 
protection by a constitution.61 It is the function of the substantial conception to 
provide justifi cation or explanation as to why a given right is or should be granted 
such a highest status and special protection in or through a constitution. Th is is 
particularly the case when, let’s say, a given human right is not recognised in a 
constitution at all or when it, though formally recognised in a constitution, is not 
aff orded a special constitutional protection as required through his procedural 
concept. As long as a given human right does not fulfi l these two elements, there 
always remains to be a gap between Alexy’s fundamental rights, on the one hand, 
and the notion of human rights, on the other.62
Th us, Alexy’s approach clearly maintains important distinctions between 
the concepts of constitutional rights, fundamental rights and human rights.63 
At the heart of this distinction lies whether or not a given right is accorded a 
constitutional recognition in legal system in the sense described above (both in 
the formal and procedural sense). But while the function of the formal concept 
is indicating whether a given right is accorded a constitutional protection or not, 
the function of the procedural concept is indicating the nature of constraint that 
should be placed on the decision-making organ. Seen in this way, we can say that, 
in essence, Alexy’s procedural concept is also and for stronger reason a formal 
concept – it is diffi  cult to see its relevance other than this. Th is, in turn, bends his 
three concepts of fundamental rights into two: formal and substantial concepts. 
Furthermore, it has been seen that the substantial concept of fundamental right is 
defi ned by the concept of human rights. Th is is in fact a point worth emphasising. 
Alexy himself stresses that there is no substantial concept of fundamental rights 
without the concept of human rights. ‘Th e foundation of fundamental rights is 
essentially a foundation of human rights.’64 For Alexy, this necessarily implies 
that if human rights can be justifi ed, then, fundamental rights can be justifi ed as 
61 Ibid 22. But see Narain (n 2).
62 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 16–17. For Alexy, when such a 
gap occurs, then the concept of human rights functions as a critique against the concept of 
fundamental rights thereby calling for constitutional reform.
63 Ibid 15–16.
64 Ibid 16–18.
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well; but if it is not possible to justify human rights neither could it be possible to 
justify fundamental rights.65
If so, then, it is possible to argue that the diff erence between his formal and 
substantial concept, upon refl ection, simply boils down to the old distinction 
between the concept of legal right and moral human right.66 Th is argument 
directly fl ows from the fact that Alexy’s ‘three concepts’ of fundamental rights 
discussed above basically concern their relationship with the constitution and 
from his description of the notion of human rights as, inter alia, ‘moral rights’.67 
For instance, he expressly stated that ‘Human rights are institutionalized by 
means of their transformation into positive law’ and if this institutionalization or 
legalization ‘takes place at a level in the hierarchy of the legal system that can be 
called ‘constitutional’, human rights become fundamental rights.’68 Th e question 
which should be asked is, however, whether this formal diff erence should lead us to 
construe two diff erent conceptions of human rights having signifi cant normative 
implications (i.e. one as mere moral right and another as a fundamental right 
endowed with special normative status and protection just based on mere formal 
constitutional recognition within a legal system). Th is question is particularly 
important in relation to, though not necessarily limited to, economic, social and 
cultural rights which oft en have no constitutional or legal recognition and, if at 
all, are formulated as mere state policy objectives.69
I would argue that the criterion of the formal recognition should not lead us 
to such a conception of human rights and that it is even not possible to maintain 
this kind of distinction if we closely see the way Alexy himself characterised 
the notion of human rights while discussing the foundation of fundamental 
rights. He states that ‘human rights are, fi rst, universal, second, fundamental, 
third, abstract, and, fourth, moral rights that are, fi ft h, established with priority 
over all other kinds of rights’.70 Here, we see Alexy employing two important 
qualitative terms – ‘fundamental’ and ‘priority’ – in providing his understanding 
65 Ibid 18.
66 Th is distinction, in turn, bears a signifi cant consequence specially in the theory of legal 
positivism who outrightly rejects the idea of human (moral) rights as phony and nonsense. 
For more on the positivist view of human rights, see generally Waldron, ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (with Introductory and Concluding Essays by 
Jeremy Waldron) (n 36). See also Sen (n 36) 316.
67 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 18 (providing discriptive defi nition of 
human rights).
68 Ibid 22.
69 Th is is of course not Alexy’s view but his approach surely gives direct theoretical support for 
such arguments for these categories of rights are seldom recognized in the constitutions. On 
approaches of several countries, see for instance, Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, Th e Justiciability 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human Rights System: 
Th eories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (Abo Akademi University University Press 2011) 127ff ; 
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‘A Full Loaf Is Better than Half: Th e Constitutional Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49 Journal of African Law 207.
70 See Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 18. See also Alexy, ‘Discourse 
Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1).
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of the notion and essence of human rights. Th is should, at least, suggest that 
human rights are by defi nition ‘fundamental’ and that they are superior to (i.e., 
must have priority over) all other kinds of rights, regardless of their formal 
location in the constitution or positive legal system. For this reason, the view 
that human rights would become fundamental rights only if they are aff orded a 
special constitutional status and protection should be rejected altogether as there 
is no substantive theory supporting such a view other than, of course, arbitrary 
legislative choices or preferences made at a given point in time which, in turn, are 
more oft en infl uenced by interest-group political agenda than serious normative 
theories.
Let’s now see Gerald Neuman’s classifi cation of human rights against that of 
Alexy. Neuman had distinguished between the concepts of ‘fundamental rights’, 
‘human rights’ and ‘constitutional rights’ as indicated in the following paragraph. 
He says that
[he] will use the term ‘human rights’ only in reference to internationally recognized 
human rights (including some rights enacted at the national level for the purpose of 
implementing international obligations), and will refer to individual rights protected by 
national constitutions as ‘constitutional rights.’ Th e same right, abstractly conceived, 
e.g., freedom of expression, may be both a human right and a constitutional right. For 
ease of reference, [he] will use the phrase ‘fundamental rights’ as an umbrella term 
including both the constitutional rights and human rights.71
From this we can say that Neuman’s distinction is essentially employed for 
mere technical purpose (for ‘ease of reference’, as he refers to it) and thus does 
not create the kind of normative hierarchy suggested Alexy’s approach. Behind 
Neuman’s technical distinction lies the old debate between ‘internationalists’ and 
‘constitutionalists’ regarding the structural relationship between international law 
and national legal system, the debate now carried over to the relationship between 
international human rights instruments and national constitution. But what is 
important here is that, as opposed to that of Alexy, the term ‘fundamental rights’ 
equally applies to all human rights regardless of whether they are recognised in 
a treaty or national constitution. In this approach, there will not be a scenario 
in which a human right is arbitrarily designated as fundamental right or mere 
human right. Th e distinction does not also warrant any normative conclusion of 
the type suggested in Alexy approach especially regarding the nature, status and 
importance of human rights. Moreover, in Neuman’s analysis, the institutional 
implication of human rights does not fl ow from the medium of recognition (i.e. 
treaty or constitution) but rather from their normative essence as human rights.72
71 Neuman (n 50).
72 Ibid. Th is is contrary to Alexy’s view that human rights become fundamental rights only if 
they are aff orded a privileged status within a constitutional system. Cf. Alexy, ‘Discourse 
Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 22.
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As stated from the outset, I raised Alexy and Neuman as typical examples 
showing the existence of divergent hierarchical conception of human rights 
employed in human rights discourse but, obviously, they are not the only ones. 
Th e common usage particularly by constitutional law scholars seems to go with 
the classifi cation suggested by Alexy especially in relation to ESC rights based on 
the generally held assumption that the constitution and constitutional norms have 
utmost importance and precedence over all other normative principles. However, 
practical evidence from around the world proves that this is not necessarily true 
as the practice of the constitutional protection of but certain human rights is only 
a matter of recent history.73 For instance, most constitutions recognise several 
civil and political rights such as the right to freedom of expression, association 
and assembly; nevertheless, these rights are constantly violated by governments 
around the world almost on a daily basis. It can also be added that although 
many countries have given a constitutional recognition to the rights of women to 
equal political participation, a great majority of women still suff er from systemic 
discrimination, marginalisation and underrepresentation. Furthermore, even 
though the judicial or constitutional review of legislative and executive acts 
may play some roles in ensuring respect for human rights, it is not something 
that exists everywhere, nor can it be taken for granted.74 As Henkin notes, the 
judiciary is no doubt a necessary component of human rights protection but not a 
suffi  cient one in ensuring the actual realisation of human rights.75
Th us, in reality, the signifi cance of the constitutional protection of human 
rights depends not on its formal existence but rather on several background 
factors including the society’s social, political and legal culture. Neuman argues 
that
the formal elevation of a human rights treaty to constitutional status does not have any 
consequences. In a society where the constitution is routinely violated, it may be an 
empty gesture. Th e actual eff ect depends on many other factors, both social and legal. 
Among the legal factors, one relevant question is how the constitutionalization aff ects 
the available remedies. Another is whether the right becomes directly applicable (or 
self-executing).76
73 ‘Th e Constitutional Protection of Human Rights (DIHR)’ (2012); ‘Human Rights and 
Constitution Making’ (OHCHR 2018); Louis Henkin, ‘Constitutional Rights and Human 
Rights’ (1978) 13 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 593; LWH Ackermann, 
‘Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Review’ (1989) 21 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Revew 59; Linda Camp Keith, ‘Judicial Independence and Human Rights 
Protection around the World’ (2002) 85 Judicature 195; Neuman (n 50).
74 Ackermann (n 73); Th omas Poole, ‘Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 697; Alon Harel, ‘Rights-Based Judicial Review: A Democratic 
Justifi cation’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 247; Yann Allard-Tremblay, ‘Proceduralism, 
Judicial Review and the Refusal of Royal Assent’ [2013] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; 
David M Beatty, Th e Ultimate Rule of Law (2004); Tushnet (n 12); Neuman (n 50).
75 See Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1582–1610.
76 Neuman (n 50).
Chapter 2. Th e Conceptions of Human Rights
Intersentia 33
Th is is also the view that Henkin confi rms: the practical conception of human 
rights and place they occupy in the normative system of a society by and 
large refl ects the society’s underlying background conditions which, in turn, 
signifi cantly infl uence its ‘rights-system’. Th e more the society’s background 
conditions support the idea and value of human rights, the stronger its rights-
system (that is, the laws and institutions thereof) would be in guaranteeing 
generally the eff ective realisation of those rights.77
If we however reject the formal usage suggested by constitutional scholars 
and instead focus on the normative essence of human rights, I believe that it is 
the conception suggested by Neuman that coheres with the basic understanding 
of the normative idea of human rights both generally and in the sense they are 
recognised in international law. Th e elementary and universal understanding of 
human rights underlying this conception is well expressed by Henkin, one of the 
prominent scholars in the modern study of human rights.78 Henkin expresses 
this idea as follows:
By rights I mean what are now called human rights, claims which every individual has, 
or should have, upon the society in which he/she lives. To call them human suggests 
that they are universal: they are the due of every human being in every human society. 
Th ey do not diff er with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic 
system, or stage of development. Th ey do not depend on gender, race, class or status. 
To call them ‘rights’ implies that they are claims ‘as of right,’ not merely as appeals to 
grace, or charity, or brotherhood, or love; they need not be earned or deserved. Th ey 
are more than aspirations, or assertions of ‘the good,’ but claims of entitlement and 
corresponding obligation in some political order under some applicable law, if only in 
a moral order under a moral law.
When used carefully, ‘human rights’ are not some abstract, inchoate ‘good.’ 
Th e rights are particular, defi ned, and familiar, refl ecting respect for individual 
dignity and a substantial measure of individual autonomy, as well as a common 
sense of justice and injustice.79
77 Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) (For Henkin, it is this that explains certain divergence 
in content, scope and institutional implications of human rights in diff erent traditions as in 
USA, France, USSR/China, the Th ird World).
78 Henkin has published several infl uencial articles and books in the area of international human 
rights. Few of them are Henkin, ‘Th e Universality of the Concept of Human Rights’ (n 48); 
Louis Henkin, Th e Rights of Man Today (Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia 
University 1978); Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8); Henkin, ‘Constitutional Rights and 
Human Rights’ (n 73); Barbara Stark, ‘Review of Th e Age of Rights by Louis Henkin’ (1991) 85 
Th e American Journal of International Law 733; Irwin P Stotzky, ‘Review of the Rights of Man 
Today by Louis Henkin’ (1979) 11 Lawyer of the Americas 229; Francisco Forrest Martin and 
others (eds), International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Treaties, Cases and Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press).
79 Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1582. It is this conception of human rights that 
underlies a general conceptual framework for the arguments throughout this thesis. Th ere 
are several compelling reasons in adopting Henkin’s defi nition. It can be seen as providing an 
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Th us, in essence, human rights are fundamental moral entitlements of every 
human being qua human person. As such, such notions as ‘fundamental 
rights’, ‘constitutional rights’, ‘basic rights’ and ‘human rights’ should be 
construed as simply referring to the same normative concept signifying, in 
substantive sense, similar normative status and implications regardless of 
the form or medium through which they are recognised within a given legal 
system. Th at is, the normative status and signifi cance of human rights do not 
emerge from the formal place they occupy in a legal system but rather from 
the principal normative principle upon which they are justifi ed. Th e underlying 
justifi cation for this argument will be presented in Chapter four below but for 
the purpose here the argument I would like to make is that the values, status 
and institutional implications of human rights in a socio-political and legal 
system primarily emerges from the principle of human dignity. So, the special 
constitutional status or protection aff orded to human rights within a given legal 
system, if any, should be seen as the refl ection or consequence of the recognition 
of this principle and the rights fl owing from it. Th e hierarchical conception 
of human rights, which is essentially rooted in the legal positivist bias against 
the moral rights of a human being, should therefore be rejected. For one thing, 
the constitutional recognition of human rights around the world is neither a 
consistent universal practice nor is it justifi ed on the basis of an objective 
normative theory. For the other thing, this conception creates arbitrary and 
unreasonable distinction not just between two diff erent human rights in a given 
legal system but even in relation to the same human right in two diff erent legal 
systems according diff erent formal status to the right concerned for the reasons 
already explained above. Finally, it is against the general critical functions of the 
very idea of human rights which, among other thing, is to serve as a normative 
standard against which the legitimacy of laws and other actions of the states and 
societal behaviours should be evaluated.
2.3. THE DICHOTOMISED CONCEPTION
Th e categorisation of human rights into negative and positive rights has also posed 
another major problem in the conception of human rights. Th is dichotomisation 
is the result of academic disagreement concerning the notion of freedom or 
rights: whether the concept of freedom or rights in its ‘true’ sense pertains only to 
its ‘negative’ connotation or also entails its ‘positive’ connotation.80 Th is question 
has divided scholars into two major camps. For some scholars, the notion of 
accurate interpretation of the current international understanding of what human rights are 
as refl ected in UN and regional human rights treaties and the VDPA (1993), para. 5.
80 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1); Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 
2002) (n 4) 120ff .
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freedom or rights pertains only to its negative sense but for others the true sense 
of freedom or rights should equally include its positive sense.81 Th is division 
has had a signifi cant practical eff ect in the current normative and institutional 
structure of international human rights systems.
Berlin’s ‘Two Essays on Liberty’ is believed to have provided a conceptual 
background for this division, but the careful examination of the essence of 
Berlin’s idea of liberty and the arguments in his ‘Two Essays’ as well as in several 
of his subsequent publications (including replies to his critics) show that he has 
contributed very little, if any, to these divisions.82 Th is is particularly so because 
Berlin’s idea of liberty, stated in abstract, is robust and hence inclusive of both 
the negative and positive conception of human rights particularly if seen in the 
light of his position concerning the notion of positive liberty and, a fortiori, 
socioeconomic rights on the one hand and the proponents of the idea of negative 
liberty who, in turn, hold a rejectionist view of socioeconomic rights on the 
other. Based on this, one can argue that those who support the narrow liberal-
negative conception of human rights can hardly attribute their view to Berlin’s 
theory. In any case, it is certainly clear that Berlin’s two basic notions of liberty, 
‘negative liberty’ and ‘positive liberty’, have distinctively deeper historical and 
philosophical connotations and thus lend only very marginal support, if any, to 
the way both sides employ these terms.83
Having said this, it is not the aim of this discussion to examine in detail the 
merits of these debates, as this has already been done by many authors.84 Th e 
purpose here is rather to argue, though in brief, that the conception of human 
rights in the terms of negative-positive rights does not refl ect the normative 
81 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) p.321 at n 7.
82 For more on this, see particularly Isaiah Berlin, Liberty (Edited by Henry Hardy) [2002] 
(paperback, Oxford University Press 2013). Berlin’s Liberty is a collection of various topics 
written by Berlin and published both during his lifetime and aft erwards. In fact, Berlin 
himself attributes these two ideas of liberty to another author, Constant, who spoke of 
the liberty of the ancient and the moderns in one of his lectures. See Benjamin Constant, 
Political Writings: Liberty of Ancients Compared with Th at of the Moderns (Speech Given at 
the Athenee Royal in Paris, Trans and Ed by Biancamaria Fontana) (Cambridge University 
Press 1819).
83 Th e reason I say this is that Berlin’s idea of negative and positive liberty is specially directed 
against Rousseau’s position about complete fusion between the general will and private will 
such that whatever the body politique (the representative of the general will in Rousseau’s 
theory) does is for the interest of the private person and that this body (state/government) may 
take decisions contrary to the will of the private persons so as to bring true liberty to the latter, 
the view Berlin completely rejects as monotonous, overreaching and dictatorial. In his reply 
to his critics, he emphasised that his arguments do not apply to the kind of positive liberty 
construed as ensuring the duty of ensuring education and health care to the vulnerable parts 
of the society. See particularly Berlin (n 82) 30–54 (correcting misconceptions about his views 
regarding the two notions and replying to his critics).
84 See particularly Shue (n 2); Eide, Krause and Rosas (n 3); Fredman (n 30); MacCallum, Jr. (n 1); 
Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Langford (n 3); Koch (n 3); Koch (n 32); Coomans (n 
3); Sepulveda (n 13); Arambulo (n 13); Yeshanew (n 69).
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essence and importance of the very notion of rights but the types of action or 
behaviour legitimately expected from an ideal duty-bearer in a given context.85 
For instance, MacCallum has strongly criticised the underlying assumptions 
and arguments behind the negative and positive view of freedom and instead 
introduced an alternative and a broader conception of what freedom entails.86 
Interestingly, MacCallum’s conception of freedom has been subsequently adopted 
in the writings of many authors including Alexy87, Rawls88, Shue89 and Gould.90 
Th is discussion also substantially draws on his and Alexy’s analysis of this 
alternative conception of freedom. Th us, if we take a step back and look somewhat 
deeper into the arguments supporting ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom, we will 
be able to see that they both merely express the type(s) of actions that a person is 
entitled to expect, as of right, from the state rather than the substantive ideals of 
freedom.91
For the proponents of negative freedom, a person is said to be free if he or 
she is not subjected to any kinds or forms of limitations ensuing especially from 
the state in making and pursuing his or her own autonomous choices; to be free 
is to be left  alone by the state for all legal and practical purposes with respect 
to one’s own private life and life-projects. For them, this is the only true or real 
sense of the ideal of freedom.92 Per this conception, which generally refl ects 
the liberal/ libertarian conception of freedom, the state is considered to be the 
principal source of unfreedom threatening individual rights and hence should 
be constrained by every available means.93 Th e right to individual freedom 
thus requires the state and its agents to abstain from interfering in, obstructing, 
frustrating, directly or indirectly, the choices and decisions that individuals make 
as regards matters pertaining to their private life. Th is is, they contend, the only 
true right that individuals are justifi ed to claim, as of right, against the state. Th is 
means that an assertion of the right to negative freedom functions as an antithesis 
to the power of the state vis-à-vis the individual subjects. As such, the proponents 
85 See Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139ff .
86 See MacCallum, Jr. (n 1). Of course, MacCallum himself attributes the origin of this conception 
to Constant (n 82) who discussed in terms of the liberty of the ancient and the modern as noted 
above.
87 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4).
88 John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Revised Ed, Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
1999); Rawls (n 38).
89 Shue (n 2).
90 Carol C Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2004).
91 In the same vain, the notion of ‘positive obligation’ and ‘negative obligation’ is used to refer 
to the type of performance required from the obligation bearer (usually a state), that is, 
whether it is a performance of an action or an omission (no-action, forbearance). For detailed 
treatment of this, see particularly Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian 
Rivers, 2002) (n 4) (who also sees negative or positive right as a subclass of the generic right to 
something).
92 See MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 320ff .
93 See Fredman (n 30) 10.
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of the negative-liberal view of freedom rejects the notion of positive freedom as 
utterly nonsense.94
Adherents of positive freedom, on the other hand, approach the idea of 
freedom from its practical or factual imports, that is, they argue that a person 
is free if he or she is able to enjoy that freedom in fact. According to this view, 
the idea of freedom which does not entail the practical ability or possibility of 
individuals to exercise the same is valueless.95 Th ey contend that the true notion 
of freedom must necessarily include its positive sense which, in turn, requires 
the state not only to refrain but also to take certain positive measures towards 
ensuring the practical realisation of individual rights and freedom. Th us, for 
them, the right to freedom signifi es both the right to non-interference against the 
state and the right to affi  rmative or positive actions from the state.96
Certainly, both sides agree on the abstract idea that freedom and the rights 
thereof concern the extent to which individuals are able to enjoy an autonomous 
life. Its dichotomised (negative-positive) conception therefore does not essentially 
concern its abstract notion but factors preventing individuals from enjoying 
their autonomous living and the corresponding role of the state vis-à-vis those 
factors, especially whether the state is normatively required to take affi  rmative 
action or not.97 Th e division particularly concerns whether or not material (social 
and economic) conditions should be seen as constitutive element of the ordinary 
conception of human rights and freedom which the state must be required to 
ensure for everyone. Th e proponents of negative freedom reject this view. But the 
proponents of positive freedom argue that a human being without basic material 
conditions of life such as food, healthcare, housing, education, work, or social 
security cannot be considered as a free and autonomous person in the meaningful 
94 Kelley (n 2); Cranstson (n 2); Neier, ‘Social and Economic Rights: A Critique’ (n 51); Neier, 
Th e International Human Rights Movement: A History (n 6); Bossuyt, ‘Th e Legal Distinction 
between Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 51); Vierdag, 
‘Th e Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (n 2). See particularly Griffi  n (n 6) 96ff . See also Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) 
(n 20) 84–87 (discussing the orthodox liberal view of freedom).
95 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 337.; See 
also Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and 
Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 87–88 (discussing Raeser’s social conception of law 
and rights). Of course, there is also an extreme reading of positive freedom in the socialist 
(communist) theory of freedom which sees freedom from an economic perspectives thereby 
giving priority to economic liberty over political liberty. Th is discussion is however not 
followed here.
96 See particularly Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) 
(n 4) Chapts 7 & 9; Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3) Chapts 1 & 2; Gould, Globalizing 
Democracy and Human Rights (n 90) 3–4& 31–42; Fredman (n 30) 9ff ; Sen (n 3) 3–11 & 13–25; 
Sen (n 36) 318ff .
97 Th is is obvious with proponents of ‘positive freedom’ as they argue that the abstract idea of 
freedom is essentially connected with the freedom of choice and action. See particularly Alexy, 
A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139–144.
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sense of the term. Th e state should therefore be required to ensure these material 
conditions because without these being realised for those in need it can hardly 
be considered as fulfi lling the practical demands of human rights and freedom.98
So, the dichotomised conception is merely a formal conception which cannot 
help us in answering the most basic substantive questions involved in the idea 
of human rights. In fact, it has turned away scholarly attention from the most 
fundamental and pressing issues to a rather less important and highly idealised 
formal discourse of human rights.99 For instance, we cannot explain the holistic 
and practical aspect of human rights and freedom by merely focusing on the 
actions or inactions of the state, nor can we comprehend their essence through 
the notion of negative and positive rights and freedom. Th is does not mean that 
there is no merit in each of them but rather to argue that they both fall short 
of providing us with adequate answers regarding the nature and implications of 
human rights and freedom. One might be tempted to suggest abandoning these 
conceptions altogether and start over100 but it is possible to modify and expand 
these conceptions and fi t them into the holistic understanding of human rights 
and freedom as it can generally be seen from the following discussions. Th e idea of 
human rights and freedom go far beyond formal conception and signifi es rather 
deeper substantive principles concerned with the regulation of highly complex 
and dynamic human relations.
2.4. THE TRIADIC CONCEPTION
As an alternative to the dichotomised view discussed above, scholars like 
MacCallum suggest that freedom and rights should be conceived as a ‘triadic’ 
or ‘three-point’ relationship.101 In my view, while it was MacCallum who fi rst 
98 See Raz (n 30) 155ff ; Rawls (n 88) 76–77 & 105–106.
99 Th us, MacCallum suggests that by abandoning such dichotomisation we are in a position 
to assess the merits and demerits of arguments from diff erent sides and to assess the merits 
of proposals made from diff erent angles in respect to diff erent variables of freedom. See 
MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 319ff . And drawing on Shue, Koch advises that we should beware of not 
to be taken away by the conceptualisation and reconceptualization of our words losing sight of 
practical issues that matter. See Koch (n 32) 25–28.
100 See for instance, Beitz (n 2); Charles R Beitz, ‘Human Rights as a Common Concern’ (2001) 
95 Th e American Political Science Review 269 (who suggests that we should only look at the 
practice of politics and institutions and see what their functions are in international politics). 
Chwaszcza (n 48) 333, 335 and 348ff  (arguing that human rights should be understood as 
standards of institutional legitimacy than as individual claim rights).
101 As will be seen shortly, the term triadic relation reveals that the traditional distinction of liberty 
into positive and negative does not concern the real structure or content of liberty as such (the 
object and purpose of it or how it is important to or ultimately connected to the dignity of 
person) but rather the subject-matter of liberty – a liberty-object, diff erent variables in a triadic 
relationship and the weight given to such variables. See Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional 
Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 141ff .; MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 314–315.
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introduced this robust and practical view of freedom and rights, it is however 
Alexy who gave it a more detailed treatment.102 Th us, according to MacCallum,
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom 
from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, barrier to doing, not doing, 
becoming, or not becoming something. Such freedom is thus always of something (an 
agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something; it 
is a triadic relationship.103
Interestingly, it is also this very same idea of liberty underlying Rawls’ theory of 
(social) justice as we can see from the following text.
Th erefore I shall simply assume that any liberty can be explained by a reference to three 
items: the agents who are free, the restrictions or limitations which they are free from, 
and what it is that they are free to do or not to do. Complete explanation of liberty 
provides relevant information about these three things. …Th e general description of 
a liberty, then, has the following form: this or that person (or persons) is free (or not 
free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so.104
And, according to Alexy,
A complete description [of liberty] must contain reference to three elements: the 
person lacking liberty, the obstacle to their liberty, and that which the obstacle makes 
diffi  cult or impossible. Th is indicates that we should think of an individual liberty of 
a person as a three-point relation, the liberty of a person as the sum of their individual 
liberties, and the liberty of a society as the sum of the liberties of its members.
Th e basis of the concept of liberty is thus a three-point relation between a liberty-
holder, a liberty-obstacle, and a liberty-object.105
102 A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139–140 & 120ff .
103 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 314.
104 Rawls (n 88) 176–78 (citing Maccallum, Jr.).
105 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 138ff  cum n 
115 (drawing on Maccallum and Rawls). But as Alexy makes it clear, this very same is also true 
in relation to the normative concept of (human) rights. Th us, following the same analytical 
structure seen in relation to freedom, the normative statement the ‘right to something’ 
expresses the existence of normative relations between the ‘right-holder’, the ‘addressee’ of 
the right and the ‘subject-matter’ in respect of which the right is said to exist. Th is analysis 
also reveals that, as it is true with the notion of freedom, the traditional negative-positive 
right division is largely based on the actions or omissions of the addressee of a particular 
right, that is, whether the addressee of the right is expected to act directly or refrain from 
direct interference. In particular, drawing on his theory of deontic expressions, he argues that 
the normative idea of ‘right to something’ expresses the existence of normative relationships 
between persons (right-holders and right-addressees) with regard to certain actions or 
omissions which can, in turn, be described in the language of the three basic deontic modes: 
prohibition, command, and permission. ibid 120–38. For more on deontic expressions, see 
generally Robert Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse 
as Th eory of Legal Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (Oxford University 
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Th us, the term triadic or three-point relation employed by MacCallum and Alexy 
respectively emerges from the three basic constitutive elements of the concept of 
freedom and rights. Th ese are an individual person, the subject-matter of freedom 
and right (what one has freedom or right to, that which the right or freedom 
purports to guarantee), and the limitations (restrictions, obstacles, limitations) to 
the full and eff ective enjoyment of freedom and rights.106 Th e triadic conception 
can thus be seen as expressive of the idea of freedom and rights as normative 
description or abstraction of complex individual relationships existing at 
diff erent level of generality concerning their socio-economic, political and other 
relevant social matters. Accordingly, this view can also be construed as the social 
conception of freedom and rights. Alexy is quite emphatic in this regard. He argues 
that ‘liberty is not an object in the same way as a hat is,’107 that is, it does not refer 
to the relationship between a human being and an object; it rather and always 
signifi es practical human relationships.108 Th e same is also true with Finnis.109 
He basically sees rights as virtual expressions of all the requirements of practical 
reasonableness which, in turn, refers to practical considerations in relation to 
various kinds of juridical or moral relationships existing between individuals.110 
As Finnis himself notes, such relationships deny the reductionist expression of 
the two-way relationships between a person and a thing traditionally preferred 
by lawyers.111 For him, the complex normative relationships expressed through 
the notion of rights is ‘the relationships of justice’.112 Th is remains to be true even 
if we take the formal understanding of freedom and rights as referring to the 
capacity of individuals to make autonomous choices and pursue those choices as 
Press 1989). Th us, under this view, the right to life is seen as a negative right; a state is therefore 
negatively limited not to wilfully kill individuals whereas the right to health care is regarded as 
a positive right and which implies that the a state is required to take positive measures to ensure 
health care services to the individuals. But it is to be seen that this kind of characterisation is 
unsustainable under the triadic conception of rights.
106 MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 314–315; Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian 
Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 120–21 & 139–41.
107 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139.
108 Th is point is well argued by Alexy. ‘Of course,’ says Alexy, ‘one can speak of the liberty that 
someone has, in the same way as the one can speak of the hat they have. But having in the 
case of liberty does not consist of a relation of possession between a person and an object. 
It would therefore seem appropriate to think of liberty as a quality which can be associated 
with persons, objects and society. But this is too crude and superfi cial. Someone who says 
that somebody else is free is saying that certain obstacles, limitations, and resistance do not 
exist for that person. Even this is not yet adequate […] A complete description must contain 
reference to three elements: the person lacking liberty, the obstacle to their liberty, and that 
which the obstacle makes diffi  cult or impossible. Th is indicates that we should think of an 
individual liberty of a person as a three-point relation …’ (emphasis original). ibid. See also 
MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 315ff .
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the idea of choice itself, upon refl ection, indicates the relational nature of rights 
and freedom.
Th is view of the idea of freedom and rights as normative abstraction of 
complex social relations is a crucial point emerging from the triadic conception. 
Th e signifi cance of this conception particularly lies in the notion of the ideal of 
a free person presented through this conception, i.e. what it means to be a free 
human being in the practically meaningful sense of the term. So, in the triadic 
conception of freedom and rights, the primary question is this: for a human being 
living in a society organised under a system of rules and institutions, what does 
it mean to be a free person? In other words, what factors or conditions enable a 
person to be free or prevent one to be a free person?113 In this regard, unlike the 
dichotomised conception, the source of unfreedom or obstruction to individual 
rights is immaterial. What is rather important is whether or not a person is free. 
To this end, the triadic conception takes a practical intuitive idea of human 
being defi ned by its relationality. In Chapter four, I will discuss this in detail and 
argue that a human being is both a biological and moral being endowed with 
inherent value and rights thereof. As biological and moral being, every human 
person has various kinds of inherent biological and moral needs without which it 
is not possible to live and lead a life worthy of human dignity. For now, I should 
simply state that, practically speaking, a free person is the one who enjoys those 
inherent moral and material (biological) conditions of life adequately and without 
any limitations. Th is approach is quite revealing for it shift s our focus from a 
formal discourse to a more robust and substantive view of human rights and 
freedom. It also expands our perspectives regarding the existence of diff erent 
kinds of limitations to the enjoyment of human rights and freedom other than 
the state, for it becomes clearer that it is not just the action or inaction of the 
state but all forms of unfavourable economic, cultural, social, political and legal 
environment are equally factors negatively aff ecting the free and full enjoyment 
of human rights and freedom. In substance, therefore, human rights and freedom 
should be conceived as essentially consisting in the absence of wide-ranging types 
of ‘obstacles, limitations, or resistances’ existing as a matter of law, fact or both, 
regardless of whether they are deliberately intended or unintended, undermining 
the capacity and opportunity of individuals to live and lead a dignifi ed human life 
in a political society.114
113 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 139 ff  cum nn 
114, 120–21 & 125 (citing Hobbes and others).
114 Ibid 139. In fact, there are ample scholarly works taking this approach to human freedom 
and rights. See for instance, Sen (n 3); Marta C Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality and Species Membership (Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2006); 
Cynthia A Stark, ‘Respecting Human Dignity: Contract versus Capabilities’ (2009) 40 
Metaphilosophy 366; Daly (n 44); Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (n 90); 
Shue (n 2); Sanford Levinson, ‘Th e Welfare State’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2010). But see Berlin (n 
82) 32.
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2.4.1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRIADIC 
CONCEPTION
Th e conception of freedom and rights as normative expression of triadic 
relationship brings signifi cant conceptual transformation to the dichotomised 
views discussed above. As it will be explained below and following Alexy’s very 
helpful analysis referred to above, the notion of negative freedom now refers to an 
expanded class of freedom whereas the notion of positive freedom refers only to a 
very limited notion of freedom.115 And, the converse is true when this is applied 
to the notion of negative and positive rights: that is, the concept of negative rights 
is austericised whereas the concept of positive rights is signifi cantly expanded. 
In fact, according to Alexy, both the right to negative and positive acts are the 
sub-class of the ‘right to something’ which, in turn, can be restated as the right 
to demand negative or affi  rmative actions from the addressees of the rights 
concerned. Let’s us briefl y see each of them one by one.
a) On the Negative-Positive Freedom
Th us, under the triadic view of freedom, the diff erence between negative and 
positive freedom pertains only to one component of the three-point relationship: 
the object of freedom. According to Alexy,
the only diff erence between positive and negative liberty lies in their object. In the case 
of positive liberty, the object is a single act, whereas in the case of negative liberty it is a 
choice of actions. Th ese concepts of positive and negative liberty do not correspond in 
every respect with normal usage. Th e concept of negative liberty is broader than usual, 
while the concept of positive liberty is narrower.116
As stated above, the central point in the triadic view of freedom is not the source 
or nature of obstacles to freedom but rather whether a person is free or not, that 
is, whether he or she is in a position to choose to do or not to do that which 
he or she wants or does not want to; to become or not to become the kind of 
person he or she wants to or does not want to; in short, whether a person has both 
the opportunity and capacity to choose between alternative courses of actions 
pertaining to matters aff ecting his or her private life. Accordingly, Alexy is of the 
115 See for instance, MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 330ff  (arguing that freedom is always and necessarily 
to be free from a restraint or limitation). It is this notion of restraint or limitation that Alexy 
expands to great length. See particularly Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] 
(Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 288ff .
116 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 141–142; see 
also MacCallum, Jr. (n 1) 320ff .
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opinion that the traditional notion of negative and positive freedom can easily be 
combined together and be referred to as ‘negative freedom’ in the wider sense.117
A person can be described as negatively free to the extent that the alternative courses 
of action open to him [or her] are not limited by obstacles to action. Obstacles to 
action could be further diff erentiated. To the extent that they are positive acts of 
others, in particular the state, we are concerned with negative liberty in the narrow 
sense or liberal liberty. Negative liberty exists in its narrow liberal sense when positive 
acts obstructing liberty are not carried out. Th is is exactly the case when one is neither 
commanded nor prohibited from doing something.
Negative liberty in its wide sense extends beyond this. It includes liberal liberty but 
extends beyond this to embrace things such as socioeconomic liberty which exists to 
the extent that the economic deprivation of the individual does not prevent him from 
realizing alternative courses of action.118
Th is transformation of the notion of negative liberty is quite interesting because 
the new wider sense of negative freedom goes further than its traditional narrow 
conception and cover other sources of unfreedom such as economic and social 
deprivations. In other words, as opposed to the traditional view which defi nes 
socioeconomic deprivations as the subject of positive freedom, they are now 
redefi ned as the subject of negative freedom. Th is is so because a person who 
lacks these material (biological) conditions of freedom is negatively prevented 
from becoming a free person as much the same as he or she can be prevented 
by unwarranted state interference. Th is in eff ect means the scope of negative 
freedom is quite wider than its traditional notion as it includes both the capacity 
to make choices and to pursue the choices towards their ends.119
Th e opposite is, however, true in the case of the notion of positive freedom. As 
stated above, Alexy makes it clear that the object of positive freedom is a single 
act. Th is in turn refers to the Hegelian-Kantian idea of rationality which holds 
that there is only a single, rational and correct way of acting and that positive 
freedom consists in the capacity of a person (a rational being) to identify this 
117 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 142 cum 138–
144. ‘In order to avoid confusions, which is unlikely because the context of the discussion 
always plays a guiding role, one can refer to this as ‘negative liberty in the wide sense’ and thus 
the general right to liberty can be distinguished into ‘negative liberty in the wide sense’ and 
‘negative liberty in the narrow sense’.
118 Ibid 230 & 133–144 cum n 126.
119 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4). Th is, in 
turn, shows that the boundary erected between traditional negative and positive freedom is 
actually false and therefore serves no purpose. Per Alexy, by inserting diff erent variables in the 
liberty-obstacle and liberty-object, it is possible to derive diff erent conceptions of liberty as for 
instance, democratic liberty, economic liberty, political liberty, social liberty, cultural liberty 
and the like, not only legal or liberal ones. Th e possibility to derive diff erent kinds of liberties 
derive by inserting diff erent contents in the three variables shows the fruitfulness of the three-
point or triadic conception of liberty. ibid 142–43.
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correct way and act accordingly.120 In other words, a person is considered to be 
positively free only if he or she is able to act in such a rational and correct way. 
Th erefore, this notion of positive freedom is not only narrow but is also concerned 
with a very abstract state of mind of a person (monologues thinking) in respect of 
his or her ideal act, the subject this research is hardly concerned with.
b) On the Negative-Positive Right
In the same vain, the generic right to something gives rise to the right to negative 
and positive acts depending on the specifi c contexts of each right. Th e right to 
negative acts is referred to as defensive rights and the right to positive acts as 
entitlements.121 Traditionally, defensive rights consist of the narrow negative 
liberal rights, and entitlements consist of those rights known under the name 
of welfare rights or economic, social and cultural rights. Th e central point of 
defensive rights is prohibiting the state from negatively aff ecting the human rights 
of the individuals through its legislative, administrative or policy actions. Th is 
entails that there are three types of defensive rights: ‘the right that the state should 
not prevent or hinder certain acts of the right-holder’, the ‘right that the state 
should not adversely aff ect certain characteristics or situations of a right-holder’ 
and the ‘right that the state should not remove certain legal positions of the right-
holder’.122
According to Alexy, the right to positive acts (entitlements), on the other 
hand, refers to requiring the state to perform certain affi  rmative actions and, 
thus, can simply be referred to as ‘performance’ rights.123 Th is, in turn, gives rise 
to two categories of performance rights: those that concern the rights to factual 
acts (factual performance) and those that concern the right to normative acts 
(normative performance). Th e fi rst category of performance rights requires the 
state to take certain factual measures such as administrative and policy measures 
whereas the second category of performance rights require the state to enact 
legislative measures providing for substantive, procedural and institutional 
mechanisms which are necessary for the free and full enjoyment of one’s rights.124
It should be recalled that in the traditional view entitlements refer only to 
economic, social and cultural rights, but in the triadic view they refer to all classes 
of rights requiring the state to perform certain factual and normative actions. 
As Alexy puts, ‘Every right to a positive action on the part of the state is an 
entitlement. Th e concept of an entitlement is thus the exact counterpart to that 
120 Ibid 140–141 cum nn 120–121.
121 See ibid 120–122.
122 Ibid 122–126 (emphasis original). In the respective order, these are called rights to non-
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of a defensive right, which includes every right to a non-action, or an omission, 
on the part of the state’.125 Th is, in turn, indicates that the scope of entitlements 
cover wide-ranging classes of performance rights which can generally be stated 
as follows: all rights to protective measures as in the case of measures needed 
for the protection of life and property through legislations; to procedural and 
organisational measures providing for procedural and institutional mechanisms 
through which substantive rights can be realised; and to the direct provision 
of certain material goods and services such as social security, medical care, 
unemployment benefi ts, education subsidies and the like.126 Th erefore, under 
the triadic conception, the notion of negative or defensive rights is substantially 
narrower than that of performance rights or entitlements. Th e right to negative 
acts is signifi cantly robbed of its traditional normative contents but the right to 
positive acts is signifi cantly expanded. Th e only demand fl owing from the right 
to negative acts is simply the obligation to abstain from acting. However, the right 
to positive acts are very broad and thus impose wide-ranging obligations on the 
addressee of the rights concerned.
2.5. CONCLUSION
Th e vocabulary of human rights and freedom is undoubtedly very popular but not 
everyone understands their normative meanings and institutional implications in 
the same way. Th ough the lack of consensus on the concept and conception of the 
normative idea of human rights and freedom can be attributed to several factors, 
the discussion in this Chapter has dealt only with two of the major factors: the 
hierarchical and dichotomised conception of human rights and freedom. It was 
seen that the hierarchical conception expresses the positivist-constitutionalist 
bias against the general moral idea of human rights and freedom whereas the 
ideological division between liberal-individualism and welfarism is clearly at the 
back of the dichotomised conception. Th e implications of both conceptions are 
particularly pervasive on the normative status and signifi cance of ESC rights: 
both of the conceptions reject ESC rights as human rights. But it was seen that 
neither of the views coherently refl ect the holistic understanding of the real 
essence and function of human rights and freedom justifi ed on the basis of the 
principle of human dignity. Th e triadic conception, on the other hand, provides 
us with richer and more practical understanding of human rights and freedom 
in at least three respects. First, it helps us to conceive human rights and freedom 
125 Ibid 294.
126 For the extensive discussion on this, see ibid 330–348. In order to distinguish between the 
traditional entitlements and the one suggested here, Alexy suggests, respectively, entitlement 
in the narrow sense (social rights) and entitlement in the wide sense (which is extensive than 
one expects).
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in terms of the three-point normative relationship between individuals and their 
environment rather than the two-point relationship existing between a person 
and an object; second, it provides us with an interesting and a useful perspective 
of the ideal of free person (i.e. what it means to be a free human being) and, third, 
it signifi cantly expands our understanding of the (potential) factors constituting 
limitations to the free and full enjoyment of human rights and freedom and 
the proper role of the state in addressing those limitations. Th is all lead us to 
defi ne the triadic conception as a relational or social conception of human 
rights directly emerging from and at the same time refl ecting the practical and 
complex socio-economic and political life of individuals in a political society.127 
Th e strength of the triadic conception is further supported by the letter and 
spirit of international human rights law. As briefl y noted above, international 
human rights law provides that all human rights drive from human dignity and 
that it expressly rejects both the hierarchical and dichotomised view of human 
rights. As one of the oft en-quoted paragraph of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Program of Action (VDPA) clearly provides, ‘All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’ that they ought to be given the 
same treatment and emphasis by everyone concerned regardless of economic, 
social, cultural and political diff erences existing in the world.128 Th at is, there is 
neither a conceptual distinction nor a normative hierarchy that can rationally be 
established between the rights and freedoms recognised in international human 
rights law nor can we fi nd any legal basis or objective normative theory justifying 
hierarchical and dichotomised reading of the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
therein be it civil, cultural, economic, political or social human rights. On the 
contrary, the conception of human rights enshrined in international human 
rights law best coheres with the triadic conception of human rights and freedom. 
Th is is so because, alike the triadic conception, the rights and freedom recognised 
in various human rights instruments clearly presuppose the existence of complex 
and dynamic relationship between individuals and their environment. In fact, it 
is within this dynamic and complex social relations that the rights and freedom 
guaranteed therein get their full practical meaning and signifi cance.129 In 
127 See Chapter 3.4 below.
128 VDPA (1993), para 5. Taken in its entirety, VDPA, the outcome of the Th ird World Conference 
on Human Rights, plays an important role in the political history of human rights as it has 
reaffi  rmed and re-established the true essence and place of human rights in an international 
normative discourse by reinterpreting and correcting the historical error created during 
the codifi cation processes of the International Bill of Rights basically owing to the political-
ideological antagonism between diff erent blocks.
129 Borrowing Finnis’ interesting statement about the language of modern rights, we can say that 
the grand justifi cation and goal of the rights recognised in international human rights law is to 
express the demands for social justice which should be realised in a political society. See Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 39) 210ff  (expressing the mondern grammar of rights as 
expressions of the demands of justice). Nickel’s description of internationally recognised rights 
as expressive of, inter alia, reduced individualism and more egalitarian approach also goes with 
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addition, the rights recognised therein not merely concern those liberal-negative 
rights but also equally provides for the right to material conditions of life required 
to live and lead a life worthy of human dignity in a political society. Furthermore, 
international human rights law not only prescribes negative obligations but also 
the positive obligations of the State to take necessary measures required to ensure 
the eff ective realisation of the rights and freedom recognised for everyone within 
its jurisdiction. Th is all shows that the triadic conception of human rights and 
freedom better explains the conceptual and normative structure of the rights 
recognised under international human rights law.
this conception. James W Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Refl ections on 




THEORIES OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN BRIEF
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Although there are several theories of human rights, it has so far not been 
possible to come up with a universally valid human rights theory through 
which we can comprehend the holistic nature and implications of human rights 
in the contemporary world.130 In particular, the controversy surrounding the 
normative foundation of human rights is longstanding and yet to be settled; and, 
admittedly, this is not an easy matter to be considered in detail in this study.131 
130 Freeman, ‘Th e Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights’ (n 48); Freeman, Human Rights: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach (n 48); Nickel (n 129); Jerome J Shestack, ‘Th e Philosophic 
Foundations of Human Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 201; Heiner Bielefeldt, 
‘Philosophical and Historical Foundations of Human Rights’ in Catarina Krause and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Abo Akademi University 
Institute for Human Rights 2009); Claudio Corradetti (ed), Philosophical Dimensions of 
Human Rights: Some Contemporary Views (Springer 2012). But see Chwaszcza (n 48) 335–348 
(criticizing the modern philosophical approach to the idea of human rights).
131 In Chapter, aft er making a limited review of dominant traditional theories and introducing 
an alternative practical narrative of the idea of human rights, I will present and examine in 
greater detail the principle of human dignity as a normative foundation of human right in 
chapter four. Th us, just as an indication of existence of diff erent approaches to the theory 
of human rights, the reader is referred to the following publications. Makau Mutua, Human 
Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press 2002); Chwaszcza 
(n 48); Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’ (2007) Working Paper No. 14/2007; 
Gerard A Hauser, ‘Th e Moral Vernacular of Human Rights Discourse’ (2008) 41 Philosophy 
& Rhetoric 440; Johannes A van der Ven, Jaco S Dreyer and Hendrik JC Pieterse, Is Th ere 
a God of Human Rights? Th e Complex Relationship between Human Rights and Religion: A 
South African Case (Brill 2004); Issa G Shivji, ‘Th e Concept of Human Rights in Africa’; Marie-
bénédicte Dembour, ‘What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Th ought’ (2014) 32 Human 
Rights Quarterly 1; Kao (n 1); Patnaik (n 1); Oswald Hanfl ing, ‘Rights and Human Rights’ 
(2018) 58 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 57; Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘Th e Concept 
of Human Rights’ (1988) 83 Anthropos 343; Tom Campbell, ‘Human Rights: A Culture of 
Controversy’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 6; Samuel Moyn, Th e Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History (Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, 2010); Corradetti 
(n 130); Michael J Perry, Th e Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (Oxford University Press 
1998); Beitz (n 2); Griffi  n (n 6); Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights as Natural Rights’ (1982) 4 
Human Rights Quarterly 391; Yingru Li and John McKernan, ‘“Achieved Not Niven”: Human 
Rights, Critique and the Need for Strong Foundations’ (2017) 21 Th e International Journal of 
Human Rights 252; Cole (n 10); Michael Ignatieff , ‘Human Rights as Politics, Human Rights as 
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Th e idea of human rights touches almost every aspect of the life of human beings 
and their environment.132 As such, an attempt to theoretically ground this idea 
of human rights inevitably faces very complex questions ranging from private 
relations to those highly sophisticated socioeconomic and political relations of 
the society. Th is obviously shows the diffi  culty to fully capture the whole aspect of 
the idea and signifi cance of human rights through a narrow theoretical prism that 
concentrates on one or certain of the issues involved. In fact, it is not surprising to 
see the disagreements or controversies surrounding the theoretical justifi cations 
of human rights not just between scholars of diff erent disciplines but even between 
scholars of a given discipline.133
For instance, it is possible that one may approach the justifi cation of human 
rights from an ethical-moral point of view while another may address the same 
through procedural-democratic theory and so on. In legal theory, which in itself 
consists of very divergent strands concerning the law and legal institutions, 
one may employ various viewpoints such as natural law, legal positivism, 
legal pragmatism, sociological, anthropological and historical theory of law 
or discourse theory of law.134 Surely each viewpoint has provided a valuable 
Idolatry (Th e Tanner Lectures on Human Rights)’; Anita Jowitt, ‘Th e Notion of Human Rights’ 
in Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance 
in the Pacifi c (ANU Press 2010); Rolf Kunnemann, ‘A Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ 
(1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323; Gregg, Human Rights as Social Construction (n 19); 
Douzinas and Gearty (n 48); Michael J Perry, Toward a Th eory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, 
Courts (Cambridge University Press 2007); Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 
1); Bryan S Turner, ‘Outline of a Th eory of Human Rights’ (1993) 27 Sociology 489; Kohen 
(n 1); Shestack (n 130); A Belden Fields, ‘Human Rights Th eory: Criteria, Boundaries, and 
Complexities’ (2009) 2 International Review of Qualitative Research 407; Biren Roy, ‘In 
Defence of Human Rights’ (1997) 32 Economic and Political Weekly 259; Micheline Ishay, 
‘What Are Human Rights? Six Historical Controversies’ (2004) 3 Journal of Human Rights 
359; Claudio Corradetti, Relativism and Human Rights: A Th eory of Pluralistic Universalism 
(Springer 2009); Ellen Messer, ‘Pluralist Approaches to Human Rights’ (1997) 53 Journal of 
Anthropological Research 293; Cranstson (n 2); Richard Falk, ‘Human Rights’ Foreign Policy 
18; Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘“Western” versus “Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions?: A Critique 
of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights’ (2000) 28 Political Th eory 90; 
Habermas, ‘Th e Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ (n 20).
132 See for instance Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1596 (who discribed the historical 
normative function of the concept of individual rights in US and France as forming part and 
parcel of the comprehensive theory of government). See also Raz (n 30) 261ff .
133 Dembour (n 131); Ishay (n 131); Perry, Th e Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (n 131); Alexy, 
‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 39); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 8); 
Griffi  n (n 6); Ignatieff  (n 131).
134 Th e contributions in the following legal theory textbooks indicate the presence of variates of 
theories of human rights in legal theory. See for instance, Simmonds (n 39); Dennis Patterson 
(ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy) 
(2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2010); Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Th eory 
(n 43); Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Th omas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy Volume I & II (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy) (2nd edn, Blackwell 
Publishing 2007). See also H Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man (With an 
Introduction by Philippe Sands) (Oxford University Press 2013); Roshwald (n 48) (discussing 
various kinds of conceptions and theories developed over a period of time).
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perspective in the modern understanding of human rights but none of them has 
so far been able to provide us with an adequate and comprehensive justifi cation of 
(the nature and implications) of the idea of human rights.
So, I believe, it is important to state the following three points regarding 
how we should approach the theoretical justifi cation of human rights. First and 
foremost, we should always bear in mind that human rights issues permeate 
through the whole spectrum of individual and collective interests. Th is implies 
that we cannot approach a theory of human rights from purely idealised-narrow 
individualistic or collectivist perspective and present it as a comprehensive theory 
of human rights. In reality, a given question of human rights involves complex 
individual and collective interests inseparably interwoven with each other such 
that arguments pertaining to their practical realisation always oscillates between 
the two, of course, depending on the contexts in which it arises.
Second, we should recognise that human rights questions are essentially 
practical questions as opposed to abstract metaphysical ideals.135 Th ey are rooted 
in and concerned with the actual day-to-day life experiences of every human 
being and group of human beings living in a political society. Th ere is, therefore, 
very little point which could be gained from hanging up in the air or, to borrow 
from Raz, ‘over-intellectualisation’136 of human rights discourses. We should not, 
of course, dismiss the ideal-metaphysical theory of human rights but it is very 
important to underscore that such an ideal theory might not as such be helpful 
in making relevant policy choices and actions in relation to practical human 
sciences as the (human rights) law if it fails to adequately take into account the 
real life-experiences of individuals within their society. Finally, it is possible to 
argue that the purpose of the theoretical-philosophical argument about human 
rights should not be seen as founding human rights anew but rather as an attempt 
to refl ectively or retrospectively provide a comprehensive explanation and 
justifi cation of the idea, functions and implications of human rights especially in 
the context of complex social relations in a given political society.
Having said this, this Chapter examines the controversies observed in the 
hierarchical and dichotomised conceptions of human rights discussed above in 
the light of the existing dominant theories of human rights. In particular, the 
135 Th is draws on the approaches of authors like Rawls who for instance described his theory of 
justice as political, not metaphysics (Rawls (n 88). Alexy describes law and legal science as 
practical science. Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as 
Th eory of Legal Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105). Nino also argues 
that the relevant concept of human being in the construction of human rights is the idea of 
human being defi ned in empirical biological terms known to each of us as species being (Carlos 
Santiago Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (Clarendon Press 1991) 34–37; see also Carlos 
Santiago Nino, ‘Th e Concept of Moral Person’ (1987) 19 Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana 
de Filosofía, 47. Most importantly, Nussbaum sees humanity as animality understood in its 
practical and intuitive sense. See Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and 
Species Membership (n 114).
136 Raz (n 30) 371. (Raz made this remark in connection with the ideal of personal autonomy).
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discussion in this Chapter has two basic objectives. Th e fi rst is identifying the 
underlying value assumptions driving the theories under consideration and the 
second is explaining their respective views of the relationship between individual 
human rights and interests, and the general societal interests usually embodied in 
the state function. I believe that these two points generally explain the disagreement 
on the idea, nature and functions of human rights. Accordingly, in the following 
few pages, this study will try to briefl y discuss the central tenets of some of the 
traditional human rights theories (natural law, liberalism, utilitarianism and 
socialism) with the view to show the gaps and inconsistencies in their approaches 
to (the justifi cation of) human rights. I will also examine somewhat closely the 
discourse theory of human rights advanced particularly by Alexy and Habermas. 
Discourse theory claims to be the most comprehensive rational justifi cation of 
human rights founded solely on universal pragmatic discourse, that is, without 
assuming any value commitment whatsoever. Th rough this, it claims to have 
addressed the major weaknesses in other traditional theories such as natural law 
and natural rights, liberalism and socialism. So, I will pay close attention to its 
claims and see if it can indeed provide us with a robust and practical conception 
of human rights need in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, because of the 
reasons to be seen shortly, neither of the traditional theories nor the recently 
proposed discourse theory of human rights can be regarded as an adequate theory 
of human rights. I argue that it is not possible to construct a comprehensive 
justifi cation of human rights without the idea of social relations and the principle 
of human dignity.
3.2. TRADITIONAL THEORIES
Th ere have been many attempts to justify the idea of human rights through such 
normative theories as natural law, natural rights, liberalism, socialism and using 
such ideals as autonomy, will, utility, interest and entitlement.137 In fact, depending 
on the kind of interest or value they seek to promote, it is possible to divide some 
of these traditional theories into individualist or autonomy-based and collective 
interest-based theories of human rights. Th e purpose here is not discussing each of 
these theories but to generally point out two of the major reasons why they cannot 
serve as a comprehensive theory of human rights. Th e fi rst reason is that they all 
rely on narrow value assumptions and the second reason is that they all are based 
137 See for instance, Chwaszcza (n 48); Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society (n 39); Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology Individuality 
and Community in Marx’s Th eory of Social Reality (n 30); Dworkin, Th e Th eory and Practice of 
Autonomy (n 5); Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135).
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on the separationist view of the individual and the society: that the individual 
rights and societal interests and values are separate and irreconcilable.138
3.2.1. AUTONOMY-BASED THEORIES
a) Natural Law and Natural Rights
Following the natural law and natural rights theory of human rights, which 
is regarded as the oldest theory of human rights, a human being is viewed as 
transcendental and autonomous being endowed with certain natural (inherent) 
and inviolable rights that ought to be respected and ensured by the society and 
state.139 Th is argument, in turn, draws on the narratives or assumptions about the 
state of nature, and the nature and capacity of human beings, the conditions or 
circumstances of individuals in the state of nature. Notwithstanding variations or 
disagreements regarding these narratives, it can be said that natural law theorists 
generally agree on the following major points.140 Th us, in the state of nature every 
human being is, fi rst and foremost, free to do or not to do whatever he or she likes 
to do or not to do and to this extent recognise no authority or limitation except 
the one fl owing from natural law or natural reason itself. Second, everyone is 
equal in terms of the authority and power and of the rights and responsibilities 
they have under natural law; hence everyone is said to have the same measure of 
self-esteem and treatment under natural law. Th ird, they are self-loving or self-
preserving being in the sense that they are all concerned primarily with their own 
welfare and well-being; accordingly, they not only perform activities essential to 
the preservation and promotion of their lives but also actively resist every forms 
of destructions directed against their life and well-being, both individually 
and in common. Fourth, they are sociable or egalitarian beings, that is, there is 
mutual or reciprocal recognition of each other and each other’s interest, and that 
138 See generally Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell 1974) 26–35 & 48–53; Alan 
Ryan, ‘Liberalism’ in Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Th omas Pogge (eds), A Companion 
to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Vol. I) (2nd edn, Blackwell 2007); Peter Self, ‘Socialism’ 
in Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Th omas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy (Vol. I) (2nd edn, Blackwell 2007); Peter Vallentyne, ‘Distributive Justice’ 
in Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Th omas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy (Vol. II) (2nd edn, 2007) 556–559; Barry Hindess, ‘Marxism’ in Robert 
E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Th omas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (Vol. I) (2nd edn, Blackwell 2007).
139 See for instance, Shestack (n 130) 206–208; Freeman, ‘Th e Philosophical Foundations of 
Human Rights’ (n 48) 497–500; Nickel (n 129) 8; Lauterpacht (n 134) 16ff .
140 See particularly Brian Bix, ‘Natural Law Th eory’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory (2nd edn, Blackwell 2010) 211ff ; Bix (n 39) chapts 5–7; 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 39) 18–19 & 23–25; Mark C Murphy, ‘Natural Law 
Th eory’ in Martin P Golding and William A Edmundson (eds), Th e Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory (Blackwell 2005) 18–22.
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they are naturally, inherently committed to live a peaceful and harmonious life 
with each other.141 Th is characterisation, of course, necessarily presupposes that 
human beings have inherent capacity for rationality and communication. Th at is, 
it is assumed that human beings have inherent capacity both to give and receive 
reasons pertaining to their choices and actions and that this capacity inheres in 
each and every human being. In particular, it is argued that every human being 
inherently possesses the capacity to recognise and abide by the dictates of natural 
reason (law), which for some is equivalent to the law of God.142
It is on the basis of these accounts of the nature of human beings that natural 
law and natural rights theories justify several natural (i.e. inherent moral) rights 
of human beings, in particular, the right to self-preservation which includes the 
right to take and use the fruit of nature necessary to sustain and subsist his or her 
life and repel all physical threats directed against his or her own life; the right to 
freedom of choice and action – the right to autonomy; the right to equality which 
can be restated as the right to equal self-esteem, treatment, entitlement, equal 
power, equal standing and responsibility, etc.; and the right to mutual recognition 
and assistance. In this regard, it is argued that individuals are entitled to free and 
full enjoyment of their natural rights but only subject to the principle of mutuality 
(reciprocity) fl owing from natural law.143
However, the natural law theory as well as its later version, natural rights 
theory is criticised for being too subjective and individualistic. In particular, it is 
argued that the theory conceives individuals and their private interests as superior 
to collective interests, and the modern state as subservient to the fulfi lment of 
private interests of individuals. Th is especially fl ows from its view of individuals 
as autonomous beings endowed with inherent and inviolable rights that should be 
respected and ensured by the state and society regardless of the general collective 
interests.144
141 For more on the idea of the state of nature, law of nature and natural rights argument, see 
Th omas Hobbes, Leviathan (Edited with an Introduction and Notesby J. C. A. Gaskin) [1996] 
(Oxford Wol, Oxford University Press 1998); Craig L Carr (ed), Th e Political Writings of 
Samuel Pufendorf (Trans Michael J. Seidler) (Oxford University Press 1994); Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Th e Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (Trans by H.J. Tozer, Introduction 
by Derek Matravers) (Wordsworth 1998); Christopher Hitchens, Th omas Paine’s Rights of 
Man: A Biography (Atlantic Monthy Press); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government [1690] 
(Edited, with an Introduction, by C. B. Macpherson) (Hackett Publishing 1980); Nozick (n 138); 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 39); Paul, Fred D. Miller and Paul, Natural Rights 
Liberalism from Locke to Nozick (n 39); Hugo Grotius, Th e Rights of War and Peace: Book II 
(Edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac, Major 
Legal and Political Works of Hugo Grotius) (Liberty Fund 2005).
142 Th is is explicitly stated in Pufendorf ’s discussion. See Carr (n 141) 74ff . at Observation 1 
through 5).
143 Locke (n 141); Rousseau (n 141); Hobbes (n 141); Carr (n 141); Grotius (n 141). 
144 Douglas J Den Uyl and Douglas B Rasmussen, ‘Ethical Individualism, Natural Law, and the 
Primacy of Natural Rights’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Jr Fred D. Miller and Jeff rey Paul (eds), 
Natural Law and Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2001) 34ff ; Shestack 
(n 130) 206–208.
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b) Liberal-Individualism
Although this conception of human being and the rights thereof has initially 
originated from natural law and natural rights theory, it is more or less this very 
same view that underlies the liberal and libertarian theory of human rights and 
the state. In fact, there is no doubt that liberalism has emerged from natural rights 
theory145 and, for this reason, most of the arguments presented as a justifi cation 
of individual human rights overlap in many respects. Th us, similar to what has 
been said in the preceding paragraphs, the liberal conception of human rights 
places signifi cant emphasis on the autonomy and inviolability of individuals: it 
claims that individuals are autonomous and the rights fl owing therefrom are 
inviolable.146 For instance, as autonomous beings, individuals are said to have 
the right to choose and decide what is best for them – they have the right to 
self-determination – and, as such, it is argued that the state has no legitimate 
reason to interfere in or dictate those choices whatsoever. It is argued that the 
role of the state is merely limited to what is oft en colloquially referred to as a 
‘night watchman’ service.147 Th e liberal theory of human rights (as advanced 
145 Th is is so because both natural rights theory and liberalism claim their origin to Locke’s theory 
of rights and civil society. For more accessible discussion on this, see Wolfe (n 39) especially 
pp 134–148 discussing the brief historical development of liberalism and its core tenets and 
tendencies. Although Wolfe states the fi rst core principle of liberalism as the principle of 
dignity, this is in fact hardly the case in the modern strands of liberal theories. Liberalism’s 
core claim is the principle of autonomy rather than dignity. Moreover, Wolfe preferred to 
state the individualistic orientation of liberal theories as one of its ‘tendencies’ as opposed to 
its coherent principle. But as manifested in its approach to economic institutions and, above 
all, the role of the state in the realisation of basic socioeconomic rights and social justice, 
we can strongly argue that individualism constitutes one of the identifi able core principles of 
liberalism and hence cannot simply be relegated to the status of tendencies. See also Paul, Fred 
D. Miller and Paul, Natural Rights Liberalism from Locke to Nozick (n 39); A John Simmons, Th e 
the Lockean Th eory of Rights (Princeton University Press 1992); George Khushf, ‘Inalianable 
Rights in the Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke: A Reappraisal’ in MJ Cherry (ed), 
Persons and their Bodies: Rights, Responsibilities, Relationships (Kluwer Academic Publishers 
1999).
146 Griffi  n (n 6); Dworkin, Th e Th eory and Practice of Autonomy (n 5); Raz (n 30). Also, most 
of Constant’s description of what he called the ‘liberty of the modern’ essentially concerns 
the individual autonomy-based theory of liberty and rights. See particularly Constant (n 82) 
310–311, 321 & 323ff . See also generally Levinson (n 114) 539ff  (discussing, inter alia, some key 
arguments of liberal individualism’s conception of freedom or rights); Christman (n 48).
147 Th at is, the state predominantly exists for and hence concerned with ensuring security and 
stability and to take care of market externalities. See Christman (n 48) (particularly Chapter 
4, discussing the ‘canons’ of liberalism); Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society (n 39) 92–97; Nozick (n 138) chapt 3; Wolfe (n 39) 
144–148; Ryan (n 138) 361–366. But see Levinson (n 114) 539–541 (comparing and contrasting 
the liberal and welfarist view of the functions of the state). Constant (n 82) 310–311, 321 & 323ff  
(describing the nature of the liberty of the moderns). See also generally Henkin, ‘Rights: Here 
and Th ere’ (n 8) 1584–90 (discussing the liberal individualistic conception of rights in the U.S. 
legal system; Oliver De Schutter, ‘Th e Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of 
Human Rights’ in Peter Van der Auweraert and others (eds), Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights: An Appraisal of Current European and International Developments [Maklu 2002] 208ff .
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by many of its proponents), therefore, implies that the only genuine (real) rights 
that individuals can rightfully claim upon the state is the negative right of non-
interference, i.e. the right to be left  alone (laissez faire) with respect to all aspects 
of their private choices and actions and that the state is negatively required to 
abstain from interfering in those choices and actions of individuals pertaining to 
their life, liberty and property. Not only this, alike natural rights theory, it also 
suggests that the interests and rights of individuals have all-time primacy over 
the collective interests and values of society.148 Th is, in turn, fl ows from two basic 
assumptions driving the theory: the view that the individual rights and social 
interests are distinctively separate and therefore have antagonistic relationship 
with each other and that the confl ict between individual rights and collective 
interests are essentially irreconcilable (that it is not possible to realise one without 
sacrifi cing the other).149 For all these reasons, both of these theories cannot be 
considered as a comprehensive justifi cation of inherent human rights.
c) Th e Principle of Autonomy
As just seen above, the fundamental claim of natural law (and natural rights 
theory) and liberal theory of human rights is that an individual person is an 
autonomous being thereby suggesting that the principle of autonomy constitutes 
an ultimate normative principle through which all human rights are or can be 
justifi ed.150 In my opinion, in order to accept the principle of autonomy as the 
normative foundation of human rights, it is necessary that it fulfi ls the following 
three conditions. First, autonomy should be inherent in all human beings; second, 
it should be present in equal measure and at all-time in every human being (i.e. it 
should neither be relative nor contingent); and, fi nally, it should be regarded as a 
universal normative value.
However, in all the three conditions, the principle of autonomy fails and hence 
cannot be regarded as the foundation of inherent, equal and universal foundation 
of human rights. With respect to the fi rst point, some authors have already shown 
148 See Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3) 1–2; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental 
Rights’ (n 39); Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, 
Economy and Society (n 39) 92–97; Vallentyne (n 138) 558–559; Christman (n 48) 27–28 & 
43–46. But Raz, a liberal scholar himself, rejects this view and off ers interesting reconstruction 
of the liberal theory of rights as encompassing collective interests. See particularly Raz (n 30) 
250–263. In this regard, three basic points in Raz’s arguments are worth stating here: that while 
confl icts may be inevitable (not just between private and public interests but even also between 
a person’s private interests), there is no mortal confl ict between the two and that there is no 
rule which gives rights an automatic priority over collective interests and that individual rights 
and freedoms are part and parcel of the collective interests which in turn establish the reason 
for their entrenchment in the liberal constitutional norms. For comments on Raz’s distinctive 
liberal conception, see generally Wolfe (n 39) 82ff .
149 Christman (n 48) 125ff ; Vallentyne (n 138) 558–559; Wolfe (n 39) 144–148; Ryan (n 138) 361–366.
150 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 210ff ; Wolfe (n 39) chapts 4 & 5. Cf. Raz (n 
30) 203–207 cum Chapt 14.
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that autonomy or autonomous life cannot be regarded as inherent quality or 
value of human being but rather as a value that ought to be achieved through 
the realisation of various necessary social and material goods over a course of 
time.151 For instance, according to Raz, there are two but interconnected senses 
of autonomy. In the fi rst, primary, sense, it expresses the idea that a person can 
be considered as autonomous if he or she becomes an independent author of 
his or her own life. In the second sense, it concerns the conditions that must be 
available to the individuals (i.e. conditions of autonomy) for the achievement 
of an autonomous life (understood in the fi rst sense).152 Th e primary sense of 
autonomy (to become an autonomous person) is, therefore, the function of its 
second sense: that is, it calls for the availability of necessary and indispensable 
social and materials goods for it is impossible that a person would ever become 
an autonomous agent or live an autonomous life without the actual availability of 
the conditions of autonomy.
Th is could lead us to deduce at least two important conclusions in relation 
to the point at hand. One is that as long as autonomy is not an inherent value 
of a human being, it cannot be a ground for inherent rights of every human 
being. Th e other is that those indispensable social and materials conditions of 
autonomy are essentially integral elements of state public policy measures. Th is, 
in turn, indicates that there are deep substantive relationships (interrelatedness) 
between individual and social interests and that, as a consequence of this, both 
the society and state have an indispensable place in the comprehensive theory 
of human rights quite diff erent from those expressed in the traditional human 
rights theories.153 Seen in this light, it can even be argued that the principle 
of autonomy rather signifi es the social and egalitarian conception of human 
rights, much less than it justifi es the strict individualistic conception of human 
rights. Th is means that the idea of autonomy can be taken as implying human 
sociability (solidarity, mutuality, relatedness and interdependence) contrary to 
151 Raz (n 30) 203–207 cum 154–157 & Chapt 14); Wolfe (n 39). Th e contingent and temporal 
nature of relative individual autonomy is well-expressed by Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 87–89.
152 Raz (n 30) 204ff . Th us, in order to realise this sense of autonomy, that is, for a person to 
live an autonomous life, he or she should be fully left  alone – there should not be any form 
of interference, positive or negative, from the state. Th is refl ects the version of liberal-
individualistic conception of autonomy. However, the second sense of autonomy cannot be 
realised without the existence of various kinds of conditions of and therefore calls for positive 
measures from the state. Alexy in his part conceives the principle of autonomy as consisting of 
private and public dimensions. ‘Th e essence of private autonomy is the individual choice and 
realization of a personal conception of the good. Public autonomy is defi ned by a collective 
choice and realization of a political conception of the right and the good entails two elements: 
the private and public conception of autonomy.’ Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ 
(n 1) 209.
153 Raz (n 30) 207; Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (n 90). See also Rob 
Buitenweg, ‘Individual Freedom and ESOCUL Rights: Th e Illusions of Libertarianism’ in Eva 
Nieuwenhuys (ed), Neo-Liberal Globalism and Social Sustainable Globalisation (Brill 2006) 
81–83.
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individual atomism suggested by liberal-individualism. In other words, given all 
the necessary material and social conditions needed to achieve an autonomous 
life, it is diffi  cult to hold the principle of autonomy as implying fundamental 
contradiction or mutual exclusivity (separated-ness) between individual human 
rights and general collective interests.154
In turn, this points us to the second reason why autonomy cannot serve as 
an ultimate justifi cation of human rights: it is essentially a relative and highly 
contingent value. An autonomous individual life is simply a relative and 
contingent state of aff airs. Th us, the principle of autonomy can only be a relative 
norm such that it cannot be a basis for the justifi cation of absolute and equal 
rights of every human being. Th is is because, as both Raz and Griffi  n note, there 
are multiple factors that determine the achievement of an autonomous living 
such as economic, environmental, cultural, social and institutional factors: this 
is to say that whether and the degree to which a person may become and lead an 
autonomous life is highly contingent up on these and several other factors.155
Th us, there is no person in whose life autonomy can be taken for granted. For 
instance, there is no autonomy, in the meaningful sense of the term, in the life of 
those persons who constantly lack those conditions of autonomy (such as persons 
who struggle every day with lack of survival needs or suff er from diff erent kinds 
of mental disabilities). Th is means that it is, strictly speaking, very diffi  cult for 
them to make autonomous choices with respect to matters aff ecting their private 
life.156 Hence, it is neither true that every person is born with (the same level of) 
autonomy nor is it true that every person leads an autonomous life throughout his 
or her entire lifetime. It is rather a self-evident fact that in every society there are 
persons with no or severely diminished level of autonomy due to their personal, 
154 Raz (n 30) 206–207. Even Griffi  n, who holds human agency (which entails autonomous 
choice and liberty) as the foundation of human rights, recognises welfare rights (‘minimum 
provision’ as necessary conditions of autonomy. See generally Griffi  n (n 6) Chapts 2.4 & 8–10. 
‘[Our agency] has parts: autonomy, liberty, and minimum provision.’ ibid. 67.
155 ‘Not every human decision is autonomous. Many decisions are eff ectively determined by 
outside infl uences: by unconscious drives largely shaped by others, by genetic abnormalities 
such as males with two Y-chromosomes, and so on.’ Griffi  n (n 6) 150. See also Raz (n 30) 
154–157. ‘Th e autonomous agent is one who is not always struggling to maintain the minimum 
conditions of a worthwhile life. Th e more one’s choices are dictated by personal needs, the 
less autonomous one becomes. Of course, natural conditions may also force people to make 
choices determined by the need to secure the necessities of a worthwhile life. And it would be 
wrong to think that every such condition is in any way regrettable. Autonomy is possible only 
within a framework of constraints. Th e completely autonomous person is an impossibility.’ 
ibid. 155. Alexy recognises the private and public function of the principle of autonomy. For 
him, the principle of autonomy is only a prima facie principle which only gives rise to prima 
facie rights. Th us, it aims to guarantee a degree of autonomous life that can be achieved in 
given society where the realisation of diff erent interests is necessarily subjected to the principle 
of reasonable balancing. Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 209ff . See also 
Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135) 138ff  (discussing the principle of moral autonomy).
156 See Raz (n 30) 155–157 & 204–205.
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social and environmental factors.157 But it is absurd to say that persons with no 
or diminished level of autonomy lack inherent human rights in equal terms with 
all other persons. In order to avoid this kind of conclusion, it is obvious that 
one needs to come up with an alternative practical conception of human being 
contrary to the one suggested through such theories as liberal-individualism, 
the conception which better characterises the life of human being in terms of 
vulnerability which implies that human beings have inherent (an ever-present) 
need for security, care and solidarity.158
Finally, autonomy also lacks the quality to be a universal normative value upon 
which universally valid human rights can be justifi ed. For instance, in some cultures, 
the notion of autonomy does not existent or, at least, is not oft en attached the kind 
of importance it has been given in the West. Such values as (social) solidarity, social 
justice, mutuality and care are said to instead provide stronger motivation for some 
societies in caring for the interests and well-being of their members. If particularly 
seen in the light of inherent vulnerability of human being and hence ever-present 
neediness for security, we can actually say that it is the value of social solidarity 
(and care) that provides stronger case for the universal validity of human rights.159
Th us, we can conclude that the principle of autonomy has inherent limitations 
with respect to all the three necessary conditions mentioned above and as such 
it cannot be considered as the normative foundation of inherent, equal and 
universally valid human rights. Th is however does not mean that the idea of 
autonomy is entirely irrelevant in human rights discourse. Th e value of autonomy, 
as Raz notes, consists not in the possession of the right of autonomy but rather in 
the exercising of autonomy itself. Th at is, to meaningfully talk about the rights of 
autonomy, it is necessary that one has autonomy available to her in the fi rst place. 
And, as seen above, it is the primary responsibility of each society to ensure the 
availability of various social and material conditions (now also referred elsewhere 
as human capability needs160) through which individuals achieve some level of 
autonomy in their life. But it is not possible to justify this responsibility on the 
basis of the principle of autonomy for it lacks the quality and breadth required 
to adequately justify the holistic purpose of the institution of human rights: the 
protection and preservation of the inherent life and dignity of human being, in 
particular, of the most vulnerable members of the society.
157 See for instance, Griffi  n (n 6) 150.
158 Carr (n 141) 151. See generally Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species 
Membership (n 114); Bryan S Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (Th e Pennysylvania 
State University Press 2006).
159 Cf. Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) (who argues that autonomy is the 
foundation of human rights justifi ed through rational discourse-theoretical theory. It 
remains to be seen in the discussion below if this claim by Alexy can indeed be accepted). 
Th e alternative theoretical argument for this draws on authors like Grotius, Pufendorf and 
recently on Nussbaum and Sen. See Carr (n 141) 81; Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality and Species Membership (n 114); Sen (n 3).
160 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114); Sen (n 3).
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3.2.2. COLLECTIVE INTEREST-BASED THEORIES
Utilitarianism, socialism and communitarianism have reacted, in one way or the 
other, against the ‘hyper-individualistic’ claim of autonomy-based theories of 
human rights and sought to instead defend the primacy of collective interests over 
individual rights.161 Generally, all of these theories deny the existence and, if any, 
the precedence of individual rights over collective interests. For them, individual 
interests are inseparably subsumed within the general interests of the society: 
individuality is essentially subsumed in the collectivity. Th erefore, they are 
basically reactionary (in fact, rejectionist) theories advancing instead collective 
(general, communal) interests; and, for this reason, they are oft en criticised for 
their totalitarian tendencies supplying arguments sacrifi cing individual rights for 
the sake of collective interests.162
For instance, in utilitarianism, utility is regarded as the fundamental value 
through which state public policy should be guided.163 It is oft en vaguely 
interpreted as generating the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number 
of the people. Th us, for utilitarianism, it is not only acceptable but the right 
mode of action to sacrifi ce individual rights or minority interests as long as a 
given measure is said to yield an aggregated greatest amount of pleasure for 
the majority of the people concerned, regardless of the nature of the interests 
in issue.164 Similarly, socialism also rejects the very idea of individual rights.165 
Henkin notes that the only basic right individuals can have in socialism is to live 
in the socialist society and state where all means of production and distribution 
are owned in common. Any benefi t individuals may enjoy in the socialist state is 
neither inherent nor inviolable claim-rights but rather a grant from the socialist 
state at its own will. It is thus socialism – collective ownership of land, labour and 
capital – that holds the central place in the socialist conception of the relationship 
between individuals and their society.166
161 See Christman (n 48) 125ff  (discussing theories developed as critiques to the liberal theory).
162 Andrew Heywood, Politics (3rd ed, Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 48ff ; Christman (n 48) chapts 5 
& 7; Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and 
Society (n 39) 100–104; Simmonds (n 39) 17ff ; Bix (n 39) 117–120; Vallentyne (n 138) 556–557; 
Kateb (n 5) 79ff  (discussing problems with utilitarian view of human rights).
163 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Edited and with Introduction and Notes by John 
Gray) [1991] (Paperback, Oxford World’s Classics 2008) 136–167 & 197–201; HLA Hart, Essays 
in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Clarendon Press 1983) 182ff .
164 Sen (n 3); Hart (n 163); Raz (n 30) 222, 238–239 & 271. See generally Raz ibid, 267ff  (examining 
consequantialism which is central to the utiitarian theory). As he notes, utilitarianism is oft en 
identifi ed as leading to anti-liberal arguments justifying state’s ‘encroachment on individual 
freedom’. ibid 267.
165 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and 
Society (n 39) 100–104.
166 Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1599ff ; Shestack (n 130) 210–211; Gould, Rethinking 
Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society (n 39) 13–16 & 
100–104. Of course, these are not the only collective interest-based theories of human rights. 
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Obviously, this highly abstract description of the traditionally dominant 
theories of human rights does not fully capture many of the divisions within each 
of them, nor is it also the purpose of this discussion to fully analyse each and 
every segment of these theories. Nonetheless, the discussion has shown two major 
problems or limitations cutting-across these theories, that is, both autonomy-
based and collectivist theories suggest that the relationship between individuals 
and society is inherently antagonistic and that individual and general societal 
interests are not only separate but also have an irreconcilable confl ict (i.e., ensuring 
or promoting one necessarily means sacrifi cing the other). Th ese problems are, 
in turn, the result of the narrow underlying assumptions as regards the kind of 
interests and values each theory seeks to promote in its own ways. Neither of 
these theories could, therefore, provide us with a comprehensive justifi cation of 
inherent human rights recognised in various global and regional human rights 
instruments where both individual and collective interests are interwoven and 
given due recognition and protection. Th e holistic view of the idea, nature and 
implications of human rights needs a diff erent assumption and argument than 
the ones put before us through these theories.
3.3. DISCOURSE THEORY
3.3.1. INTRODUCTION
It is not inaccurate to state that discourse theory167 of human rights is born out 
of scholarly dissatisfaction on the inability of value-based traditional human 
rights as the ones discussed above to provide a rational and universally valid 
justifi cation for human rights. As I have tried to show in the preceding discussions, 
all traditional theories of human rights make some kind of fundamental value 
assumption and commitment. Robert Alexy and Jürgen Habermas, the principal 
architects of the discourse theory, however, rejects the view that universal human 
rights can be justifi ed on the basis of any of the traditional value-based human 
Th e arguments based on cultural relativism also gives due emphasis on cultural values and 
individual duties than the human rights individuals have qua human being.
167 Discourse theory is also alternatively referred to as procedural theory, general practical 
discourse, rational practical discourse, practical discourse, rational discourse or practical 
rationality. For details on the topic see particularly Robert Alexy, ‘Problems of Discourse 
Th eory’ (1988) 20 Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 43; Alexy, A Th eory of Legal 
Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal Justifi cation (Trans Ruth 
Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105); Robert Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of 
Practical Reason’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 231; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1); 
Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) chapts 
3 & 5.3.
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rights theories.168 But, fi rst, let me briefl y introduce what discourse theory is 
so that one may understand the essence of discourse-theoretical justifi cation 
of human rights. Th ere are two stages in the discourse-theoretical justifi cation 
of human rights. Th e fi rst stage is concerned with the justifi cation of discourse 
rules themselves. Th en, these discourse rules, or discourse ethics as some refer 
to it, are used to drive individual human rights both directly and as a matter of 
necessity.169
Generally, discourses are sets of interconnected linguistic activities through 
which we test the truth or correctness of the things we say. Th ose discourses 
concerned with the correctness (i.e. rational validity or truth) of normative 
statements are referred to as practical discourses or, also, rational practical 
discourses. Th us, the theory of rational discourse is a normative theory of 
discourse addressing the question how the rules of rational discourse could be 
justifi ed.170
In this regard, it is said that there are two groups of rational discourse rules: 
basic rules and rationality or justifi cation rules.171 Basic discourse rules are 
the ones generally concerned with the rules of non-contradiction, consistency, 
clarity, generality and the like. Th ey are seen as the irreducible elements or atoms 
governing the possibility and validity of all kinds of general discourses such 
that no discourse can dispense with them.172 Th e rationality rules, also referred 
to as general justifi cation rules, on the other hand, have particular relevance 
for the practical rational discourse which, in principle, requires that everyone 
making assertions or claims of truth value ought to give reason(s) to that eff ect 
unless there is a reason not to do so.173 Th erefore, rationality rules are essentially 
concerned with ‘[securing] the impartiality of practical argumentation and 
therewith of any practical opinions resting on it’.174 Accordingly, freedom and 
equality of argumentation are said to be the ‘most important rules’ falling under 
this category for they guarantee everyone’s right to free, equal and universal 
participation in discourse. Th us, everyone capable may take part in discourse, 
168 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 209ff ; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and 
Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 18–22; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 118–131.
169 See Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 211ff ; Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 
20) 118–131.
170 Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal 
Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105) 14–20, 179–180 cum n 11; 
Alexy, ‘Problems of Discourse Th eory’ (n 167) 44–48; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 107–111.
171 Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal 
Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105) 187ff .
172 Ibid 189–91.
173 Ibid 191ff .
174 Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 235. See also Alexy, 
‘Problems of Discourse Th eory’ (n 167) 46.
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introduce or question any assertion, express wishes, attitudes and needs without 
any limitations in any manner whatsoever.175
It should, however, be noted that these rationality rules are simply necessary 
presumptions which hold true for all practical rational discourse. Th ey are 
neither deduced from nor implied by any supra normative principle.176 Th is is 
the reason discourse theory is identifi ed as one type of transcendental-pragmatic 
arguments which holds that certain categories of rules are necessarily valid for 
the very possibility of practical argumentation in the fi rst place, for without them 
no rational discourse is said to ever exist.177 For Alexy, this rational pragmatic 
discourse especially in its elementary form is part and parcel of everyday human 
life: every human being is essentially a discursive creature in that it is only in 
some serious exceptional situations as fatal accidents that individuals may lose 
the capacity to participate in general discourse.178
Alexy, nevertheless, makes it clear that there is no obligation to participate 
in discourse nor is it taken for granted that everyone actually takes part in 
practical discourse. Rationality rules are, thus, mere prescriptions that 
whosoever is interested in a given practical discourse ought to follow in order 
to judge the validity of the outcome thereof which is determined solely by the 
degree to which the discourse is carried out in accordance with the general 
175 Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal 
Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105) 191–194; Alexy, ‘A Discourse-
Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 235–236; Alexy, ‘Problems of Discourse 
Th eory’ (n 167) 46. Th us, Alexy underlines that the rationality rules express the Liberal/
Kantian conception of universality and autonomy of practical rationality. From these, he 
formulates an abstract condition underlying the principle of universal agreement or consensus 
stated as follows: ‘UA: In any discourse a norm can only fi nd universal agreement when the 
consequences of generally following that norm for the satisfaction of the interests of each and 
every individual are acceptable to all by reason of arguments’. Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical 
Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 236. ‘A norm which fi nds universal agreement under 
this condition is in an ideal sense, correct. It therefore has ideal moral validity.’ ibid. Th is 
principle of universal agreement is more or less similar with Habermas’ abstract discourse 
principle which he states as follows: ‘D: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
aff ected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’. Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) 
(n 20) 107.
176 Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 239; Alexy, ‘Discourse 
Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 213; Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of 
Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) 
(n 105) 185.
177 Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal 
Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick) (n 105) 112–115; 123–124 & 185–187.
178 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 217–218; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and 
Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 21–22; Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of Practical 
Reason’ (n 167) 241–242. On this point, Alexy distinguishes his approach from other authors 
like Habermas and Hare in that he opted for what he calls ‘a weak version’ of transcendental 
pragmatic argument. For more details, see Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 
216ff ; Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 239ff .
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rules of justifi cation mentioned above.179 Alike all kinds of procedural theories, 
Alexy states, ‘the correctness [and thus validity] of a norm or the truth of 
a proposition’ is defi ned in terms of its adherence to a certain predefi ned 
procedure and nothing else; other than this, there is no other mechanism for 
evaluating the validity or justness of certain decisions. In short, in discourse 
theory, validity or justness is simply the function of a predefi ned procedural 
correctness.180
Alexy, however, maintains that, even if participation in discourse is said to 
be merely voluntary, the argument for the universal validity of discourse rules or 
ethics can be strengthened through its two other elements. Th e fi rst argument is 
the argument from utility which, according to Alexy, holds that, even for those 
who have no or little interest in discourse rules, adherence to them yields better 
advantage or utility than other means of dispute resolutions such as coercion, 
threat, domination, fraud or deception: discourse rules have better strategic 
importance irrespective of whether or not one honestly believes in the universal 
validity of such rules. Th e second argument is what he calls the argument from 
sociological-empirical evidence and it states that although it cannot be concluded 
for each and every person, there are suffi  cient number of persons with genuine 
interest in practical correctness concerning their everyday social life.181 Having 
said all this, it is interesting to note that the principal driving force behind 
179 Th is means that, in addition to the requirements of basic discourse rules, the extent to which 
the principle of autonomy, equality, freedom and universality are adhered to with respect 
to the topic of discourse and its outcomes determines the degree of its validity and justness. 
Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 235 & 241–243; Alexy, 
‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 218–219.
180 Alexy, ‘Problems of Discourse Th eory’ (n 167) 44. But Alexy notes that there is no one way 
of constructing a procedure through which a given norm can be generated and its validity 
be judged for diff erences may result from the requirements as regards the participants, the 
procedure itself, from the character of the norm which, in turn, is the function of the other two 
requirements. ibid 44–46.
181 Alexy here states that the argument for the universal validity of practical rational discourse 
has three interrelated components: the transcendental-pragmatic argument (which I have 
already described), the argument from utility and, fi nally, the argument from empirical 
evidence. In his own words, ‘My thesis is that the universal validity of the rules of discourse 
can be substantiated by means of a three-part argument. Th e fi rst part consists of a very 
weak version of a transcendental-pragmatic argument, then comes the second part-an 
argument which takes account of the maximisation of individual utility. Th is combination 
presupposes the third part in the form of an empirical premise’. Alexy, ‘A Discourse-
Th eoretical Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 239ff . See also Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory 
and Human Rights’ (n 1) 213–220. Th e motivation for participation in discourse is not 
important for the validity of discourse rules does not rest on subjective (internal) behaviour 
of participants. For Alexy, what is decisive is the fact of engagement in argumentation. 
Th is is so because, as he maintains, the justifi cation of discourse rules is mainly concerned 
with their objective (institutional) validity to which human rights and law belong and, in 
the fi eld of law, compliance with the justifi ed rules hardly depends on actual motive of the 
participants than on their externally displayed conducts. Alexy, ‘A Discourse-Th eoretical 
Conception of Practical Reason’ (n 167) 242–243; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human 
Rights’ (n 1) 218–220.
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discourse theory is designing and justifying mechanisms through which confl icts 
or disagreements can be resolved through discursively generated consensus of 
discourse participants. And for this to be possible, discourse theory says that all 
discourse participants, both real and future, are required to treat one another 
as autonomous, free and equal participants in relation to any discourse topics 
whatsoever.182
3.3.2. JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
DISCOURSE RULES
Alexy, in particular, believes that universally valid ideas of human rights cannot 
be justifi ed on the basis of any of the traditional theories but discourse theory. 
He argues that the essence of the Kantian-liberal conception of human rights183 
can only be established completely through reasoning alone that raises a claim 
to objectivity, correctness or truth.184 For him, neither of the traditional theories 
can off er any objective criteria of validity required for the rational justifi cation 
of human rights. Discourse theory, Alexy argues, is able to provide the most 
comprehensive and stable basis for the justifi cation of equal and universal validity 
of human rights for it is solely based on rules of practical reason (rationality). Th is 
is so because, it is argued, there is no prima facie value claim that could be made 
in discourse theory except the rules of discourse itself. And it is this aspect of the 
theory which makes it distinctive from other human rights theories proposed so 
far.185 Of course, whether this claim of the discourse theory is valid and hence it 
is in fact able to successfully ground the equal and universally valid human rights 
remains to be seen but, at least for Alexy, there is no doubt that ‘if anything can 
establish the universal validity of human rights, that is reasoning that establishes 
it. Discourse theory is a theory centred on the concept of reasoning. Th at is the 
most general ground for the view that discourse theory can contribute to the 
foundation of human rights’.186
182 See generally Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law 
and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 107ff .
183 Th at is, human rights as originating from the principle of autonomy universally possessed by 
everyone. See Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 209–210.
184 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 18–19 & 21.
185 Ibid 18–22; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 209–2011. Habermas, for 
instance, states that ‘postconventional morality provides no more than a procedure for 
impartially judging disputed questions. It cannot pick out a catalogue of duties or even 
designate a list of hierarchically ordered norms, but it expects subjects to form their own 
judgements’. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law 
and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 114.
186 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 1) 21; Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and 
Human Rights’ (n 1) 210–211.
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But the discourse rules seen above are only concerned with an ideal pragmatic 
conversation. Th us, so far nothing has been said concerning whether these rules 
are also equally valid as rules of human behaviour in practical actions. In ideal 
pragmatic reasoning, there is no immediate demand or consequence that would 
practically follow from accepting a given rule as valid. However, with respect to 
rules concerning practical action, once a given rule is judged as a valid norm, then 
everyone is expected to behave according to that norm under the pain of sanction; 
and, human rights norms, in essence, belong to norms of practical actions.187 Th is 
entails that the justifi cation of discourse rules does not automatically amount to 
the justifi cation of human rights. In order to say this, it is necessary to show that 
the ideal discourse rules are also the rules of practical action (behaviour) as well.
According to Alexy, establishing discourse rules as the rules of practical 
actions requires further assumptions and arguments pertaining to the discourse 
theory. To this end, he has proposed three complementary arguments drawn from 
the principles of autonomy, consensus and democracy. It however appears that, of 
all the three, the argument from autonomy holds a central place in establishing 
the rules of discourse as the rules practical action. His argument from autonomy 
substantially draws on what Nino refers to as ‘basic norm of moral discourse’ 
which, in turn, is related to Kant’s conception of (moral) autonomy.188 For Nino, 
there is close affi  nity between Kant’s idea of moral autonomy and basic feature of 
moral discourse. In his own words,
moral autonomy in Kant’s sense is intimately connected with a fundamental 
feature of moral discourse: with the fact that it does not operate through coercion, 
misrepresentation, or conditioning but through consensus. Th at is, moral discourse, 
unlike, for example, law, aims to obtain a convergence of actions and attitudes through 
the free acceptance of the same ultimate general principles of conduct.189
Th us, Nino is of the opinion that anyone who ‘honestly’ takes part in ‘moral 
discourse’ should be seen as attaching ‘positive value to the autonomy which 
manifests itself in actions determined by the free adoption of moral principles’; this, 
in turn, refl ects the kind of ‘minimum tacit agreement’ supposed to exist between 
those who chose to freely and sincerely participate in basic moral discourse, 
187 See Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 220; Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 
20) 114–116. Th is clearly distinguishes ideal discourse rules from legal rules (which itself is also 
a species of general discourse rules). See generally Alexy, A Th eory of Legal Argumentation: 
Th e Th eory of Rational Discourse as Th eory of Legal Justifi cation (Trans Ruth Adler and Neil 
MacCormick) (n 105); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 222ff .
188 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 222 citing Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights 
(n 190) 138. For the diff erent interpretation of Kant’s notion of (the principle of) autonomy, see 
generally Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27).
189 Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135) 138.
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which can be stated as follows: that ‘it is desirable that people determine their 
behaviour only by the free adoption of principles that, aft er suffi  cient refl ection 
and deliberation, they judge valid.’190
Alexy refers to this basic norm of moral discourse as the ‘principle of 
autonomy’191 for it implies that whoever accepts this principle must not only 
accept the autonomy of others in ideal discourse but also in the context of 
practical action. Th at is, the demands of the principle of autonomy can only 
be fully realised if one participate in moral discourse with the view to resolve 
social confl icts only through a discursively generated and controlled consensus, 
and nothing else.192 It follows from this that no one should be subjected to 
any norms adopted without his or her eff ective participation in and refl ection 
thereupon whether it is at the level of discourse and actions. Th rough this, 
Alexy argues, ‘discourse and autonomy become two sides of the same thing’ 
eff ectively removing the dichotomy between ideal discourse and practical 
action. Th is, in turn, means that those discourse rules (rules of rationality) 
discussed above become, for all intents and purposes, the rules of behaviour as 
well.193 Th erefore, per Alexy, this principle of autonomy thus described can be 
seen as giving rise to ‘the general right to autonomy, which is the most general 
human and basic right’.194 Th is general right to autonomy, Alexy maintains, 
provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to judge for [oneself] what is right and 
good, and to act accordingly’.195
Th is principle of autonomy is said to be consisted of two principal elements: 
‘private autonomy’ and ‘public autonomy’.196 Private autonomy concerns freedom 
of choices and actions of individuals whereas public autonomy refers to the 
‘collective choice and realization of a political conception of the right and the 
good’.197 As such, the right to autonomy entails only a prima facie right, that 
is, the right which remains valid as long as it is not constrained by legitimate 
and compelling public interest (implied by the public function of autonomy). 
190 Ibid (internal citations omitted); Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 222 
(quoting and discussing Nino’s argument just cited).
191 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 223.
192 Alexy defi nes discursively generated consensus as follows: ‘Discursively generated consensus 
is a consensus that has come to existence on the basis of a discourse. It remains discursively 
controlled if it can be called into question at any time. If this happens, a new attempt must be 
made to generate a consensus discursively.’ ibid.
193 Ibid 223–224.
194 Ibid 226 (which he also refers to it as the ‘general right to freedom,’ citing Kant).
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid 209. For Habermas’ analysis of the notion of private autonomy and public (civic or 
political) autonomy and deduction of the system of rights, see Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 
20) 118–130. See also Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135) 137ff  (discusses in terms of 
moral and personal autonomy).
197 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 209; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 118ff . 
See also Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1584–85.
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Interestingly, with this conception of the principle of autonomy, in sharp contrast 
with its orthodox liberal conception discussed earlier, both the individual 
rights and public interest are brought together as constituting one complete 
spectrum.198 Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that the confl icts between 
(the implications of) private and public autonomy are entirely removed. It rather 
indicates that there is no irreconcilable or mortal confl ict between individual 
rights and general societal interests. Potential confl icts especially ensuing from 
the legal, institutional and policy dimensions of the private and public functions 
of autonomy are naturally inevitable.199 At the same time, the mediation or 
resolution of such confl icts goes to the heart of the public functions of autonomy: 
that is, designing and setting both generic and specifi c standards and procedures 
through which interests can be prioritised, mediated and continuously balanced 
against each other and defi ning procedural mechanisms through which confl icts, 
both real and future, between various interests can be resolved.200
Now, on the basis of the general right to autonomy, Alexy argues, the whole 
catalogue of specifi c human rights can be justifi ed in at least two ways.201 On the 
one hand, some categories of rights can be analytically justifi ed as ‘special cases’ 
of the general right to autonomy but only ‘in insofar as they are conceptually 
contained in it’. Th is will particularly give rise to concrete individual freedom 
and rights.202 Other categories of rights can, on the other hand, be justifi ed as a 
‘necessary means for acting autonomously’ and this, in turn, will give rise to, for 
instance, ‘the right to protection through the state and basic social rights, like the 
right to the basic means of living’.203 Hence, although these two processes may 
not provide us with complete justifi cation of the entire catalogue of human rights, 
198 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 226–227; Habermas (n 37) 120 (‘Private 
autonomy extends as far as the legal subject does not have to give others an account or 
give publicly acceptable reasons for her action plans.’ (emphasis original)). Th at is, the 
re-interpretation of the notion and principle of autonomy by authors like Nino, Alexy and 
Habermas as consisting of both individual and public dimension or function clearly opposes 
it with its narrow individualistic construction discussed above.
199 For an interesting treatment of the substantive relationship between individual rights and 
collective goods, see particularly Raz (n 30) 244–263. In substance, Raz argues that ‘rights 
are not to be understood as inherently independent of collective goods, nor as essentially 
opposed to them. On the contrary, they both depend on and serve collective goods. Hence 
there is no general rule giving either rights or collective goods priority on cases of confl ict’. 
ibid 255.
200 In particular, Alexy’s further arguments from the principle democracy introduces interesting 
dimensions in relation to the institutional, procedural and policy implications of human 
rights justifi ed through discourse rules. See Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 
1) 233; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and 
Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 121ff . For some arguments on balancing, see generally 
Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (n 30).
201 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 227. For Habermas’ approach and 
justifi cation of rights, see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 122–131.
202 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 227.
203 Ibid.
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they are able to establish certain fundamental rights as direct and necessary 
consequents of the general right to autonomy.
As stated above, Alexy maintains that the justifi cation processes of human 
rights via the principle of autonomy is further strengthened through the principle 
of consensus and democracy. Th e argument from consensus helps to introduce 
the idea of ‘universality in the form of equality and impartiality’. As such, it 
requires that the interests and rights of all persons, real and potential, be given 
impartial and equal consideration. But, as Alexy himself recognises, we cannot 
say that this is entirely a new element for the very idea of autonomy itself implies 
equality of all persons in the abstract sense.204
Th e argument from democracy in its part helps to further explicate the 
institutional dimension of the discourse-theoretical justifi cation of human rights 
by establishing connection between their theoretical and practical validity. It 
should however be noted that there is dual relationship between discourse rules 
and democracy.205 Generally, democracy and, hence, constitutional democratic 
structure is viewed as approximation of the practical, institutional realisation of 
ideal discourse rules. Th is is true only if the institutional democratic procedures 
are organised in accordance with rules of general discourse theory, in particular, 
the rationality rules. On the other hand, it is said that the very possibility of 
democracy or democratic structure itself demands the validity and practical 
realisation of certain fundamental rights of autonomy such as the right to equal, 
free and full participation, the right to freedom of expression and the like.206 
Nonetheless, though crucial, the argument from democracy should not again 
be considered as a new element in the justifi cation of human rights through 
discourse theory because, as just seen above, the principle of autonomy already 
contains as one of its principal constitutive element the principle of collective or 
public decision-making. Th us, the principle of democracy does not justify any 
new right but sheds more light on how the public function of autonomy should be 
designed and structured so as to ensure the right to equal and free participation 
for all persons concerned.207
204 Ibid 227–233. ‘Unequal human rights cannot be justifi ed in an ideal discourse because 
under the ruling of freedom [that is autonomy], equality, and rationality in argumentation, 
arguments for an unequal distribution of human rights will not last.’ ibid 229.
205 Th is dual substantive relationship between human rights and democracy is particularly well-
recognised in Habermas which he describes as ‘co-originality’, that is, human rights and 
democracy are ‘co-originally constituted’ and this, in turn, also constitutes what he calls the 
‘logical genesis of rights’ and in this way the principle of democracy is also considered to be 
‘at the heart of a system of rights’ (emphasis original). Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 121–
122.
206 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 233.
207 But cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and 
Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 120–123.
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In summary, discourse theory, especially as advanced by Robert Alexy, uses an 
ideal pragmatic speech situation as a vehicle to procedurally drive fundamental 
human rights. Th us, he asks us to imagine and contemplate on an ideal speech 
situation where an ideal speaker and audience are fully committed to resolve 
every disagreement on any subject through rational argumentation alone and, 
therewith, the necessary conditions for the very possibility of such situation. 
Closely looked at, the discourse process, from initiation to conclusion, cannot be 
carried out without fi rst presupposing certain basic and necessary rules governing 
what ought to be accepted and excluded as regards the nature of argumentations 
and conduct of discourse participants. However, in the social world where every 
value assumption is relative, the discourse participants could only agree on mere 
procedural rules or criteria so as to judge the validity of both the process and 
outcome of their ideal discourse. In particular, we have observed that discourse 
participants ought to recognise free exchange of ideas and arguments, respect 
the autonomy of each other and treat each other as equal discourse partners 
throughout their discourse. Th ese are accordingly regarded as basic rights and 
freedoms presumed to have been guaranteed for every ideal participants of the 
discourse. However, we have said that human rights norms are norms of practical 
actions and, hence, have little to do with ideal discourse situations. But Alexy 
argued that the dichotomy between rules of ideal discourse and of practical action 
(behaviour) is removed by the arguments from the principle of autonomy which is 
further strengthened through arguments from consensus and democracy. Having 
said this, it is now time to assess whether these central claims of the discourse 
theory are strong enough to establish it as an adequate and comprehensive theory 
of human rights.
3.3.3. ASSESSMENT
According to Alexy, the traditional theories cannot justify universally valid human 
rights because they are all premised on some kind of arbitrary and subjective 
values. Th erefore, the discourse theory should at least be immune to this very 
same criticism in order to come closer to be considered as a comprehensive theory 
of human rights. Th at is, whether it is, in fact, a pure or neutral procedural theory 
of universal human rights, as it claims to be.
As we have seen above, there is no doubt that, Alexy was committed to 
providing a discourse theoretical foundation for the Kantian-liberal conception 
of human rights, in turn, based on the value of individual autonomy. In the face 
of this clear value commitment, it is hardly clear how it can be claimed that there 
is no preconceived value claim in discourse theory other than pure procedural 
rules necessary for the possibility of rational discourse itself. It is one thing to say 
that the Kantian-liberal conception of human rights can also be justifi ed through 
hypothetical discourse procedure but it is another thing to say that there is no 
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value claim made in designing such a procedure in the fi rst place. To say the least, 
it is essential that autonomy be accepted as a value, be as intrinsic or extrinsic, by 
all discourse partners to begin with. If there is no meeting of minds as regards the 
primacy of the value of autonomy in the way Alexy describes, that is, if there is a 
diff erence in the conception of what the ultimate guiding value is, then, we cannot 
see discourse being carried out between discourse participants. In other words, 
there must, fi rst and foremost, be a prior value judgement about the primacy 
and signifi cance of a value of autonomy by those concerned. In addition to this, 
there is also no compelling reason why participants should choose autonomy as 
a superior value over other, at least, equally signifi cant values such as dignity, 
humanity, equality, solidarity, justice and equality of concern and respect.208
Also, Alexy did not establish autonomy as an inherent value equally present 
in the life of every human being, nor did he indicate that it is universally 
accepted as such everywhere. It has already been shown in some detail above 
that autonomy is not something that is inherently available but that which 
individuals achieve over the course of their life span through the realisation 
of various necessary social and material conditions: in short, it is relative, 
contingent and has limited cross-cultural validity.209 So it cannot give rise 
to an inherent, equal and universal idea of rights that human beings (should) 
have qua human being, that is, regardless of the capacity for moral discourse 
or autonomous life. Inherent and equal human rights should be justifi ed on 
anything except on something deeply refl ecting the quality and value of being 
human, but as Torre clearly disputes, discursive capacity, one of the central 
assumptions of discourse theory – human beings as discursive creatures – is 
not one of such a quality.
Indeed, Alexy’s three steps strategy – moving from (1) a claim to correctness to (2) 
a claim to justifi ability to eventually land into (3) a claim to justice – is bound to 
fail, since discourses are not the whole of human experience (one could even regret 
that human beings are not fully discursive beings, but still observe that this is the 
case).210
Even if we have a potential for rational discourse and, more generally, systematic 
thinking, it is the capacity which comes to pass only aft er socialisation being 
nurtured through education and training.
Furthermore, it is also questioned if there is in fact any fundamental human 
right that emerges through discourse theory, let alone it be regarded as a 
208 Cf. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 8) 198–199; Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible 
Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton University Press 2006) 9–23; Nussbaum, 
Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 67–81; Rawls (n 88) 
52–56.
209 See Chapt 3.2.1(c) above.
210 Torre (n 2) 65.
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comprehensive theory of human rights. For instance, Toddington argues that ‘Th e 
fundamental impulse of Discourse Th eory is to eschew the moral substantivism 
of ethical relationalism in favour of a pragmatic, procedural approach to 
theoretical analysis, issues of social justice and in the case of Alexy [also of] legal 
argumentation’. But in his view, despite its proceduralism claim, ‘[the] egalitarian 
permissions and prohibitions’ that the rules of discourse ethics consisted of ‘seem 
to exhibit a substantial character, yet they are presented as merely expressing a 
composited procedural maxim’.211 It nevertheless stands to reason that ‘Th e 
implementation of [the discourse rationality rules], and the exercise of the 
privileges they extend, presuppose that all participants already have rights to, 
and have indeed secured, the basic generic well-being that the agents minimally 
require to act purposively in the fi rst place’. Th us, the discourse rules presented 
to us ‘as discourse-participant rights presuppose basic agency rights to freedom 
and well-being’ that ‘all prospective communicators must claim’ as ‘generic rights 
validly and, obviously, acknowledge them mutually’.212 Th is is so because, per 
Toddington,
[t]he presuppositions of abiding by the communicative rules are, in eff ect, that each 
individual has suffi  cient practical wherewithal or, in Gewirthian terms, ‘freedom 
and well-being’ in order to be a participant. Again, these substantial rights to what 
is required to exercise agency in the form of participation in a discourse presuppose 
the fundamental validity of the [Principle of Generic Consistency213] and thus, as 
noted, its validity is logically prior to the outcomes of discourse procedures. Discourse 
ethics procedures cannot thus establish these rights and duties [but proceeds from 
presupposing that that they exist].214
For this reason, there is no (human) right of discourse participants emerging anew 
from prescriptions of discourse rules as such. Toddington thus maintains neither 
does the discourse ethics ‘provide an apodictic demonstration of the rationality of 
fi nal and subsistent ends: the intrinsic worth of persons’ that is quintessentially 
‘required to establish the set of mutual rights and duties in question,’ nor does 
it ‘share [the] aspiration’ of such methodology ‘but claims to launch substantive 
ethics on the back of a procedural theory’.215
211 Stuart Toddington, ‘Th e Moral Truth about Discourse Th eory’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217, 218–219.
212 Ibid 223.
213 Gewirth, thus, argues that individuals recognize and value generic freedoms and well-being of 
other individuals in the light of and in accordance with that which they value for themselves. 
Hence, anyone who claims that she is entitled to have these rights and freedoms must at the 
same time acknowledge that all other persons have equally valid claims to have those same 
rights and freedoms under the pain of generic inconsistency, hence the principle of generic 
consistency.
214 Toddington (n 211) 223.
215 Ibid.
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Th erefore, we cannot look into a discourse theory as a substantive justifi cation 
of the inherent rights of human beings. Th ere is, however, one element of the 
theory that remains essential especially with respect to the practical institutional 
implications of human rights for a political society. Th at is, provided that 
there could be found an overarching theory and normative principle through 
which inherent human rights can be justifi ed, it is possible to argue that the 
institutional and procedural mechanisms essential for the realisation of human 
rights may have to be designed in a manner that would approximate or at least 
be substantially informed by the procedural principles of discourse theory. In 
this regard, it is also important to particularly recognise two important points 
following from discourse theory: the fi rst is that it helps us to appreciate the 
complementary relationship between the (substantive) idea of human rights and 
the principle of democracy and the second, but still related to the fi rst point, is 
that it establishes economic, social and cultural rights as integral elements of the 
principle of autonomy and democracy and therewith confi rms the falsity of the 
hierarchical and dichotomised conceptions of human rights discussed in chapter 
two above.
3.4. HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SOCIAL IDEA
Clearly, the major problems or limitations identifi ed in relation to the traditional 
human rights theories call for the development of an alternative normative 
theory which can explain the idea, nature and implications of human rights 
in a more comprehensive manner. To this end, I would like to suggest that 
the idea of human rights should be construed as being deeply rooted in and 
directly emerging from practical social relations.216 Th is view which can be 
referred to as the social conception of human rights, in substance, holds that the 
deep theory (i.e. the foundation and functions) of human rights can better be 
explained comprehensively and adequately with reference to their social essence. 
Developing this argument in detail of course deserves an independent inquiry 
of its own. Th e purpose here is simply to state some of the major assumptions 
and arguments providing the general thought-framework for the normative 
foundation of human rights centred around the principle of human dignity to be 
discussed in the next chapter.217
216 As has already been seen other theories make, but unsuccessfully, diff erent sorts of 
propositions. Neither of the proposition should be outrightly rejected as long as there is 
useful argument for the justifi cation of specifi c categories of human rights. Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive conception of human rights can only be explained by their very origin, that 
is, their being social in essence, and this is the approach followed by the social conception of 
human rights proposed in this subsection.
217 In developing this idea, I have been mainly infl uenced by, inter alia, the following authors: 
Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4); Habermas, 
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3.4.1. DEFINITION, NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS
Th e terms ‘social’ and hence ‘social relations’ are deployed in this study with 
somewhat a broad substantive meaning though not very diff erent from their 
ordinary usage.218 Th e phrase ‘social relations’ is used as a generic term to refer 
to wide-ranging modes, dimensions or levels of relationships or interactions 
between individuals and group of individuals in a political society or countries. 
Social relations take place in diff erent forms, dimensions and levels. Th us, the 
notion of social relations embraces all forms, dimensions and levels of human 
relationships. Social relations can exist at diff erent levels of generality and 
complexity ranging from simple personal relations to those highly abstract 
multidimensional relationships in a given political society. Th e structure of 
social relations can take diff erent modes or forms as family, cultural, religious, 
economic, political and legal, and, fi nally, it can assume private (personal), group, 
public and institutional dimensions.
It is obvious that the basic atom of society and hence social relations is the 
individual human being. Th us, the adjective ‘social’ in ‘social relations’ signifi es 
that both the subject and object of relations is essentially a human being. Of 
course, in the modern world, diff erent kinds of socio-economic and political 
relations are institutionalised but this does not change the brute fact that the 
fundamental element in this relationship is still the individual human being. So, 
as long as the relationship is of and between human beings, it is necessarily and, 
hence, concerned with social relations. Th is, in turn, underlines the relational 
nature of human beings. Th at is, a human being is always and necessarily in some 
kind of relationship with one or more persons regardless of the nature and scope 
of that relationship.219 Th us, participation in social relations is both a natural and 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law and Democracy (Trans 
William Rehg) (n 20); Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology Individuality and Community in Marx’s 
Th eory of Social Reality (n 30); John Searle, ‘Th e Construction of Social Reality’ (1995) 62 1995 
285; Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 
1); Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and 
Society (n 39); Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 
114); Rawls (n 38); Rawls (n 88); Sen (n 3); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 8); Carr (n 141).
218 Note that on the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, the primary meaning of the term 
social is put as: ‘1. connected with society and the way it is organized’. And the term relation 
is defi ned as: ‘1. relations [pl.] … the way in which two people, groups or countries behave 
towards each other or deal with each other. Th is defi nition of relation(s) is the same as the 
primary meaning of the term relationship which is defi ned as ‘1. the way in which two people, 
groups or countries behave towards each other or deal with each other’.
219 Th is social or relational nature of human being has been recognized by many authors. See for 
instance, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (A New Translation by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan 
D. Collins) (Th e University of Chicago Press 2011); Aristotle, Th e Nicomachean Ethics (Trans by 
David Ross Revised with an Introduction and Notes by Lesley Brown) (Oxford University Press 
2009); Locke (n 141); Carr (n 141); Grotius (n 141); Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality and Species Membership (n 114); Christman (n 48); Gewirth, Th e Community of 
Rights (n 3).
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necessary aspect of human life in the sense that, in the normal course of things, 
no human being can and will be able to avoid social relations and still be able to 
lead a normal human life. In short, the life of a human being begins and ends with 
social relations.220
Th e nature and implications of the idea of social relations thus described 
underscores the practical and fundamental idea that the substance and end 
of human life is essentially defi ned by its relationality: no single person can 
live a meaningful life nor can one pursue a personal fulfi lment outside social 
relations.221 However, owing to its abstract and complex nature, it is diffi  cult to 
provide a straightforward description of how relations between individuals and 
their social environment practically determine their personal and collective 
beings. But, in abstract, it can be said that it essentially signifi es the following major 
substantive point: it is not that an individual is because of the individual himself 
or herself, nor the society is because of the society itself (society understood in 
its organisational-collective sense). In my view, the individual is possible because 
of the society and the society is possible because of the individuals constituting 
the society.222 Th is is the deep and abstract substantive idea that I would like 
to convey through the notion of social relations. It is understandable that this 
220 Th is is somewhat refl ected in communitarian view as well, as observed by Christman. 
‘Consider how such things as a relationship with another person, a family member, an ethnic 
heritage, or a religion have value for a person. It is oft en not that one looks around, considers 
the options and chooses any of these things. Rather one fi nds oneself in the midst of them and 
comes to see their virtues, thereby discovering aspects of the (already established) situation 
that were in no way chosen, but which have come to defi ne one’s outlook and value orientation’. 
And for communitarians, ‘the source of the value of these connections, traditions, and belief 
systems is decidedly not the choice of the person involved; rather it is the intrinsic nature of 
the thing itself; refl ection merely reveals this to the person’. (emphasis original). Christman (n 
48) 135. See also generally Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3) 91–101.
221 In fact, Alexy argues that human beings are ‘discursive creatures’. Th us, for him, ‘someone 
who in his life has never participated in any moves of any discursive practice has not taken part 
in the most general form of life of human beings’. Th at is, ‘It is not easy for them to forbear from 
participating in any discourse whatever’. According to him, human beings’ participation in 
discourse is simply an existential question which cannot easily be foregone. In his own words, 
‘Th e choice of such a farewell to reason, objectivity, and truth is an existential choice’. Alexy, 
‘Discourse Th eory and Fundamental Rights’ (n 94) 22 & 21 (also citing Robert B. Brandom, 
Articulating Reasons, 2000, p 26). See also Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 
223ff . Of course, other explanations are abound as well but for the purpose here it is suffi  ce to 
state that social relations is a necessarily inherent nature of human being constituting literally 
every basic institutions of human society such as religion, culture, law and politics. See for 
instance, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law 
and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 17–22. As Christman notes, for instance, ‘On 
the communitarian alternative, selves are fundamentally social both in their metaphysical 
constitution and their psychology’. (emphasis original). Christman (n 48) 131.
222 In fact, Samuel von Pufendorf, who developed the Grotius’ idea of, inter alia, human nature 
and common sociability, argued that human being is inherently inclined towards sociality and 
this sociality or human sociability is one of the two fundamental constitutive elements of the 
universal law nature, the other being the right and duty of self-preservation (self-love). Carr (n 
141) 80ff .
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characterisation is very abstract and in its crude form but this is so because it is 
diffi  cult to fi nd any better way to restate the axiomatic truth about the relational 
nature of human life and, therewith, how both the individual and collective being 
of human life is so decisive for, in particular, the comprehensive theory of human 
rights: that it is not possible to imagine the possibility of one without the other.223
Of course, this view is by no means a new idea. In fact, it should by now 
be clear that the principal underlying assumption behind the notion of social 
relations is the age-old philosophical conception of human being as inherently 
social and political animal. Th e only thing that is new here, if at all, is the degree 
of emphasis put on it so as to show its importance for deep practical theory of 
human rights. Th us, to say that human beings are social animals is to suggest that 
they have inherent inclination or aptitude to live in common and (do in fact) value 
communal living. As such, the fundamental substantive implication of human 
sociability is social solidarity (mutuality) which, in turn, entails that human beings 
not merely lead life in common but do also make substantial interactions in the 
life and well-being of each other and hence provide one another with some form of 
mutual assistance, care and security.224 Th is explains the main reason why many 
thinkers like Grotius and Pufendorf identify sociability as essential characteristic 
feature of humanity, as already been referred to above.225 In abstract, sociability 
essentially entails the willingness to see the realisation of one’s good (interest, 
well-being, happiness) in and in relation to that of others. It can thus be said that 
sociability is closely associated with such notions as mutuality, reciprocity and 
friendship (although it may not be literally equated with any of them). In fact, it 
is argued that mutuality, care and reciprocity are among key obligations fl owing 
223 In expounding this, Pufendorf has made the following observations. He stated, ‘man 
would have been but little removed from beasts, and would not lead a much more cultured 
and commodious life than they, if there were not also implanted in him by nature another 
inclination, so that he enjoyed living in the society of those similar to himself […] Nothing is 
more miserable for man than perpetual solitude. He alone among living things has been given 
the ability to expound to others the perceptions of his mind by means of articulate sound, and 
there is no fi tter instrument than this for contracting or preserving society. In no class of living 
things can the advantages of one be so greatly promoted by others as of men by one another. 
Such is the neediness of human life that it can be preserved only with diffi  culty if a number of 
persons do not conspire to be of service to one another’. ibid 80. Carr also notes Pufendorf ’s 
insistence that ‘[H]umans need the society of others in order to sustain themselves and to 
enhance their well-being’. ibid 9. And as Carr also points out, ‘Th e rational acknowledgment 
of each person’s inescapable need for the society of others is put forward as the basic principle 
of natural law; “Any man must, inasmuch as he can, cultivate and maintain toward others 
a peaceable sociality that is consistent with the native character and end of humankind in 
general”’. ibid 10. Based on this, Pufendorf interpreted the old Aristotelian-Stoic-Grotian view 
that ‘Man is by nature a social animal’ as implying that ‘Man is destined by nature for the 
society of those similar to himself, and this society is to the highest degree congruent with 
and useful to him. He has also been endowed with such a disposition that he can through 
cultivation acquire the aptitude to conduct himself rightly in that society’. ibid 81 & 9–10.
224 Carr (n 141) 81.
225 Ibid 80ff .
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from the dictate of natural law (reason). For instance, according to Pufendorf, 
who developed and defended Grotius’s idea of sociability, human sociability 
constitutes the ultimate normative foundations of the principle of natural law. So 
the conception of human beings as political animals (itself fl owing from the social 
nature of human beings) suggests that they are beings wherein mutual cooperation 
and communality are indispensable for human existence and overall well-being 
and fl ourishing.226 Th is thinking, in turn, rests on the basic assumption as regards 
the inherent capacity of human beings to give and receive reasonable terms for 
mutual cooperation and abide by those terms of cooperation. Together, the social 
and political nature of human beings reveal that human beings are essentially 
rational moral beings: they are endowed with inherent capacity to judge between 
right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust and so on.227 Th is is indeed 
important because the social and political conception of human beings is neither 
possible nor relevant especially for our discussion concerning the social idea of 
human rights without this capacity for rationality and morality. In short, the 
social and political conception of human beings reaffi  rms the relational nature of 
human beings. And this is the reason why the idea of social relations is considered 
here as an elementary characteristic feature of humanity: practically speaking, 
it is from this elementary aspect of humanity that all other social values and 
institutions emerge. Th at is, social relations constitute the ultimate foundational 
framework through which all human values and institutions come into existence. 
Th ere is no basic social institution which has no foundation in the idea of social 
relations, be it religion, culture, morality, law or state.228
Th erefore, the idea of social relations provides us with an interesting framework 
in thinking about, for instance, the relationship between individual and collective 
values on the one hand and the importance or weight we ought to attach to each 
of them on the other. In particular, it introduces an alternative perspective to 
both the individualistic (atomistic) and collectivist (totalitarian) conceptions 
dominating, in one way or another, the modern thinking of human rights. Th is 
226 See Carlos Eduardo Maldonado, Human Rights, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Essays toward a 
Social Ontology (Th e Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 1997); Christman (n 48) 
135ff ; Carr (n 141) 80ff .
227 For instance, the conception of individuals and society as cooperative beings is also one 
of the underlying theoretical backbone of Rawls’ Th eory of Justice. But this fundamental 
presupposition can only rest on the basic idea that human beings are by nature sociable and 
hence inherently engages in complex form of social relations such as agreeing on fundamental 
political principles and installing basic social institutions. See Rawls (n 88) 491–496; Rawls 
(n 38) 15–22, 278–281, 299–304; Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and 
Species Membership (n 114) Chapt 3.
228 One of the central claims put forward by Gould in her ‘Rethinking Democracy’ is the argument 
for the primacy of social relations. See Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society (n 39). See also Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology 
Individuality and Community in Marx’s Th eory of Social Reality (n 30). See generally Carr (n 
141) 99–108; Searle (n 217); John R Searle, ‘Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles’ (2006) 80 
Papers 51; Carlos Eduardo Maldonado (n 226); Rawls (n 38) 15–22, 278–281 & 299–304.
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idea of social relations does not follow the kind of individualistic relations assumed 
through the Hobbesian social contract thesis. Hobbes’ view of the state of nature 
as an all-out war by all against all fl ows from his assumptions regarding the 
nature and circumstances of individuals that they are amoral, rational (prudent), 
mutually disinterested, egoistic and destructive beings driven only with their 
own self-interest in social cooperation.229 Nor does it subscribe to the totalitarian 
conception of society and social values constructed on the basis of utilitarianism 
and socialism whereby (the value of) every relationship is viewed solely from the 
collectivist standpoint. As already discussed above, these ideals are at the back of 
the dichotomised, antagonistic and narrow construction of the relations between 
the individual and society and, as such, present to us a rather false picture of 
humanity and social relations constituting its social world. But as implied through 
such substantive values as dignity and sociability already defended by many authors 
(including Aristotle, Mirandola, Cicero, Th omas Aquinas, Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Paine and, more recently, Dworkin, Nussbaum, Sen and Gewirth), the life of 
humanity is essentially a life of community (relationality) whereby the individual 
and common (social) values are inseparably interwoven with one another.230
229 Of course, it is notable that there are two extreme views of social contract thesis. Hobbesian 
and Grotian views. Th e individualistic conception and construction of the thesis is oft en 
identifi ed with Th omas Hobbes’ view of the individuals and the circumstances in the state 
of nature. For Hobbes, individuals in the state of nature were in the state of perfect natural 
freedom, equality and power, recognised no (moral) rules and power, solely concerned with 
the protection of their life and interest and to this end had a natural right and power to use 
all available means. He saw them as egoistic, mutually disinterested, destructive beings who 
could be driven by nothing but their own personal interest. Th is in turn would lead them to 
the state of an all-out war against all. Th us, for Hobbes, the egoistic and asocial nature of 
individuals coupled with the absence of moral or positive authority would characterise the 
state of nature as the state of anarchy unfi t for human living, paving the way for the emergence 
of civil society organised under strong sovereign power. But this view was harshly criticised 
by, in particular, Pufendorf, who argued that such way of the description of both the nature of 
individuals and the state of nature hardly fi ts to the true nature of human beings but beasts. As 
already noted, Pufendorf instead argued for Aristotelian-Grotian view of human sociability. 
And more recently, Nussbaum repeated similar criticism against this view while discussing 
Rawls’ theory of justice who relied on Hobbes’ conception of the nature of individuals and 
the society. See Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership 
(n 114) Chapts 1 through 3. For Nussbaum, however, it is diffi  cult to categorise Rawls’ idea of 
(social) justice under the classical construction of social contract theory rooted in Hobbesian 
view of individuals and civil society. Even though Rawls’ idea gives allegiance to some ideas 
developed in that traditions (his construction of basic liberty, priority of primary goods, the 
role of individual circumstances in the evaluation of the justness of a social system or basic 
structure of the society), his conception of the general idea of social justice and the role of 
social institutions puts him unease with that of the classical interpretation of the tradition. In 
any case, while the absence of formalised institution-based cooperation in the so-called the 
state of nature can be asserted with some degree of plausibility, it is not only diffi  cult but would 
be absurd to maintain that there were no social relations whatsoever in the state of nature; if 
this were the case, then, the very possibility of the social contract hypothesis would also utterly 
collapse.
230 Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (n 90) 4–5 & 31–39; Christman (n 48) 135–
148; Sen (n 3) 282–298; Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3) 1–8, chapt 3.2, 3.6 & 3.7.Th is of 
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3.4.2. SOCIAL RELATIONS AS MORAL RELATIONS
Th e relational view of humanity presented through the notion of social relations 
can be objected on the bases of several compelling empirical facts as confl ict, 
homicide, discrimination, exploitation and domination routinely present 
in everyday social life. However, the idea of social relations does not deny the 
existence of these and other similar facts; it rather treats them as deviations or 
social evils that should be struggled against by humanity itself. Judging certain 
behaviour as deviations or social evils, of course, presupposes the presence of 
some kind of moral standards or principles. In fact, it is counterintuitive to 
think that social relations in the sense described above could ever take place in 
a normative vacuum. It is thus indispensable to start with necessary and basic 
moral assumptions in thinking about human life and social institutions.231
In this regard, it has already been noted that the principal underlying 
assumption behind social relations ultimately rests on the moral capacity of 
humanity, that is, humanity’s inherent capacity for rational moral thinking and 
action.232 Hence, we should be able to generally agree that human relations are 
shaped by some kind of moral assumptions, principles and values although it is 
possible to disagree on the specifi cs of such assumptions, principles or values. 
Th us, while there is a fundamental moral assumption and judgment about 
course does not suggest that there is no confl ict between various interests in a society. While 
interests and goals of diff erent kinds always compete in diff erent forms and at diff erent levels, 
such confl icts are settled, accommodated, structured and balanced through the application 
of various normative principles developed over the course of time. Th e central organising 
principle in this regard will be discussed in detail in the next chapter but here it is suffi  ce to 
state that, following Nussbaum, for instance, human beings not only want to live together but 
they want to live together well in a manner compatible with the values of human life in dignity, 
justice, equality, rule of law, care, benevolence, compassion, altruism and etc.. See Nussbaum, 
Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 81–91 & 155–160. 
Th e following Raz’s argument is also in perfect concordance with this idea of substantive 
interconnectivity between individual and common values. Th us, for Raz, ‘rights are not to be 
understood as inherently independent of collective goods, nor as essentially opposed to them. 
On the contrary, they both depend on and serve collective goods. Hence there is no general 
rule giving either rights or collective goods priority in cases of [for instance,] confl ict’. Raz 
(n 30) 255. And so does Sen’s interesting characterisation of individual freedom as a social 
commitment. Sen (n 3) 282ff .
231 Indeed, the idea of humanity as sociability can be countered with unfortunately very 
sorrow events and practices in the history of humanity such as slavery, genocide, holocaust, 
discrimination, oppression, barbaric wars and confl icts. However, endorsing these as normal 
practices of the society would be repugnant to the nature of human beings and society. Th e 
best approach is thus to treat them as deviations against which moral and legal norms and 
institutions are developed over the course of time.
232 Th is is one of the basic assumption in the writings of the following authors. Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Trans and Ed Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, 
Trans Revised Jens Timmermann, Introduction Christine M Korsgaard) (Revised Ed, Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3); Rawls (n 38). For a rational 
justifi cation of morality, see generally Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Th e University of 
Chicago Press 1978).
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humanity and social life in classifying certain activities, practices or behaviours 
as deviations or social evils, this judgment itself rests on the assumption as to 
the presence of an objective normative standard to this eff ect. However, I have 
already stated above that all normative values and social institutions emerge from 
social relations in the fi rst place and, not vice versa.
Th e question worth asking is, therefore, in what sense do we say that social 
relations normally take place within some kind of moral assumption or principle? 
In my opinion, in social relations, the basic moral principle through which we can 
objectively discriminate between good and evil behaviour is nothing but the self-
refl ective consciousness and, hence, recognition of the status and value of humanity 
and human life. Th at is, the respect for, protection, preservation and promotion of 
the inherent and existential value of humanity constitute an ultimate underlying 
moral assumption behind social relations. Th erefore, without going into details, 
this moral principle implies the kind of treatment that should be due to humanity 
and, as such, prescribes the way individuals ought to treat and behave towards 
one another in their private and collective relations. Th is all indicates that social 
relations are essentially moral relations par excellence: that is, relationships between 
moral beings on moral grounds. It is basically on the basis of this fundamental 
moral principle that we can be able to distinguish and judge between morally good 
and evil behaviours, activities or practices in the social world.233 Th is provides a 
general, primordial, justifi cation for humanity’s continued eff ort to nurture and 
embrace morally good behaviours and activities and to reject those morally evil 
ones.234 In other words, the protection, preservation and promotion of the life and 
inherent value of humanity as a whole constitute the elementary justifi cation for the 
existence of basic social institutions such as morality, law and state in a society.235 
233 If we think of ethics, and so also of a human being, in these interdependent, relational terms, 
then ethical thinking and acting will always involve thinking and acting in ways that are 
attentive to the complex set of relations in the midst of which our own life is constituted.
234 Aristotle for instance recognises the existence of vice and virtue as being present in individuals. 
See Aristotle (n 219) Book II-IV. It is notable that what is deviation and norm are defi ned by the 
society depending on the civilization of time and place but there are primordial values and facts 
which remain unchanged since the time in memorial as the one described. See for instance, 
Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changingg World (Polity Press 1990), Chapts 1 through 3 
(where he describes the struggle that humanity has passed through to come to terms with the 
idea of human rights now provided in international human rights instruments such as UDHR).
235 Th is is essentially the fundamental idea that cuts-across the legal philosophy of thinkers 
like Radbruch who sees law as essentially a cultural concept which gets its true compulsory 
nature from the idea of morals. Anton-Hermann Chroust, ‘Th e Philosophy of Law of Gustav 
Radbruch’ (1944) 53 Philosophical Review 23, 29ff . According to Radbruch, ‘Law has as its 
prime object the social coexistence of men. Th us “legality” becomes something that is common 
to all values which have as their ultimate object the “common good” rather than the individual 
and his personal interests or motives. From this Radbruch infers that legal norms are in their 
original meaning not merely precepts or “commands” directed to the individual, but primarily 
standards or “patterns” by means of which the co-existence as well as the cooperativeness of 
diff erent individuals may be “appraised” or evaluated. Consequently, law is in the fi rst place a 
body of means or “instruments” by which a certain human behaviour can be “appraised” as to 
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In this regard, it should be axiomatic that the underlying social support for any 
basic social institution is essentially rooted in its perceived contribution, in one 
way or another, towards the furtherance of humanity’s general welfare; it is hard 
to imagine the existence and validity of any basic social institution whatsoever 
without it serving some point in a society. We can, for example, say that the social 
justifi cation for a legal system is nothing other than society’s inherent existential 
need for security, stability and peace which is also implied (or even required) by the 
fundamental moral principle mentioned above.236
I strongly believe that this idea of social relations and of human rights that 
comes with it is true for every society. As such, it is not possible to portray the idea 
and function of human rights as only indigenous to certain specifi c culture. Th e 
basic argument behind the social conception of human rights is that humanity is 
held together by practical and complex social relations and that no social relations 
can be constituted without due and proper respect for the inherent life and value 
of human being. Th is, in turn, assumes that every society has the general moral 
capacity to appreciate the importance of human life and the minimal moral 
values attached to it. It further assumes that every society has some sense of moral 
judgment as regards what is good and evil, just and unjust in relation to human 
being and his or her environment.237
Surely, there is general epistemological problem that one encounters in this 
argument for there is no adequate account of each and every society’s fundamental 
moral systems. But this problem is equally true for those who utterly deny the 
universal nature of human rights on account of cultural relativism. In the absence 
of tangible evidences concerning the underlying moral systems of diff erent 
cultures around the world and their bearings on the idea of human rights, 
whatever argument is proposed on the basis of cultural relativism cannot be 
anything more than mere speculation or subjective interpretation.238 Even then, 
its social signifi cance or importance; it is not simply a body of “commands” ordering human 
conduct.’ ibid 34–35. Chroust also observes that, per Radbruch, ‘Law serves morals primarily 
by guaranteeing certain personal rights, in order to enable man to comply with his moral 
duties, and not by imposing certain obligations and restrictions. Th us a “personal right” is, 
according to Radbruch, nothing but the right of every one to do what he considers his moral 
duty. In this the preservation and protection of “individual rights” becomes a moral duty, and 
is identical with the preservation of man’s moral personality and dignity’. ibid 34.
236 Radbruch recognises the realisation of certainty, security (peace and order), and justice as 
among key constitutive justifi cations of the idea of law. Chroust (n 235); Gustav Radbruch, 
‘Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945)’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13. ‘Law is 
the will to justice. Justice means: To judge without regard to the person, to measure everyone 
by the same standard.’ ibid 14.
237 Cicero and Pufendorf among others believe that the sense of justice is a natural moral capacity. 
Kant also defends that every human being possesses this natural moral capacity. Dworkin also 
argues that morality is inherent. Rawls also endorses that individuals possess sense of justice 
and capacity for moral judgement.
238 Sen (n 3) 227ff  (criticizing several aspects of the cultural relativist view of human rights as well 
as the problem of misconception of historical and cultural values of other societies by certain 
authors).
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it is diffi  cult to imagine or endorse the legitimacy and viability of any cultural or 
moral systems devoid of a minimal level of consciousness about the sanctity and 
respect-worthiness of the inherent life and value of human beings.
3.4.3. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Th e idea and function of human rights are indissociable from that of other 
basic social institutions as morality, law and state. Th ere is no such thing as the 
metaphysics of human rights other than those practical existential and inherent 
needs of humanity which should be recognised, respected and realised in and 
through the functioning of a political society. As already argued, the basic idea of 
human rights has a social foundation in the sense that it directly fl ows from and 
is closely intertwined with what humanity is and ought to be. And, in fact, it is 
possible to see the modern idea of human rights enshrined in several international 
treaties as an advancement of the moral and relational nature of humanity (its 
relationality and sociability), and human rights norms thereof as concretisation 
of the fundamental moral principles behind social relations. So, the primary 
social point or raison d’être of human rights and human rights norms in a given 
political society cannot be other than the protection, preservation and promotion 
of humanity and its inherent value.
Several authors have expressed this fundamental function of human rights 
in somewhat diff erent but complementary manner. According to Dworkin, for 
instance, the point of the institution of human rights can be stated in terms of 
two interrelated normative ideals: the protection of human dignity and political 
equality – that is, equality of concern and respect.
Th e institution of rights against the Government is not a gift  of God, or an ancient 
ritual, or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the 
Government’s job of securing the general benefi t more diffi  cult and more expensive, 
and it would be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point. Anyone 
who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our government for respecting 
them, must have some sense of what that point is. He must accept, at the minimum, 
one or both of two important ideas. Th e fi rst is the vague but powerful idea of human 
dignity. … Th e second is the familiar idea of political equality.239
239 So, for Dworkin, ‘It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the 
Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that is necessary to protect his dignity, 
or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other value of personal 
consequence. It does not make sense otherwise’. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 8) 198–
199. See also Michael J Meyer and William A Parent (eds), Th e Constitution of Rights: Human 
Dignity and the American Values (Cornell University Press 1992); Dworkin, Is Democracy 
Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights 
(n 3).
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Also, some of the institutional arguments that Raz puts forward regarding the 
justifi cation behind aff ording entrenched constitutional protection for certain 
fundamental liberal (human) rights, as he refers to them, can be taken as also 
pointing to some of the primary function of human rights in a political society.240 
Raz denies that the role of entrenched liberal constitutional rights consists ‘in 
articulating fundamental moral or political principles’ or ‘in the protection of 
individualistic personal interests of absolute weight.’241 For him, the purpose of 
the constitutional entrenchment of such rights is rather ‘to maintain and protect 
the fundamental moral and political culture of a community through specifi c 
institutional arrangements or political conventions’.242 Th e principles fl owing 
from fundamental rights and the institutional cultures (and jurisprudence) 
developed around the same contribute towards the mediation of various private 
and collective (and institutional) interests as well as ensuring balance of powers 
between diff erent organs of government. Th is is particularly so because, following 
Raz, fundamental rights, inter alia, ‘express values which should form a part of 
morally worthy political cultures’ that should be placed far beyond and above 
ordinary decision-making procedures.243 Th is does not mean that fundamental 
rights are devoid of private purposes such as the ones oft en claimed in liberal 
individualism.244 He argues that while there are undoubtedly important private 
interests protected through fundamental rights, their ultimate values however 
rests essentially in the collective or public interests they are meant to serve.245
Also, Henkin’s interesting historical account of the role of human rights in the 
socio-political and legal history of France and United States supports this view. 
According to him, in these two countries, the idea of human rights formed an 
integral element of ‘a comprehensive theory of government’. In particular, having 
analysed the conception and institutional signifi cances of human rights within 
the respective systems, Henkin made the following observations:
France and the United States represent two strands in a single eighteenth century 
conception of rights. Th ey have much in common, and some important diff erences. In 
240 For his full discussion, see Raz (n 30). Here, I say some of his arguments because he thinks 
that the reason for such entrenchment is not entirely from their moral force or importance 
but largely political expediency, the point I would not share with him. His argument could be 
the case for those countries with privileged constitutional status or special judicial procedure 
for human rights. But in the end, such a practice even depends not on universal principle 
but rather on particular political culture of a given society. It is my view that, as a matter 
of  principle, inherent human rights should, by defi nition, be aff orded special constitutional, 




244 It is worth noting that Raz expressly rejects the individualistic conception of liberal rights, 
rights as having only and strictly private interests confl icting with collective interests. See for 
instance his arguments at ibid.
245 Ibid.
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both, individual rights are part of a comprehensive theory of government. It includes 
representative government, with separated branches. It includes as well inherent 
individual rights, as ends in themselves, not merely as instrumental to some overriding 
conception of the good society. Important rights cannot be wholly sacrifi ced even for 
the general, public good.246
In fact, more can be said down this line, but for the purpose of this sub-section, 
it suffi  ces to note that the holistic picture of the social function of human rights 
goes further than what is usually suggested through extreme individualistic and 
collectivist (totalitarian) views of human rights and covers basic questions of 
socioeconomic and political justice and institutional governance. In particular, 
human rights norms play signifi cant roles in mediating and balancing competing 
interests in a society by, for instance, prescribing irreducible individual rights and 
freedom that ought to be guaranteed for each and every human being on the one 
hand and justifying institutional mechanisms through which private and public 
interests should simultaneously be promoted and realised as one undivided whole 
on the other.247
Th is general function of human rights, of course, involves very complex 
processes of weighing and prioritisation. At the same time, it presupposes the 
existence of overarching normative criterion through which these interests can be 
valued and ordered according to their relative weight on the ladder of priorities. 
Th is is crucial because without such foundational normative principle, the whole 
process of balancing would somehow rest on arbitrary and contingent ground. 
In this writing, the principle of human dignity is presented as rich and powerful 
normative principle justifying the relational nature of human rights through 
which the legitimacy of collective values and institutional decision-making 
processes can be assessed. But the major question is in what sense does the 
principle of human dignity serve as the normative foundation of human rights, 
and this is the subject to be explored in the next Chapter.
246 Henkin, ‘Rights: Here and Th ere’ (n 8) 1597. See also Henkin, ‘Constitutional Rights and 
Human Rights’ (n 73).
247 For more on the arguments pertaining to the balancing of human rights with genera public 
interests, see generally Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ 
(n 30); Cali (n 30); Adrian Brockless, ‘Human Rights and Individuality’ (2013) 12 Th ink 
69; Souleymane Bachir Diagne, ‘Individual, Community, and Human Rights’ (2009) 101 
Transition 8. For more on the interface between human rights and constitutional norms, see 
Neuman (n 50); Henkin, ‘Constitutional Rights and Human Rights’ (n 73); Alexy, ‘Discourse 
Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1); ‘Human Rights and Constitution Making’ (n 73). But see 
for instance, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of 
Law and Democracy (Trans William Rehg) (n 20) 121–122 (who argues that human rights and 
constitutional democratic principles are co-original, that is, they both co-originate from the 
operation of discourse procedure).
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3.5. CONCLUSION
Th e assessment of the existing major human rights theories, though in brief, 
clearly indicates that the contemporary human rights discourse suff ers from 
lack of deep substantive theory through which, among other things, the idea, 
nature and practical implications of inherent and universal human rights can be 
explained in a holistic manner. A holistic conception of human rights cannot be 
founded on the narrow and separationist value assumption for such could only 
lead us, as it already did, to a highly subjective and fragmented understanding of 
what human rights are and what they are for. Nor can a theory of human rights 
be derived from mere procedural construction of discourse ethics suggested by 
authors like Alexy for it eventually leaves the idea of human rights without any 
substantive moral foundation. At the same time, a deep theory of human rights 
cannot be dissociated from the social-political conception of human beings and 
the relations they constitute among themselves and their social environment. 
Th e social-political conception of human beings sees humanity as a whole as 
inherently relational (sociable, solidaristic) and mutually cooperative being. 
Accordingly, human beings naturally and necessarily constitute some form 
of relations between themselves and their complex social environment. At the 
heart of its complex social relations lies humanity’s moral self-consciousness 
and neediness to protect, preserve and promote the inherent life and value of 
humanity. Th is, in turn, shows that, fi rst, social relations are essentially moral 
relations and, second, behind these social relations stands an abstract and deep 
fundamental moral principle through which the legitimacy of diff erent kinds 
of actions and behaviours are scrutinised and judged which, upon refl ection, 
turns out to be the principle of human dignity. From this relational and moral 
nature of human beings and the fundamental moral principle underlying their 
complex social relations emerge a universal social idea of human rights. To this 
end, human rights are nothing but an advancement of the social-moral aspect of 
humanity and the further concretisation of the principle of human dignity. As 
such, their basic function, stated in abstract, is prescribing normative principles 
and institutional mechanisms through which a political society ensures basic 
moral and material conditions required to live and lead a life worthy of dignity, 
a dignifi ed living for its members. In the fi nal analysis, this abstract idea and 
function of human rights forms, to use Henkin’s interesting expression, an 
integral element of a comprehensive theory of government of a political society 
which cannot be explained through a reductionist construction of individualistic 






Th e purpose of this Chapter is providing an in-depth examination of the idea 
of human dignity as the normative foundation of human rights. In particular, it 
seeks to analysis and show if and in what sense the principle of human dignity can 
and should be regarded as an underlying normative justifi cation of ESC rights as 
inherent and universally valid human rights. But as noted in Chapter three above, 
defending human dignity as the normative foundation of human rights requires us 
to show, fi rst, that it is itself an inherent (intrinsic) moral value of every human being; 
second, that it is present in each and every human being equally, unconditionally 
and at all-time; and, fi nally, that it is regarded as a universal moral value. Before 
doing this, it’s important to fi rst address the controversy aff ecting the notion of 
human dignity. On the one hand, the idea of human dignity holds a central place 
in human rights law, constitutional law, and jurisprudence.248 It has received an 
248 Alan Gewirth, ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’ in Michael J Meyer and William A Parent 
(eds), Th e Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Cornell University 
Press 1992); Louis Henkin, ‘Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights’ in Michael J Meyer 
and William A Parent (eds), Th e Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 
(Cornell University Press 1992); Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity 
(Proceedings of the British Academiy No. 92) (Oxford University Press 2013); Glenn Hughes, ‘Th e 
Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2011) 39 Journal of Religious 
Ethics 1; Neal (n 29); Wicks (n 29); Lorraine E Weinrib, ‘Th e Charter in the International 
Context: Human Dignity as a Rights-Protecting Principle’ (2005) 17 Nat’l J. Const. L. 325; Daly 
(n 44); Neomi Rao, ‘Th ree Concepts of Human Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86 Notre 
Dame Law Review 183; Neomi Rao, ‘On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ 
(2008) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 201; Catherine Dupre, ‘Unlocking Human Dignity: 
Towards a Th eory for the 21st Century’ (2009) 2  European Human Rights Law Review 190; 
Maxine D Goodman, ‘Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2006) 
84 Nebraska Law Review 740; Riley (n 24); Paolo G Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a Stranger”: Th e 
Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights’ (2003) 81 Texas Law Review 1031; 
David Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’ [1999] Public Law 682; David Feldman, 
‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 2’ [2000] Public Law 61; Christopher McCrudden, 
‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655; Roberto Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common 
Ground for a Global Bioethics’ (2009) 34 Jounral of Medicine and Philosophy 223; Henriette 
Sinding Aasen, Rune Halvorsen and Antonio Barbosa Da Silva (eds), Human Rights, Dignity 
and Autonomy in Health Care and Social Services: Nordic Perspectives (Intersentia 2009); Leslie 
Meltzer Henry, ‘Th e Jurisprudence of Dignity’ 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 160.
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increasing attention in other fi elds including in moral and political philosophy.249 
It is a common phrase in social protest, activism and political rhetoric. In human 
rights law, it is regarded by many as a fundamental normative principle upon 
which inherent human rights are universally justifi ed.250 On the other hand, there 
is no or little consensus on its normative meaning, status and function both in 
theory and practice. In fact, some authors reject the assertion that human dignity 
is a foundation of universal human rights. For them, the popularity of the term 
in academic writing and practice conceals the existence of deep disagreement on 
what it entails not only between diff erent legal systems but even within a given legal 
system.251 Th ere are even authors who argue that the term dignity is nothing but 
a mere place holder or a useless concept employed by tribunals to limit legitimate 
democratic conversation on important societal issues.252
249 Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 
2007); Meyer, ‘Th e Simple Dignity of Sentient Life : Speciesism and Human Dignity’ (n 5); David 
Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy of Law) (Cambridge 
Univ Press 2007); Ulrich Eibach, ‘Protection of Life and Human Dignity: Th e German Debate 
between Christian Norms and Secular Expectations’ (2008) 14 Christian Bioethics 58; Doron 
Shultziner, ‘A Jewish Conception of Human Dignity: Philosophy and Its Ethical Implications 
for Israeli Supreme Court Decisions’ (2006) 34 Journal of Religious Ethics 663; Andrea 
Sangiovanni, Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights (Harvard 
University Press 2017); Kateb (n 5); Sabine C Carey, Mark Gibney and Stephen C Poe, Th e Politics 
of Human Rights: Th e Quest for Dignity (Cambridge University Press 2010); Human Dignity and 
Bioethics: Essays Comissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008); R George Wright, 
‘Consenting Adults: Th e Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively’ (1995) 75 
Boston University Law Review 1397; Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27); Patrick 
Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing 2009); 
Sensen (n 44); David Luban, ‘Th e Rule of Law and Human Dignity : Re-Examining Fuller’s 
Canons’ (2010) 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 29; Qianfan Zhang, ‘Th e Idea of Human 
Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: A Reconstruction of Confucianism’ (2000) 27 Journal 
of Chinese Philosophy 299; Daryl Pullman, ‘Human Non-Persons, Feticide, and the Erosion of 
Dignity’ (2010) 7 Bioethical Inquiry 353; Kaufmann and others (n 44).
250 Preambles to ICCPR and ICESCR partly provides, ‘Recognizing that these rights derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person’. Similarly, the Preamble to VDPA (1993) partly 
provides ‘Recognizing and affi  rming that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth 
inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms …’. See also the Preamble and Article 1 UDHR.
251 See for example an exchange between the following authors. Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a 
Stranger”: Th e Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights’ (n 248); Paolo 
G Carozza, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply’ (2008) 
19 European Journal of International Law 931; McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights’ (n 248); Conor O’Mahony, ‘Th ere Is No Such Th ing as a Right 
to Dignity’ [2012] International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON) 551; Conor O’Mahony, 
‘Th ere Is No Such Th ing as a Right to Dignity: A Rejoinder to Emily Kidd White’ (2012) 10 
International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON) 585; Emily Kidd White, ‘Th ere Is No Such 
Th ing as a Right to Human Dignity: A Reply to Conor O ’ Mahony’ (2012) 10 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON) 575. See also Waldron, ‘Is Dignity the Foundation of 
Human Rights?’ (n 5); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos 
(1907–1991)’ (2007) XLVII Arch.europ.social 201; Schachter (n 5).
252 R Jame Fyfe, ‘Dignity as Th eory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme 
Court of Canada’ (2007) 70 Saskatchewan Law Review 1; McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and 
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However, it will be seen that the controversies or disagreements surrounding 
human dignity have, by and large, more to do with the competing historical-
philosophical construction of the term than its current practical usage. In 
particular, it will be argued that human dignity should be conceived as practical 
and relational normative principle underlying our complex social relations. In one 
sense, this argument calls for the dissociation of the term from some of its past 
conception but in another sense, it also calls for the recognition and continuation, 
though in a more refi ned form, of the fundamental normative meaning associated 
with the very notion of the term from the inception. Th is, in turn, leads us to take 
an issue not only with its past religious, cultural and political interpretation but 
also with its philosophical conception as advanced by thinkers like Immanuel 
Kant.253
In order to develop this argument in detail, this Chapter begins with the 
discussion of the historical-philosophical conception and evolution of the idea 
of human dignity over the course of time and its normative signifi cance for 
the current human rights discourse. To this end, it takes a practical approach 
to the notion and function of human dignity, that is, it seeks to understand its 
normative meaning and functions in terms of its current usage and in the light of 
the practical social relations previously described in Chapter three. Th is practical 
approach will help us to see and appreciate the practical-intuitive sense in which 
human dignity is regarded as the normative foundation of all human rights and, 
to this extent, the existence of signifi cant coherence in its meaning and functions 
across various socioeconomic, cultural, political and legal contexts. In this regard, 
it is worth noting that the phrase ‘human dignity as a normative foundation of 
human rights’ is more or less used in the sense described by Rosen. According to 
Rosen, to say that human dignity constitutes the normative foundation of human 
rights would at least entail the following three basic things.
First, it would explain and justify the claim that all human beings share ‘inviolable’ 
dignity and that they are ‘free and equal’ in that dignity. Second, it would show that 
it followed from this that they also have inviolable and inalienable rights. Th ird and 
fi nally, it would identify what those rights [are].254
To these, I would like to add as a fourth point that human dignity would also 
serve as a guideline (standard) for the regulation of social behaviours and 
practices especially by introducing an internal and external evaluative normative 
standard255 to the way we ought to treat each other in the context of practical 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (n 248); Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity Is a Useless Concept: 
It Means No More than Respect for Persons or Th eir Autonomy’ (2003) 327 BMJ 1419.
253 See particularly Chapt 4.3 below.
254 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 54.
255 See particularly Riley (n 24) 129–131.
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social relations.256 Th at is, as it will be explained below, it would serve as a critical 
standard of legitimacy against which various kinds of social behaviours and 
practices are evaluated and judged both at individual (personal) and institutional 
level.257
Aft er discussing the conception, normative essence (character) and 
signifi cance of human dignity for human rights discourse in detail, the Chapter 
then proceeds with assessing the way it is deployed in and the general normative 
functions attached to the same in the current international positive law and few 
national jurisdictions with the view to, fi rst, see its coherence with the general 
conclusions reached in the fi rst half of this Chapter and, second, provide a 
groundwork for the discussion in the Part two of the study wherein its specifi c 
legal implications for the obligations of the States will be assessed in the context 
of international ESC rights jurisprudence.
4.2. DIGNITY AS RANK AND STATUS
Th is view of dignity is related, on the one hand, to the socio-cultural stratifi cation 
of a society into dignitaries and common (ordinary) people and, on the other 
hand, to the comparative evaluation of the value and status of humanity with that 
of other ordinary creatures in the universe. In both cases, the notion of dignity is 
hierarchical in the sense that those to which dignity is attributed are regarded as of 
higher value than the other and hence refl ects the diff erentiation in rank or status 
between those who are said to have and those who do not have dignity. In the fi rst 
sense (that is, in the hierarchical view of a society), dignity generally concerns the 
social worth, respect and privileges attributed to dignitaries of a society owing to 
the social ranks (statuses) they occupy in a society and the functions that fl ows 
from those ranks.258 Th e ranks may be of a religious, cultural, tribal, or ‘political’ 
nature that persons normally occupy on socio-cultural factors which, normally, 
has nothing to do with the merits of those individuals holding the positions.259 In 
a hierarchical society, therefore, dignity implies the value attached to the persona 
256 See Kant (n 232) 40–48 at 4:431–4:442; Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 26–27 
& 149.
257 See particularly Chapter 4.7.2 cum 4.5 & 4.6 below.
258 See Joern Eckert, ‘Legal Roots of Dignity in German Law’ in David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein 
(eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 
2002); Arieli (n 42); Lewis (n 24); Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27); Waldron, 
‘Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991)’ (n 251). Th e discussions 
by Starck, Eckert, Arieli and Waldron are useful explorations into these two historical 
connotations of dignity especially how the Judio-Christian conception of human being has 
played a role in combination with the Stoic-Romanic legal thinking and the 18th century 
intellectual revolution of the Western societies in the evolution of the second connotation over 
the fi rst one.
259 Eckert (n 258) 43; Rosen, ‘Dignty: Th e Case Against’ (n 27) 145 (addressing some objections to 
the notion of dignity).
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and position of dignitaries (nobilities, clergies, tribal leaders, etc.) and hence, does 
not belong to every members of a society. Th is is the reason it is oft en referred to 
as dignity of rank or aristocratic dignity.260
In the second sense, dignity connotes the status of humanity in the universe. 
It is considered as a value that pertains solely to humanity for it is said that 
humanity occupies an elevated, higher position over all other creatures.261 But 
we should note that this view is still hierarchical in nature because it compares 
humanity with other animals and says that because humanity is higher in 
status it has dignity. However, the diff erence from the dignity of rank is that it 
is seen as, at least generally, pertaining to every human being and not just few 
social dignitaries.262 Th ere are diff erent arguments put forward to justify this 
conception of dignity among which the religious and humanistic arguments are 
the dominant ones.
In its religious (theological) construction, it is said that the dignity of human 
being fl ows from the relationship that exists between humanity and God who 
created humanity in His own likeness and images endowing it also with special 
authority to have dominion over all other creatures. Th is, it is said, shows the 
dignifi ed, elevated status of human beings in the universe. For some, notably for 
those who follow the Christian doctrine, the special value that God endowed 
to humanity could also be deduced from the sacrifi cial works of salvation God 
accomplished through Jesus Christ. And for some time, this view has been one 
of the dominant views as regards the idea and value of humanity especially up 
until the period of humanistic movements. Perhaps, it is because of this that 
dignity is seen by some as typically expressing the Judeo-Christian theological 
understanding of human beings.263 However, not all who write on the historical 
260 Waldron, ‘Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991)’ (n 251) 201–208 & 
216–227; Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 11; Michael J Meyer, ‘Introduction’ in 
Michael J Meyer and William A Parent (eds), Th e Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and 
American Values (Cornell University Press 1992); Sensen (n 44) 152–161 (for Sensen, this view 
is a traditional paradigm of dignity).
261 Th is is what Kateb refers to as stature dignity of humanity, the dignity that humans have as 
a species. See Kateb (n 5) 123ff . David Feldman in his part states that ‘Human dignity can 
operate on three levels: the dignity attaching to the whole human species; the dignity of 
groups within the human species; and the dignity of human individuals,’ adding that ‘Th e 
legal implications of each kind of dignity are slightly diff erent’. See Feldman, ‘Human Dignity 
as a Legal Value: Part 1’ (n 248). But Cf. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political 
Entitlements’, Human Dignity and Bioethics (Essays Commissioned by President’s Council on 
Bioethics) (2008) 354–357.
262 See generally, Kateb (n 5); Sensen (n 44); Lewis (n 24); Gewirth, ‘Human Dignity as the Basis 
of Rights’ (n 248); Parent (n 44).
263 See particularly Eckert (n 258); Arieli (n 42); Christian Starck, ‘Th e Religious and Philosophical 
Background of Human Dignity and Its Place in Modern Constitutions’ in David Kretzmer and 
Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law 
International 2002); Michael Meyer, ‘Human Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue’ in David Kretzmer 
and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer 
Law International 2002); Andrew Brennan and YS Lo, ‘Two Conceptions of Dignity: Honour 
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evolution of dignity share the view that the term has biblical origin. According 
to Sulmasy, for instance, there is no evidence to back the assertion that the term 
dignity as used today has originated from ‘Jewish and Christian Scriptures’.264 
Rosen also shows how the Catholic Church had struggled to reconcile itself with 
the notion of human dignity for a long period of time. According to Rosen, it is 
only recently that the Church adopted the term in its teachings.265
In the scholastic, and later humanistic, view, humanity is said to have dignity 
because of certain unique attributes and capacities it possesses. Th e whole 
approach behind this view therefore seems to be the articulation of those unique 
attributes said to have been possessed by human beings only.266 However, diff erent 
authors propose diff erent attributes in justifying the dignity of human beings. It 
generally seems that the capacity for rational thinking, knowledge, language and 
moral actions are said to be the major distinguishing features relied on to show 
that humanity has an elevated status above all others and therefore has dignity.267 
For instance, Arieli notes that scholastic and humanistic writers relied on the 
idea of freedom and self-determination as among the ‘necessary attributes’ of 
humanity justifying its dignity. Th us, as he observed,
Reformulated in the scholastic theology and the humanistic interpretation of the 
Renaissance, this view became the central message of Humanism. For Lorenco Valla, 
Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Ludovico Vives the existential freedom, 
the potential powers of man to raise himself to the highest levels of excellence in 
understanding, virtue, holiness and creativity, his capacity of change and progress, raise 
man to the central position in the created world. Th is was the message of Maneti’s De 
Excellencia et dignitate hominis and of the famous oration of Pico della Mirandola, De 
Dignitate Hominis which became the watchword and central message of Humanism.268
and Self-Determination’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human 
Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007); Zhang (n 249); Chana Safrai, ‘Human Dignity in 
a Rubbinical Perspective’ in David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002); Lewis (n 24).
264 Sulmasy (n 27) 10–11. In fact, he also disputes that the Western notion of dignity has anything 
to do with the sense of the term as used in ancient Greek philosophy. ibid.
265 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 47–54 & 90–100. See also Sulmasy (n 27) 12; 
Sensen (n 44) 157–159; Kateb (n 5) 24ff .
266 Kateb (n 5) 24ff ; Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261).
267 Kateb, who sought to defend the secular conception of human dignity, identifi es two types 
of dignity – dignity of individuals (status dignity) and dignity of species (stature dignity) – 
arguing that these fl ow from the ‘unique and non-natural traits and attributes, characteristics, 
and capacities’ of human beings and humanity as a whole. Kateb (n 5) 5ff . But Nussbaum 
strongly criticizes such an approach to the justifi cation of human dignity. See Nussbaum, 
‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261) 354–357 & 362ff  (criticizing Stoic 
association of dignity with rationality and arguing instead for dignity based on animality, 
that is, on human animal nature, respectively). For Sensen, Kant’s notion and use of dignity is 
rooted in Stoic conception of the term referring to an elevated position of something. Sensen 
(n 44) 143ff .
268 Arieli (n 42). Th us, for Arieli, this indicates that ‘freedom and the possibility of self-
determination are the necessary attributes of man and the rights follow logically from Man’s 
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Eckert also notes that Mirandola, to whom major credit is owed in this tradition 
especially for providing a major background for the current discourse of 
human dignity, expresses these human qualities in the terms of rationality and 
autonomy.269 According to Eckert, Mirandola ‘regarded the human being as 
microcosm containing the aptitude for all kinds of behaviour. Th e destiny of man 
was to fi nd a rational decision on the basis of his anima rationalis. Th us, hominis 
dignitas was constituted by man’s ability to make autonomous decisions’.270 
Eckert also mentions Samuel von Pufendorf, another important fi gure next to 
Mirandola in this early intellectual conception and development of the idea of 
dignity, who is also well-known for his doctrine of natural law and natural rights 
and the natural equality of human beings.271 Eckert notes that, for Pufendorf, 
‘man had human dignity because of his “immortal soul” and because he was 
“indu’d with the light of understanding”. Since everyone was endowed with it, all 
human beings were equal by nature’.272
In spite of their diff erences in terms of the human attributes that each author 
relies on, it is possible to observe a common continuous intellectual eff ort to 
rationalise the dignity of human beings over a course of time. In this regard, it is 
said that the Stoic philosophy (of man and society) has had notable contributions 
not only in the attempt to rationalise the dignity of human beings but also in the 
wider socio-political discourses especially through its holistic understanding of 
the relationships between the individual (the self) and the society (the collectivity). 
In Stoicism, human beings are seen social (sociable) beings and hence sociability 
is presented as one of the important characteristic features of humanity.273 Th e 
Stoic social philosophy, within which the scholastic and humanistic idea of 
dignity was largely developed, have had signifi cant consequences in shaping the 
subsequent academic discourses on the conception of not just human dignity but 
also the general idea of society and its socio-political institutions.274 And, in fact, 
status of worth, dignity and creativity.’ ibid. See also Sensen (n 44) 153ff  (discussing the 
historical origin of dignity).
269 Pico Della Mirandola is generally regarded as the pioneering humanistic-renaissance writer 
who have elaborating the philosophical idea of the dignity of man and his work is believed 
to have been the bases for the subsequent and modern discussions of the concept of human 
dignity. See particularly Sensen (n 44) 159–161. See generally, Francesco Borghesi, Michael 
Papio and Massimo Riva (eds), Pico Della Mirandola: Oration on the Dignity of Man: New 
Translation and Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2012); Pico Della Mirandola, On 
the Dignity of Man (Trans Charles Glenn Wallis) (Hackett Publishing 1965). See also Eckert (n 
258); Arieli (n 42); Kateb (n 5).
270 Eckert (n 258) 44.
271 For more on Pufendorf, see Carr (n 141). In addition to Mirandola, Sensen also discusses the 
historical/traditional use of dignity in the writings of Cicero and Leo the Great. Sensen (n 44) 
155–161.
272 Eckert (n 258) 44.
273 Arieli (n 42); Eckert (n 258).
274 For instance, following Arieli, stoicism was a major reason for the Roman legal system to be 
able to maintain side-by-side the spiritual and secular systems which later became known as 
one of the unique feature of the Western European civilization. Arieli (n 42).
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as Nussbaum’s recent publication shows, stoicism has still important infl uence 
on the social and political philosophy of the modern society.275 In the words of 
Arieli, ‘Upon closer examinations one realizes that the stoic conception of man 
and mankind became the basis upon which all universal conceptions of political 
philosophy since the Renaissance were raised and it prepared the ground for 
the revolutionary change of the social and political thought in the Age of the 
Enlightenment’.276
Th erefore, for the purpose of this discussion, we can say that the central tenet 
of this tradition is, on the one hand, the express rejection of the association of 
dignity with social ranks and, on the other, the intellectual reconstruction of 
dignity on some basic attributes possessed by all human beings. According to 
some authors, the hierarchical view of society and the dignity of rank associated 
with it could not be regarded as a viable theoretical construction upon which the 
idea and value of human society and its social institutions can be established. In 
particular, it was clear that the traditional appeal to such grounds as culture and 
religion as justifi cation for social institutions were increasingly diminishing due 
to the secular tendency of the scholastic and humanistic writings. At the same 
time, it was necessary that the nature and dignity of humanity be established on 
stable and universal principles that could affi  rm the natural and inherent equality 
of every human being. Th is, however, required the revision of the approaches 
and the background social assumptions; in particular, it was necessary that 
the connotation of the status and ground from which this was said to emerge 
had to either be abandoned altogether or reconstructed in the light of the social 
philosophy of the time which saw every human being as equal in status and 
value.277
Th is attempt to dissociate dignity from social ranks and to instead restate it as 
dignity of humanity, that is, as a universal value pertaining to every human being, 
is indeed an important contribution of the scholastic and humanistic discourse. 
Nonetheless, there is still a major problem that remains with this view: that it 
concerns an eff ort to deduce dignity from some supposedly observable attributes 
believed to be distinguishing humanity from other animals. In this sense, it still 
remains to be a hierarchical view of some sort. As rank is used to diff erentiate one 
person from the other in justifying dignity of rank, those attributes are used to 
diff erentiate humans from other animals thereby justifying dignity of humanity, 
so it seems.278
Th is scholastic and humanistic approach to dignity can however be criticised 
on several grounds. One problem is the divergence of opinion on the kind of 
275 See for instance Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership 
(n 114).
276 Arieli (n 42); Lewis (n 24).
277 Among many authorities, see Arieli (n 42); Eckert (n 258); Kateb (n 5); Lewis (n 24); Stark (n 
114).
278 Eckert (n 258) 43–44.
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human attribute that should be present in order to justify human dignity. Th is 
raises a related question as to how a certain attribute as rational thinking, 
language, morality, self-determination or any other human attribute is selected 
among the many attributes human beings possess. For some, this approach is 
appropriate for showing the characteristic diff erence between human beings and 
other animals (that they belong to diff erent categories) and not for justifying 
humanity as a being elevated status with dignity. In my view, the diffi  cult question 
that such an approach faces is its arbitrariness, contingency and inconsistency 
raised by Sulmasy and Nussbaum.279 Th at is, it should be obvious that not every 
person may have, or is able to retain in his/her entire life those human attributes, 
qualities and capacities.280 Th is may force us to conclude that persons with no 
sound faculty for rationality or language or morality do not have or retain their 
human dignity, which clearly is an absurd conclusion to follow at least for human 
rights scholars. Even then, no two persons may have the same degree of capacity 
for rational thinking, language, morality and the like. Th is may, in turn, force 
us to accept the conclusion that there is a degree or gradation of dignity, in turn, 
diminishing its status as a universal and equal value – a position diffi  cult to accept. 
But, most importantly, these attributes are essentially the product of socialisation, 
that is, they are nurtured and developed in a particular social context: we learn 
to reason rationally and to distinguish between wrong and right and so on. In 
short, it is diffi  cult to follow this method and establish the idea of equal and 
universal dignity and hence of human rights on those human attributes which 
are by defi nition arbitrary, contingent and would ultimately lead us to some sort 
of inconsistency.281
In fact, both dignity of rank and status refl ect nothing more than the 
conventional creation and attribution of values. According to Sulmasy, this usage 
of dignity can better be referred to as ‘attributed dignity’. Th is is described as 
the ‘worth or value that human beings confer upon others by acts of attribution. 
Th e act of conferring this worth or value may be accomplished individually or 
communally, but it always involves a choice. Attributed dignity is, in this sense, 
created. It constitutes a conventional form of value’.282 Th us, it is necessary to carry 
out a major intellectual ‘rethinking’ in order to establish its true essence and provide 
a rational and stable ground for its justifi cation as the value of humanity.283 So 
while the scholastic and humanistic discourse has made important contributions 
279 Sulmasy (n 27) 13–15; Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species 
Membership (n 114) 85–88 & 159–160; Kateb (n 5) 123ff .
280 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 88–89.
281 Sulmasy (n 27) 13–15; Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261) 362.
282 Sulmasy (n 27) 12. ‘Th us we attribute worth or value to those we consider to be dignitaries, 
those we admire, those who carry themselves in a particular way, or those who have certain 
talents, skills, or powers. We can even attribute worth or value to our selves using this word’. 
Hence, for Sulmasy, the ‘Hobbesian notion of dignity is attributed’. ibid. See also Sensen (n 44) 
152–155.
283 Eckert (n 258); Lewis (n 24).
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for our understanding of human dignity, it also had left  some major issues that 
needed to be addressed for the subsequent intellectual discourse if dignity is to 
establish an equal and universal conception of human rights.
4.3. DIGNITY AS INHERENT VALUE OF HUMANITY
It is therefore safe to say that the cumulative eff ect of the scholastic and humanistic 
discourse on human dignity especially carried out with Stoic social philosophy as 
its backdrop has led to fundamental reconstruction and explication of the idea of 
human dignity in the Enlightenment and subsequent periods. For this, it is stated 
above, a major intellectual rethinking of the idea of humanity and the foundation 
of its basic social institutions such as state, law and authority had to be carried 
out. To this end, the Enlightenment period is seen by many as the era where 
this ‘fundamental rethinking’ of the socio-political system of a society has been 
carried out which eventually has resulted in the legitimacy crisis of traditional 
orders.284 Th is is particularly evident from some landmark historical events as 
the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the American Declaration of 
Independence, both closely related to the contemporary idea of human rights and 
the fundamental values underpinning them.285 As Eckert clearly puts,
At the beginning of the modern era, a process of fundamental rethinking led to a 
loss of legitimacy for the traditional orders based on dignity according to hierarchical 
ranks. Th is process was followed by the recognition of the universal and equal human 
dignity as a major principle of law and politics. Due to the crisis of the traditional 
orders, it became possible and necessary to give political and legal eff ect to the idea of 
human dignity in the meaning of universal human rights.286
Seen particularly in the light of the discourse on the idea and value of dignity, 
authors like Riley and Lewis describe the process it has passed over the course 
of time as the process of reifi cation, codifi cation, equalisation, democratisation, 
universalisation and generalisation.287 Th at is, by expressly rejecting the pre-
existing hierarchical and hence discriminatory and exclusionary construction of 
the term, the intellectual discourse of the Enlightenment period had sought to 
articulate the idea of dignity as the inherent value of human being regardless of 
such factors as social positions, race, gender, nationality, ethnicity or other markers 
of social hierarchies.288 According to Eckert, ‘Th e events of French Revolution’ 
284 Eckert (n 258); Lewis (n 24).
285 Sensen (n 44) 149–152 (discussing the use and conception of dignity in the UN major human 
rights documents).
286 Eckert (n 258) 44–45.
287 Riley (n 24); Lewis (n 24).
288 Meyer, ‘Human Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue’ (n 263) 196.
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had, for instance, ‘led to the realization that the idea of dignity could only be 
justifi ed by separating dignity from rank and acknowledging dignity as an innate 
element of every human being’. In this respect, it is stressed that ‘Th e universal 
and equal dignity of man had to be inviolable and inalienable.’ And it was the 
same idea that was refl ected in the American Declaration of Independence.289
4.3.1. IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY
However, some authors argue that the view of dignity as inherent and equal 
value of humanity was not fully articulated and defended up until the time of 
Immanuel Kant who, according to Rosen, was able to provide a natural conclusion 
to the idea of dignity as unconditional and inherent value of humanity.290 So it 
is important to briefl y look at Kant’s notion of dignity and see to what extent 
it can indeed be regarded as an inherent value of human being and hence as a 
normative foundation of human rights. Here, there are at least two main reasons 
for paying special attention to Kant’s notion of dignity: it is one of the infl uential, 
though complex, views of dignity especially in moral philosophy and human 
rights discourse. It has also been referred to by almost all human rights scholars 
as the normative foundation of human rights but with no or little attention to 
its specifi c meaning and implications of the Kant’s use of the term.291 As we 
proceed with our discussion, it should be clear that the sole concern here is to 
see the basis upon which Kant has justifi ed (assuming he does that) dignity as 
intrinsic value of human being and what it means for the whole discourse of the 
current human rights; beyond this, it is neither necessary nor a right place to 
discuss its meaning and function in, for instance, his complex moral philosophy. 
In discussing Kant’s notion of dignity, I mainly rely on a recent publication 
by Rosen as I found it more accessible and relevant for the question at hand 
especially in terms of its implications in the context of the current human rights 
discourse.292
289 Eckert (n 258) 44–45.
290 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27). For Meyer, the idea of inherent egalitarian 
account of human dignity drawn from Kant is ‘a moral high-water mark of modern ethical and 
political thought’. Meyer, ‘Human Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue’ (n 263) 196.
291 See Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27). Sensen (n 44). Meyer, ‘Human Dignity as 
a (Modern) Virtue’ (n 263) 196; Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, 
Human Rights, and Human Genetics’ (1998) Th e Modern Law Review 661; Derek Parfi t, On 
What Matters (Edited and Introduced by Samuel Scheffl  er Vol 1) (Oxford University Press 2011). 
See also Kretzmer and Klein (n 24); Malpas and Lickiss (n 249); Marcus Duwell and others 
(eds), Th e Cambridge Hanbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press 2014); McCrudden, Underst. Hum. Dign. (Proceedings Br. Acad. No. 92) (n 
248); Meyer and Parent (n 239).
292 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27). But there is also equally interesting work on the 
same subject by Sensen (n 44).
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Rosen notes that although there were diff erent conceptions of dignity 
‘widespread through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the concept played 
only a small role in political theory until the time of [Kant]’ who, in his view, is 
largely responsible for the most part of the ‘modern theory of human rights’.293 
Indeed, many would agree with Rosen that Kant’s notion of dignity, a powerful 
and complex concept constituting the core of his moral philosophy, ‘should stand 
at the centre of any historical account of dignity, for it has been the inspiration 
– rightly or wrongly – of very much of what has come later’.294 Per Rosen, the 
term dignity (in German Würde295) is particularly central in his Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork). And, for him, it is not surprising that 
dignity is seen as constituting the core of Kant’s moral theory given the frequency 
of the use of the term in the Groundwork which, in turn, is a foundation for his 
Metaphysics of Morals.296
In explaining the meaning of dignity as used in Groundwork, Rosen pays 
particular attention to one of the relevant passages where Kant distinguishes 
between two kinds of values: price and dignity. Th us, Kant says that
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price, or a dignity. What has a price 
can be replaced with something else, as its equivalent; whereas what is elevated above 
any price, and hence allows of no equivalent, has a dignity.
What refers to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; what, even 
without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, i.e. a delight in the mere 
purposeless play of the powers of mind, has a fancy price; but what constitutes a 
condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not merely have a 
relative worth, i.e. a price, but an inner worth, i.e. dignity.
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in 
itself; because it is possible only by this to be a legislating member in the kingdom of 
293 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 19.
294 Ibid. See also generally Parfi t (n 291) chapt 10; Sensen (n 44); Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and 
Political Entitlements’ (n 261); Schachter (n 5); Daly (n 44); Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Dignity 
and Human Rights’ 20–23.
295 Readers may fi nd the following note by Rosen interesting: ‘A German word for dignity is 
Würde, a word that is closely related etymologically to Wert, the term for ‘worth’ or ‘value.’ 
Th e adjectival form, wurdig means both ‘valuable’ and ‘deserving’ – as in ‘deserving of reward’ 
– and ‘dignifi ed.’ (Th ere is parallel here with Latin – Domine, non sum dingus – and English. 
‘Worthy,’ which has, of course, the same root as Würde, has something of the same duality. We 
talk, for example, about ‘local worthies’ or ‘dignitaries’ as well as of ‘worthy winners’).’ Rosen, 
Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 19. See Sensen (n 44) 147ff .
296 According to Rosen, the use of the term dignity is more frequent in Groundwork whereas 
in his other works it is used ‘relatively infrequently’. In his counting, the term is said to 
have appeared sixteen times in the whole work and four times in the passage 4:434– 435 
where Kant distinguishes between diff erent kind of values that ‘everything’ can have ‘in the 
kingdom of ends’. Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 20ff ; Sensen (n 44) 143–144. 
See also comment by Christine M Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, Immanuel Kant, Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals (edited by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, introduction by 
Christine M. Korsgaard) (Revised Ed, Cambridge University Press 2012) ixff .
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ends. Th us morality and humanity, in so far as it is capable of morality, is that which 
alone has dignity.297
Th is passage, according to Rosen, ‘goes right to the heart of Kant’s view of 
morality’.298 One of the values expressed in this passage, price, concerns ‘those 
that are fungible (can be substituted for)’ whereas the other, dignity, concerns 
‘those that have an inner value and are raised above all price, or that have […] an 
unconditional, incomparable value’. He is in fact of the opinion that it is possible 
to replace most of Kant’s use of the term dignity with the phrase ‘unconditional 
and incomparable worth’. For instance, the statement that ‘Autonomy is thus 
the ground of the dignity of human nature’ can be restated as saying in eff ect 
that ‘autonomy is a ground of human nature’s unconditional and incomparable 
value’.299 He also argues that ‘dignity, for Kant, is a kind of value rather than being 
a value itself ’; it ‘is a quality of a class of valuable things’.300
Th e basic question here is to whom (or what) does this kind of value belong 
and on what basis. According to Rosen, dignity in Kant’s usage belongs only to 
human beings and nothing else. Th e reason for this is the basis of having dignity 
itself which is the capacity for morality.301 For Kant, morality is an autonomous 
act of a rational being (which includes but not limited to human being) in 
conformity with maxims of a categorical imperative.302 Rosen argues that the 
meaning of autonomy employed by Kant is quite diff erent from the way it is 
understood currently, that is, as the capacity of individuals to freely choose and 
act as it pleases them. Kant conceives rational beings as autonomous beings that, 
as analogous to an ideal legislator, give law and by virtue of this and at the same 
time remain subjected to the command of the self-legislated law: an autonomous 
act in this sense consists in being at once both the subject (author) and object 
of self-legislated law. Th at is, ‘it is, in the fi rst instance, the lawgiving that has 
dignity’. Th us, ‘What Kant has in mind as autonomy is the idea that the moral law 
which we must acknowledge as binding upon us is self-given,’ which, according to 
Rosen, ‘is something quite diff erent from the modern understanding of autonomy 
as the capacity of individuals to choose the course of their own lives however they 
see it fi t’.303
297 Kant (n 232) 4:434–4:435 at pp 46–44 (all emphasises are in the original); Rosen, Dignity: Its 
History and Meaning (n 27) 20ff .
298 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 21.
299 Ibid 21–22.
300 Ibid 22&23 (emphasis original). Sensen, however, argues that for Kant dignity is not the name 
for value. Sensen (n 44) 143–144.
301 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 22–27.
302 Kant’s maxim of categorical imperative has two forms: the form which concerns the formula 
of the universality of law and that which concerns the formula of humanity. See Kant (n 232) 
4:420ff  at pp 33ff . For more on this, see Sensen (n 44) 96ff ; Parfi t (n 291) Chapts 9 & 10.
303 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 25. Rosen notes that ‘Th e word “autonomy” is 
composed of ‘two ingredients: (autos = ‘self ’) and (nomos= ‘law’)’. See also Sensen (n 44) 147ff .
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A rational moral action, that is, morality, in the sense used by Kant is the sole 
reason for every rational being to be an end in itself and as such have dignity: an 
intrinsic, inner, unconditional worth. As Kant himself explicitly states, ‘morality 
is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself; because 
it is possible only by this to be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends’ and 
from this he comes to the conclusion: ‘Th us morality and humanity, in so far as it 
is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity’.304 But for Rosen the idea 
of autonomous rational being (a being capable of rational moral action of the 
kind Kant describes) is simply identical with human beings because ‘only human 
beings (so far as we know) are capable of acting morally and feeling the force of 
morality’s claims’. Th is also means that morality and hence dignity is necessarily 
exclusive to humanity. ‘Only morality has dignity and only human beings carry 
the moral law within themselves’; in addition, Rosen is also of the opinion that 
dignity conceived in this way by Kant is a distinguishing moral watermark of 
human beings as well as a kind of ‘deeply egalitarian’ value that they intrinsically 
and inalienably possess within themselves regardless of their social position in a 
society.305
By looking at the relevant texts in which the term is used, the arguments 
thereof and the overall purpose of Kant’s Groundwork and Metaphysics, I believe 
that Rosen’s interpretation that dignity as used by Kant refers to a kind of value 
and that humanity is worthy of this kind of value only by virtue of its capacity 
for morality (in the sense expressed in the form of categorical imperative) is 
indisputable. However, the question I would like to raise is whether dignity 
understood in this manner (by Kant) is indeed an inherent, equal and hence 
egalitarian value unconditionally pertaining to every human being that can 
accordingly be regarded as a universal foundation of human rights. A related 
question I would also like to ask is if or at least in what sense is Kant’s notion of 
dignity diff erent from the scholastic and humanistic conception of dignity, that is, 
dignity as status.306 Th ese questions must arise because, as I have just presented, 
304 Kant (n 232) 4:435; Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 22, 24 & 26.
305 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 23–24. Th is point is repeatedly emphasised in 
other pages as well. ‘Most importantly, for Kant, to say that something has dignity is not to 
attribute a substantive value to it but to say that it has value of a particular kind – intrinsic, 
unconditional, and incomparable. Only one thing, however, actually has this intrinsic, 
unconditional, and incomparable value: morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of 
morality.’ ibid 30. ‘Human beings have dignity because of the moral, the unique intrinsically 
and unconditionally valuable thing there is, is embodied in us and in us alone, and this “inner 
transcendental kernel” is something that we all share equally.’ ibid 31. It is by virtue of this 
dignity that humans are ‘“raised above” the natural world’. ibid 30. And for this reason, ‘it 
would be wrong to think of human beings as part of the natural world in the way that rivers, 
trees, or dogs are’. ibid 24.
306 For Sensen, Kant’s notion of dignity is in fact the Stoic conception of dignity which, in turn, is 
used to show the elevated position or status of humanity in the natural world. See Sensen (n 44) 
143–145. For more on the Stoic account of dignity, see also ibid 153–161; Nussbaum, ‘Human 
Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261) 352–357.
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dignity of humanity (that is, the basis for a human person to have dignity) is 
directly connected with the capacity for morality – rational moral action – of 
some sort.
In Kant, I argue, the justifi cation for the dignity of humanity is not as immediate 
as it fi rst appears to be. In fact, up on close refl ection, it becomes clearer that 
not every human being has dignity. Th is is so because only autonomous actions 
conforming to (actions taken on the grounds of the demands of) his categorical 
imperative can have the value of dignity. And only beings with a capacity for this 
kind of actions are considered to be persons (that is, rational beings) and are, 
therefore, regarded as ends in themselves. But in order to be a person, a rational 
being, it is necessary that one has to act in accordance with the demands of the 
moral law. Fulfi lling the commands of the moral law, in turn, necessarily requires 
that a person has a sound rational faculty in the fi rst place. Only then can a person 
be able to have the capacity for morality and only by virtue of this can a person 
be deemed to have dignity. Th is indicates that it is not possible to automatically 
declare Kant’s idea of dignity as inherent and unconditional, unless of course one 
is referring to diff erent sort of inherence and conditionality than what is being 
considered.
As Nussbaum argues, human being referred to as personhood (rational 
personality) and as mere animal being (animality) has two distinctive signifi cances 
in Kant’s moral theory.307 In fact, for Kant, these two human natures belong to two 
diff erent worlds. Th e fi rst one belongs to the world of rational morality whereas 
the second to the world of sense or natural necessity. Personhood represents the 
rational nature of humanity which has a moral signifi cance and hence a value as 
an end in itself but animality represents humanity as mere biological fact with 
no moral signifi cance and end in itself. In other words, as long as a human being 
is guided by and acts upon his/her senses or natural dictation, it is a mere animal 
being in and subjected to the world of sense and, for this reason, cannot have a 
value in itself; it is only a person, a rational aspect of human being, which is an 
end in itself and therefore can have the special kind of moral value, dignity.308
307 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 130–131.
308 Kant discusses this distinction in the Groundwork starting at 4:446. Th e world of rational 
morality or freedom is also referred to as the world of understanding, deterministic, 
intellectual or noumenal world and the world of sense is also referred to as the world of 
appearance, sense, naturalistic or phenomenal world. According to Korsgaard, ‘Th ese two 
conceptions of the world arise from refl ection on our cognitive relation to the world. Th e 
world is given to us through our senses, it appears to us, and to that extent we are passive on 
the face of it. We must therefore think of the world as generating, or containing something 
which generates, those appearances – something which is their source, and gives them to us. 
We can only know the world in so far as it is phenomenal, that is, in so far as it is given to the 
senses. But we can think of it as noumenal.’ Korsgaard (n 296) xxxi (emphasis original). Th e 
implication of this on the conception of dignity is well-summarised by Nussbaum as follows. 
‘Th erefore, for Kant, human dignity and our moral capacity, dignity’s source, are radically 
separate from the natural world. Insofar as we exist merely in the realm of nature, we are not 
ends in ourselves and do not have a dignity; things in the realm simply have a price … Insofar 
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But this also means that the dignity that Kant has in mind is not, I argue, the 
kind of value that we all as animal human beings have in common. Dignity as 
conceived by Kant belongs only to persons who are able to simultaneously be both 
the subject and object of a moral law; it does not belong to those who cannot fulfi l 
these conditions, for whatever reason they might fail to do so. For Kant, because 
of this conditionality of dignity on the capacity for morality, mere humanity is 
not enough to have dignity. If dignity is thus clearly conditioned on the capacity 
for morality of some sort (a ‘rather complex capacity for moral and prudential 
reasoning’, as Nussbaum refers to it) which, in turn, necessarily presupposes the 
possession of sound faculty and a special kind of rational moral disposition, it 
cannot automatically be an egalitarian (equal and universal) worth inhering in 
every human being. Th ere is a clear empirical possibility that a human being may 
not always and necessarily act on maxims of categorical imperative; in addition, it 
is also a fact that not every person is born with this kind of capacity nor can every 
person retain the same throughout life time.
‘Th e Kantian split between personhood and animality is deeply problematic’, 
says Nussbaum. One problem, according to Nussbaum, is that ‘it denies’ ‘the fact 
that our dignity just is the dignity of a certain sort of animal. It is the animal 
sort of dignity, and that very sort of dignity could not be possessed by a being 
who was not mortal and vulnerable’.309 Th e other problem associated with this 
sort of thinking, according to Nussbaum, is that it ‘wrongly denies that animality 
can itself have a dignity’ by suggesting that it somehow lacks moral intelligence. 
In addition, it presents our rational personality as ‘self-suffi  cient rather than 
needy, and purely active rather than also passive’ thereby distorting or at least 
denying the fact that it can easily be inhibited by several factors including disease, 
accident, old age and disability.310 Moreover, it also ‘makes us think of the core 
of ourselves as atemporal’ nature which is ‘utterly removed, in its dignity, from 
[…] natural events’ while in fact the ‘human life cycle’, as a life of animal being, 
is constituted and bound by diff erent stages of dependency and maturity.311 
Nussbaum particularly stresses that
If we imagine a being who is purely rational and moral, but without animal neediness 
and animal capacities … we see, I believe, that the dignity of such a being, whatever it 
is, is not the same sort of dignity as the dignity of a human being, who is characterized 
throughout life … by [neediness for diff erent sort of things].312
as we enter the realm of ends, thus far, and thus far alone, we have dignity and transcend the 
price … [it is] the person, seen as the rational/moral aspects of human being, [which has the 
end]. Animality itself is not an end.’ Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and 
Species Membership (n 114) 131.
309 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 132.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid 132–133. Nussbaum notes that this suggestion is the result of Kantian conception of 
‘moral agency’ which ‘looks like something that does not grow, mature, and decline’. ibid 132.
312 Ibid 132.
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I also argue that Kant’s justifi cation of dignity of humanity is not entirely diff erent 
from the dignity of status, that is, as something which distinguishes humanity 
from the rest of creatures. It seems as if the status view of dignity has in fact 
remained unaff ected in Kant’s view although in a diff erent, highly sophisticated 
and subtle form.313 In my opinion, this diff erence, sophistication and subtlety 
has nothing to do with Kant’s justifi cation of dignity as a special kind of value 
pertaining to humanity but rather of morality, which indeed appears to be quite 
diff erent from that of his predecessors (which is not the concern of my discussion 
here).314
As we have seen above, dignity as the status of humanity (as beings elevated 
above the rest of other creatures) is justifi ed on certain attributes considered to 
be unique to humanity such as capacity for rationality and self-determination. 
Th e same is also true with Kant where, in his case, capacity for moral action is 
considered as the reason for humanity’s dignity. Indeed, one may say that the 
way a particular human attribute is deployed by Kant and his predecessors is 
diff erent but the essence of the whole argument in both cases is still a justifi cation 
of dignity of humanity on the basis of a certain human attribute. In both cases 
the conclusion that fl ows from this approach is also similar: that dignity inheres 
in rational being alone. It is particularly seen that Kant’s notion of dignity is 
essentially exclusive to rational beings because of the requirement of the capacity 
to fulfi l the commands of moral law. Of course, for Rosen only human beings are 
capable of doing that: thus, the idea of rational being, according to Rosen, is simply 
synonymous with a human being. Th is ultimately leads him to conclude that a 
human being alone can have Kantian dignity and nothing else.315 It is thus this 
substantive connection between dignity and capacity for rational moral action 
that makes Kant’s notion of dignity unavoidably a conditional, distinctive, less 
egalitarian, and hierarchical (in fact, exclusive) kind of value. Th is in turn means 
it is impossible to automatically present (that is, without necessary substantive 
modifi cation of the conception) Kant’s conception of dignity as an unconditional 
and inherent value of every human being. For this very reason, Kant’s notion of 
dignity cannot be regarded as the foundation of inherent, equal and universal 
human rights.
313 Ibid 130–133 & 159–160. For Sensen, Kant’s notion of dignity concerns the expression of the 
elevation or highest status of mankind in the natural world and hence does not concern the 
inner or inherent value of humanity. Sensen (n 44) 165ff . Rosen seems to suggest that this 
connection between dignity and status in Kant is only appearance not of a substance. Rosen, 
Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 26. However, I argue that the dignity-status connection 
is in fact at the centre his overall argument which is very fundamental in his justifi cation of 
morality and the respect due thereof.
314 For his critique of the previous approach to morality, see Kant (n 232) 4:432–4:433 at pp 44–45.
315 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 22–24, 41 & 114.
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4.3.2 AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In my view, dignity can only be accepted as the normative foundation of inherent, 
equal and universal rights of every human being if it can fi rst be shown that it is 
itself an unconditional and inherent value that every human being has just by 
virtue of being a human person. In other words, for dignity to serve as a stable 
normative foundation of human rights, it should fi rst be established that it is not 
something humans ought to earn or deserve by acting or thinking in a certain 
way but that inheres intrinsically in them just by virtue of being what they are, 
that they are humans. Only then can we say with some level of certainty and 
coherence that it is a supreme foundation of the practical conception of human 
rights. And, I believe this perspective can be deduced from the discussions by 
authors like, just to mention few, Sulmasy316, Nussbaum317 and Dworkin.318 
Th e notion of dignity presented in the writings of these authors is richer, more 
practical and coherent to be regarded as inherent value of human being and hence 
as a normative justifi cation of all human rights.
In particular, I found that the discussion by Sulmasy can provide us with 
an interesting conceptual clarity as to how the idea of human dignity should be 
understood in its elementary and more practical sense. He argues that the idea 
of dignity as intrinsic value of human being can be substantiated on the basis of 
two but complementary arguments: moral consistency and axiology. According 
to Sulmasy, intrinsic dignity is
the worth or value that people have simply because they are human, not by virtue 
of any social standing, ability to invoke admiration, or any particular set of talents, 
skills, or powers. Intrinsic value is the value something has by virtue of being the kind 
of thing that it is. Intrinsic dignity is the value that human beings have by virtue of the 
fact that they are human beings. Th is value is thus not conferred or created by human 
choices, individual or collective, but is prior to human attribution.319
316 Sulmasy (n 27).
317 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114); 
Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261).
318 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208).
319 Sulmasy (n 27) 12. Th is defi nition is followed by Sulmasy’s very short statement (intended to 
give a kind of example to his defi nition), but without any further explanation, that ‘Kant’s 
notion of dignity is intrinsic’. Th is cannot however be true given particularly his own plain 
description of the idea of intrinsic dignity and the subsequent substantive discussion he off ers 
in support of this and that of Kant’s conception and justifi cation of dignity just discussed; in 
fact, there is an important tension between the two which I am to discuss shortly. In addition, 
I will argue that that Sulmasy’s construction of the concept is particularly refl ective of the 
current understanding of the term in both international and national legislative practices 
and jurisprudence; we cannot however say the same in relation to that of Kant without 
abandoning the predication of the dignity of humanity on the capacity for rational moral 
action. I rather think that Sulmasy is tempted to refer to Kant’s dignity as intrinsic in terms of 
the idea of his infl uential justifi cation of morality (and the complex role dignity plays therein). 
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In relation to his fi rst line of justifi cation, Sulmasy says that ‘Consistency is at 
least a necessary condition of a valid moral argument’ but he argues that it is 
not possible to achieve consistency in our moral arguments if intrinsic dignity 
(as a fundamental moral value of human being) is to be justifi ed on account of 
any human attributes or qualities.320 On the contrary, it necessarily ‘leads to 
gross inconsistencies in our universally shared, settled moral sense’.321 Th is is 
so because there are no two persons in the world who possess the same kind of 
attributes or qualities as skill, capacity, power, autonomy, intelligence, rationality 
and so forth and that these are essentially contingent and arbitrary in nature.
For him, if dignity is to be accepted as expressing the equal and universal 
moral value of human beings, it is imperative to dissociate the idea of dignity 
from such arbitrary human attributes and instead justify it on something 
each of us has in common. ‘Th us, the argument from consistency claims that 
fundamental human dignity must therefore be something each of us has simply 
because we are human.’322 Th e one stable thing that all humans have and share 
is simply being human. All the rest is highly contingent and a matter of arbitrary 
conventionalism and hence cannot give rise to objective and universally valid 
moral argument required to justify dignity as intrinsic fundamental moral value 
pertaining to every person qua human being. Being human must therefore be 
suffi  cient to say that humanity has a priori intrinsic dignity. Th us,
No matter what value others may attribute to persons because of properties such as 
skin colour, or how free they are to do as they would like, they have dignity because 
they are somebodies – human beings. Being somebody; being a human being, is the 
foundation of the notion of human dignity.323
He is also of the view that intrinsic dignity can similarly be justifi ed from the 
perspective of axiology (theory of value). Axiology, according to Sulmasy, 
primarily distinguishes between attributed and intrinsic values. Attributed value, 
which for him also includes instrumental value as one subclass, is described as a 
value conveyed by a certain external valuer. Th is clearly entails that ‘Attributed 
See for instance ibid 14–15 (commenting on the idea of moral objectivity and its implication 
for dignity).
320 In this regard, Sulmasy says that there are basically two options available to us. Th at is, in ‘its 
fundamental moral meaning, the word ‘dignity’ can be defi ned as the value or worth that a 
human being has either: (a) in terms of some property, or (b) in terms of simply being human’. He 
rejects the fi rst one as morally inconsistent and untenable and adopts the second one. ibid 13–14.
321 Sulmasy (n 27) 13.
322 Ibid 14. See also Malpas (n 30) 21–22.
323 Sulmasy (n 27) 14–15 (emphasis in the original). Sulmasy notes that the term ‘somebody’ comes 
from Martin Luther King, Jr. (which he in turn attributes to his grandmother telling him, 
‘Martin, don’t let anyone ever tell you that you’re not a somebody’). It carries the substantive 
notion of ‘a human being’. ibid 14n21 (citing Garth Baker-Fletcher, Somebodyness: Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the Th eory of Dignity, Harvard Dissertations in Divinity, No. 31 [Fortress 
Press, 1993], p.23).
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values depend completely upon the purposes, beliefs, desires, interests, or 
expectations of a valuer or group of valuers.’324 Intrinsic value is, however, 
diff erent from attributed values in at least two important aspects: fi rst, it is ‘the 
value something has of itself – the value it has by virtue of its being the kind of 
thing that it is. It is valuable independent of any valuer’s purposes, beliefs, desires, 
interests, or expectations’; second (and because of what it is) it exists objectively 
and independently of any (role of) external valuer.325 So something has an 
intrinsic value not because the value is attributed to it by an external valuer but 
simply because of what it is as a matter of natural fact or, in his own words, ‘by 
virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is’.326
According to Sulmasy, ‘if there are intrinsic values in the world, the recognition 
of the intrinsic value depends upon one’s ability to discern what kind of thing it 
is’.327 Th is is precisely the case in relation to ‘natural kinds’.
Th e fundamental idea behind natural kinds is that to pick something out from the rest 
of the universe, one must pick it out as a something. Th is leads to what its proponents 
call a ‘modest essentialism’ – that the essence of something is that by which one picks 
it out from the rest of reality as anything at all – its being a member of a kind. Th e 
alternative seems inconceivable – that reality is actually completely undiff erentiated 
and that human beings carve up this amorphous stuff  for their own purposes. It 
seems bizarre to suggest that there really are no actual kinds of things in the world 
independent of human classifi cation – no such things, de re, as stars, slugs, or human 
beings. Th us, the intrinsic value of a natural entity – the value it has by virtue of being 
the kind of thing that it is – depends upon one’s ability to pick that entity out as a 
member of a natural kind.328
In this regard, he stresses that the underlying logic behind natural kinds is that of 
extensionality and not of intensionality.
Importantly, the logic of natural kinds suggests that one picks individuals out 
as members of the kind not because they express all the necessary and suffi  cient 
predicates to be classifi ed as a member of the species, but by virtue of their inclusion 
under the extension of the natural kinds that, as a kind, has those capacities. Th e logic 
of natural kind is extensional, not intensional.329
From this follows the axiological defi nition of dignity as ‘the intrinsic value of 
entities that are members of a natural kind that is, as a kind, capable of language, 
rationality, love, fee will, moral agency, creativity, and aesthetic sensibility’. For 
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Sulmasy, this ‘defi nition is decidedly anti-speciesist’ in the sense that ‘if there 
are other kinds of entities in the universe besides human beings that have, as a 
kind, these capacities, they would also have intrinsic dignity – whether angels or 
extraterrestrials’.330
Th us, in this way, the argument from axiology provides us with an interesting 
insight as to how we may understand ourselves as species belonging to a natural 
kind especially by making explicit the basic idea and value of humanity in a more 
descriptively articulated sense. Th is does not, however, mean that intrinsic dignity 
is justifi ed on the ground of possessing certain attributes (which he categorically 
rejects in the fi rst). On the contrary, the argument simply says that it is only a matter 
of natural fact that human beings, as a species, possess those general capacities; 
they are just historical-empirical facts about human ‘species’ as a member of a 
natural kind.331 Th e description is clearly not meant to be exhaustive but mere 
explication of some of the (potential) attributes that human beings naturally 
possess as a species. Th ere is however no suggestion that all of these attributes are 
or ought to be equally present in each and every member of human species.
Following Nussbaum, who, as seen above, also rejects the predication of dignity 
on the capacity for rational morality and the artifi ciality of the distinction between 
personhood and humanity as animal being, morality is important but it is not the 
only valuable attribute of our humanity. Th us, in her capabilities approach to social 
justice, Nussbaum expressly argues against dissociation of rationality (the rational 
moral nature) from humanity as animal being (that is, humanity as a biological 
fact) and the diff erentiation in status and moral values that follows this distinction 
in Kant’s moral theory. As she argues, contrary to the Kantian conception, this 
approach ‘sees rationality and animality as thoroughly unifi ed’.332 As I understand, 
Nussbaum suggests that the kind of dignity that ought to be justifi ed as a basic 
moral value of human being should be rooted in (or at least draw on) the biological 
fact of our animality as a vulnerable being ‘in need of a plurality of life-activities’333 
and in the conception of ‘the human being as a political animal’ where rationality 
is celebrated as just one aspect of our dignity rather than as something opposed 
with it.334 Ultimately, it should be able to give us the underlying reason for valuing 
our humanity as such and to guide us (as evaluative normative principle) in the 
kind of practical actions we ought to take in respect of treating our humanity, that 
is, our human life as it is, as something worthy of dignity in itself.335
330 Ibid. George Kateb also adopts similar approach in justifying what he calls the secular 
conception of dignity of humanity as species. Kateb (n 5).
331 Sulmasy (n 27) 15ff ; Gewirth, ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’ (n 248) 12–13; Riley 
(n 24) 131ff .
332 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 159–
160. See also Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261) 356ff .
333 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 159.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid 70–71, 74–92 & 179–183.Nussbaum, frontiers, 70–71; 74–81; 179–183; see also pp 81–92.
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Th is is the same line of practical thinking that Dworkin also calls for. He 
suggests that we ‘look not to principles that are distinctly political or even moral 
but rather to principles that identify more abstract value in the human situation’. 
For Dworkin, the ‘more abstract value’ that could be found ‘in the human situation’ 
is the principle of human dignity, which he states as consisting of two intertwined 
basic elements: the principle of intrinsic value of a human life and the principle 
of personal responsibility of each person endowed with this intrinsic value (and it 
is only the fi rst element which is of particular interest for our discussion here).336
Dworkin’s fi rst principle, the intrinsic value of human life, is precisely the 
same as what we have discussed above in connection with Sulmasy’s axiological 
view of dignity as well as with the complementary idea of dignity as a moral 
value of a person qua human person. He argues that the conception of human 
life as having intrinsic value entails that ‘each human life has a special kind of 
objective value’ contained in its ‘potentiality’ in the sense that ‘once a human 
life has begun, it matters how it goes. It is good when that life succeeds and its 
potential is realized and bad when it fails and its potential is wasted’. For him, 
‘this is a matter of objective, nor merely subjective value’, that is to say, whether 
or not a human life has succeeded or failed is a matter of special concern not just 
to a particular person whose life it is but rather to all of us who have a reason to 
value life in itself.337 According to Dworkin, a serious practical refl ection on this 
principle must lead us to the realisation that the intrinsic and objective value of 
human life is the same and equal for every human being for we cannot off er any 
objective grounds to argue otherwise.338 It ‘cannot be thought to belong to any 
human life without belonging equally to all’ human beings as such.339 So we can 
clearly see that Dworkin’s conception does not require us to predicate the idea 
of dignity as intrinsic value of human being on such grounds as rationality or 
capacity for moral action. It only asks us to refl ect on what we can accept as the 
most abstract value (principle) that can be identifi ed in the context of a practical 
human situation through which we all can then say that we have a reason to 
value a human life as an end in itself; and this turns out to be, at least in his 
understanding, the dignity of every human being.
So, I have shown the two principal options available to us in thinking dignity 
as the value of humanity: the one which draws on Kant and the alternative view I 
have presented above. In my view, it is the alternative view of dignity which should 
be referred to as the inherent, unconditional, equal and universal moral value of 
336 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208) 9–11 (see 
generally 9–23). According to Dworkin, ‘Th ese two principles – that every human life is of 
intrinsic potential value and that everyone has the responsibility for realizing that value in 
his own life – together defi ne the basis and conditions of human dignity, and I shall therefore 
refers to them as principles or dimensions of dignity’. ibid 10.
337 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208) 9–17.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid 16.
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humanity through which we can justify and explain the inherent and universal 
nature of concrete human rights in a comprehensive and coherent manner. Th e 
Kantian option cannot help us to do that but would rather lead us in the direction 
of committing some sort of grave moral inconsistency and relativism unless its 
premises are revised and accommodated within the second practical conception 
of dignity.
Th e implication of the whole argument behind the practical and alternative 
view of dignity is that humanity, as a natural kind, has an a priori intrinsic value 
in itself and that it is not necessary for each of its individual members to in fact 
possess all of the characteristic features or attributes that could be identifi ed or 
associated with humanity so as to be considered as its full and equal member 
and by virtue of this have the intrinsic value of humanity. It is suffi  cient that one 
is born to human kind in order to have the value he/she ought to have by the 
logic of the being that he/she is. ‘It is not the expression of rationality that makes 
us human, but our belonging to a kind that is capable of rationality that makes 
us human.’340 It is simply this natural-empirical fact that settles the question 
of whether one is human and therefore has human dignity. Th e (capacity for) 
rational morality is just one among many characteristic features, aptitudes and 
capacities that humans may, as a kind, have along with, for instance, compassion, 
love, care, language, creativity. Th ere is no objectively acceptable reason why one 
or more of these attributes (say, for instance, rationality or language) should be 
the only necessary precondition for having the intrinsic value of humanity.341
Th erefore, I strongly believe that this approach settles the idea of dignity 
conceived as a priori, inherent and fundamental moral value of humanity on a 
stable and coherent ground, which is the biological fact of being a human person. 
Th e intrinsic value of humanity simply fl ows from this natural, biological fact 
– the fact of being somebody, as beautifully stated by Martin Luther King, Jr. 
– and nothing more.342 In particular, the understanding of dignity as a priori 
and inherent (innate, intrinsic, natural, unconditional) value of humanity 
has far reaching implications for our moral and human rights discourse for it 
re-establishes humanity and its inherent value as a priori to and transcending 
over cultural, religious, legal, political or other social institutions. Understood in 
this sense, it is possible to assert that humanity and its dignity is not and should 
not be the product of certain form of sociocultural or intellectual conventionalism 
of some sort. In fact, the argument will be in the reverse order: that is, rather than 
sociocultural and political systems or conventional values being the determinants 
of the dignity of humanity, they themselves are required to be subjected to a 
critical scrutiny against the dignity of humanity. Moreover, this perspective also 
340 Sulmasy (n 27) 16.
341 Ibid 15–16; Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208) 
9–17.
342 Sulmasy (n 27) 14 n21.
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provides signifi cant coherence to other concrete normative principles for it clearly 
places humanity and its inherent value at the centre of all normative discourses.343
As I have stated above, many have already tried to discuss the signifi cance 
of human dignity in diff erent contexts but not every author agrees with what 
it actually entails and how we should understand its implications. In my view, 
the main source of disagreement is rooted in the (re-)construction of the idea 
of dignity itself. Th ose who refer to Kant for the justifi cation of dignity and 
hence human rights cannot help but inevitably end up in some sort of moral 
inconsistency and useless abstraction of its implications utterly detached from 
the reality of human life. Unless we approach dignity as pertaining primarily to 
our biological (physical) existence, any of the arguments we off er to explain its 
inherent, unconditional, egalitarian and universal nature cannot succeed for it 
is incorrect according to Kant’s original conception and nor can any attempt to 
justify, on the basis of that conception, the inherent, equal and universal notion 
of human rights.
But how should we then look at Kant’s view of dignity? One option is to 
abandon altogether and start afresh; the other option is to revise its use and 
try to accommodate it within a more practical alternative understanding of the 
dignity of humanity just presented above. I suggest to adopt the revisionist and 
accommodative approach. Th e reason for this (which of course I am not going to 
explain in detail but just state) is that it is wrong to treat Kant’s use of dignity in both 
of his Groundwork and Metaphysics as the justifi cation of the dignity of humanity 
in the sense we understand it today. Th e sole purpose for Kant in these celebrated 
publications revolves around identifying, justifying and articulating the supreme 
principle of morality which turns out to be the principle of autonomy (freedom 
of will). And, Kant actually attributes the value of dignity not to humanity per 
se but to a specifi c category of action and the mental disposition connected to it. 
According to Kant, a rational human being ought to think and act in conformity 
with a categorical moral imperative which requires that humanity in one’s own 
and in other person be treated always as an end in itself and never merely as a 
means. A rational human being is, as a rational universal legislator, both and at 
the same time, the author (originator, subject) and object of the command of this 
categorical imperative. Th is however comes not out of fear, coercion, inclinations, 
impulse or any self-interest or advantage attached to it or even duty but rather 
out of due respect (awe, reverence) for the command of the moral law originating 
from within. In short, a rational human being is thought to be at once the subject 
and object of a moral law that one gives to oneself autonomously, that is, out of 
own free will.344
343 Th at is, in the sense reaffi  rmed in VDPA (1993) Recital 2 that ‘Recognizing and affi  rming that 
all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and that 
the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
344 Kant (n 232) 4:432–4:441 at pp 44–52.
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It is to this and in fact only to this particular way of moral thinking and action, 
that is, to morality that Kant ascribes dignity: a special, incomparable, inner, 
unconditional and respect-worthy value. ‘Morality,’ he says, ‘thus consists in 
referring all action to the legislation by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible’ 
and that ‘morality is the condition under which alone a rational [human] being 
can be an end in itself; because it is possible only by this to be a legislating member 
in the kingdom of ends’. From this, he concludes that ‘morality and humanity, in 
so far as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity’.345
Th is is, however, not the kind of dignity of humanity that we are talking about 
today in connection with human rights – it is a diff erent notion of dignity used for 
diff erent purpose. Th is in turn shows that it is not Kant who erred in suggesting 
that we attach intrinsic value to humanity on the basis or because of its capacity 
for morality but the subsequent confl ation and extrapolation of his idea of the 
dignity of morality with the view of dignity of humanity used as a justifi cation for 
inherent human rights. Th is confl ation is not only wrong but also commits grave 
error of interpretation because the idea that it is only morality which has dignity is 
incoherent with the idea that every human being has inherent and unconditional 
dignity just by the mere fact of being a (biological) human person. For instance, 
when one says that Kant’s use of dignity is inherent, he/she is actually saying that 
morality is inherent. And dignity in that context simply refers to the external 
valuation of the moral action of the rational being – the one who carefully thinks 
twice before acting. It is with this intermingling of the two diff erent notions of 
dignity that the problem of confl ation and extrapolation starts, ultimately leading 
us to counterintuitive, morally grave and inconsistent justifi cation of the dignity 
of human being and the rights thereof as explained above.
So, the call for revision and accommodation here does not concern Kant’s 
use of the notion but rather the subsequent wrong application or usage of his 
view in the current human rights discourse. To be sure, the function of dignity 
in Kant’s moral theory has a fundamental, noble and complementary role to 
play in human rights discourse although not as a justifi cation of the dignity of 
human being and the rights thereof but in providing us with signifi cant insight 
into how we ought to see and treat each other, both in our private and public 
(institutional) relations.346 Generally speaking, no one would deny that morality 
and moral values have important social functions, regardless of whether one 
accepts the natural, conventional or other kind of moral theory. But at the same 
time, it is obvious that the development of moral capacity in individuals requires 
the affi  rmative role of the society.347 In this sense, we can say that the institution 
345 Ibid 4:434–4:435 at pp 46–47.
346 Th is complementarity between dignity of morality and dignity of humanity becomes clearer 
as we consider the core normative principle signifi ed by human dignity and the concrete 
implications it entails in practice under subsequent sections.
347 Rawls (n 38) 15–22 & 29–35; Peter Corning, Th e Fair Society and the Pursuit of Social Justice 
(Th e University of Chicago Press 2011) 84.
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of morality and human rights are close relatives: they both serve certain social 
ends in a diff erent but complementary angle.
Th is is precisely the reason I have repeatedly stated that the discussion of 
the idea of dignity as the inherent value of human being in this Chapter and 
throughout is quite diff erent from its use in Kant’s moral theory (the very reason 
I have refrained from commenting on it as well). Understood in this way, we 
cannot, for instance, accuse Kant of denying dignity of humanity to children, 
persons with mental disability, criminal off enders or anyone who, for whatever 
reason, fails to fulfi l the commands of moral law for he never intended to use 
dignity in this sense. Th us, Kant must be right in saying that criminal off enders 
do not have his particular notion of dignity.348 For Kant, a moral action worthy of 
dignity is that which is graceful and ought to be celebrated for the action is taken 
out of admiration and respect for the maxim of law. Th us, if by morality he is 
speaking of a specifi c form of moral action, that is, an action taken out of respect 
for the moral law, it must be true that we cannot celebrate disgraceful, at times, 
shocking criminal action, nor do we look both at such action and the doer of the 
action with respect; we rather react with the sense of rejection and condemnation; 
we even contemplate the kind of punishment that we think should fi t (do justice 
to) the doer’s action. In this sense, we are in fact agreeing with Kant that it is the 
graceful, respect worthy action and behaviour that deserve his special kind of 
value (in short, dignity of morality) ‘for which,’ as he says, ‘the word respect alone 
makes a befi tting expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it’.349
But, as I have argued above, this view is completely diff erent from the idea of 
human dignity conceived as unconditional and inherent value of humanity qua 
human being that even the doer of the worst crime possesses just by virtue of 
being a human person. Th us, while we reject the doer’s action and behaviour and 
contemplate what we consider should be a fi tting punishment for the same, we 
still continue to respect the value of his/her humanity. As a refl ection of this, for 
instance, we should not, at least up on rational refl ection, seek the ill-treatment 
or ill-punishment but should simply seek appropriate justice for the doer of a 
criminal act. Th at is, regardless of his/ her conduct, we still ought to respect the 
intrinsic value (dignity) of the mere humanity of the off ender.350
Th e same can also be said in relation to the case of children and persons 
with mental disabilities. Roughly stated, we do not expect them to reason and 
act in accordance with the kind of moral imperative enshrined in Kant’s moral 
law. To this extent we can say that Kant’s theory of morality excludes children 
348 For instance, in Metaphysics, he says that ‘Certainly no man in a state can be without any 
dignity, since he at least has the dignity of a citizen. Th e exception is someone who has lost it 
by his own crime, because of which, though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s 
choice […].’ Immanuel Kant, Th e Metaphysics of Morals (Introduction, Translation, and Notes 
by Mary Gregor) (Cambridge University Press 1991) AK 330 at p 139 (emphasis in the original).
349 Kant (n 232) 4:436 at pp 47–48 (emphasis in the original).
350 Parent (n 44) 54–56.
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and all other persons who lack mental conditions necessary for rational moral 
action as required by his categorical imperative because they do not have the 
actual capacity to rationally appreciate and abide by its demands. However, from 
a human rights point of view, we are required to respect and take good care of 
vulnerable persons for they have inherent dignity due to their mere humanity 
just like all other human beings: dignity of humanity is not and ought not to be 
defi ned in terms of age, physical or mental (in)capacity.351
Th erefore, it is evident that Kant’s notion of dignity is quite diff erent from 
the notion of dignity currently used in human rights discourse. Th is, in turn, 
means that his notion of dignity cannot be defended as intrinsic, unconditional, 
egalitarian and universal value of human being through which equal and universal 
human rights can be justifi ed. In fact, such a conception not only makes the idea 
of human dignity (and the rights thereof) completely detached from the practical 
situation of human life in a political society but also validates the position of 
the critics who deny its relevance altogether.352 Th e best alternative perspective I 
presented above however dissociates the idea of human dignity from all arbitrary 
attributes such as rationality and rather conceives it as a value inherent in our 
mere humanity (which indivisibly exists as a biological and moral fact).353 It is 
on this perspective that the holistic and universal idea of human rights can be 
constructed and defended.
4.4. THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Th e preceding two sections have critically examined the diff erent conceptions of 
the notion of human dignity as a (moral) value. Th is section will now discuss the 
kind of core normative principle associated with it over the course of time and 
its substantive import for the justifi cation of human rights. Th e discussion in the 
preceding sections has, in substance, shown that the notion of dignity is used to 
show a value attributed to some kind of elevated position.354 In the aristocratic 
(rank) conception, this value pertains only to certain individuals (dignitaries) 
occupying the highest position in the social world whereas in the scholastic and 
humanistic (status) conception, it pertains to humanity because humanity was 
regarded as an elevated position in itself in the natural world.355 Finally, the 
351 Ibid.
352 Macklin (n 252); O’Mahony, ‘Th ere Is No Such Th ing as a Right to Dignity’ (n 251); Fyfe (n 252).
353 Parent (n 44) 54.
354 In the rank and status conception, this position pertains to that of social dignitaries (compared 
to the so-called ordinary persons) and humans (compared to that of nonhumans) respectively 
whereas in the case of dignity as inherent value of humanity, it pertains to humanity as a 
whole.
355 See generally, John Loughlin, ‘Human Dignity: Th e Foundation of Human Rights and 
Religious Freedom’ (2016) 19 Memoria Y Civilizacion 316ff ; Sensen (n 44); Daly (n 44) 11ff .
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conception of dignity as inherent value of humanity embraces the general idea 
of the status conception but rejects the justifi cations given for the elevation of 
humanity as arbitrary and inconsistent.
Having said this, I argue that human dignity won’t have any substantive value 
in legal and human rights theory if there is no normative principle associated with 
the attribution of value to this elevated position. I believe that this principle can 
be deduced by closely looking at the objectives sought through such attribution 
of value to both the social position and humanity. In the aristocratic tradition, 
the purpose of the attribution was to show the importance and, hence, respect-
worthiness of the valued social positions. So, the ordinary people were required or 
at least expected to show respect (reverence) to the position and persons holding 
the position (offi  ce). In the scholastic/humanistic and renaissance traditions, 
the attribution had the purpose of extending this respect (reverence) to every 
human being. Th is reconstruction was directed at the hierarchical, oppressive and 
discriminatory socio-cultural and political systems in which ordinary individuals 
were treated as a property or animal devoid of any moral personality (for example, 
as the history of slavery shows).356 Th us, these traditions were specifi cally aimed 
at re-asserting and equalising (democratising) the moral respect-worthiness of 
every human being.357 If this is so, I believe that the current practical conception 
of dignity as inherent value of humanity more or less signifi es the same normative 
ideal.358 Its diff erence is accordingly not in the objectives sought through the idea of 
dignity but in the justifi cation of the attribution of the value itself for, as seen above, 
the current practical conception seeks to ground and re-assert an unconditional 
respect-worthiness of every human being on the mere fact of being a human 
person, that is, regardless of the capacity for rational thinking and morality.359
Th is all indicates that, despite the apparent variation in its historical and 
current usage discussed above, the basic normative principle associated with the 
idea of dignity has remained constant over the course of time. Th is turns out to 
356 Lewis (n 24); Kateb (n 5); Bernard R Boxill, ‘Dignity, Slavery, and the Th irteenth Amendment’ 
in Michael J Meyer and William A Parent (eds), Th e Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and 
American Values (Cornell University Press 1992).
357 See particularly Loughlin (n 355). See also Daly (n 44); Lewis (n 24); Riley (n 24). But in this 
regard, I personally do not think that they had the current philosophical debate in mind 
regarding whether animals, nature, etc. should have dignity or not especially in the sense 
currently debated by animal-rights movement and the right of nature. For arguments extending 
dignity to animals see, for instance, Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and 
Species Membership (n 114); Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ (n 261). 
While it is not necessary to engage with such discussions, I should state that I follow Riley’s 
argument that the argument for dignity (and rights) of animals would entail a quantifi cation 
and not qualifi cation of the term for the very reason that, as Riley argues, while the concept 
of ‘dignity simpliciter is predominantly applied to humans,’ the argument to apply ‘to [other 
ordinary] animals, or indeed any other specifi c group’ is ‘extending’ the concept ‘by analogy, 
not expanding [the substantive essence of] the concept’. Riley (n 24) 131.
358 Hughes (n 248).
359 Riley (n 24); Lewis (n 24); Daly (n 44); Parent (n 44).
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be the principle of respect.360 Th at is, in whichever way it has been used in the 
course of history, the ideal of respect remained to be the core conceptual essence 
and normative principle engrained in the very notion of dignity. Th is means that, 
strictly speaking, there is no substantive meaning or relevance of the concept of 
dignity without the ideal of respect not just in legal and human rights discourse but 
also in a wider academic debate. In particular, that the notion of dignity signifi es 
the principle of respect unlocks several of the questions involved in relation to its 
current usage in human rights law. Here, I would like to mention two important 
points. First, it brings clarity to the questions why and how should a human being 
be respected in the practical context of the modern socioeconomic, legal and 
political systems.361 As seen above, the traditional conception of dignity (in its 
rank and status sense) tried to give answers to these questions by looking outside 
humanity (comparing humanity with its social and natural world).362 Kant had 
tried to reverse this view by connecting respect-worthiness of humanity with 
the capacity for morality.363 But the practical view of human dignity presented 
and defended above, however, answers these questions by purely looking within 
humanity itself rejecting all other arguments based on external factors or human 
attributes as arbitrary and irrelevant. For this view, human beings ought to be 
respected for no other reason than their mere (bare) humanity. Th us, borrowing 
from Kant’s idea of morality, this view holds that our mere humanity is and 
ought to be treated as an ultimate end in itself.364 Seen in this light, human 
dignity emerges as a basic normative principle through which we can assert an 
unconditional respect for the inherent value of human being. Based on this, it is 
possible to articulate the specifi c legal and policy implications of what respect for 
the inherent value of human being entails or should entail in practice as will be 
seen in the subsequent sections and Part two of this study.
Second, it proves the stability (and continuity) of the normative meaning of 
human dignity, as opposed to what some critics try to argue.365 Th at is, it shows 
360 Neal (n 29); Gewirth, ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’ (n 248); Riley (n 24); Kateb (n 
5); Parent (n 44) 56ff ; Parfi t (n 291) chapt 10; Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 
19ff . ‘Th [e] requirement to respect all persons is one of Kant’s greatest contributions to our 
moral thinking.’ Parfi t (n 291) 233. Parfi t adds, ‘When Kant explains the sense in which we 
must always treat rational beings as ends, he claims that such beings have dignity, by which he 
means a kind of supreme value’. ibid 235. For more on the treatment of the notion of respect 
see particularly Darwall (n 29).
361 Parfi t examines these questions in relation to Kant’s notion of dignity of rational beings. Parfi t 
(n 291) chapt 10.
362 For instance, in the rank-based construction of dignity, the reason to respect dignitaries is 
determined by the underlying sociocultural conventional values. Th us, tribal leaders, royal 
families or nobilities and clergy men are said to have dignity and on that basis are owed 
respect. Th at is, being in that social position generates the right of respect for the status as well 
as the persona of those occupying it.
363 For more on this, see Kant (n 232) 4:429–4:436 at pp 41–48.
364 See ibid Ak 4:429ff  at p 41ff ; Parfi t (n 291) chapt 10.
365 For a linguistic analysis of human dignity, see generally Doron Shultziner, ‘Human Dignity: 
Functions and Meanings’ in Jeff  Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human 
Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007). See also Darwall (n 29).
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how its normative meaning has been purifi ed (edifi ed and reifi ed) over the course 
of intellectual history and being made fi tting to (relevant for) the specifi c socio-
legal and political situations of human beings at a given time.366 Th is is important 
because if it were seen as signifying diff erent normative principle over diff erent 
course of times, then it would have inevitably suggested that what dignity is 
nothing but in the eyes of the beholder. Th is, in turn, would have weakened its 
relevance for the theory of human rights. According to Riley, the ‘[rejection] of 
any continuity between “aristocratic dignity” and “contemporary dignity”’ would 
also force us ‘to deny that there is any conceptual or normative continuity in 
dignity claims at all.’367 In his opinion, such evolutionary construction aimed at 
showing the existence of complete breakaway between the two notions puts ‘us in 
the position of either accepting radical indeterminacy in meaning (i.e. accepting 
dignity simply means whatever people say it means), or conversely, stipulating that 
certain conceptions of dignity should be privileged as primary or defi nitive’.368
4.5. THE INFLORESCENCE OF THE PRINCIPLE
Th e preceding section has dealt with and answered the question how the idea 
of dignity as a normative concept can and should be understood in theory. In 
substance, it is argued that dignity implies an unconditional respect for human 
being. Accordingly, the principle of human dignity is just one and the same as 
the principle of respect for human being; so, from now on, I will use the two 
phrases interchangeably. But this still does not clearly explicate its concrete 
meaning and signifi cance in the practical social contexts in which it is frequently 
used. Beyond the philosophical discourses regarding its meaning, a claim of 
respect for the dignity of human being is routinely invoked in almost every 
corner of social life essentially as a tool of resistance against acts and state of 
aff airs undermining the value of humanity such as torture, murder, oppression, 
social exclusion, poverty and denial of basic conditions of life.369 Admittedly, this 
does not mean that such ‘dignity-based claims’ always rely on the literal usage 
of the term dignity in making such assertions. Rather, this section aims to show 
that while the principle of respect engrained in the notion of human dignity is a 
generic normative concept, there are varieties of terms, also referred to as ‘family 
366 Riley (n 24) 133–136.
367 Ibid 119.
368 Ibid.
369 Notable and lively evidence is the invocation of the term by social and political activists 
against austerity measures following the 2008 economic crisis: from Spain’s ‘Indiginado” to 
Greece ‘solidarity’ movement and from the ‘occupy’ movements in the Western major cities to 
the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ which, starting in Tunisia, covered most of the Middle 
East and North Africa countries.
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of terms’ or ‘dignity-languages’ through which its specifi c meanings and imports 
are further concretised in practice.370
So, it is necessary to consider how the theoretical understanding of the 
principle of human dignity coheres with the practice of dignity-based claims.371 
In this way, it is possible to clarify what the principle of respect for human dignity 
actually entails in these dignity-based practical claims expressed through the 
dignity-languages or family of terms to be discussed in this section. Here, the term 
‘infl orescence’372 is employed as a central organising concept, a catch-all phrase, 
to refer to the specifi c inferences expressed through the apparently distinct family 
of terms. Interestingly, these family of terms or dignity-languages do not suggest 
variations in the meaning of human dignity but rather the infl orescence of its 
core normative principle, the principle of respect. Th is means that the principle 
of respect for human dignity unifi es and gives substance to the specifi c assertions 
advanced through these terms in diff erent context.
But fi rst it should be mentioned that it is Sulmasy who has (as far I know) 
introduced the notion of ‘infl orescent dignity’ as an overarching concept intended 
to capture the diff erent interpretations or derivations of the central idea of 
human dignity373, yet almost all authors in one way or another recognise the idea 
expressed through this construction.374 Interestingly, the dictionary meaning of 
the term ‘infl orescence’375 is defi ned in a rather exemplary and symbolic way. 
For instance, the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides the primary 
meaning of the term as ‘the mode in which the fl owers of a plant are arranged in 
relation to axis and to each other; the fl ower of a plant collectively’; its secondary 
meaning is also stated as ‘the process of fl owering or coming into fl ower’. 
Similarly, the Mariam Webster Dictionary (online version) defi nes it as ‘the mode 
of development and arrangement of fl owers on axis; the budding and unfolding 
of blossoms: fl owering’; the encyclopedic article from Britannica accompanying 
this defi nition further explains its meaning as follows: ‘Cluster of fl owers on one 
370 Th e phrase ‘dignity claims’ and ‘family of terms’ is taken from Riley (n 41) and Parent (n 326) 
respectively.
371 To this end, the discussion here draws particularly on very helpful discussions by Sulmasy (n 
27); Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27); Parent (n 44); Riley (n 24); Kaufmann and 
others (n 44).
372 Th is is the term used by Sulmasy while making important distinctions between three 
diff erent historical conceptions or uses of the idea of human dignity: attributed, intrinsic, and 
infl orescent. See Sulmasy (n 27) 12–13.
373 Ibid 12 (emphasis in the original).
374 For instance, Meyer uses phrases such as ‘sense of dignity’ and ‘dignity of virtue’. See Meyer, 
‘Human Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue’ (n 263) 195ff . Rosen in his part identifi es four strands 
of dignity: ‘dignity as a valuable characteristic not restricted to human beings, dignity as high 
social status, and dignity as behavior with a certain respect-worthy character (or indignity 
as behavior lacking it)’ and ‘dignity-as-respectfulness’. See Rosen, Dignity: Its History and 
Meaning (n 27) 16, 19, 54, 57–58 & 11–115.
375 Th is term is said to have originated from New Latin infl orescentia, from late Latin infl orescent, 
infl orescens, present participle of infl orescere from Latin in- + fl orescere meaning to begin to 
bloom.
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or a series of branches, which together make a large showy blossom. Categories 
depend on the arrangement of fl owers on an elongated main axis (peduncle) or on 
sub-branches from the main axis, and on the timing and position of fl owering’.
Th is being the lexical meaning of the term infl orescent, Sulmasy describes his 
notion of infl orescent dignity as follows.
By infl orescent dignity, I mean the way people use the word to describe how a process 
or state of aff airs is congruent with the intrinsic dignity of human being. Th us, dignity 
is sometimes used to refer to a virtue – a state of aff airs in which a human being 
habitually acts in a way that expresses the intrinsic value of the human. Th is use of 
the word is not purely attributed, since it depends upon some objective conception 
of the human. Nonetheless the value itself to which this use of the word refers is not 
intrinsic, since it derives from the intrinsic value of the human. Aristotle’s use of the 
word is infl orescent, as are some of the Stoic usages.376
Both the lexical defi nition of the term ‘infl orescence’ and Sulmasy’s 
contextualisation of the same into the practical usage of the idea of dignity 
(infl orescent dignity) are quite illuminating. Th us, as a single seed of a tree form 
blossoms, masses of fl owers, on its branches while remaining fi xed to the main 
axis of the tree, so does the principle of human dignity when used in diff erent 
contexts: that is, while the overarching abstract normative meaning of human 
dignity remains the same, the dignity-languages express the specifi c normative 
imports that fl ow from the main ‘axis’ (the principle of respect for human being) 
in a given practical context. Put diff erently, the dignity-languages make it possible 
to make dignity-based claims in a variety of ways without specifi cally resorting 
to the literal usage of the term dignity. And, it is such a usage that the phrase 
infl orescence dignity is intended to capture as a term of art unifying those usages 
manifesting the specifi c normative bearings of the principle of respect for human 
being in a given practical context.
Seeing the nature of conducts (actions and behaviours) generally expressed 
through dignity-languages, it is possible to distinguish them into two basic 
categories. On the one hand, there are family of terms which characterise actions 
and behaviours that are respectful to the dignity of human being and for this 
reason can be said to be ‘dignifi ed’ conducts.377 Th e following family of terms 
describe this category: honour, virtue, humane, elevation, exaltation, sublime, 
worth, self-determination and the like. On the other hand, there are family of terms 
which express those conducts utterly inconsistent with and hence disrespectful to 
the dignity of human being and accordingly regarded as ‘undignifi ed’ conducts. 
Th e following are just some of this family of terms: humiliation, debasement, 
exploitation, slavery, degradation, dehumanisation, dishonouring, denigration, 
376 Sulmasy (n 27) 12.
377 Th is also goes in line with Rosen’s idea of ‘dignity-as-respectfulness’ mentioned above.
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disgraceful, enfeeble, injustice, exploitation, incarceration, torture, rape, 
exclusion, inhumane, demeaning and impoverishment.378
Th ese seemingly distinct but interrelated dignity-languages give specifi city 
and concreteness to the abstract principle of human dignity when it is invoked 
in a given practical context. It should however be obvious that the elementary 
logic behind distinguishing conducts into dignifi ed and undignifi ed in relation 
to a human being essentially rests on the basic moral assumption that there must 
be a specifi c way of treatment that is due to the nature of human being and, as a 
corollary to this, a manner of treatment that is naturally antithesis to its nature.379 
Of course, this assumption in itself is of no practical value unless it is at the same 
time accepted that human beings in general have the elemental capacity to not 
only discern but also to make a choice between what is dignifi ed and undignifi ed 
in their day-to-day activities; if this were in fact not the case, the whole system of 
morality would rest on a shaky foundation, let alone the argument from human 
dignity.
Th us, the fundamental moral claim that the principle of human dignity 
and the family of terms associated with it clearly assert in general is this: that 
a human being ought to be treated with due and proper respect. As such, it is 
possible ‘to speak of a single concept’ of human dignity, on the one hand, and 
‘[its] varying conceptions’, on the other.380 Regarding the relations between these 
varying conceptions of human dignity, that is, the infl orescence of its meanings 
and implications, Alexy stated the following. ‘Th e diff erent conceptions are 
hard to classify – there are no clear boundaries, only, what Wittgenstein called 
family resemblances: a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and 
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail’.381 
Th is characteristic feature of the principle of human dignity is very crucial in 
explaining its essence as a fundamental normative principle. In particular, the 
discussion in this section regarding its relationship with the variety of concepts 
referred to as dignity-languages reveals at least the following three important 
aspects of the principle of human dignity.
First, it shows that the idea of human dignity goes much deeper than it is 
commonly understood; in particular, it indicates its conceptual richness and 
378 Th ese are family of terms drawn from diff erent publications on human dignity; I take that 
they all express the idea of infl orescent dignity as defi ned here. See particularly, Parent (n 44); 
Brennan and Lo (n 263); Daniel Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect’ in David 
Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(Kluwer Law International 2002); Kaufmann and others (n 44).
379 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 57ff .
380 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 233ff ; Riley 
(n 24) 133ff .
381 Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights [1986] (Trans. Julian Rivers, 2002) (n 4) 233 (citing 
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn., 1958, p. 32; 
internal quotation omitted).
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hence characteristic feature as a foundational norm.382 Second, it reveals that the 
principle of human dignity is an evaluative and qualitative normative principle 
which helps us to distinguish between actions, treatments, behaviours or conducts 
due to the inherent value of humanity and those which are not; as it is stated above, 
the guiding principle behind such a moral judgment is the ideal of respect for 
the inherent value of human beings.383 According to Rosen, the use of dignity as 
evaluative term (in the sense of what is dignifi ed) relates the current usage of the 
notion of human dignity back to its historical usage.384 Th us, as an evaluative and 
qualitative norm, the principle of human dignity functions as a tool of resistance 
against all forms of conducts and practices undermining the inherent value 
of human beings. Th is is essentially what underlies Rosen’s idea of dignity-as-
respectfulness which in turn signifi es the moral right of every human being to be 
treated respectfully and the right not to be treated disrespectfully.385 According to 
Chaskalson, ‘In a broad and general sense, respect for dignity implies respect for the 
autonomy of each person, and the right of everyone not to be devalued as a human 
being or treated in a degrading or humiliating manner’.386 Parent also provides 
as with equally powerful interpretation of what it means to have human dignity 
stressing its evaluative character.387 He argues that ‘To possess moral dignity is to 
be entitled not to be subject to or victimized by unjust attitudes or acts of contempt. 
It also embodies the right not to be unjustly victimized by contemptuous failures to 
act.’388 Following Parent, the moral rights fl owing from this ideal of moral dignity 
serve to prescribe the treatment which ought to and ought to not be due to a human 
being. Th ey particularly seek to secure certain inviolable space for every human 
being against ‘gratuitous invasion’.389 And the principle of
Moral dignity condemns those invasions that involves unfair personal devaluation. In 
doing so, it establishes a kind of moral inviolability for all human beings. It furnishes 
each one of us, whether strong or weak, politically powerful or disenfranchised, 
competent or retarded, and whatever our race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation, 
with an indefeasible moral standing to protest (or to have protested on our behalf) all 
insidious attempts to degrade our persons.390
382 See Chapt 4.7 below discussing diff erent normative function of human dignity. See also 
Shultziner (n 365) 73–74.
383 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 57–58 & 30.
384 Ibid 30.
385 For full discussion of Rosen on this point, see ibid 54–62.
386 Arthur Chaskalson, ‘Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value’ in David Kretzmer and 
Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 134.
387 Parent (n 44) 48ff . Parent suggests that the concept of ‘human dignity should be understood 
to be constituted by a particular, especially important moral right. It is a right that secures to 
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Th ird, the discussion in this section also shows that the principle of human 
dignity is practically a relational normative principle. Th is will be explained in 
detail in next section but, in short, the ideal of respect engrained in the notion of 
dignity not only signifi es but clearly presupposes a rather dynamic relationship 
between human beings. Th is makes the principle of human dignity an essentially 
relational normative principle fi tting for the social conception of human rights 
discussed in Chapter three above.
Th erefore, it can be concluded that the principle of human dignity and the 
infl orescence of its meaning through diff erent family of terms confi rm that 
the principle of human dignity is characteristically a generic (an abstract) and 
practical normative principle whose essential meaning is both rooted in and makes 
sense in the context of concrete and lived experiences of individuals in a political 
society. Th is, in turn, establishes it as fundamental evaluative and qualitative 
normative principle against which the legitimacy (and appropriateness) of the 
society’s socioeconomic, cultural and legal systems vis-à-vis the inherent value of 
human beings can be assessed and judged.
4.6. THE RELATIONAL NATURE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Having examined the principle of human dignity and the infl orescence of its 
meanings in various contexts, it is now time to explore one of its basic features 
that establishes it as a fi ttingly foundational normative principle for human rights. 
In this regard, we have already said that the conceptual connection between 
human dignity and the idea of respect reveals an important point relevant for our 
discussion. Th at is, as opposed to autonomy and equality, the principle of respect 
for human dignity does not in any way imply the idea of atomised individualism 
but rather presupposes the existence of deep substantive relationship between 
human beings.391 Th is is so because the very idea of respect presupposes the 
existence of dynamic and meaningful individual interactions. Th e person who 
owes or is owed respect is situated in a complex and multidimensional relationship 
with other fellow persons.392 Th is entails that the principle of human dignity 
is characteristically a relational normative principle. Th at is, the moral duty to 
unconditionally respect each other’s inherent dignity can only make sense in the 
context of dynamic relationship that exists between individuals.393
391 For instance, Nino compares what he calls the principle of personal autonomy with the 
principle of human dignity and says that while the former is a static principle the latter is 
dynamic one. Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135) 176.
392 Carl Cranor, ‘Toward a Th eory of Respect for Persons’ (1975) 12 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 303–319 (as cited by Darwall [n 46] 37).
393 Th e essence of the implication of this moral duty is well-recognised by Dworkin who argued 
that the principle of human dignity compels every human being to a moral duty to see to it that 
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Several authors have recognised the fact that (the principle of) human dignity 
signifi es or requires the existence of deep and dynamic relationship between 
individuals. Malpas and Lickiss, for instance, employ the ‘topographical’ and 
‘ecological’ views of human beings respectively to elucidate this relational 
nature of the principle of human dignity and the underlying values thereof.394 
In substance, both views seeks to show the practical understanding of human 
being as having open, complex, dynamic and situated interactions (individually 
and as species) with the ‘self ’, ‘the social’ (i.e. with other fellow humans) and the 
surrounding environment.395
Th e discussion by Malpas particularly concerns the epistemological dimension 
of human dignity which he explains drawing on Davidson’s theory of knowledge 
who, in turn, is responsible for introducing three types of human knowledge ‘that 
are mutually implicated with one another: knowledge of the self, knowledge of 
others, and knowledge of the world’.396 For Malpas, there is more to this ‘merely 
epistemic’ constructivism
since who and what we are is so much bound up with our knowledge of ourselves, and 
since our knowledge of ourselves is interdependent with our knowledge of others and 
the world, so who and what we are is itself bound up with our knowledge of others and 
of the world.397
According to him, this is another way of picturing the ‘“topographical” character 
of human [being], since one way of understanding the interrelatedness that is at 
issue here is precisely in terms of a certain form of complex situatedness’.398 Th us, 
this topographical view of human beings advanced by Malpas therefore rejects 
that individuals could meaningfully be viewed as atomised and self-enclosed 
beings.
Rather than being somehow self-enclosed and separate, human being has to be 
understood in terms of his/her particular topos – in terms of the place in which he/she 
a human life goes and be successful and should not be wasted. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible 
Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (n 208) 9–16.
394 See Malpas (n 30); Norelle Lickiss, ‘On Human Dignity: Fragments of an Exploration’ in Jeff  
Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 
2007).
395 In their Introductory chapter, Malpas and Lickiss characterise the idea of human dignity as 
‘conversation’, a characterisation intended to especially explicate the relational nature of its 
practical normative imports (this revealing characterisation literally came out of the nature 
of the proceeding organized to have a ‘genuine conversation’ among scholars of wide-ranging 
disciplines). Malpas and Lickiss (n 21) 5.
396 As discussed and cited by Malpas (n 30) 21. ‘It is Davidson’s contention that no one of these is 
possible without the others – knowledge of self, for instance, of one’s own attitudes, feelings, 
and so on, is thus interdependent with knowledge of others and with the knowledge of the 
world.’ ibid.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid (internal citation omitted).
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fi nds himself/herself – a topos or place that is formed through the interactions between 
individuals and groups of individuals, between individuals and the environments and 
things that surrounds them, and between individuals and themselves.399
According to Malpas, these complex topographic relations thus described have 
wider implications not just in relation to our epistemic lives but in relation to 
our entire ethical lives as well. More generally, it is possible to say that this view 
helps us to picture human being and its basic institutions such as language, 
ethics, morality and knowledge from the relational point of view.400 Here, it is 
particularly interesting to see the relational nature of human dignity that emerges 
from this view, as Malpas clearly explains in the following text. Th us, he argues 
that
If human being is indeed relational … then human dignity will, in turn, be similarly 
relational in character. What this means, fi rst of all, is that dignity will play out across 
the three dimensions of relationship that are at issue here: there is a sense of dignity 
that obtains in terms of the sense of worth that we have in relation to ourselves, a sense 
of dignity that we have of ourselves in relation to others, and so also a sense of the 
worth of others in relation to ourselves, a sense of the worth of ourselves in relation to 
the wider world, and of that wider world as it stands in relation to us. Th at dignity is 
expressed here in terms of ‘relation to’ should not be taken to suggest that the dignity 
at issue does not belong to anything ‘in itself ’, but rather that dignity always and only 
appears as something standing within a wider structure of relations since only then 
does something even appear.401
Th is, in turn, means that the principle of human dignity as relational normative 
principle is essentially concerned with how one ought to act and live in relation to 
other fellow human beings in a society. As Malpas and Lickiss state,
Dignity is not an idea abstracted from human action, but has life only in the actual 
relations between human beings. Dignity is, in the end, evident only in the concreteness 
of human life and practice and the extent to which our life and practice can be seen as 
enabling of human dignity is perhaps the best measure of its humanity.402
Lickiss, in her part, presents the ‘ecological’ conception of human beings in the 
context of healthcare where she stresses the important role of the interpersonal 
relationship between a patient and physician.403 As she argues, the idea of care, the 
399 Ibid.
400 Ibid. Malpas here provides the conception of ethics that emerges from this and argues that 
most of our key ethical notions can only make sense in the context of the complex dimension 
of human relations.
401 Ibid 22.
402 Malpas and Lickiss (n 21) 5.
403 Lickiss (n 394) 35–41.
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foundation of practical human science like medicine, primarily entails the idea of 
interpersonal relationship. Ensuring an eff ective care however requires that this 
relationship be established on the practical understanding of the person and his 
or her sociocultural environment. And Lickiss argues that a human being ‘is a 
relational reality’.404 As such, he or she is related not only to the internal self (one’s 
inward environment) but also to the external world defi ned by its complex cultural, 
phenomenological, context.405 Th e interpersonal relationship established on the 
appreciation of this complex situatedness plays a signifi cant role in preserving the 
‘internal cohesiveness’, the dignity, of those who are in the vulnerable positions 
like a patient suff ering from severe pains. It is ultimately the value of this human 
relationship predicated on the idea of care that gives dignity its dynamic and living 
idea. As she interestingly puts it, ‘Dignity is embedded in life’s dynamism’.406
Human dignity, the living idea, may be manifest in action, but that action is not, in 
the last analysis, directed inwards, but outwards, in relationship, even in surrender. 
Absolute autonomy may [be] the antithesis of dignity, the self-locked in (truly no exit). 
Human dignity, therefore, maybe incorrectly conceived as a static entity, or property, 
but rather as process, always a becoming and moving to what is not yet… as is life. 
Dignity is embedded in life’s dynamism.
Th erefore, the topographical and ecological conceptions of human being clearly 
underscore the relationality of humanity as well as the normative values underlying 
the principle of human dignity – this view is clearly in stark contrast with the 
one which sees human beings as self-enclosed, individualistic beings defi ned by 
their static relationships. Th at is, they provide us with interesting insights into the 
relationship between the relational conception of human beings and the principle 
of human dignity. Not only this, the topographical and ecological conceptions also 
play an important role in addressing the epistemological and axiological questions 
oft en raised in connection with the practical implications of the principle of 
human dignity.407 One is that these conceptions signify the imperative nature of 
human (social) relations.408 Th is is so because it is simply impossible for anyone to 
avoid participation in social relations: a child begins to make interactions with its 
surrounding environment no sooner than it is born to the social and physical world. 
Relationality is both an indispensable and inescapable attribute of humanity: that 
is, there is no one who can avoid social relations and at the same time be able to 
live as a human being. Human relationality involves, inter alia, a complex and 
substantive understanding of each other, that is, mutual recognition of each other’s 
404 Ibid 33ff .
405 Ibid 32–35.
406 Ibid 35.
407 In this regard, I draw on and follow Riley’ useful discussion (see the discussion in the following 
pages).
408 See Chapt 3.4 above.
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interests and values. Th is in turn gives dignity its practical and dynamic meaning. 
Following Malpas, for instance, one recognises his own dignity and the dignity of 
others via the complex interaction we make with ourselves, other persons and the 
wider cosmic world; the sense of value that we attribute to ourselves and others 
and the environment is the result of this highly intertwined relationship.409
In addition to the discussion by Malpas and Lickiss, the epistemic problem 
surrounding the notion of human dignity can also be further clarifi ed by considering 
the relationship between human dignity and human body as well-captured in Riley’s 
interesting analysis.410 He says that ‘We predominantly know dignity through 
the body. […] Dignity asserts the inviolability of the body’.411 In this regard, it is 
possible to identify two basic aspects of the human body particularly relevant in 
the general normative discourse. In one sense, the body represents the biological, 
physical, constitution of humanness; it is the factual aspect of what it means to be 
human. Accordingly, it denotes the empirical or physical personality of a human 
being. Th is, in turn, plays a signifi cant role in settling, to a great extent, the alleged 
epistemic problem associated with human dignity. Th at is, the body, being a mirror 
of what it means to be human, enables us to have a pictorial understanding of what 
dignity or indignity entails in the practically relevant sense of the term.412 Because 
of this, we know and are able to know what actions or conducts are undignifi ed 
and therefore prohibited or ought to be prohibited and what is required or ought 
to be required vis-à-vis a human being and vice versa. In other words, the refl exive 
function of the human body makes it possible to recognise and make sense of factors 
antithetic to the inherent dignity of human being in concrete terms such as pain, 
degradation, humiliation, insult, hunger, poverty, sickness, oppression and torture.
In another sense, the human body also functions as the ‘site of normativity’.413 
Th is signifi es the moral personality of human beings, that is, as beings with rights 
and obligations.414 In this sense, the body represents a moral aspect of humanness 
and therefore denotes a moral personality of a human being. Moral personality, in 
essence, consists in the moralisation and hence idealisation of the factual personality 
of a human being through the system of rights and obligations. Accordingly, we 
are able to understand the practical bearings of such normative ideas as freedom, 
right, autonomy, responsibility, etc. by picturing the way they stand in association 
with the physical personality of a human being. So, the normative idea of a human 
body entails some sort of the concretisation and idealisation of a human being as 
409 Malpas (n 30) 22.




414 Riley here chose to discuss this in terms of the juridical concept of a person but for the purpose 
here there is no reason to limit the discussion to the juridical domain for the body also plays 
the same function in the moral domain as well. In fact, it is possible to argue that the juridical 
construction of the person is an extension of what it means to be a person in the moral sense of 
the term. Cf. ibid.
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it represents humanness as consisting of both the physical (biological) and moral 
personalities. Human dignity as the inherent value of a human being therefore 
pertains to both the physical and moral aspect of humanness. As such, it asserts an 
unconditional and undivided respect-worthiness of a human being as it denies the 
division or gradation of these two aspects of human personalities.415 For instance, 
it does not make sense to talk of the moral respect-worthiness of a human being 
in dissociation from his or her physical (biological) conditions and vice versa, for 
neither is possible without the other. Accordingly, the principle of human dignity 
signifi es not only the moral and physical respect-worthiness of a human being 
but also the fact that its core normative demand (an unconditional respect for the 
inherent value of a human being) cannot be realised without ensuring due and 
proper respect for both aspects of humanness.
Th is practical understanding of a human being as particularly expressed through 
the topographical and ecological conceptions, and the normative function of the 
human body is crucial in explaining the relationality of the principle of human 
dignity for it gives clarity to the idea of respect, mutual recognition and attribution 
of values. It expresses not only how we see ourselves individually but also how we 
are related to other fellow human beings and the physical world. As Malpas argues, 
‘Who and what we are is not determined solely by our existence as independent 
beings, but is instead intertwined with the being of those others in relation to whom 
our lives are shaped, as well as with respect to the wider world in which our lives are 
played out.’416 We see ourselves not only in relation to and in the eyes of ourselves 
but also in relation to and in the eyes of other fellow persons and vice versa. Most 
importantly, it is also another way of speaking about the unity of humanity and 
hence the universal imperativeness of the principle of human dignity. We ought to 
attribute the same value that we attribute to ourselves to our fellow persons; to treat 
in the same way as we would like to be treated by others, for we all possess within 
our person the same inherent and inalienable value by virtue of our mere humanity.
One may, however, simply reject the unity of humanity expressed through the 
practical understanding of human dignity and instead hold the gradation of dignity 
on such factors as wealth, religion or culture. In that case, one has to also face at 
least Nino’s logic of ‘performative contradiction’ or Gewirth’s ‘principle of generic 
consistency’.417 Th at is, one who rejects the unity of humanity established through 
the practical idea of human dignity must be able to show why he has dignity but not 
others; why his dignity is more important than that of others; and how his dignity 
is diff erent from that of others. But, in my opinion, this is simply an inconceivable 
415 Ibid 132–133; Parent (n 44) 62–64. In the words of parent, ‘Moral dignity condemns those 
invasions that involve unfair personal devaluation. In doing so, it establishes a kind of moral 
inviolability for all human beings’. ibid 62.
416 Malpas (n 30) 20.
417 See generally Nino, Th e Ethics of Human Rights (n 135); Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights 
(n 3); Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1).
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project to pursue.418 As already argued above, the idea of human dignity conceived 
as the inherent value of a human being does not take such arbitrary and contingent 
factors into account. Th e ‘dignity that belongs to a human life’ cannot ‘be accounted’ 
on any other grounds than the ‘worth of a human life which is given only through 
the articulation of that life in relation to self, others and world.’419 Th at is why it 
is simply impossible to consistently and validly deny the relatedness of humanity 
and the universal imperativeness of the principle of human dignity. According 
to Malpas, ‘inasmuch as human dignity is tied to human beings, then one’s own 
dignity cannot be separated from the dignity that belongs to others’. By necessary 
implication, ‘To treat one human being as without dignity is potentially to deny 
the dignity of every human being, even one’s own, and so one may even say that an 
assault on the dignity of one is an assault on the dignity at all’.420
Th is view of human dignity as signifying human relatedness gives concreteness 
to its core normative principle (the principle of respect) by placing its importance 
in the context of complex and dynamic social relations between individuals. As 
Malpas argued, ‘it is precisely the need to be attentive to human worth that is at 
the centre of ethical thought and action’ which, in this case, entails the need to be 
‘attentive to the complex relatedness in which all human life consists; a relatedness 
that encompasses ourselves, the others with whom we live, and the wider world’.421
Th is attentiveness to the inherent value of human being as required by the 
principle of human dignity further elucidates the relational (social) conception of 
humanity which, as argued in Chapter three above, not only attributes an intrinsic 
moral value to human life but also strives to respect, protect, preserve and promote 
the same. Th e practical expression of humanity’s attentiveness to the inherent 
value of human being should essentially consist in ensuring unconditional respect 
for those biological and moral conditions (needs) of life indispensable to live a 
dignifi ed human life. Th ese, in turn, concern basic material and moral conditions 
of life which must be fulfi lled as a matter of respect for the inherent value of human 
being. So, the idea that the principle of human dignity asserts an unconditional 
respect-worthiness of every human being gets its substantive and practical meaning 
in relation to these material and moral conditions of human life. As explained 
above using the normative function of human body, the lack of these material and 
moral needs essentially destroys the dignifi ed existence of a human being. Th is 
implies that, in order for a political society to comply with the basic requirements 
of the principle of human dignity, it is essential that every member of the society 
be guaranteed (has access to) these conditions of life, both in theory and in fact. It 
is practically impossible for the state and society to show respect for the inherent 
value of human being without ensuring these conditions at an adequate level.
418 Alexy, ‘Discourse Th eory and Human Rights’ (n 1) 214.
419 Malpas (n 30) 23–25; Sulmasy (n 27) 13–17. According to Malpas, ‘Th e question of human 
dignity is surely inseparable from the question what it means to be human’. ibid 19.
420 Malpas (n 30) 23.
421 Ibid 25.
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It will briefl y be noted in the following section that these material and moral 
conditions of life are now recognised in positive international law in the form of 
what has generally become economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. 
But generally speaking, while those basic material conditions of life are legally 
guaranteed through ESC rights regime, those basic moral conditions of life are 
guaranteed through civil and political rights regime. And, interestingly, both 
regimes expressly provide that these conditions are an undivided constitutive 
elements of a dignifi ed human life, that is, a life wherein all of its material and 
moral conditions are available to an adequate level. Th is, in other words, means 
that the various kinds of human rights currently guaranteed through diff erent 
international positive law are nothing but specifi c articulation of what the 
principle of human dignity entails for a political society in concrete legal terms. 
As such, both civil and political rights, and ESC rights are justifi ed upon and 
hence equally drive their normativity and substantive content from the principle 
of human dignity.422 Hence, ESC rights are equally constitutive elements of a 
dignifi ed human life which must be realised as a matter of respect for the inherent 
value of human being.
In conclusion, this section has addressed two important points. First, it has 
explained the normative character of the principle of human dignity especially 
by using the topographical and ecological conception of human beings, and the 
empirical and normative function of human body. It emerged from the discussion 
that the principle of human dignity is essentially a relational normative principle 
whose core normative demand gets its substantive meaning in relation to the 
intuitive understanding of what it means to be a human being and in the context 
of practical and dynamic human relationship. Second, it has also shown that from 
this conception of human dignity necessarily fl ows a general moral obligation to 
recognise (value) and be attentive to the inherent needs of human being which, 
in concrete terms, consists in ensuring basic material and moral conditions of life 
required to live a dignifi ed human life.
4.7. ITS NORMATIVE FUNCTIONS IN PRACTICE
So far, the discussion in this Chapter has addressed the theoretical conception of 
the meaning and implications of (the principle of) human dignity. Th is section 
now examines the way the principle of human dignity is recognised in the general 
international human rights law and some national jurisdictions and the principal 
normative functions assigned to it. Th is will supplement the insights and 
perspectives gained through the theoretical analysis of the term in the preceding 
sections as well as provide important basis for the analysis of international ESC 
rights case law in the next chapters. It particularly identifi es three interrelated uses 
422 See particularly Section 4.7.1 below.
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of the principle of human dignity in (international) positive law: as a foundational 
(constitutive) and regulative norm and as an absolute human right; these are, in 
turn, found to be expressive of and hence consistent with its normative meaning 
and implications seen the preceding sections.
4.7.1. AS A FOUNDATIONAL NORM
As generally implied through the preambles of UN Charter and UDHR, some of 
the socioeconomic conditions antecedent to the creation of the United Nations 
and UN human rights systems were antithetic to a dignifi ed human life especially 
because of the scale of war, violence, systematic extermination, repression, 
colonisation, starvation and poverty. Th e creation of UN and other subsequent 
global and regional human rights institutions was aimed at countering the 
recurrence of such state of aff airs and practices and ensuring respect for the 
inherent dignity and rights for all members of humanity.423 In other words, 
reaffi  rming faith in the dignity and inherent rights of human beings was the 
raison d’etre of the new world order envisioned by international community 
through the UN and its human rights institutions and other regional human 
rights systems.424 Chaskalson underscores this point as follows:
Th e UN Charter, reacting to the horrors of the recent war, articulated aspirations for 
a new world order in which things would be diff erent. It went beyond affi  rming faith 
423 See Arieli (n 42); Klaus Dicke, ‘Th e Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ in David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002); Chaskalson (n 
386); Th addeus Metz, ‘African Conceptions of Human Dignity : Vitality and Community as 
the Ground of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Rev 19; Daly (n 44).
424 See Marcel Brus, ‘Social Sustainable Globalisation and International Law: In Need of a New 
International Constitutional Balance’ in Eva Nieuwenhuys (ed), Neo-Liberal Globalism and 
Social Sustainable Globalisation (Brill 2006) 146–148. Also, according to Arieli, there was no 
other normative principle other than human dignity to eff ectively refl ect the rejection of the 
past practices and instead install the beginning of new hope and value systems of the world 
embodied by the new Organisation (the UN). Arieli (n 42). Of course, an argument could be 
made against this reading of the object and purposes of the UN and other regional institutions. 
For instance, one may say that the primary interests of the then states were the creation of 
peace, protection of national sovereignty and economic growth. It is possible to respond to this 
argument with a question: what is the value of all these without a human being? Th e discussion 
in the previous sections about the principle of human dignity and its practical implications 
however clearly accommodates all these and many more of them but it expressly rejects an 
attempt to attach an independent value to anyone of these. Seen in the light of the practical 
conception of human dignity, peace, security, democracy, rule of law, economic growth and 
social progression are all integral part of what ensuring respect for human dignity entails. 
Th ey are necessary means to the ultimate end as Spijkers interestingly puts: ‘A world in which 
the intrinsic human dignity of all the world’s citizens is respected and secured is a better world 
for all.’ Otto Spijkers, Th e United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law 
(Intersentia 2011) 352.
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in human rights and dignity. It required, also, from all member states that adopted 
the Charter, a pledge to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
United Nations for the achievement of this purpose.425
Spijkers, who carried out an in-depth study of the evolution of global values 
through the architecture of the United Nations Systems, also confi rms this point 
when he states that the ‘importance of universal respect for the global value of 
human dignity’ was established against such a background of the dehumanisation 
of ‘the entire groups of people’ that the world witnessed at the time of WWII. 
‘Just aft er the war,’ Spijkers writes, ‘there was some dispute about the exact 
interpretation of the value, and […] about the best way to secure its promotion 
and respect. But there was no objection to the value itself. Th e basic idea that all 
human beings had to be treated with dignity precisely because they were human 
beings, was universally accepted’.426
In my opinion, this clearly speaks to the foundational role of the principle of 
human dignity which can be explained by referring to several of the constitutive 
acts of the principal international organisations, various international human 
rights treaties and other legislative and adjudicative practices of relevant 
international institutions. In this regard, the UN Charter is recognised as being 
the fi rst international instrument providing human dignity as a foundational 
norm.427 Th is does not however mean that the idea of human dignity was 
entirely new to international law but rather to state that the UN Charter was the 
fi rst in assigning this crucial normative status and function to the principle of 
human dignity as far as positive international law is concerned.428 Th is function 
can be seen as the recognition in the positive law of the meaning and practical 
implications of the principle of human dignity discussed above: that is, asserting 
an unconditional respect for the inherent value of human being. Th is in practical 
terms entails that everyone must have available to him or her all those essential 
material and moral conditions indispensable to live and lead a dignifi ed human 
life. To this end, the removal of socioeconomic and other conditions antithetic 
to a dignifi ed human life is indispensable. Th is, in turn, requires the presence 
of necessary legislative, institutional and policy measures within a given system. 
425 Chaskalson (n 386) 133–134.
426 Spijkers (n 424) 352.
427 Dicke (n 423) 111ff ; Chaskalson (n 386); Jochen Abr Frowein, ‘Human Dignity in International 
Law’ in David Kretzemer and Eckart Klein (eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002) 121–123.
428 See for instance, Frowein tracing the historical role of the notion of human dignity in 
international law back to the early 16th century discussions of Spanish school of thought 
in relation to whether conversion of Indians to Christianity was justifi ed. Frowein (n 427); 
Chaskalson (n 386). See generally Johannes Morsink, Th e Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Origins, Draft ing, and Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press 1999); Spijkers (n 424).
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Th is was essentially the promise provided in the Preamble of the UN Charter as 
partly stated below.
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
and; to reaffi  rm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, 
and; to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and; to 
promote social progress and better standard of life in larger freedom;
Th ese dignity-based Charter promises were since then reaffi  rmed in many 
subsequent international treaties, particularly in all human rights instruments 
adopted at the UN and regional level. For instance, Spijkers observed that the 
UN General Assembly ‘has been very consistent and explicit in its use of human 
dignity as the source of all human rights’.429 Th e most important human rights 
instrument in this regard is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Here, it suffi  ces to see how human dignity is provided in the Preamble and Article 1 
of the UDHR which expressly state the core values and principles inspiring the 
formulation of its substantive provisions. Its Preamble partly provides that
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the 
world, [w]hereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in 
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear 
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people … [w]
hereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffi  rmed their faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom, … the promotion of universal respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms … proclaims [the 
declaration and the freedoms and rights constituted therein] as a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations.
And, Article 1 of the same partly provides that ‘All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights’. Its Article 2 further underscores the implication 
of this grand principle enshrined in Article 1, that is, by virtue of being equal in 
dignity and the rights fl owing therefrom, ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in [the] Declaration’ and to this extent there can be no 
distinction or exclusion of any kind be made between human beings in relation 
429 Spijkers (n 424) 456 (and generally chapt 6). He also notes that ‘Th e idea that human dignity 
constitutes a universally shared foundation of the human rights movement has also been 
accepted in the literature.’ ibid.
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to the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms fl owing from the inherent human 
dignity. And these statements of principles enshrined in the UDHR have been 
consistently reiterated in the binding human rights treaties. In particular, the 
Preamble of the ICESCR reaffi  rms the foundational function of the principle of 
human dignity as follows.430
States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world, [r]ecognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person, [r]ecognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and 
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy 
his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights, [c]
onsidering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms […]
Some authors argue that the proclamation of human dignity as a foundational 
norm of the new international legal order embodied by the UN clearly marked a 
fundamental breakaway (at least a promise to do so) of humanity from its past. 
In particular, it is said to represent the rejection of the antecedent ideologies, 
values and practices, on the one hand, and the advent of new values concerned 
with ensuring respect for the inherent rights of mankind.431 According to Arieli, 
‘Standing on the threshold of twenty-fi rst century, one is permitted to say that the 
conception of humanity as expressed by the [UDHR] has become the only valid 
framework of values, norms and principles capable of structuring a meaningful 
and yet feasible scheme of national and international civilized life.’ For him, ‘no 
other ideological frameworks could have become the basis for the reconstruction 
of the world community’ than the principle of human dignity. But human 
dignity is able to function as such especially ‘because the inherent justice and 
equity of its human message as well as its seemingly self-evident truth defi ned in 
the meta-language of rational categories of universal generalizations bestowed 
upon it a particular force of persuasion’.432 Drawing on Klein, we can therefore 
say that this foundational function of the principle of human dignity provides a 
430 Th e same is also true with ICCPR which recognises the foundational nature of the principle 
of human dignity in similar words as ICESCR except the minor diff erence in terms of the 
order of reference to the specifi c rights at the third Recital as can be seen in the next sentence. 
‘Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal 
of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights’. (emphasis added).
431 Chaskalson (n 386) 133–134.
432 Arieli (n 42). See also Brus (n 424) 146–148.
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new legitimacy basis for international and national legal systems regarding the 
realisation of fundamental human rights for all.433
It is the same function (and vision) of human dignity that was recognised 
in the founding instruments of the respective regional organisations. For 
instance, the Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe (although it did 
not literally refer to human dignity) states that the Contracting Parties were 
concerned with ‘the preservation of human society’ through the provision of 
basic conditions of life which, in turn, form integral elements of human dignity. 
Hence,
Th e Governments of [the Contracting Parties],
Convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation 
is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation; Reaffi  rming their 
devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their 
peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, 
principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy […]434
Th e Charter of the former OAU and the new AU Constitutive Act also provide 
similar statements to this eff ect. Th us, the Preamble to the OAU Charter states 
that the Heads of African States and Governments
Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples 
[…] [c]onvinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in 
the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established 
and maintained […] [p]ersuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles of which we reaffi  rm our 
adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among 
States […]435
433 Dicke (n 423). As just seen, this is particularly true in relation to all international human rights 
instruments adopted at the UN and regional level which in one way or another recognise the 
dignity of human being as the foundation of not only inherent human rights but also of justice 
and peace in the world and for the ultimate realisation of the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying basic biological and moral conditions of life.
434 Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe, CETS No. 001. To this end, Art 3 of its Statute 
particularly states that ‘Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of 
the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms […].’
435 Th ese are more or less repeated in the Constitutive Act of the new continental organization 
but with further additional purposes and principles. In particular, the AU Constitutive Act 
provides respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, 
promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; and respect for the 
sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, 
acts of terrorism and subversive activities as among its core organizational principles. See Art 
4 (m – o) the AU Constitutive Act.
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Similarly, the Preamble to the Charter of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS), to the extent relevant here, states the following:
Convinced that the historic mission of America is to off er to man a land of liberty and 
a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of 
his just aspirations […] [c]onfi dent that the true signifi cance of American solidarity 
and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within 
the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social 
justice based on respect for the essential rights of man; [p]ersuaded that their welfare 
and their contribution to the progress and the civilization of the world will increasingly 
require intensive continental cooperation; [r]esolved to persevere in the noble 
undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles 
and purposes they solemnly reaffi  rm; [c]onvinced that juridical organization is a 
necessary condition for security and peace founded on moral order and on justice […]
However, it is worth noting that these international instruments are essentially 
not concerned with providing a lexical defi nition of what human dignity is but 
rather with the creation, promotion and preservation of a legal, social, economic, 
cultural, political and institutional environment in which a dignifi ed human life 
is universally possible for every human being. Th at is, in order to respect and 
ensure a dignifi ed life for every human being, it is necessary that States parties 
and all other relevant actors respect and guarantee, jointly and severally, the 
equal and inherent rights of everyone, the rule of law, democratic participation, 
constitutionalism, peace, social justice as well as just political, economic, and 
social order.436 Th us, we can say that the idea of ‘Respect for human dignity’ 
envisioned through these instruments ‘encompasses a broader area’ in which 
complex international and national socioeconomic, political and legal actions 
should be taken. Th is, in turn, indicates that human dignity functions not only 
as a raison d’etre of each of these global institutions but also as an ultimate 
aspirations and achievements for all nations in the world.437
Furthermore, various national legal systems expressly provide human dignity 
as the foundational norm.438 According to Chaskalson, the value of human 
436 Brus (n 424) 138–147.
437 Brus (n 424); Dicke (n 423); Arieli (n 42). In fact, human dignity and the values thereof has 
already been defended in detail by some authors as constituting the core of international 
public policy. See Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights 
and World Public Order: Th e Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (Yale 
University Press 1980).
438 See particularly Eckert (n 258); Duwell and others (n 291) chapts 36 through 46 (discussing 
the place of human dignity in various national constitutions or legal systems); Riley (n 24); 
Rao, ‘On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (n 248); Rao, ‘Th ree Concepts 
of Human Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (n 248); Daly (n 44); Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a 
Stranger”: Th e Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights’ (n 248); David 
Kretzmer, ‘Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence’ in David Kretzemer and Eckart Klein 
(eds), Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 
Chapter 4. Human Dignity
Intersentia 135
dignity constitutes an underlying new normative framework of the new South 
Africa which represents, on the one hand, a breakaway from its old discriminatory, 
demining, degrading and exclusionary system of apartheid and, on the other 
hand, a new constitutional order based on the respect for the inherent rights 
and freedoms of its citizens.439 Th e same is also true with respect to the German 
Basic Law which erects human dignity as a foundational constitutional principle. 
In relation to this, many argue that the recognition of human dignity in such a 
foundational manner is a clear evidence to the fact that the Basic Law constitutes 
a new legal order built upon the fundamental value of human dignity.440
Besides this, international and national human rights jurisprudence also 
confi rms this normative function of human dignity. For instance, Carozza 
observed that the practice of jurisprudential cross-fertilisation in the adjudication 
of human rights issues around the world is essentially predicated upon the 
principle of human dignity and this, in turn, has given rise to the emergence of 
global ius commune of human rights.441 Interestingly, the discussion by Carozza 
and other authors confi rms that the function of human dignity as a foundational 
norm is regardless of whether or not it is expressly recognised as such in a given 
positive law system because it is itself regarded as a ‘suprapositive norm’; that is, as 
an assumed fundamental norm from which the legitimacy of a modern (positive) 
legal system itself fl ows.442 According to Carozza, in particular, there is clear 
evidence as to the existence of a transnational judicial dialogue predicated upon 
the understanding of common humanity and human dignity. And ‘clearly the real 
centre of gravity of the global jurisprudence is in the affi  rmation of the dignity 
of the human person and the principle that human rights law exists to protect 
that dignity’. Th is does not however mean that judicial cross-fertilisation solely 
concerns issues of human rights or dignity. It is rather to say that the intensity is 
much stronger when cases involve inherent human dignity and rights. ‘In every 
region, and in almost every case,’ he argues, ‘the courts’ language shows that their 
capacity to compare with, and to borrow and benefi t from, the jurisprudence of 
2002); Chaskalson (n 386); Henkin, ‘Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights’ (n 248); Parent 
(n 44); Aharon Barak, ‘Human Dignity: Th e Constitutional Value and the Constitutional 
Right’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University 
Press 2013); Henry (n 248).
439 Chaskalson (n 386) 139.
440 Eckart Klein, ‘Human Dignity in German Law’ in David Kretzemer and Eckart Klein (eds), 
Th e Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002); 
Eckert (n 42).
441 Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a Stranger”: Th e Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of 
Human Rights’ (n 248); Carozza, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights: A Reply’ (n 251). See also Paolo G Carozza, ‘Human Rights, Human Dignity and 
Human Experience’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford 
University Press 2013).
442 Th e term ‘suprapositive norm’ is coined by Neuman to signify that the normative value of 
human dignity goes beyond the fact of being posited by a specifi c provision of a positive law. 
For more on this, see Neuman (n 50).
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foreign legal systems has the most traction when it grips the ground of human 
dignity’.443
Th e principle of ‘Human Dignity in this way serves as the basis for the 
“suprapositivity” of borrowed principles of human rights’. Th us, ‘By appealing to the 
principle of human dignity, courts establish the basic ground of commonality and 
comparability of their decisions with those of courts in other jurisdictions, despite 
whatever other diff erences may exist in their positive law or political and historical 
context’.444 Th e implication of this is pretty clear and, at the same time very powerful, 
especially in relation to the point under consideration. As Carozza argues,
More generally, then, we can reasonably say that the normative force of the 
transnational jurisprudence we have examined is premised upon the recognition of 
the common humanity of all persons. Th e universality of this sentiment, in principle, 
complements and supports the transnational character of the discourse and practice, 
and consistently provides a justifi cation for courts to take foreign sources into 
account despite constraints of constitutional form, historical contexts, or political 
and social practice. Th e courts treat the idea of human dignity as the common thread 
to be followed across all those contingencies. In doing so, they never suggest that a 
dignifi ed, human life means anything fundamentally diff erent in the otherwise 
variable contexts of diff erent cases. To put this idea in another way, it is very clear that 
one of the strongest, most central foundations of the transnational jurisprudence of 
human rights in these cases is the recognition of our common humanity, our shared 
human nature.445
Th is suprapositive (that is, the foundational) function of human dignity can 
also be explained with reference to Touri’s view of the structure of modern legal 
system.446 Touri characterises modern law as a ‘multi-layered’ normative system. 
443 Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a Stranger”: Th e Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of 
Human Rights’ (n 248) 24. Th is is contrasted with other forms of judicial borrowing, i.e. ‘Cases 
comparing the formal language of constitutions and statutes, or comparing the pragmatic 
experiences of criminality and deterrence, for instance, stand out because they are exceptions 
to that rule’. Th is is, however, diff erent when foreign materials are invoked in relation to the 
principle of human dignity. Th us, ‘when courts invoke foreign sources, we see a familiar 
pattern, a movement from the formal aspects of a case to the general principles in play and 
specifi cally to the concept of human dignity’ to the eff ect that ‘those cases within a global 
jurisprudence that most fully and directly invoke the foundational principle of human dignity 
tend to be relied upon more frequently and fully by other courts’. ibid.
444 Carozza, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply’ (n 251) 932–
933. Cf. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (n 248).
445 Carozza, ‘“My Friend Is a Stranger”: Th e Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human 
Rights’ (n 248) 24. In his intervention in the debate between Carozza and McCrudden, Riley, 
while generally accepting the substance of Carozza’s conclusion, however seems to suggest 
that this should not mean the shared understanding of the ontological, epistemological 
or axiological meaning of dignity but it is the grammar of dignity that led to such global 
consensus regarding the normative function of human dignity. See Riley (n 24) 121.
446 Kaarlo Tuori, ‘Fundamental Rights Principles: Disciplining the Instrumentalism of Policies’ in 
AJ Menéndez and EO Eriksen (eds), Arguing Fundamental Rights (Springer 2006) 33–51.
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Th at is, ‘Law, as a symbolic normative phenomenon, does not consist merely of 
the surface level of explicit, discursively formulated normative material, such as 
statutes and other legal regulations, and court decisions; it also includes “deeper,” 
sub-surface layers, [which is referred to as] “the legal culture” and “the deep 
structure of law.”’447 According to Touri, the diff erence between these levels or 
layers of the modern legal system could be assessed in terms of, inter alia, the 
rates of change that each layer undergoes. Touri notes that ‘the surface is the level 
of incessant movement, caused by ever new regulations and decisions; the legal 
culture also evolves, but according to slower rhythm; and fi nally, even the deep 
structure, although constituting the most stable layer in law, is not immune to 
change’.448 Touri also identifi es three essential elements of his ‘deep structure,’ 
the sub-surface level of modern law which he refers to them as: conceptual, 
methodological and normative elements. Th e ‘Normative elements consist of the 
most fundamental principles characterising modern law’; and, without going 
into details, it is mainly, if not only, constituted by the ‘fundamental-rights 
principles’.449 As Touri explains, the main characteristic feature associated with 
the sub-surface level is its function as the constitutive and regulative principle 
and as censorship of the surface-level legal practices – such as law-making, 
adjudication and application practices.450
Interestingly, the foundational function of the principle of human dignity can 
analogously be identifi ed with all the layers of Touri’s modern law though in a 
complex way. For the purpose of this discussion, his idea of deep-level normative 
element, especially the function that he identifi es with this level, is particularly 
revealing because it can be equated with the idea of the suprapositive function 
of the principle of human dignity. Similar to what Touri argues about the deep-
level of his idea of modern law, the principle of human dignity determines the 
legitimacy of the surface level legal practices.451 In this way, I argue that it brings 
a critical dimension to the modern legal system by indicating to us the kind of 
actions, argumentations or interpretations that ought to be prohibited, required 
or permitted vis-à-vis the inherent value of human being. Th is, without doubt, 
is the basic function that the modern international law assigns to the principle of 
human dignity. Th us, as a principal foundational norm, the principle of human 
dignity stands as an underlying justifi cation of the new world order constituted 
on the universal recognition, protection and promotion of inherent human rights 
and as a suprapositive normative principle against which the legitimacy of the 




449 Touri, p. 42. And, for Touri, the diff erence between the modern law and traditional law could 
essentially be explained by the specifi cities of their respective deep structures. ibid.
450 Tuori (n 446) 43ff .
451 Ibid 43–44.
Part One. Th e Conceptions and Th eories of Human Rights
138 Intersentia
4.7.2. AS A REGULATIVE NORM
Th e regulative function of human dignity means that it serves as an evaluative 
and qualitative normative principle through which the legitimacy of various 
social practices in a society can be assessed. Th is function is particularly critical 
with regard to the practical implementation of human rights where the sphere 
of individual freedom of action and legitimate state intervention are in constant 
fl ux. As a regulative norm, the principle of human dignity points to the limits 
of the legitimacy of State actions in relation to the inherent rights of human 
beings by prescribing an absolute limitation on State actions and indicating the 
boundaries between permissible and impermissible spheres of actions for its 
legislative, executive and adjudicative functions.452
Admittedly, one may fi nd diffi  culty in clearly maintaining this distinction in 
practice but it is crucial especially in clarifying some of the inconsistencies and 
confusions concerning the principle of human dignity and its relationship with 
specifi c human rights that it gives rise to. Th is is so because simply declaring the 
principle of human dignity as an absolute norm may not fully express its holistic 
essence especially when invoked as a justifi cation of certain rights of a relative 
nature. But the central guiding idea behind this distinction seems to be that the 
more closely related a given interest (right) to the core aspect of the dignity of 
human being, the less justifi ed it is to balance that interest or right against some 
kind of public policy measures whatsoever. Th us, to the extent that the interest or 
right in question concerns an indispensable minimum level of material and moral 
conditions of life, the principle of human dignity can be considered as signifying 
an absolute requirement and as such precluding any kind of balancing against the 
interest or right under question. In other cases, the principle of human dignity 
requires the fulfi lment of particularly weighty reasons to override the inherent 
rights of a human being.453 It is essentially this idea that coherently explains the 
hierarchical structures underlying the right to life, the right to be protected against 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to privacy and the right to be 
protected against poverty and social exclusion.
Th is regulative function of human dignity can also be illustrated using Riley’s 
idea of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ critique that it brings to the legal system.454 First, 
human dignity introduces important ‘internal critique’ to a legal system by 
pointing to a certain minimum substantive requirements that a just legal system 
452 Frowein (n 427) 123–124.
453 For more on the idea of balancing of fundamental rights, see generally Alexy, ‘Balancing, 
Constitutional Review, and Representation’ (n 30); Cali (n 30); Fredman (n 30).
454 See Riley (n 24) 129–131. ‘In the light of this we can not only separate dignity as a positive norm 
and as a normative heuristic, but even more fundamentally, as a normativity located within 
and without law. Such a division is no doubt conceptually problematic, but it does serve to 
distinguish functions and phenomena which themselves point to an origin which is not legal 
normativity or legal positivity.’ (emphasis mine). ibid 129.
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must meet in order to be compatible with the requirement of unconditional respect 
for the inherent value of a human being. We have already said that the principle 
of human dignity asserts unconditional respect for both the biological and moral 
being of a human person. To this extent, the principle of human dignity functions 
as an internal evaluative critique to the (adequacy of) legal, institutional and policy 
measures which ought to be adopted for the realisation of these material and 
moral conditions of life within a given legal system. Second, it also functions as an 
‘external critique’ to a legal system. Th at is, it imposes an absolute limitation on the 
scope of the State’s legislative, executive and judicial authority vis-à-vis the inherent 
values of human being; in other words, it provides us with an ideal standard for 
demarcating a normative boundary which the state should never be permitted to 
cross.455
Some critics argue that this limiting function of the principle of human 
dignity is characteristically undemocratic for it inhibits legitimate public policy 
debates under the guise of its claim of absoluteness.456 However, this is a mistaken 
view because by pointing to the boundary between what ought and ought not be 
permitted in relation to the inherent value of human being, the principle of human 
dignity enables us to assess and judge, that is, to critique the legitimacy of public 
policy measures. Th is, in turn, furthers the continued validity and legitimacy of 
social and democratic values in a political society rather than undermining them. 
Of course, this does not suggest that this ideal cut-off  point envisioned by the 
principle of human dignity is always clear to everyone. Nevertheless, reference to 
the regulating function of human dignity defi nitely makes it clear that there is a 
necessary limitation with respect to society’s conversation regarding such issues 
as legality and socio-political legitimacy.457 Th erefore, it can be concluded that the 
critical normative dimension that human dignity brings to the legal system as an 
internal and external regulative norm is important particularly in guaranteeing 
the eff ective protection of inherent human rights by enabling us to evaluate and 
judge the normative contents and legitimacy of a given legal system and practice.
4.7.3. AS AN ABSOLUTE HUMAN RIGHT
In addition to being a foundational and regulative norm, human dignity is also 
recognised as an absolute human right in its own right. Th is fl ows from its basic 
feature as qualitative and evaluative principle just discussed above. As already 
argued, the ideal of respect engrained in the notion of human dignity makes it 
possible for us to distinguish between dignifi ed and undignifi ed conducts vis-à-vis 
the inherent value of a human being. Th is, in turn, suggests that there is a treatment 
455 Ibid 129–131.
456 Fyfe (n 252) 11 (citing Robin Gibbins).
457 See particularly Riley (n 24) 131–132.
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or behaviour which is naturally due to a human being as well as that antithetic to 
the same. In other words, the principle of human dignity asserts that a human 
being ought to be treated in a certain manner: that is, as a bearer of a supreme, 
inalienable and inviolable moral value, every human being ought to be treated with 
due and proper respect. Th is, in essence, is another way of stating that every human 
being has an unconditional moral right to be respected or to be treated humanely 
or respectfully. Th us, according to Rosen, there are two aspects to this most basic 
right: one is the right of everyone to be treated with dignity or the right to a dignifi ed 
treatment; the other, in fact, the corollary of the former, is the right not to be treated 
disrespectfully, i.e. in a manner contrary to one’s inherent dignity. Understood in 
this way, the right to dignity is typical of an absolute human right as it goes to the 
inner most and inviolable core of a human being that one possess just by virtue of 
being a human person; we can also say that it is the substantive core of all other 
inherent human rights.458
Human dignity as an absolute right has been well-recognised both in human 
rights law and jurisprudence. For instance, Rosen refers to Article 3 paragraph 1(c) 
of the Geneva Convention III which asserts an absolute prohibition of ‘outrages 
upon dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment’. Th is, in other 
words, means prohibition of ‘violations of dignity, exemplifi ed by humiliating and 
degrading treatment’.459 For Chaskalson, this right to be treated with dignity is 
neither new nor is it recognised only under international law.460 ‘To legal systems 
based on Roman law, the concept of dignity as a right is not strange. Roman law 
treats dignity as a right of personality, and provides civil and criminal remedies for 
its infringement’.461 According to Klein, the function of dignity in German Basic 
Law clearly goes beyond its foundational value for it is also recognised as a basic 
right in its own right.462 In particular, he notes that the Federal Constitutional Court 
‘expressly qualifi es [the Basic Law’s] phrase “the dignity of man shall be inviolable” as 
a legal right’.463 Th is, states Klein, is the same as saying that ‘Everybody has the right 
to his or her inviolable dignity’. Th us, Klein argues, the fundamental ‘right to human 
dignity is the right not to be treated in specifi c ways. It is a modal right.’464 Similarly, 
Kretzmer shows that the right to dignity is well-recognised in the jurisprudence of the 
458 Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (n 27) 57–61. He argues that ‘a right to dignifi ed 
treatment is potentially a universal right’ but his analysis clearly shows that this right without 
doubt admits no form of exception in that it belongs to every human being irrespective of who 
he or she is and how one behaves in a society: ‘everyone – even those of us who don’t have a 
moral strength to behave in a dignifi ed way when we are faced with moral challenges – should 
be treated ‘with dignity.’ Th ey should be treated ‘with respect’ – that is, most importantly, they 
should not be treated disrespectfully by being humiliated or degraded’. ibid 60.
459 Ibid 60.
460 Chaskalson (n 386) 134ff .
461 Ibid 135.
462 Klein (n 440).
463 Ibid 147.
464 Ibid 152.
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Israeli Supreme Court. According to Kretzmer, the Court clearly ‘regards the right to 
human dignity as a specifi c right that exists alongside other classic rights, such as the 
general right to personal liberty, the right to property, freedom of movement, and the 
right to privacy’.465 As already seen above, the foundational and regulative functions 
of the principle of human dignity do not automatically suggest its absoluteness. But 
the right to be treated with dignity (humanely, respectfully) establishes an absolute 
and inviolable core of other basic human rights precluding any sort of balancing or 
compromise whatsoever. As such, it can be said that, borrowing Riley’s terms, the 
right to dignity is a ‘peremptory’ and ‘conclusory’ right from which the legal system 
should not be allowed to derogate under any circumstance.466
In summary, this section has distinguished and discussed three basic ways 
in which the principle of human dignity is being used in modern (international) 
positive law and jurisprudence. First, human dignity is enshrined as an 
overarching justifi cation of both the institutional structures and specifi c human 
rights. Second, it is used as a standard of legitimacy against which the practices of 
the States and other actors are evaluated. Th ird, it is also recognised as an absolute 
human right. All these functions of the principle of human dignity identifi ed in 
this section are essentially refl ective of (and consistent with) its characteristic 
feature as the most basic, relational and an evaluative normative principle 
examined in detail in the preceding sections.
4.8. CONCLUSION
Th e main task of this Chapter was examining whether and in what manner the 
idea of human dignity provides a viable justifi cation for ESC rights guaranteed 
under international law. To this end, it has examined in detail three major points 
in relation to human dignity. First, it has explored its diff erent conceptions and 
the arguments off ered in favour of these conceptions. Second, it has identifi ed 
its core normative principle and the nature and implications of the same both 
generally and for the justifi cation of human rights. Th ird, it has analysed the way 
it is being used in (international) positive law and jurisprudence. In relation to 
the fi rst point, having shown its historical-philosophical conceptions as rank 
and status, and as the inherent value of humanity and the critical limitations 
in these conceptions, it was argued that the justifi cation of human dignity as 
inherent value of humanity and foundation of specifi c human rights should be 
approached in the light of the practical-intuitive understanding of the nature of 
human being. Th is practical approach reveals that humanity is constituted of two 
inseparable beings (and hence personalities), that is, the moral and biological 
(physical) beings (and personalities). Th is necessarily implies that dignity as 
465 Kretzmer (n 438) 169.
466 Riley (n 24) 131–132.
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inherent value of humanity pertains equally and at once to both aspects of our 
humanity. Th is leads us to the second crucial point of this Chapter, that is, the 
implication of this conclusion for the normative principle signifi ed through the 
notion of human dignity. In this respect, it was shown that, despite the presence 
of diff erent conceptions over the course of time, the core normative principle 
engrained in the very notion of human dignity has remained to be the principle of 
respect which, in turn, generally asserts an unconditional respect for the inherent 
life and value of every human being. It was argued that this ideal of respect 
should be construed as pertaining both to the biological and moral aspect being 
human. Interestingly, it was seen that the one who owes and is owed respect is a 
human being situated in the context of practical social relations. So, the principle 
of human dignity is essentially a relational normative principle in the sense 
that it gets its full substantive meaning in the context of dynamic and mutual 
relationships that naturally exist between human beings in a political society. As 
such, it prescribes how human beings ought to see and treat themselves in relation 
to the three dimensions of human life in social relations: the self, the social and 
wider environment. And the principle of human dignity injects a fundamental 
moral imperative to this relationality of humans by requiring them to see and treat 
themselves with due and proper respect. From this also follows the evaluative and 
qualitative nature of the principle of human dignity through which the legitimacy 
of actions and behaviours in the society can be scrutinised vis-à-vis the inherent 
value of human beings. Admittedly, this construction of the principle of human 
dignity can lead us to several legal, institutional and policy arguments but for the 
purpose of this study, it was held that respecting and ensuring the inherent life 
and value of human being essentially consists in ensuring those indispensable 
moral and material (biological) conditions of life required to live a dignifi ed 
human life. As these moral and material conditions of life are now recognised and 
articulated in the form of specifi c human rights under international human rights 
law, the States parties also bear a compelling (international) legal obligation to 
ensure the same for every human being within their jurisdictions. To this extent, 
the argument from the principle of human dignity and the specifi c human rights 
recognised in international law does not suggest any form of hierarchy between 
the moral and material conditions of life. As such, the status and implications of 
ESC rights guaranteeing those material conditions of life are generally the same 
as that of civil and political rights providing for those moral conditions of life, 
for both human rights regimes drive their normative essence and substantive 
content from the principle of respect for the inherent life and value of human 
being. Th is conclusion is also supported by the specifi c normative functions of 
human dignity recognised in international human rights law and jurisprudence, 
the third major point discussed under this Chapter. For instance, it was seen that 
its foundational and regulative functions give a justifi cation and legitimacy basis 
for the socioeconomic, legal and policy measures aimed at the realisation of a 
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life of dignity for every member of human society. And as an absolute human 
right (the right to be treated with due respect), human dignity can also be seen 
as providing for a peremptory normative basis through which we can continue 
to insist and argue for the unconditional obligation of the State to realise the 
minimum essential core of each of the substantive human rights inherent in our 
humanity. Having said all this, what remains to be seen is the specifi c contents 
of the State’s legal obligation to respect and ensure the material conditions of life 
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Part one of this study has dealt with the problem of the conception and 
justifi cation aff ecting the human rights status of ESC rights. In substance, 
it argued for the social conception of human rights which can be justifi ed 
on the basis of the principle human dignity. In particular, it argued that the 
principle of human dignity asserts an unconditional respect for the inherent 
life and value of human being which, in practical terms, means respecting and 
ensuring the inherent biological (material) and moral conditions required to 
live a dignifi ed human life. Now the main purpose of this Part is examining the 
specifi c legal obligations the State in relation to the realisation of the material 
conditions guaranteed through ESC rights regime by taking international ESC 
rights jurisprudence as a subject of inquiry. Th e investigation in this Part is 
based on the understanding that international human rights law imposes on 
States parties the generic obligation to respect and ensure the free, full and 
eff ective enjoyment of all human rights within their jurisdiction. Th is is a 
generic international legal obligation assumed by all the States parties to a given 
human rights convention that applies to all the rights therein.467 It is a broad 
467 Customarily these obligations are stated in the preamble and the fi rst two or three 
paragraphs of international human rights instruments. For instance, see African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and the protocols there to; American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) and the protocols there to; the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the protocols there to; European Social Charter (1961) and Th e Revised 
European Social Charter (1996); ICESCR and related UN treaties protecting ESC rights 
including UDHR and CRPD. See also ICCPR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC and CPMW. While it 
is to be recalled the academic distinction between negative and positive State obligations, 
tribunals have, however, clearly rejected such a distinction in practice stating that the 
generic obligation to secure the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of all human rights has 
wide-ranging implications on the part of the State and that the distinction between negative 
and positive obligation is only a matter of context than a substance. See particularly Airey 
v. Ireland (Application No. 6289/73), Judgment of 9 October 1979, paras 25–26; López Ostra 
v. Spain (Application No. 16798/90), Judgment of 9 December 1994, para 51. Th is obligation 
has also been well-recognised and emphasised by all human rights monitoring bodies 
particularly in connection with the scope of the State’s obligations under the respective 
human rights instruments. Th us, for ECtHR, see for instance, Al-Dulimi and Montana 
Management Inc. v. Switzerland (Application no. 5809/08), Judgment of 26 November 2013; 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (Application No. 30696/09) [GC], Judgment of 21 January 2011; 
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (Application No. 25965/04), Judgment of 7 January 2010; D.H. 
and Others v. the Czech Republic (Application No. 57325/00), Judgment of 13 November 2007; 
Orsus and Others v. Croatia (Application No. 15766/03) [GC], Judgement of 16 March 2010; for 
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obligation covering a wide-range of legal, institutional and policy measures that 
States should take in order to give eff ect to the rights they recognise within their 
jurisdictions.
Th e IACtHR has interpreted the generic human rights obligation of the 
State in terms of the obligation to respect and ensure (guarantee) the free, full 
and eff ective exercising and enjoyment of all human rights without any kind 
of discrimination.468 Th e obligation to respect signifi es the limitations on the 
power of the State party which, in turn, ‘derive from the fact that human rights 
are inherent attributes of human dignity and are, therefore, superior to the 
power of the State’.469 Th e obligation to ensure or guarantee ‘implies the duty 
of the States party to organize all the governmental apparatus and, in general, 
all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are 
capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights’.470 It 
particularly ‘requires the government to conduct itself so as to eff ectively ensure 
the free and full exercise of human rights’.471 Th is also means that ‘any exercise of 
public power that violates the rights recognized by the Convention is illegal’.472 So 
‘Whenever a State organ, offi  cial or public entity violates one of those rights, this 
constitutes a failure of the duty to respect the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention’.473 Similarly, the African Commission also considers that the generic 
obligation of the States parties enshrined under Article 1 of the African Charter 
entails the duty to take specifi c measures necessary to give eff ect to the rights and 
freedoms within their domestic legal system. Per the Commission, if any State 
party neglects its generic obligation to secure the rights recognised in the Charter, 
IACtHR, see Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, merits, judgment of 29 July 1988; Th e 
‘Street Children’ (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 19 November 
1999 (hereaft er ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala); Th e Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement, 17 June 2005; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 29 March 2006; Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment 27  June 
2012 (hereaft er Sarayaku v. Ecuador); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 24 August 2010; Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 4  July 2006; Baena-Ricardo et al v. Panama, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 2 February 2001; for African Commission on Human 
Rights, see Communication 368/09: Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v Republic of Sudan, 
decision on merits, 54th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 22 October to 5 November 2013 (hereaft er Abdel Hadi et al v. Sudan); Communication 
279/03–296/05: Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) / Sudan (joined) (hereaft er Darfur case v. Sudan); Communications 147/95 and 
149/96 (joined), Sir Dawda K Jawara / Th e Gambia, decision on merits of 11  May 2000 
(hereaft er Jawara v. Gambia);
468 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, paras 164ff .
469 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 165.
470 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 166.
471 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 167.
472 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 169.
473 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 169.
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it in itself would constitute an independent violation of the Charter, even if the 
State or its agents are not the immediate cause of the violation.474
Th e generic legal obligation to secure all human rights is recognised in human 
rights case law as constituting the bedrock of the States’ international human 
rights obligations: that is, any claim of the violation of a specifi c human right 
always directly entails an alleged violation of the generic legal obligation of the 
State to respect and ensure the eff ective realisation of the right in question.475 Th us, 
while this generic legal obligation also gives rise to other concrete and specially 
aggravated (heightened) human rights obligations in relation to the specifi c rights 
and needs of vulnerable persons, every State bears the obligation to design its 
legislative and institutional measures necessary to ensure and give eff ect to the 
rights within its jurisdiction just by virtue of being party to a given human rights 
convention.476 In fact, international human rights courts and monitoring bodies 
now consider that the failure to adhere to this generic legal obligation in itself 
constitutes an independent violation by the State of its international erga omnes 
human rights obligations.477
However, the problem is that the scope of the State’s generic legal obligation 
is essentially determined by the substantive content(s) of each of the rights 
recognised under a given human rights convention. Th is is basically the critical 
challenge raised against the nature of the State’s obligations fl owing from ESC 
rights recognised under international human rights law. Th at is, for some, the 
474 Communication 295/04: Noah Kazingachire, John Chitsenga, Elias Chemvura and Batanai 
Hadzisi (represented by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum) v. Zimbabwe, merits, 51st 
Ordinary Session, 18 April to 2 May 2012 ((hereaft er Noah Kazingachire et al v. Zimbabwe), 
para 141 (citing also Commission NDL v. Chad Communication 74/92, para 20).
475 See Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 162 stating, ‘Each claim alleging that one of 
those rights has been infringed necessarily implies that Article  1(1) [to respect and ensure 
all rights and freedoms] of the Convention has also been violated’. See Ireland v. UK, paras 
238–241, discussing the signifi cance of Article  1 particularly stressing that it is one of the 
many provisions attesting the binding character of the Convention, setting apart the 
Convention undertaking from other classic treaties by requiring the States to secure the rights 
and that its violation fl ows automatically from failure to secure one of the substantive rights 
guaranteed in the Convention. See Abdel Hadi et al v. Sudan, para 91 where the AfCoHPR 
held, ‘a violation of any provision of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights] by 
a State Party automatically engages its responsibility under Article 1’. See Jawara v. Gambia, 
para 46, stressing the fact that ‘Article 1 gives the Charter the legally binding character always 
attributed to international treaties of this sort. Th erefore, a violation of any provision of the 
Charter, automatically means a violation of Article 1. If a State party to the Charter fails to 
recognise the provisions of the same, there is no doubt that it is in violation of this Article. Its 
violation, therefore, goes to the root of the Charter’.
476 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, para 166ff ; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 61ff ; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 109ff ; Ximenes-Lopez v. 
Brazil, para 170–174. See Abdel Hadi et al v. Sudan, para 191–192; Noah Kazingachire et al v. 
Zimbabwe, para 140–142.
477 See for instance, the ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 235; Five Pensioners, paras 136–137 (citing 
also Magna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Com, para 113; Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of February 6, 2001, para 136–137; Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 261).
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way these rights are formulated in the relevant treaties such as the ICESCR 
indicates that they are programmatic rights which only give rise to contingent 
and discretionary policy measures as opposed to compelling legal obligations.478 
Th e present study has nevertheless argued in the previous chapters that the 
nature of ESC rights (as it is also true with all other human rights) essentially 
ensues from the underlying normative principle upon which they are justifi ed: 
the principle of human dignity. It was particularly shown in Chapter four that the 
principle of human dignity signifi es the generic obligation to respect and ensure 
the inherent life and value of human being which, in turn, entails the obligation to 
ensure indispensable moral and material (biological) conditions required to live a 
dignifi ed human life. Th e substantive ESC rights recognised under international 
law are designed to provide everyone with legal entitlements to those critical 
material (socioeconomic) conditions of life. Th ese material conditions are 
indispensable constitutive elements of the conception of a dignifi ed human life 
which should be secured for every person as a matter of respect for the inherent 
life and value of every human being.
Th e major question that remains to be discussed in this Part is, therefore, 
the kind of concrete legal obligations the State bears for the realisation of these 
critical material conditions of life guaranteed through ESC rights and the way 
these obligations are specifi cally refl ected or addressed in the jurisprudence of 
international human rights courts and monitoring bodies. Th e discussion in 
this Part accordingly aims to provide an in-depth and systematic analysis of 
international ESC rights jurisprudence with the view to see how international 
human rights courts and monitoring bodies entrusted with the mandate to 
adjudicate ESC rights claims have given eff ect to the generic legal obligations of 
the State in practice.
To this end, the investigation in this Part had started with an extensive 
review of ESC rights case law of the European, African, Inter-American and 
UN human rights systems so as to identify how the respective human rights 
courts and monitoring bodies have generally approached the adjudication of 
these rights. On the basis of this review, their approaches were thematised and 
restated in terms of specifi c legal principles so as to present the discussion in a 
systematic and coherent manner. In this regard, the principal approach of this 
Part was discussing all the relevant ESC rights cases available before each of 
the human rights courts and monitoring bodies under consideration. However, 
some exceptions to this principal approach had to be accepted. First of all, when 
it is practically impossible to discuss all cases due to the large number of cases 
decided by the specifi c human rights bodies (e.g. ECtHR); it may also be not 
necessary as oft en the decision in a given case may merely repeat and apply the 
principle(s) already established in previous jurisprudence. In these situations, 
478 See for instance, Vierdag, ‘Th e Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 2).
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the discussion was limited to the landmark cases and recent judgments of the 
tribunal concerned. Furthermore, some judgments are delivered in the languages 
other than English and that the English translation of the case was not available 
at the time of the research. In such a case, the researcher had referred to the case 
summary off ered by the respective court so as to at least appreciate its general 
fi nding(s) and conclusion(s) and mitigate the gaps this might create on the overall 
conclusion of this study.
Although the main target of the Part two of this study is international ESC 
rights case law from across jurisdictions, reference was also made to some relevant 
general comments, resolutions and reports in order to compliment the discussion 
of the case law. In particular, reference was made to the general comments of 
the UN human rights committees, the resolutions of the UN Human Rights 
Council, and the reports of the UN Offi  ce of High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Secretary General and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. Th ese additional materials were particularly important in shedding more 
clarity on the contents of and in showing the general orientation of the respective 
jurisdictions in relation to each of the topics discussed in this Part. While it is 
not the interest of this study to make any judgement on their normative values, it 
is important to note that the general comments have been used as authoritative 
sources of interpretations of human rights provisions. Th e reports referred to in 
this Part provide a general overview of the jurisprudence of the relevant human 
rights courts, monitoring bodies and, at times, some national jurisdictions 
concerning their respective topics. Both the resolutions and reports were also 
helpful in providing us with the general state of the law and what the international 
community consider to be the responsibility of the State under the relevant topics.
All the cases discussed in this Part are selected from the respective court’s or 
monitoring body’s database using diff erent technics and strategies. Th e European 
Human Rights Database provides the option to search cases using relevant 
treaty provisions also by combining it with diff erent other search options such 
as the level of importance of the case and date of the judgement. Th e ECtHR and 
ECSR also publishes guides to certain provisions and case digests respectively. 
Th e researcher accordingly applied all of these options in order to identify the 
relevant cases for the study. Particularly, in relation to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
Articles 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14 are key provisions through which socioeconomic rights 
and claims are oft en adjudicated before the Court and these are accordingly the 
focus of this study in searching and selecting the Court’s cases. In relation to the 
case law of the ECSR, the researcher scanned through each of the cases one by 
one as the Committee has decided only few cases so far. Th e UN human rights 
database also provides us with the option to search for cases using the specifi c 
treaty provisions and human rights (treaty) body or the combination of both. Th e 
African Commission’s database provides us with the option to search for cases 
using specifi c provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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Again, for there were only few relevant cases decided by the African Commission 
and the two most important UN human rights committees with the mandate to 
adjudicate ESC rights claims within the UN system (the Committee on ESC Rights 
(CESCR) and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)), the 
researcher adopted the same strategy employed in relation to ECSR. In addition, 
the researcher relied on relevant provisions of ICCPR (e.g. non-discrimination, 
equality, participation, prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading 
treatment) in fi nding the relevant cases of the UN Human Rights Committee 
dealing with ESC rights issues. With respect to the Inter-American human rights 
system, the researcher, fi rst, relied on the academic works (books and journals) 
and the relevant thematic reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACoHR) in order to get an overview of the Court’s general approach to 
ESC rights claims479 and, then, went through each of its judgements one by one to 
select the relevant cases for the discussion in this Part.
Th e review of the relevant international ESC rights case law and the 
identifi cation of the general patterns cutting-across the approaches of each of 
the courts and monitoring bodies under consideration, has led to the conclusion 
that, in the context of ESC rights, the legal obligation of the State to ensure the 
material conditions of life has two major constitutive dimensions: procedural 
and substantive. Th e procedural dimension deals with due process (procedural 
justice) guarantees fl owing from ESC rights. Under this dimension, three core 
procedural principles are identifi ed and discussed: participation, access to justice 
and accountability. Th e substantive dimension concerns essential minimum 
(irreducible) guarantees fl owing from ESC rights. Under this dimension, four 
core substantive principles are identifi ed and discussed: dignifi ed life, equality 
and non-discrimination and the protection of vulnerable persons. As far as 
this study is concerned, these seven principles essentially summarise the core 
principles developed over the course of time by international human rights 
courts and monitoring bodies regarding the State’s legal obligations fl owing from 
international ESC rights recognised under international law.
In each of the chapters below, these principles are identifi ed, restated 
and analysed taking into account the background behind each case and the 
corresponding arguments and fi ndings of the respective human rights court 
or monitoring body. For instance, a given case may concern a complaint of an 
479 Th is was because there is a general impression that the IACtHR does not (or has refused to) 
directly deal with ESC rights. Although this might have been true during the earlier periods 
of the Court, recent academic discussions however clearly document signifi cant changes to 
the Court’s approach. Th e cases and analysis in this study overwhelmingly confi rms that the 
Court’s approach has in fact been generating landmark judgments and rich jurisprudence in 
the area of ESC rights claims. For instance, it is the Inter-American Court of Human rights 
which for the fi rst time had come up with the notion of the ‘the right to dignifi ed existence’ 
as necessarily including ESC rights which the State must realise for every person within its 
jurisdiction as a matter of respect for inherent life and dignity of human being (see Chapt 8 
below).
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alleged violation of the right to health. But it is clear that the right to health, like 
all other human rights, is an abstract right providing for bundles of freedoms 
and entitlements which, in turn, can be stated in terms of specifi c procedural and 
substantive rights. Getting to the heart of the matter requires one to investigate 
the background leading to the (alleged) violations of the right under consideration 
and the specifi c legal analysis and conclusion(s) of the court or monitoring body. 
Th e outcome then can be evaluated in terms of the procedural and/or substantive 
principles required to respect and ensure the material conditions of life signifi ed 
by the underlying principle of human dignity. Following this approach enabled a 
systematic and coherent analysis of international ESC rights jurisprudence in this 
Part of the study.
On this basis, Part two argues that, in relation to ESC rights, satisfying the 
concrete demands of the principle of human dignity (that is, respecting and 
ensuring essential material conditions of life) practically consists in guaranteeing: 
the right to participate and have a say in the decision-making processes (Chapter 
fi ve), the right to have access to and obtain eff ective remedy (Chapter six), the right 
to have eff ective mechanisms through which the State agents and other actors 
can be held accountable (Chapter seven), the right to essential threshold level 
of material conditions of life commensurate with the ideal of dignifi ed human 
life (Chapter eight), and the direct provision of essential minimum material 
conditions of life for the vulnerable persons both as a matter of priority and on 
the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Chapter nine). 
Th is reconstruction of the State’s concrete legal obligations for the realisation of 
ESC rights (as having both procedural and substantive dimensions as civil and 
political rights) counters the dominant perception that ESC rights are merely 
contingent programmatic rights. In essence, the procedural and substantive 
principles identifi ed and discussed in this Part confi rm that ESC rights are 
predominantly about ensuring due process guarantees and in certain specifi c 
contexts also concern substantive legal obligations to ensure certain outcomes for 







Th is Chapter discusses the right to participation as one of the procedural 
dimensions of the State’s obligation to ensure the inherent material conditions 
of life guaranteed through ESC rights regime. To this end, it examines how 
the right to participation has been recognised and approached in international 
ESC rights case law and its specifi c signifi cance in ensuring the substantive ESC 
rights required to live a dignifi ed human life. It will be seen that guaranteeing 
this right is regarded as a critical element of the State’s obligation to realise ESC 
rights both generally and for the vulnerable members of the society such as 
minorities, women, children, indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities. In 
particular, this Chapter will show that the right to participation is indispensable 
in reaffi  rming the equal and inherent dignity of all vulnerable persons. To this 
end, it will focus on those major international ESC rights cases in which the right 
to participation (in the sense described below) is directly or indirectly involved, 
and on other soft  laws available especially in the practices of UN human rights 
bodies.
5.2. THE CONCEPTION OF PARTICIPATION
Traditionally the right to participation was considered as falling under the 
category of civil and political rights; even then the focus has been on the narrow 
notion of participation in the electoral process. However, it will be seen below 
that the right to participation480 not only constitutes an integral element of ESC 
rights enshrined in various international human rights instruments481 but also 
a fundamental prerequisite for the eff ective realisation of ESC rights as well.482 
480 It should be noted that the term participation is a broad concept and includes such notions as 
consultation, constructive (meaningful) engagement and the right to be heard which therefore 
has wide-ranging applications beyond participation in the electoral processes.
481 See Arts 21(1–3) and Art 27(1) UDHR; Art 25 ICCPR; Arts 1, 2, 4, 13 & 15(a) ICESCR; Arts 13 
& 22 ACHPR; Art 23 & 26 ACHR; Art 14 Ad-Prot. ACHR; Art 45 (c, d, f, g) OAS Charter.
482 For instance, HRC, General Comment No. 25 and CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 
25; Shue (n 2) 71–78; Fredman (n 30); Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality 
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It is also regarded as one of the most important human rights establishing the 
indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights.483 It has been defended 
as one of the universal basic human rights484 and central human capability 
needs fl owing from human dignity.485 Th e right to participation is essentially 
a procedural right but with fundamental substantive implications. It seeks to 
guarantee the right of everyone to take part and have a meaningful say in a decision-
making process aff ecting one’s rights or interests. As such, it does not directly 
concern itself with achieving a certain predefi ned outcome of a process much less 
it prejudges the specifi c content(s) of the outcome concerned. It rather concerns 
the manner and process of arriving at a certain outcome or decision. Accordingly, 
the principal and most relevant question that arises in relation to the right to 
participation is the extent to which those aff ected by a certain socioeconomic, 
policy, administrative or political decision have or have had a reasonable 
opportunity to eff ectively take part in and have a meaningful contribution to 
the relevant decision-making process concerned.486 It should however be noted 
that, in human rights law, the essence of the right to participation puts heavy 
emphasis on its eff ectiveness (that is, constructive or meaningful participation) as 
opposed to mere formal participation. As the following discussion shows, in order 
for the right to participation to be eff ective, it is essential that the process and 
manner of participation should be accompanied by certain essential minimum 
guarantees. While the specifi c implications of each of its elements may have to 
be assessed in terms of the specifi c context in which it is applied, it is necessary 
that a given participation in a decision-making process should adhere to the 
following constitutive elements: it should be relevant to a proposed decision, 
timely, transparent, respectful to the rights and dignity of the persons concerned, 
meaningful, conducted in good faith (i.e. with the view to constructively engage 
the participants and arrive at a fair and just solution) and in accordance with a 
and Species Membership (n 114) 77ff ; Gewirth, Th e Community of Rights (n 3) chapt 8; Gould, 
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (n 90).
483 See HRC General Comment No. 25; CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25; CRC General 
Comment No. 12; European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), 
decision on merits of 19 October 2009 (hereaft er ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51); Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), decision on merits 
of 25 June 2010 (hereaft er COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009); Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), decision on merits of 28 June 2011 
(hereaft er COHRE) v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010).
484 Shue (n 2) 71–78.
485 Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Development: Th e Capabilities Approach (Cambridge 
University Press 2000) 80; Martha C Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: Th e Human 
Development Approach (Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 34; Nussbaum, 
Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114) 77–78.
486 See particularly Human Development Report 1993; HRC General Comment No. 25: Article 25 
(Participation in the Public Aff airs and the Right to Vote), adopted in its Fift y-seventh Session 
(1996); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 23: Political and Public Life, adopted in Sixteenth 
Session (1976); CRC General Comment No. 12: Th e Right of Th e Child to Be Heard, adopted in 
Fift y-fi rst Session (2009).
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clear and pre-established procedure or standard (the rule of law). Th at is, failure 
to ensure these essential minimum guarantees will signifi cantly undermine the 
value and eff ectiveness of the right to participation and ultimately the eff ective 
protection of the substantive rights it is intended to safeguard.487
5.3. JURISPRUDENCE
5.3.1. IACtHR
Th e Sarayaku case provides us with the most recent and authoritative examination 
of the right to participation in international law in relation to the protection of 
ESC rights. In summarising its general conclusion on the legal status of the right 
to participation in international law with respect to the specifi c context of the 
right of indigenous peoples, the IACtHR stated the following.
Th e Court has established that in order to ensure the eff ective participation of the 
members of an indigenous community or people in development or investment plans 
within their territory, the State has the obligation to consult the said community in an 
active and informed manner, in accordance with its customs and traditions, within 
the framework of continuing communication between the parties. Furthermore, 
the consultations must be undertaken in good faith, using culturally-appropriate 
procedures and must be aimed at reaching an agreement. In addition, the people or 
community must be consulted in accordance with their own traditions, during the 
early stages of the development or investment plan, and not only when it is necessary 
to obtain the community’s approval, if appropriate. Th e State must also ensure that 
the members of the people or the community are aware of the potential benefi ts and 
risks so they can decide whether to accept the proposed development or investment 
plan. Finally, the consultation must take into account the traditional decision-making 
practices of the people or community. Failure to comply with this obligation, or 
engaging in consultations without observing their essential characteristics, entails the 
State’s international responsibility.488
Th e Sarayaku case is particularly interesting because it provides us with 
an authoritative, up-to-date and detailed treatment of the right to eff ective 
participation in the Inter-American Human Rights System and in international 
law in general. So, it is important to closely examine the facts of this case and the 
reasoning of the Court in a relatively brief manner as follows.
As far as it is relevant here, the Sarayaku case concerns a complaint against the 
concession agreement between the Respondent State and an oil company for the 
purpose of exploration of hydrocarbon and exploitation of crude oil in the area 
487 See for instance, Sarayaku v. Ecuador, paras 178–232.
488 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 177 (internal citations omitted). See also ibid, paras 178–232.
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encompassing large part (over two-third) of the territory of the Kichwa Indigenous 
Peoples of Sarayaku, home to over one-thousand two hundred people, without 
any form of eff ective and genuine consultation with and against the express will 
of the population. Following the agreement, the people were forcefully removed 
from their territory, denied re-entrance to their land on which their entire 
livelihood and well-being has been based for a long period of time. Th ere were 
also heavy explosives (for seismic exploration) placed in their territory with the 
permission and protection of the State, therewith endangering their lives and 
security.489 Th is, in turn, resulted in violation of several of their rights enshrined 
in the American Convention, most importantly here, their right to property, 
life, integrity and liberty.490 Th e State denied that it had any legal obligation to 
conduct prior consultations with indigenous peoples and communities at the 
time of the concession agreement.491 It argued that it has a sovereign authority 
and right to carry out development activities in any part of its territory and to 
exploit all natural resources which belong to its full and exclusive ownership.492 
While recognising the general importance of the participation of the indigenous 
communities for their social and cultural development, they had no right to veto 
its decision nor did it have any legal obligation to engage with them prior to taking 
the impugned decision.493
Th erefore, the primary question for the Court was to determine the existence 
of an international norm prescribing a legal obligation of the State to ensure the 
right to eff ective participation (in the sense of the right to prior consultation) of 
the Sarayaku People at the time the said decision was taken and, if so, the content 
and scope of that obligation.494 In addressing these questions, the Court’s analysis 
drew largely on two substantially interrelated points: on the one hand, the unique 
features of the indigenous peoples way of life generally and in relation to their 
communal (ancestral or traditional) land and, on the other hand, the normative 
principles applicable to their way of life and communal land.495
With respect to the fi rst part of the question, it is interesting to note that, 
unlike other similar prior cases heard by the Court496, there was no dispute as to 
489 Ibid para 244ff .
490 Unlike other similar cases decided by the Court, the right of the Sarayaku People to the territory 
under question was an undisputed fact in the case as the State has already acknowledged fully 
during the domestic judicial proceedings. See, inter alia, paras 55, 61, 62, 124 & 149.
491 Ibid paras 124 & 128.
492 Ibid para 129.
493 Ibid paras 124 & 130.
494 For the Respondent State also argued that even if it could be argued that there is such an 
obligation some of the activities of the company dubbed as ‘socialization’ had satisfi ed the 
requirement of prior consultation, the Court had to also assess whether indeed the practice of 
the so-called socialization had indeed satisfi ed the right to prior consultation as defi ned under 
international law. See ibid paras 178–211.
495 See ibid paras 145–232.
496 Th e Court had already entertained similar issues concerning indigenous peoples and their 
right to communal land decided prior to the current case. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
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the fact that the Sarayaku People have close intrinsic relationship with and a legal 
right over their traditional land. What remains to be established is the interaction 
between this intrinsic relationship and the general right to participation. Th us, 
the Court considered it proven (both from the State acknowledgement before the 
Court and at diff erent fora as well as from other evidence submitted to it) that land 
and communal land ownership represent a distinctive feature of the Sarayaku 
People in the same way as it is in many other indigenous communities.497 Based 
on this, the Court considered that ‘the Kichwa People of Sarayaku have a profound 
and special relationship with their ancestral territory, which is not limited to 
ensuring their subsistence but rather encompasses their own worldview and 
cultural and spiritual identity’.498
So, for indigenous peoples like Sarayaku, land represents every aspect of their 
life, physical and spiritual existence, livelihood, development and identity (social, 
cultural, political, and religious beliefs), self-conception and world view. It has 
indispensable economic value for it serves as the source of subsistence including 
for their livestock; it has important social and medicinal value; it is the foundation 
of their cultural and spiritual identity from which their unique way of life and 
world view (their identities par excellence emerges).499
With these characteristic features, indigenous and tribal communities 
constitute ‘distinct social and political actors in multicultural societies’ that ‘must 
receive particular recognition and respect in a democratic society’. It follows 
from this that respect for their right to consultation (participation) is inextricably 
interlinked with the right to recognition of and respect for their own culture and 
way of life (identity) which must also be respected and guaranteed in its own right 
‘in a pluralistic, multicultural and democratic society’.500 For the Court, ‘one of 
the fundamental guarantees to ensure the participation of indigenous peoples 
and communities in decisions regarding measures that aff ect their rights and, in 
particular, their right to communal property, is precisely the recognition of their 
right to consultation’.501 In other words, the right to participation of indigenous 
and tribal peoples in matters aff ecting their general life and welfare and communal 
property fi rst and foremost inherently stems from their distinctive identities and 
unique way of life particularly manifested in their intrinsic relationship with 
their communal land. Conversely, the obligation of the State to ensure their 
eff ective participation in decisions aff ecting their rights and interests is nothing 
more than the recognition and reaffi  rmation of their identity as distinctive and 
equal socioeconomic and political actor in and of a democratic society. In this 
Community v. Nicaragua; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay.
497 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, paras 124 cum 145–155.
498 Ibid para 155.
499 Ibid paras 145–155.
500 Ibid para159 (internal citation omitted).
501 Ibid para 160.
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regard, having reviewed extensively the legislative and judicial practices of both 
domestic502 and international legal systems, the Court came to the conclusion that 
this right to (prior) consultation of indigenous and tribal peoples fl ows not only 
from positive domestic and international law but also from a general principle of 
international law.503 ‘In other words, nowadays the obligation of States to carry 
out special and diff erentiated consultation processes when certain interests of 
indigenous peoples and communities are about to be aff ected is an obligation 
that has been clearly recognized’ both in express legal provisions, national and 
international, and as general principle of international law.504
According to the Court, the practical implication of the right to prior 
consultation and hence eff ective participation is far-reaching. It applies not just 
to a certain project but rather to all legislative, administrative or policy decision-
making processes in their respective countries.
Th e obligation to consult the indigenous and tribal communities and peoples on any 
administrative or legislative measure that may aff ect their rights, as recognized under 
domestic and international law, as well as the obligation to guarantee the rights of 
indigenous peoples to participate in decisions on matters that concern their interests, 
is directly related to the general obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of 
the rights recognized in the Convention (Article 1(1)). Th is entails the duty to organize 
appropriately the entire government apparatus and, in general, all the organizations 
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of legally guaranteeing 
the free and full exercise of those rights. Th is includes the obligation to structure their 
laws and institutions so that indigenous, autochthonous or tribal communities can be 
consulted eff ectively, in accordance with the relevant international standards. Th us, 
States must incorporate those standards into prior consultation procedures, in order 
to create channels for sustained, eff ective and reliable dialogue with the indigenous 
communities in consultation and participation processes through their representative 
institutions.505
And it also implies that it should be conducted in a manner that is compatible with 
its essential minimum guarantees so as to be regarded as eff ective participation 
both in law and in practice. Th us,
Given that the State must guarantee these rights to consultation and participation at 
all stages of the planning and implementation of a project that may aff ect the territory 
502 Th ere are also plenty of cases from domestic jurisdictions recognising signifi cance of the right 
to participation in the context of ESC rights such as the right to housing, water, education, 
welfare (social assistance) programs, health, and the protection of the rights of indigenous and 
vulnerable persons. See several of the publications in Langford (n 3); Coomans (n 3).
503 Ibid para 164 & 165. For its extensive review of the relevant documents and practices, see 
particularly ibid paras 161–164 & 168 and the accompanying references.
504 Ibid para 165.
505 Ibid para 166 (citing also Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 166; the Barrios Family v. 
Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 24 November 2011, para 47 at n 216).
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on which an indigenous or tribal community is settled, or other rights essential to 
their survival as a people, these dialogue and consensus-building processes must 
be conducted from the fi rst stages of the planning or preparation of the proposed 
measure, so that the indigenous peoples can truly participate in and infl uence the 
decision-making process, in accordance with the relevant international standards. 
In this regard, the State must ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples are not 
ignored in any other activity or agreement reached with private individuals, or in 
the context of decisions of the public authorities that would aff ect their rights and 
interests. Th erefore, as applicable, the State must also carry out the tasks of inspection 
and supervision of their application and, when pertinent, deploy eff ective means to 
safeguard those rights through the corresponding judicial organs.506
Th e second question to be answered is how the general right to participation, 
essentially fl owing from their identity as distinctive socio-political and economic 
actors in a democratic society, positive law and general principle of international 
law, is related to their right to communal or traditional land ownership. In this 
regard, the Court relied on two principal norms of human rights law: the right 
to culture and the right to property recognised both in Inter-American and 
other international human rights law. In the light of the special and profound 
relationship between indigenous and tribal communities and their traditional 
territories, there is fundamental and substantive overlap between the normative 
principles governing the right to property and cultural identity. First, we have 
already noted the broad cultural and religious signifi cance of ancestral land. Th is 
means that it is of paramount importance for the full and eff ective enjoyment, 
survival and development of their right to culture including their language and 
cultural heritage recognised under international law.507 Failure to respect and 
ensure this right for the said communities would raise fundamental question 
vis-à-vis the principle of equality and prohibition of non-discrimination in 
the enjoyment of all human rights including, here, the right to culture broadly 
construed.508
With respect to the right to property, the Court has already established that 
in the context of indigenous and tribal communities, the notion of property has 
a diff erent connotation than in a liberal conception of private property.509 It has 
506 Ibid para 167. ‘Such processes must respect the particular consultation system of each people 
or community, so that it can be understood as an appropriate and eff ective interaction with 
State authorities, political and social actors and interested third parties.’ ibid para 165.
507 Ibid paras 212–220. ‘Th e Court considers that the right to cultural identity is a fundamental 
right – and one of a collective nature – of the indigenous communities, which should be 
respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and democratic society. Th is means that States have an 
obligation to ensure that indigenous peoples are properly consulted on matters that aff ect or 
could aff ect their cultural and social life, in accordance with their values, traditions, customs 
and forms of organization.’ ibid para 217.
508 Ibid para 213.
509 Ibid paras 145–157. As opposed to the notion of private property, communal land ownership is 
one of the fundamental features of indigenous and tribal peoples in the sense that ‘land is not 
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made clear that, as a matter of human rights law both generally and in relation to 
safeguarding the rights of indigenous and tribunal communities, the communal 
conception of the right to property also deserves equal and eff ective protection 
in its own right.510 Flowing from the above discussions, the reasons for this 
now seems self-evident. For one thing, denying this right will directly amount 
to denial of their identity and existence altogether which also makes their right 
to culture devoid of any substantive content. Th is also implies discrimination 
on the basis of socio-cultural background or status and lack of equal protection 
of law and equality before the law for it evidently amounts, as the Court clearly 
noted, the imposition of the conception of private property on the communities 
as the only norm worthy of legal protection. In particular, such conception and 
approach ‘would render protection under Article 21 of the Convention [the right 
to property] illusory for millions of people’ for such a notion has no place in and, 
therefore, of no practical value for the indigenous and tribal communities: it 
would simply be reduced to a vacuous notion devoid of any substantive meaning 
whatsoever.511
It is equally meaningless if this right to property (communal land ownership) 
is to be construed as excluding their right to have control over and the ability 
to freely use and dispose all the natural resources present within their ancestral 
territory, that is, if it is to be understood as a bare (naked or empty) right of 
communal land ownership. Stated diff erently, it is impossible to ensure the eff ective 
protection of their material and other vital interests inextricably associated with 
their communal land. For instance, reiterating its earlier judgments, the Court 
stated that a measure which denies free access to their communal territory 
or prevents them from using those natural resources indispensable for their 
subsistence, medicinal and other crucial purposes can have a devastating impact 
on the communities such as exposure to poor or substandard living conditions, 
increased vulnerability to diseases and epidemics or situations of extreme 
vulnerability and suff ering that can lead to violation of various human rights 
owned by individuals but by the group and their community as a whole and its use, enjoyment 
and value are rooted in the culture, customs, beliefs and practices each community. It is also 
described above that its connotation and value go beyond the narrow economic value and goes 
to their whole life and well-being broadly construed. ibid.
510 Th us, it is now a well-established jurisprudence of the IACtHR that the sui generis relationship 
of the indigenous and tribal peoples and their communal land is protected by ACHR. As 
it consistently held, ‘Article  21 of the American Convention protects the close relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their lands, and with the natural resources on their ancestral 
territories and the intangible elements arising from these’. ibid para 145 (citing Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, para 140 and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, paras 85–87). In establishing this, the Court found support from 
two important principles: the principle of evolutive (dynamic) and non-restrictive (pro-
human rights) approach to the interpretation of human rights and human rights treaties. For 
detail arguments of the Court on these, see ibid paras 161–16 & 171 and the accompanying 
references.
511 Ibid para 145–147.
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as well as undermining their ability to preserve their way of life, customs and 
language.512 Th e following paragraph clearly summarises what is especially 
at stake in relation to the protection of the right to communal property of the 
indigenous and tribal communities.
Given this intrinsic connection that indigenous and tribal peoples have with their 
territory, the protection of property rights and the use and enjoyment thereof is 
necessary to ensure their survival. In other words, the right to use and enjoy the 
territory would be meaningless for indigenous and tribal communities if that right 
were not connected to the protection of natural resources in the territory. Th erefore, 
the protection of the territories of indigenous and tribal peoples also stems from the 
need to guarantee the security and continuity of their control and use of natural 
resources, which in turn allows them to maintain their way of living. Th is connection 
between the territory and the natural resources that indigenous and tribal peoples 
have traditionally used and that are necessary for their physical and cultural survival 
and the development and continuation of their worldview must be protected under 
Article 21 of the Convention to ensure that they can continue their traditional way 
of living, and that their distinctive cultural identity, social structure, economic 
system, customs, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by 
the States.513
In this way, we can say that the IACtHR has established the inherent right of, in 
this case, the indigenous and tribal peoples to full and eff ective participation in 
decision-making processes aff ecting their life, well-being and vital socioeconomic 
and survival interests.
However, this does not mean that the elements of the right to participation 
identifi ed by the Court in the Sarayaku case is only applicable to the case of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. Th e only relevant and necessary caveat in reading 
Sarayaku and other similar cases concerning indigenous and tribal peoples is 
the unique conception of and association with ancestral land and its rich socio-
cultural and economic signifi cance to the respective communities. Other than 
this, all the substantive principles of the right to participation are undoubtedly 
signifi cant for the eff ective protection of ESC rights of, in particular, vulnerable 
persons or group of persons such as women, persons with disabilities, children 
and ethno-linguistic or religious minorities. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the specifi c structure and manner of participation of these vulnerable groups are 
essentially matters to be determined by the domestic legal system but the argument 
for the applicability of the substantive principles of participation established by 
the Court in the Sarayaku case can be justifi ed on two basic grounds.
512 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 147. See also Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 
164; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 73.61–73.74; the Xákmok Kasek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 205–208.
513 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 147.
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Th e fi rst fl ows from the grand principle of human rights which prescribes 
the equal rights of everyone in a political society to have and enjoy the same 
opportunity and protection of law. Th e abstract principle behind the Court’s 
reasoning as well as the core essence and contents of the right to participation 
identifi ed in cases like Sarayaku have, without doubt, a universal application. Th e 
underlying justifi cation standing behind the Court’s reasoning can be abstracted 
and stated as follows: that everyone in a political society whose right or interest 
is (being) aff ected in an essentially relevant manner by a given decision of his 
or her government (legislative, policy etc.) must have a general right to eff ective 
participation in the process. Th is requires, among other things, the right and 
opportunity to make one’s views heard in all matters pertaining to one’s right and 
fundamental interest. In this regard, the most relevant consideration is whether 
a certain decision or measure has undermined (in the relevant and meaningful 
sense of the term) one’s human rights or not. And, as it is to be seen below, this 
is the very reason behind the recognition of the right to participation in all other 
ESC rights case law.514
Th is, in turn, gives rise to the second justifi cation which considers that 
ensuring the right to eff ective participation is an integral element of the general 
obligation of the State to respect and guarantee the full and eff ective enjoyment 
of all human rights. For instance, the IACtHR repeatedly emphasised that the 
State obligation to ensure the right to eff ective participation directly fl ows from 
the generic obligation of the State to respect and ensure (guarantee) the full and 
eff ective enjoyment of all the rights enshrined in the American Convention on 
Human Rights.515 By virtue of this, we can say that the State bears the obligation 
to, on the one hand, respect and guarantee the right to full and eff ective 
participation both in law and in practice. Th is entails both negative and positive 
obligations that should be assessed in the light of the contexts of the persons 
concerned and nature of the issues involved in a given case. On the other hand, 
it also means the State has the obligation to ensure the right to participation of 
all persons whose substantive ESC rights (for instance, right to health, housing, 
education, work, etc.) are or are about to be aff ected by certain proposed measure. 
Th ese justifi cations imply that, as a matter of general human rights law and ESC 
rights, the State has a clear legal obligation to give practical legal eff ect to the right 
to participation by providing, for instance, relevant legislative and institutional 
514 Among others, the right to participation in the decision-making process was an issue in 
the following cases. Buckley v. United Kingdom (Application No. 20348/92), Judgment of 
29  September 1996; Chapman v. United Kingdom (Application No. 27238/95, Judgment of 
18  January 2001;Fadeyeva v. Russia (Application No. 55723/00), Judgment of 9  June 2005; 
Complaints No.58/2009, Complaints No.63/2010; Communication 276/03 – Centre for Minority 
Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) 
v. Kenya, merits, 46th Ordinary Session of the AfCoHPR, 11 to 25 November 2009 (hereaft er the 
Endorois v. Kenya).
515 See Introduction to Part two above.
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mechanisms through which individuals and groups can participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the decision-making processes aff ecting their rights and interests. 
Understood in this way, the right to participation particularly provides an 
important procedural safeguard for the protection of the rights and interests of 
the vulnerable members of the society.516 Th e Sarayaku case therefore provides us 
with an authoritative account of the right to participation in international law. Th e 
principles developed in this case have already provided important jurisprudential 
inspirations in the resolution of various ESC rights both in the Inter-American 
and other international human rights system. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that it is not the fi rst judgment of its type in underscoring the importance of 
the right to participation in relation to ESC rights for the theoretical backdrops 
and the normative standards employed in the Sarayaku case had already been 
developed in the Court’s earlier case law.517
5.3.2. AfCoHPR
Th e importance of the right to participation for the eff ective realisation of ESC 
rights is also well-recognised in the practice of the AfCoHPR. Perhaps the 
Endorois case, which deals more or less with similar issues as the Sarayaku case, 
is the most signifi cant one especially in elucidating the interaction between the 
procedural and substantive dimension of ESC rights. Th us, it is worth paying 
attention to the reasoning of the Commission in this particular case as it also 
updates and brings together its earlier jurisprudence on the subject-matter.
In substance, the Endorois case concerned a complaint by Endorois Indigenous 
Community (Endorois Community or Peoples) against the Respondent State for 
designation of their ancestral dwelling place as a wildlife game reserve and its 
subsequent eff ects on their life and well-being without involving the Community 
or taking due and proper account of their social, economic and cultural interests 
and well-being. Th ey stated that subsequent to the decision, they were forcefully 
evicted from their ancestral lands; denied access to the site even for cultural, 
religious and economic purposes; did not receive any compensation for their loss 
and the unnecessary damages they suff ered. Th ey stressed that the decision and 
the subsequent conducts of the State had eff ectively destroyed their well-being 
and pastoralist way of life.518 Th ey also complained that the State’s concession 
agreement with a private company for the purpose of ruby mining would have 
516 See also Chapts 8 and 9 below.
517 Hence, the Sarayaku case is rooted in and developed the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in 
the cases of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay; Sawhoyamaxa People v. Paraguay; Saramaka People v Suriname; Xãknok Kasek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (all concerned with the rights of indigenous and tribal 
peoples to their ancestral land and other rights eff ectively associated with the same).
518 Endorois v. Kenya, paras 71ff .
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a serious negative consequence on their life especially as it might result in the 
pollution of the water they have long been relying on for consumption and in 
the destruction of their cultural and religious sites. Accordingly, they argued 
that these activities of the State have contravened several of their human rights 
guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.519
As far as it is relevant here, the State did not off er any major substantive 
argument but simply denied that the Community could be regarded as ‘indigenous 
people’ in the sense of the Charter or general international law and hence their 
right to special protection ensuing from or associated with that status under 
international (human rights) law.520 In its opinion, the land in question was 
legally designated as a Trust Land and administered by a council representing 
the populations residing in the specifi c administrative region(s) including the 
applicants before the Commission.521 In connection with this, it has made an 
interesting (though rhetorical and political in essence) argument which somehow 
refl ects its interpretation of the right to participation. It argued that the task of 
communities or peoples in a participatory democracy is to contribute to the well-
being of society at large and not only to care selfi shly for one’s own community 
at risk of others. It considers that the right to participation of the Complainant 
is fully ensured through its participatory political system based on universal 
adult suff rage wherein all ethnic groups in the Country freely elect representative 
members of their councils.522
Th e Commission in its part, having examined the arguments of the parties and 
the evidence before it, concluded that the manner in which the State designated 
the Game Reserve and the measures it has subsequently taken or failed to take 
have violated all those rights alleged by the Complainants. For our purpose 
here, the Commission discussed the right to participation of the Community in 
connection with other substantive rights particularly the right to development.523 
In its understanding, the right to development has two components: substantive 
(constitutive) and procedural (instrumental); it is useful both as a means and as 
an end. ‘A violation of either the procedural or substantive element constitutes a 
violation of the right to development. Fulfi lling only one of the two [elements] will 
not satisfy the right to development’.524 Th e Commission noted with affi  rmation 
519 In particular, the right to religion (art 8), the right to property (art 14), the right to culture (art 
17), the right to free disposal of their natural resources (art 21) and the right to development 
(22) ACHPR.
520 Endorois v. Kenya, para 145.
521 Ibid, paras 175–181.
522 Ibid, paras 270 & 274–276.
523 Ibid, paras 277ff . See particularly ibid paras 289–298.
524 Ibid para 277. Th is defi nition/conception is of course supported by, inter alia, the substantive 
provisions of the Banjul Charter particularly the right of a people to economic, social and 
cultural development (Art 22), to freely dispose their wealth and natural resources (art 21), of 
every citizen to freely participate in the government (art 13) and in the cultural life of the (art 
17 (2)); Art 2(3) the UN Declaration on the Right to Development.
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that the realisation of the right to development must therefore adhere to the basic 
requirements of equity, freedom of choice, non-discrimination, transparency, 
accountability and participation. It particularly stressed that equity and freedom 
of choice are the overarching themes of in the right to development.525
By equity the Commission is specifi cally referring to a fair (re-)distribution of 
the benefi t accruing from the development process526, including the right to obtain 
an adequate compensation for the loss they incurred due to the implementation 
of a given development project. It particularly concerns the extent to which 
a community aff ected by certain development project is said to have, in fact, 
benefi ted from the development outcomes in the terms of fairness and justice.527 
Per the Commission, the ultimate object and purpose of development should be 
the empowerment and improvement of the well-being, capabilities and choices of 
the communities concerned.528 Hence, the ‘right to development will be violated 
when the development in question decreases the well-being of the community’.529
Th e right to freedom of choice, the fundamental substantive element of 
the right to participation and development, concerns the extent to which the 
community have had the opportunity to participate in and meaningfully 
contribute to the decision-making process itself. Generally speaking, the right 
to freedom of choice has both negative and positive connotations. In the negative 
sense it implies absence of any sorts of external pressure, coercion, intimidation 
or fraud with respect a certain choice whereas in the positive sense it implies the 
actual ability to make free choices especially on matters aff ecting one’s life or 
interest. As the Commission emphasised, it is not suffi  cient that the community 
concerned receive certain material aid from authorities nor is it compatible with 
the requirement of the right to development for them to arbitrarily choose and 
enforce their choice or decision against the will of the community. In particular, it 
must respect and be based on free, prior, and informed consent of the communities 
at hand. Th is characterises the right to participation as an essential and integral 
element of the right to development which must be present throughout the entire 
development process.530
Alike the IACtHR, it also stressed that the community’s participation should 
be genuine and eff ective than being a mere formality. Drawing on its own previous 
practices and various international reports and jurisprudence, the Commission 
underlined that for the right to participation to be eff ective it is necessary that 
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid para 297: ‘It agrees that the Endorois, as benefi ciaries of the development process, were 
entitled to an equitable distribution of the benefi ts derived from the game reserve’.
527 Ibid paras 294–296.
528 Ibid paras 283 & 294. ‘Th e result of development should be empowerment of the Endorois 
community. It is not suffi  cient for the Kenyan authorities merely to give food aid to the 
Endorois. Th e capabilities and choices of the Endorois must improve in order for the right to 
development to be realised.’ ibid para 283.
529 Ibid para 294.
530 See particularly ibid paras 278–79, 283, 289 and 293.
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certain essential guarantees be ensured in the development process. First and 
foremost, the requirement that it should be based on free, prior and informed 
consent of the communities in itself entails the responsibility of the State to 
provide full information on the benefi ts and impacts of a proposed project and 
to this extent guarantee free, adequate and transparent communication between 
the community and its agents. In order to be meaningful, the process and manner 
of consultation or engagement with the community should particularly be 
conducted ‘in good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the 
objective of reaching an agreement’.531 Th is also means that neither the members 
of the community or their representatives be subject to any form of intimidation, 
coercion, threat, deception or fraud concerning their position on the proposed 
development project; nor should their participation be of mere formality, that 
is, with no substantive eff ect on the terms or content of the project including the 
liberty to reject the terms incompatible with their vital interests.532
Th e requirement that participation should be culturally appropriate directly 
speaks to the nature of the procedure that should be followed in order to eff ectively 
and legitimately engage with the community. Culture and cultural heritage are 
the defi ning feature of indigenous and tribal communities like Endorois, as 
also recognised by the Commission. It is the principal substantive notion that 
defi nes their identity including their social organisation and decision-making 
structure.533 And as already noted in Sarayaku and many other cases, the principal 
means of manifestation of this cultural identity, values and organisation is oft en 
through the unique physical and spiritual bond they have with their ancestral 
land or territories including its forests and ritual sites.534 It is thus imperative for 
the State to fully respect and eff ectively guarantee, both as a matter of human 
rights law and justice, the integrity and development of the right to culture of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. Conversely, failure to respect and ensure the free 
and practical enjoyment of their right to culture would eff ectively tantamount to 
denial of their existence and well-being contrary to fundamental human rights 
and values including human dignity, life, equality and non-discrimination.535 
Th is entails both negative and positive obligations. Th us, it not only requires the 
State to abstain from directly encroaching upon their right to culture through, 
for instance, destruction of their cultural, religious, ancestral sites and denial of 
access to such sites but also to positively protect an encroachment by other third 
531 Paras 289–292. ‘Th e conditions of the consultation failed to fulfi l the African Commission’s 
standard of consultations in a form appropriate to the circumstances. It is convinced that 
community members were informed of the impending project as a fait accompli, and not 
given an opportunity to shape the policies or their role in the game reserve.’ (emphasis in the 
original). ibid para 281.
532 Ibid para 279–281 & 289–292.
533 Ibid paras 241–251 (discussing the right to culture of the Endorois Community).
534 Ibid para 243.
535 Ibid paras 241, 248 & 260–261.
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parties and take all necessary and reasonable legislative, institutional and other 
practical measures to promote its enjoyment and development.536
It is in this context that one should appreciate the obligation to respect their 
cultural structures and values in engaging the communities in decision-making 
procedures. It is necessary that the manner of participation should be respectful of 
the traditional structure and cultural values of the community.537 For example, it 
is not appropriate for the State to impose its own complicated procedures or select 
certain individuals from among the community to merely inform them about 
its decisions or secure the divided opinion of the community. It should be for 
the community itself to decide how to participate and, in case of representation, 
to freely choose who should represent them according to their own customary 
decision-making process. In addition, it should also take into account their 
practical socioeconomic circumstances vis-à-vis the proposed measures. For 
instance, it is impossible to consider the participation of the community eff ective 
if it is not in a position to properly understand the pros and cons of the project and 
the technicalities and complications involved therein especially owing to the level 
of education and expertise available to them.538
Above all, any proposed decision aff ecting the interest of indigenous and 
tribal communities should not be repugnant of their basic human rights, above 
all, their right to a dignifi ed existence, the ultimate reason upon which their 
general right to participation is justifi ed. So, it would be contrary to the principle 
of respect for their dignity and life if the implementation of a development project 
or any measure would result in impoverishing the community’s well-being, 
denial of access to such basic necessities as food, water, shelter or in destroying 
their cultural and religious practices.539 As the Commission expressly stated, it is 
incumbent upon a given State to primarily ensure that any development project 
will primarily bring improvement to the well-being, capabilities and choices of the 
community aff ected by such project.540 Impoverishing or subjecting a community 
to harsh, substandard socioeconomic condition in the name of development is 
utterly illegitimate and can never be justifi ed in the eyes of fundamental human 
rights.
It is, therefore, certainly clear that lack of eff ective participation is the major 
underlying reason for violations of several of the ESC rights of the Endorois 
Community particularly the right to culture (including religion), communal 
536 Ibid paras 241–251.
537 Ibid para 267, 281, 289 & 291.
538 Ibid paras 267, 279–281, 289–291. Th e Community had no choice but to forcefully leave their 
land. ibid para 279. ‘Th e African Commission is,’ therefore, ‘convinced that the inadequacy 
of the consultations left  the Endorois feeling disenfranchised from a process of utmost 
importance to their life as a people.’ It thus ‘agrees that if consultations had been conducted in 
a manner that eff ectively involved the Endorois, there would have been no ensuing confusion 
as to their rights or resentment that their consent had been wrongfully gained.’ ibid para 297.
539 Ibid paras 283, 286, 288, 297 & 298.
540 Ibid para 283.
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property, natural wealth and resources and the right to development. Contrary 
to all the basic requirements outlined above, it was ascertained in the case that 
the community did not have the opportunity to eff ectively participate in the 
designation of their ancestral land for the purpose of game reserve and later in the 
concession for the purpose of mining activities; nor did the State take necessary 
positive measures to safeguard their vital socioeconomic and cultural interests 
and reasonably mitigate the undue suff erings they had to endure for so long. For 
instance, the case shows that the authorities refused to register the representative 
body of the Community but opted to selectively engage with few individuals 
not approved by the Community. Th e Community had no choice but leave their 
ancestral place and homes. In fact, they were subjected to forced evictions and 
subsequently denied any access to the area even for subsistence, grazing, religious 
and other cultural purposes; those who had desperately attempted to re-enter the 
land were met with violence and forced relocation. Furthermore, the Community 
were not paid any due compensation for the damage they suff ered due to the 
designation of their ancestral place as game reserve nor did they share in any of 
the revenues accruing from any of the development activities being carried out 
within their territory.
However, unlike the case of Sarayaku, the African Commission failed to 
address the right to participation in its own right but only in relation to the 
substantive ESC rights mentioned above. Th ere is no good explanation for this. 
As clearly indicated in the facts of both cases, it is evident that the overarching 
reason behind all the violations had, in fact, to do with the absence of eff ective 
participation, directly or indirectly, by the respective communities in the decision-
making process concerned. It is this that resulted in the long-term (over thirty 
years of) confrontation between the Endorois Community and the Respondent 
State and it is this very same reason that cuts-across each of the rights claimed 
by the Complainants. Th e Community did not argue that the Government 
should not have created the game reserve nor did they argue that the concessions 
should never have been granted in the area. Th e only thing they were claiming 
was that, despite its direct eff ect on their livelihood, survival and development, 
they were not consulted over the proposed projects as a result of which their vital 
socioeconomic and cultural interests were severely impoverished. It is true that 
they also claimed lack of compensation for the damage they suff ered due to the 
implementation of the project but this is only ancillary to their main claim: lack 
of genuine and eff ective participation. In my opinion, it would have been more 
logical and sensible to address the issue of the right to participation, generally 
and in the context of the Endorois Indigenous Community, in its own right. Th is 
would have, in turn, provided us with a more authoritative interpretation of the 
essence, content and signifi cance of the right to participation in the context of the 




In addition to Endorois case, the right to participation was also referred to 
by the Commission in other cases concerned with ESC rights violations. In the 
(in)famous SERAC case541, it had advanced more or less a similar view when it, 
in connection with Art 21 of the Charter (right of peoples to freely dispose their 
wealth and natural resources), criticised the Respondent State for its chronic 
failure to involve the Ogoni Communities in the decision-making process 
pertaining to an oil exploitation within their territory. It was complained that the 
manner through which the then military junta embarked on the oil exploitation 
in the Niger Delta region had resulted in the massive and systematic violations 
of ‘wide range of rights guaranteed under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’.542 It was argued that the implementation of the project had severe 
impacts on the health and well-being of the Communities due to pollution of the 
environment especially resulting from toxic wastes and oil spills contaminating 
their water, soil and air. Th e Government however did not submit any formal 
reply to the Complaint but only made some general admissions regarding the 
allegations in a Note Verbale sent to the Commission, also stating the steps it had 
been taking in order to address some of the issues raised in the Complaint.543
Th e SERAC v. Nigeria case was the fi rst case in which the Commission began 
to properly outline the obligations of the States under the African Charter in 
relation to socioeconomic rights. Hence, following the suits from elsewhere, the 
Commission stated, ‘Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations 
engendered by human rights indicate that all rights, both civil and political 
rights and social and economic, generate at least levels of duties for a State that 
undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfi l these rights’.544
For the Commission, the African Charter, being a human rights instrument, 
is not alien to these concepts, the implication being that the Commission would 
without doubt analyse the State’s human rights obligations in the light of these 
frameworks as it in fact did in SERAC case.545 It stressed that these obligations 
universally apply to all rights and entail combinations of both negative and positive 
duties which must be analysed in the context of each circumstances. In this case, 
having examined the facts (including its fi rst-hand observation in the fi eld), the 
Commission concluded that the Respondent State was directly responsible for 
violation of numerous ESC rights expressly and implicitly recognised in the 
541 Communications 155/96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) / Nigeria, decision on merits, 30th Ordinary Session,13 to 
27 October, 2001 (hereaft er SERAC v. Nigeria).
542 Ibid para 43 cum 1–9.
543 Ibid para 30 & 42. But still today the case of Niger Delta and its resultant human and 
environmental disaster are yet to be fi nally resolved.
544 Ibid paras 44–49.
545 Ibid paras 44, 48 & 49. (Interestingly, the Commission stated that the diff erent layers of 
obligations do not have nor suggest any form of priority. Th at means their application and 
implication are merely contextual).
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Charter including the right to health, housing, food, water, health environment, 
free disposal of wealth and natural resources, and development.546
While it is true that the ruthless actions of the junta, through its own security 
forces and other private agents it had sponsored, had resulted in the massive 
violations of numerous civil, political, social, economic rights recognised under 
the Charter, I would argue that the essential backdrop of the SERAC case and 
the violations thereof concerns a complete exclusion of Ogoni people from the 
decision-making process aff ecting their existential and vital socioeconomic 
interests: it is the root-cause of what could be considered as one of the egregious 
forms of human rights violations.547 According to the relevant provisions of 
the African Charter and other major international instruments, the right over 
natural resources belongs to the peoples. Hence, pursuant to Article  21 of the 
Charter, ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources’. 
Th e Commission is right in saying that this is a birth right of peoples, i.e. a right 
that they are naturally and collectively entitled to just by virtue of being what 
they are. And in the eyes of the Charter, this right is even an absolute right of 
peoples in the sense that it ‘shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the 
peoples. In no case shall a people be deprived of it’. But in essence this right 
would be of no practical value unless peoples have a mechanism through which 
they can control any legislative and policy decisions aff ecting their natural 
wealth and resources. Th at is why the right of participation is a vital ingredient 
of the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources and the related 
right to development expressly recognised in the Charter. So, it is imperative and 
indispensable that the peoples’ right to participation be respected and eff ectively 
guaranteed so that they shall have a meaningful say in all matters pertaining to 
the utilisation of their wealth and natural resources as well as in a development 
process.548
However, as it can clearly be observed from the facts in the SEARC case, the 
Ogoni Communities were absolutely excluded not just from the decision-making 
processes but also from the benefi ts as well; they only had to suff er from the costs 
and negative consequences thereof. Even though the Community and its members 
had sought to bring their concerns to the attention of the authorities including 
through peaceful demonstrations, their demands were met with nothing but 
546 Ibid paras 53–54, 58, 62–63, 66–67.
547 For more on this, see my discussion in Mosissa (n 15) 76ff .
548 One may say that a state has the sovereign right to exploit natural resources within its territory. 
While there is element of truth in such a view it is ultimately the case that such exploitation 
must be in accordance with and for the interest of the peoples constituting the said state. Th is 
is what is implied when the Commission stated, ‘Undoubtedly and admittedly, the government 
of Nigeria […] has the right to produce oil, the income from which will be used to fulfi l the 
economic and social rights of Nigerians’. But, the Commission noted, this should be carried 




series of ruthless military and paramilitary operations employed by the junta 
aimed at terrorising and silencing the Community and dissenting voices.549
Ironically and despite all of the facts, the Commission did not expressly 
discuss the right to participation as such but only in relation to those substantive 
rights. Th is in itself is very interesting but it should have done more in establishing 
the inherent human right of the peoples to participate in the conduct and aff airs 
of their country and particularly in all matters aff ecting their life and interests 
as in SERAC. So, in indicating some of the measures that the State party ought 
to take in order to comply with the requirements of the right to health and 
healthy environment enshrined in the Charter, the Commission stated that 
they must ‘[provide] meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and 
to participate in the development decisions aff ecting their communities’ and 
‘provide information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and 
activities’.550 Also, in relation to Art 21, the Commission criticised the State for 
its failure to involve the Ogoni Communities as follows: ‘in all their dealings with 
the oil consortiums, the [G]overnment did not involve the Ogoni [C]ommunities 
in the decisions that aff ected the development of Ogoniland’. It added that ‘[t]he 
destructive and selfi sh role played by oil development in the Ogoniland, closely 
tied with repressive tactics of the Nigerian Government, and the lack of material 
benefi ts accruing to the local population, may well be said to constitute a violation 
of Article 21’.551
More generally, the Commission has recognised the importance of the right to 
participation in its Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESC rights 
in the continent which, in turn, is basically a consolidation of the wide-range of 
jurisprudences and practices pertaining to ESC rights as well as in its State Party 
Reporting Guidelines for ESC rights. Th us, in outlining the substantive ESC 
rights and the corresponding State obligations, the Commission clearly stressed 
the fact that the right to eff ective participation is an indispensable prerequisite for 
549 Among others killing the community leaders and community members, burning houses, 
attacking villages, forced evictions, polluting water sources and environment, destroying 
foods, etc. See particularly para 8 & 42 as to Government’s admissions to such tactics. 
Elsewhere, taking into account the manner and nature of the violation of basic human rights 
enshrined in international human rights instruments, I have argued that SERAC case is 
typical of human rights violations in the context of what could be dubbed as humanitarian 
crisis which in turn could be the result of either basic constitutional crisis or armed confl ict. 
As I argued there, the Ogoni People had experienced double suff ering: fi rst because they could 
not enjoy their elementary human living and second because they had no recourse whatsoever 
as regards those violations. Mosissa (n 15) 78–79.
550 SERAC v. Nigeria, para 53.
551 Ibid para 55. See also para 58: ‘in the present case, despite its obligation to protect persons 
against interference in the enjoyment of their rights, the Government of Nigeria facilitated the 
destruction of Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such internationally 
established principles, [it] has given green light to private actors and, and the oil companies in 
particular, to devastatingly aff ect the well-being of the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, 
its practice falls short of the minimum conduct expected of governments, and therefore, is in 
violation of Article 21 of the African Charter’.
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the eff ective realisation of each of the ESC rights recognised in the Charter and 
other relevant human rights instruments.552
5.3.3. ECSR
Th e practices of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) and European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also provide us with rich evidence regarding 
the signifi cance of the right to participation in the realisation of ESC rights. To 
begin with ECSR, it is interesting to note that its appreciation of the importance of 
the right to participation and hence interpretation of the European Social Charter 
(ESC)553 as including this right has come in somewhat evolutionary manner. Th is 
is said because in its earlier decisions raising more or less similar issues to those 
in which it has expressly recognised the right to participation, the Committee did 
not, directly or indirectly, mention the right to participation.554 It is in ERRC v. 
France (Complaint No. 51/2008) that the Committee for the fi rst time recognised 
that the rights guaranteed in the European Social Charter, in particular, Article 30 
necessarily include the right to (civil and political) participation. Th is position has 
since then been repeatedly and emphatically reaffi  rmed in several of its subsequent 
decisions including in the COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009) and COHRE v. 
France (Complaint No. 63/2010). Th us, in ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008),
[t]he Committee considers that the reference to the social rights enshrined in 
Article  30 should not be understood too narrowly. In fact, the fi ght against social 
exclusion is one area where the notion of the indivisibility of fundamental rights takes 
a special importance. In this regard, the right to vote, as with other rights relating to 
civic and citizen participation, constitutes a necessary dimension in social integration 
and inclusion and is thus covered by article 30.555
552 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 50th Ordinary Session, 26 May 2010 (hereaft er ACoHPR 
Principles and Guidelines on ESC Rights); State Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Tunis 
Reporting Guidelines) adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
24 November 2011 (hereaft er Tunis Reporting Guidelines).
553 It should be noted that I use ‘European Social Charter’ or ‘ESC’ throughout this writing to refer 
to both the 1961 and the 1996 Revised Social Charter unless a specifi c reference is necessary in 
the text.
554 For instance, it will be seen below that Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), 
decision on merits of 4 November 2003; European Roma Rights Center v. Greece (Complaints 
No.15/2003), decision on merits of 4  December 2004 (hereaft er ERRC v. Greece (Complaints 
No.15/2003) and Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Bulgaria (Complaints 
No.41/2007), decision on merits of 3  June 2008 ((hereaft er MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints 
No.41/2007) are similar to ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), COHRE v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 58/2009), and COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010) where the ECSR recognised the 




ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008) concerns, among other things, the 
lack of access to housing and other basic social services particularly aff ecting 
the Travellers, the Roma and Sinti populations in the Respondent State. Th e 
Committee ascertained that only very few houses were made available to these 
communities over a period of eight years; even then some of the houses were of 
substandard quality as they lacked water, electricity and the required sanitary 
standards.556 In addition, people living in Caravan houses (their traditional 
house) could not access essential services as banking, mortgage because the 
law did not consider Caravan dwelling as a house.557 Furthermore, and most 
importantly here, they were also excluded from participation in the political life of 
their municipalities due to a quota system on the number of Travellers that could 
be admitted to a municipality coupled with the uninterrupted period of three 
years a person is required to reside in a municipality in order to be able to vote 
in the municipal election. According to the Committee, the combination of these 
factors has created the fact of social and political exclusion and has resulted in a 
racial discrimination against Travellers in the Respondent State in the enjoyment 
of the right to housing and other ESC rights guaranteed in the Charter.558
Th is is even more so in the cases of COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009) 
and COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010) where the Committee arrived on 
the conclusion that the Respondent States have committed what it referred to as 
an ‘aggravated violation’ of the Charter. In substance, these Complaints concern 
the practice of racial discrimination against Roma and Sinti Peoples in relation to 
housing. Particularly the Complaints indicate the diffi  culty of accessing housing 
and family benefi ts and the inhumane, cruel and violent methods employed against 
them during eviction procedures. At the backdrop of all these was the so-called 
‘security measures’ specifi cally targeting the Roma and Sinti population living 
in the Respondent State. Th e said measures practically justifi ed the segregation, 
‘ghettoization’ of the populations into camping sites mostly characterised by 
556 Paras 38–41, 49–50 & 60.
557 See paras 59–61 (discussing the consequences of failure to recognise Caravan-housing as a 
house).
558 See particularly paras 29–31, 46–50, 59–61, 69–70 & 84. According to the Committee, the 
measures taken by the State Party theoretically comply with the requirement of the Revised 
Social Charter for it takes a more of generalised approach to the housing problems. However, 
the discriminatory aspect of such approach comes to picture when applied to a concrete 
situation of the peoples aff ected as for instance the case of lack of non-recognition of Caravan 
Houses and the requirement of quota to be able to participate in municipalities’ election (i.e. to 
be able to vote). For these groups, no legal recognition for mobile houses (caravans) as houses 
means practically no access to social and administrative benefi ts (as banking, mortgage, loan). 
Th is, in turn, means, those who want to buy houses cannot access mortgage or loan services. In 
eff ect, therefore, it is very diffi  cult for such people to have eff ective access to housing. Added to 
this is the fact that the groups concerned were also evicted from their camping (stopping) sites 
arbitrary and violently in the hands of State agents. It is for this reason that the Committee 
emphasised that ‘Article E imposes an obligation to take due account of the relevant diff erences 
and to act accordingly’. ibid para 84 cum paras 67–67.
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substandard and inhuman living conditions. And, there was no adherence to 
the elementary due process of law in eviction of the same from their dwelling 
places or camping sites. It was also noted that they were victims of systematic 
and generalised violence including from police and other administrative organs, 
the practice the State neither denounced nor investigated. Not only this, the 
Committee also observed that measures designed to address the housing needs 
of those most in need were paralysed simply because of local political oppositions 
and administrative obstacles.559
Th e Committee underscored that the adoption of measures specifi cally targeting 
and aff ecting vulnerable groups and most seriously the active involvement of 
public authorities in the violence against such groups makes the violation of 
the Charter an aggravated one. Th at is, the nature and intensity of the breach 
goes beyond the ordinary violation of the Charter aff ecting not only the vertical 
relationship between the State and the victims but also shaking the widely 
shared values of the international (European) community.560 In this regard, the 
principal factor is not just the State’s failure to positively ‘adopt an overall and 
coordinated approach’ towards ensuring access to housing and other basic ESC 
rights for those who live or risk living in poverty and social exclusion but its direct 
and active involvement in the creation of such conditions of vulnerability and 
impoverishment aff ecting the populations in question.561
It is following this conclusion that the Committee begun to underline the 
importance of the right to participation in the protection of substantive ESC 
rights in the Charter. For instance, it observed that
the segregation and poverty situation aff ecting most of the Roma and Sinti 
population in Italy (especially those living in the nomad camps) is linked to a civil 
marginalisation due to the failure of the authorities to address the Roma and Sinti’s 
lack of identifi cation documents. In fact, substandard living conditions in segregated 
camps imply likewise a lack of means to obtain residency and citizenship in order to 
exercise civil and political participation.562
559 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), paras 41– 47 & 71–78; COHRE v. France (Complaint 
No. 63/2010), paras 41–55, 66 & 73–79.
560 Ibid, paras 75–78; COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), paras 53–54. ‘Having regard to 
the adoption of measures, which are incompatible with human dignity and specifi cally aimed at 
vulnerable groups, and taking into account the active role of the public authorities in framing 
and implementing this discriminatory approach to security, the Committee considers that the 
relevant criteria […] have been met and that there was an aggravated violation of human rights 
from the standpoint of Article  31§2 of the Revised Charter. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Committee also took into consideration the fact that it has already found violations in its decision 
[in ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008)]’. COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), para. 
53. For a more detailed discussion on the Committee’s decision in COHRE v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 58/2009) and its jurisprudential importance, see Aoife Nolan, ‘“Aggravated Violations”, 
Roma Housing Rights and Forced Expulsions in Italy: Recent Developments under the European 
Social Charter Collective Complaints System’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 343.
561 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), paras 57, 84–86, 93–94, 98–99 & 101–102.
562 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), para 103.
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For the Committee, ensuring the right to participation is a principal and 
an eff ective mechanism to safeguard individuals against, inter alia, poverty, 
exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination. ‘In fact,’ it emphasises, ‘the 
fi ght against social exclusion is one area where the notion of the indivisibility of 
fundamental rights takes a special importance’.563
As mentioned above, one of the issues complained in ERRC v. France 
(Complaint No. 51/2008) was the unreasonable limitation on their right to vote 
in the municipalities’ election. Th e Committee responded to this by saying that 
‘the right to vote, as with other rights relating to civic and citizen participation, 
constitutes a necessary dimension in social integration and inclusion and is thus 
covered by article 30’ of the Charter.564 Th e implication of this interpretation is 
that arbitrary denial of the right and opportunity to vote not only violates their 
political rights but also systematically reinforces the already existing structural 
socioeconomic impoverishments particularly aff ecting the communities 
concerned. In other words, it is not possible to eff ectively ensure social integration 
and inclusion without also ensuring the right to participate in the political and 
social life of the society.
Accordingly, the State has, under Article 30, a positive obligation to ‘encourage 
citizen’s participation in order to overcome obstacles deriving from the lack of 
represe3ntation of ’, here in particular, the ‘Roma and Sinti [population] in the 
general culture, media or the diff erent levels of government, so that these groups 
perceive that there are real incentives or opportunities for engagement to counter 
the lack of representation’.565 Of course, one should note that the eff ectiveness of 
the right of participation in itself depends on the extent to which the structure and 
manner of participation pay due regard to, inter alia, the particular contexts and 
needs of the individuals concerned. In relation to the Roma, Sinti and Travellers, 
this entails that their ethnic identities and cultural choices, in general, their 
specifi c lifestyles, should be taken into account and promoted for without such 
considerations the right to participation will simply be a mere formality devoid of 
any practical value whatsoever.566
So, it can be seen that the right to participation being conceived beyond 
its instrumental value as an integral constitutive element of all ESC rights 
guaranteed in the Social Charter. As we shall see later especially in connection 
with the protection of the rights of vulnerable persons (which we have in fact 
been indirectly referring to so far), the right to participation is consistently linked 
563 ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 99ff ; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), 
paras 103ff .
564 Para 99 (cited also in COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009)), para 105).
565 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), par 107.
566 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), paras 106–109. See also ERRC v. France (Complaint 
No. 51/2008), paras 101–104.
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to the values of democracy and solidarity in the social rights jurisprudence.567 
Th is in turn reaffi  rms that socioeconomic injustices are usually the function of 
systematic exclusion of persons (or group of persons) from the decision-making 
processes rather than from mere deprivation of material resources. It certainly 
seems that material deprivation is oft en the result of exclusion and marginalisation 
from socioeconomic and political processes of a society. Th at is why ensuring the 
right to participation is a decisive and necessary dimension of the realisation of 
all ESC rights and of ensuring social integration and inclusion as well.568
For similar reasons, it can retrospectively be argued that the Committee 
should or, at least, could have applied the same reasoning in Austin-Europe 
v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), ERRC v. Greece (Complaints No.15/2003) 
and MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007). ERRC v. Greece (Complaints 
No.15/2003) was the earliest collective complaint in which the Committee 
examined serious violations of several ESC rights of Roma People, in particular, 
their right to adequate standard of housing. It was complained that lack of 
suffi  cient number of permanent dwellings of an acceptable quality and camping 
sites as well as the practice of systematic eviction disproportionately aff ected 
a large number of Roma People in the Country.569 It is established that these 
problems were essentially due to the deliberate actions and inactions of the State 
authorities themselves. Th e Committee observed that the State did not take any 
signifi cant measures intended ‘to improve the living conditions of the Roma’ 
nor did the measures adopted achieved what was required by the Charter. Th e 
result was the segregation of unacceptably excessive number of Roma people to 
substandard living conditions.570 Nevertheless, unlike the complaints discussed 
above raising exactly the same violations as the one here, the Committee did not 
discuss the violations in terms of how lack of participation or exclusion from the 
socio-political process led to or reinforced the continued impoverishment of the 
population concerned. Also, the same can be said in relation to Austin-Europe v. 
567 See for instance, Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), para 53, ERRC v. Greece 
(Complaints No.15/2003, paras 19–26; International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France 
(Complaint No. 33/2006), decision on merits of 5 December 2007 (hereaft er IMATDFW v. France 
(Complaint No. 33/2006)), paras 60, 67, 128–30 & 163–69; MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints 
No.41/2007), para 39.
568 See ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 99; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), 
paras 105–106. See also UN Declaration on Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128; Art 25 
ICCPR; Nolan (n 560) 354–355.
569 Th e fact that there were, at the material time, over hundred thousand Roma populations in 
substandard housing and living conditions in the Respondent State is corroborated further 
by reports of diff erent international human rights bodies. ERRC v. Greece (Complaints 
No.15/2003, para 40. As regards evictions, the Committee observed the presence of the practice 
of ‘collective evictions of Roma both settled and itinerant without provision of alternative 
housing and sometimes involving the destruction of personal property’. ibid paras 37, 42, 46 & 
50.
570 Ibid para 42 & 43. In paragraph 42 the Committee refers to ‘a signifi cant number’ whereas 




France (Complaint No.13/2002) and MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007). 
In both complaints, though the types of disabilities involved therein are diff erent, 
the central point is the failure of the respective States to ensure the realisation of the 
right to education of persons with disabilities. In MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints 
No.41/2007), it was found that the education system of the Respondent State was 
inaccessible to children with intellectual disabilities as it was neither designed nor 
adapted to respond to their special needs; the Committee also observed that there 
was no prospect that the situation would change in a reasonable future.571 And in 
Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), it was noted that there has been 
chronic failure on the part of the State in advancing the provision of education 
for persons with autism to the eff ect that the proportion of autistic children in 
either general or specialist schools was much lower than other children, whether 
disabled or not.572 Th e crucial fact in both of these Complaints was the total 
neglect by the States parties of the fundamental interests the respective vulnerable 
persons as a whole. We read no indication as to the extent to which they have had 
the opportunity to participate in and infl uence the national political and policy 
debates regarding their fundamental socioeconomic interests but the Committee 
did not expressly refer to this point. Admittedly, in Austin-Europe v. France 
(Complaint No.13/2002), it has made a passing reference to participation as one of 
the underlying values of Article 15 of the Social Charter (providing for the rights 
of persons with disabilities) but it failed to make any substantive assessment on 
that basis.573
Having said this, the jurisprudence of the ECSR clearly shows that right 
to participation is expressly regarded as an integral element of the substantive 
ESC rights guaranteed in the Social Rights Charter. Th e Committee considers 
that ensuring the right to participation of, in particular, the vulnerable persons 
is indispensable in redressing the problem of systematic social and political 
exclusion, segregation, marginalisation, discrimination and structural poverty 
generally aff ecting these groups as it provides them with the equal opportunity to 
affi  rmatively engage in the process of socioeconomic and policy decision-making 
in their respective countries.
5.3.4. ECtHR
Th e right to participation has also been attached a signifi cant place in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) especially in relation to the 
protection of ESC rights and interests under certain provisions of the Convention. 
Th is is especially true in the context of the positive obligations of the States 
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arising in relation to the protection of the socioeconomic rights and interests of 
individuals. In such cases, it is evident from many of its judgements that the Court 
normally begins its assessment in the light of the procedural safeguards available 
to the individual. In particular, it primarily asks if the ‘decision-making process 
leading to the measures of interference’ could be considered as ‘fair and such as 
to aff ord due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual’ by the relevant 
provision of the Convention.574 Th is clearly underscores the signifi cance attached 
to the procedural guarantees in the protection of particularly substantive ESC 
rights and interests.
In fact, Luzuis Wildhaber, the former president of the Court, has argued on 
various occasions that the Convention’s guarantees have largely a procedural 
bias. Th at is, the Convention essentially requires the States to primarily ensure 
the availability and accessibility of procedural mechanisms necessary for the 
eff ective realisation of each of the rights recognised in the Convention within 
their domestic systems and defers the specifi c policy choices (the means through 
which the rights should be realised) to the discretion of the respective national 
authorities.575 Th is precisely goes with our conception of the right to participation 
as a procedural dimension of substantive ESC rights. In practice, this has been 
the principal approach adopted by the Court with respect to the protection of 
ESC rights and interests of the individuals under the Convention as confi rmed in 
several of its judgements including Chapman v. UK, Buckley v. UK and Fadeyeva 
v. Russia. For instance, in the case of Buckley v. UK, the Court made it clear that
Whenever discretion capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a Convention 
right such as the one in issue in the present case is conferred on national authorities, 
the procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in 
determining whether the respondent State has, when fi xing the regulatory framework, 
remained within its margin of appreciation. Indeed it is settled case law that, whilst 
Article 8 (art. 8) contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making 
process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to aff ord due 
respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 (art. 8).576
Four years later, this was reiterated in the case of Chapman v. UK.577 And almost 
ten years later, the Court once again underscored the same in the case of Fadeyeva 
574 See for instance, Chapman v. UK, para 92; Buckley v. UK, para 76; Fadeyeva v. Russia, para 128.
575 Luzuis Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ 
in Luzuis Wildhaber (ed), Th e European Court of Human Rights 1998–2006: History, 
Achievements, Reform (NP Engle 2006) 113–114; Luzuis Wildhaber, ‘Changing Ideas about the 
Tasks of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Luzuis Wildhaber (ed), European Court of 
Human Rights 1998–2006 (NP Engle 2006) 136–149; Luzuis Wildhaber, ‘Th e European Court 






v. Russia stating that in cases involving socioeconomic and policy choices its 
primary task is to fi rst ‘examine whether the decision-making process was fair 
and such as to aff ord due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual 
under the Convention’ adding that ‘only in exceptional circumstances may it go 
beyond this line and revise the material conclusions of the domestic authorities’. 
Th ese exceptional situations include, inter alia, the existence of manifest error of 
appreciation and the imposition of unnecessarily undue burden on the individual 
on behalf of the rest of the population.578
In both Buckley v. UK and Chapman v. UK, the Court was satisfi ed that there 
were such safeguards both in law and fact and that the respective applicants have 
in fact availed themselves of those safeguards vis-à-vis the impugned measures. 
According to the Court, the national authorities were within their margin of 
discretion in balancing the interests of the community for the preservation of 
the environment and that of the individual to respect for their home, family and 
private life: in other words, the Court found that the measures of interference in 
both cases were necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.579 
In the case of Fadeyeva v. Russia, however, the Court ‘concluded that, despite the 
wide margin of appreciation left  to the respondent State, it has failed to strike a 
fair balance between the interests of the community and the applicant’s eff ective 
enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private life’.580 According 
to the Court, ‘the onus is on the State to justify, using detailed and rigorous data, 
a situation in which certain individuals bear a heavy burden on behalf of the rest 
of the community’.581 However, it did not fi nd any clear evidence as to how the 
State had balanced between the economic interests of the entire population and 
of those residing within the proximity of a polluting plant. Nor could it fi nd any 
evidence as to the concrete steps the authorities had taken to address the dire 
health condition of the applicant ensuing from the pollution.582 In other words, 
there were no clear procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring the specifi c interests 
of the applicant nor was there any indication that she had participated in the 
decision-making process in issue.
In general, the jurisprudence of the Court show that, in relation to ESC 
rights or interests, its central focus is on the availability of procedural safeguards 
aff orded to those aff ected by a given policy or administrative decision. Th at is, 
should a dispute arise before the Court alleging an interference with the rights or 
interests guaranteed in the Convention due to certain socioeconomic and policy 
578 Para 105 & 128.
579 Buckley v. United Kingdom, para at 79–80 & 84; Chapman v. United Kingdom, para 106 & 114. 
But see the Joint Dissenting Opinion of seven judges in Chapman v. United Kingdom criticising 
the majority for merely relying on procedural matters and ignoring fundamental substantive 
issues aff ecting the applicant.
580 Para 134.
581 Para 128.
582 See paras 129–133.
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measures of the State concerned, the primary consideration of the Court is to 
fi rst review whether the national decision-making process leading to the alleged 
interference has been conducted with due regard to not just the general interests 
of the public but also to those individuals aff ected by the measure. Th is, if taken 
seriously, requires that the national decision-making systems should have some 
kind of built-in or self-regulative mechanism from the start through which the 
various interests of both the individuals and the general public can properly be 
weighed and balanced with each other. It compels the authorities to also provide 
necessary mechanisms through which those aff ected can make their views heard 
both during and aft er the decision-making process. Th is, in turn, adds a crucial 
perspective to the notion of the right to participation. Generally stated, there 
are two basic elements that emerge from the Court’s approach: fi rst, whether 
the national authorities have given due and proper regard (i.e. whether they 
have attached a proper weight) to the individual interests concerned in arriving 
at a certain (policy) decision and, second, whether those aff ected have had the 
necessary means and opportunity to challenge the decision of the authorities.583 
Interestingly, it has been seen above that if these conditions are satisfi ed, the 
Court would rarely proceed to assessing the substantive issues; and this rare 
occasion would generally seem to be when the available due process guarantees 
fail to provide the individual with meaningful protection of their rights in the 
Convention.584
Th e question whether the national authorities have given due regard to the 
interests of the individuals in adopting a measure interfering in the rights of 
an individual, in turn, falls within the Court’s assessment of the necessity of 
the measure. According to the Court, a measure of interference is said to be 
necessary in a democratic society if it responds to a pressing social need and if it 
is particularly proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.585 In this regard, the 
Court considers that it is for the national authorities to make an initial assessment 
of the necessity of a given measure in the light of their local needs and conditions. 
A justifi cation for this is that, for the Court, the national authorities are in a 
better position to make such assessments particularly ‘because of their direct 
and continuous contacts with the vital forces of their countries’ and that there 
are inherently multitude of factors involved in the socioeconomic and policy 
decision-making process of a given country.586 Th is is, however, not an absolute 
583 See Chapman v. United Kingdom, para 92; Buckley v. United Kingdom, par 76; Fadeyeva v. 
Russia, paras 102–105.
584 Fadeyeva v. Russia, para 105.
585 For the latest approach in the Court’s assessment of necessity and proportionality in relation 
to positive obligations of the States under socio-economic rights, Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 
94–105. See also Chapman v. UK, para 90; Buckley v. United Kingdom, para 76; Fadeyeva v. 
Russia, paras 102–105.




discretion as they only make an initial assessment of the necessity of adopting a 
given measure. Th e scope of this discretion will be restricted based on the nature 
of the right interfered with and its importance to the individual, the nature of 
activities restricted, and the existence of an international (European) consensus 
in relation to the issue involved in a given case. Th erefore, it is ultimately for 
the Court to make a fi nal assessment of whether the authorities have achieved 
a reasonable balance between the competing interests in the light of both the 
procedural and substantive guarantees enshrined in the Convention.587
In principle, whether the assessment is made by the national authorities or 
the Court, it is clear that the general guiding principle is the same: whether the 
measure can be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Th e nature of a 
‘democratic society’ and, hence, what is necessary in such a society at a particular 
time and place may vary from case to case. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that 
such norms as the rule of law (including absence of arbitrariness), accountability, 
pluralism and respect for human rights including the right to participation are 
among few of the characteristic features of a democratic society.588 It is, therefore, 
indispensable that decision-making processes in such a society respects the right 
to participation of individuals in matters aff ecting their essential ESC rights 
and interests and, to this end, ensures a fair and reasonable balance between 
competing interests involved therein.589
5.3.5. UNHRS
Th e practices of the UN human rights organs and its other relevant institutions 
also attest the importance of the right to participation in the realisation of, in 
particular, ESC rights. In fact, it is possible to state that the right to participation 
has now become one of the common phrases in any of the UN offi  cial documents 
such as reports, resolutions, declarations and treaties concerned, directly or 
indirectly, with the protection and promotion of human rights. It has also been 
referred to in several general comments of the human rights treaty bodies and in 
the reports UN independent experts. It is recognised that the right to participation 
has a paramount importance not just for the eff ective realisation of ESC rights 
but also for the realisation of all human rights and for ensuring the rule of law, 
development, democracy and social justice. It also appears that ensuring full and 
587 Buckley v. United Kingdom, para 74; Chapman v. United Kingdom, para 90–91; Fadeyeva v. 
Russia, para 102.
588 For more on the Court’s view of the values of democratic society and its relation with the 
Convention rights, see particularly (mutatis mutandis) Refah Partisi (Th e Welfare Party) 
and Others v. Turkey (Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98) [GC]), 
Judgment of 13  February 2003 (hereaft er Welfare Party et al v. Turkey), para 86ff ; United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (133/1996/752/951), Judgement of 30 January 
1998 (hereaft er United Community Party et al v. Turkey), para 43ff .
589 Cf. Buckley v. United Kingdom, para 76; Chapman v. United Kingdom, para 92.
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eff ective right to participation of individuals in the political and public aff airs of 
their countries will be one of the principal focuses of the UN and its human rights 
institutions in the post-millennium development agenda. In this regard, greater 
emphasis is placed especially on promoting the right to participation of women 
and other vulnerable individuals and groups in a society.
However, this increased recognition of and attention to the importance of 
the right to participation has not yet been matched with a clear articulation and 
development of its normative contents. Th is is even more so with respect to its 
role in the protection of socioeconomic rights. So far, there are only two general 
comments and one general recommendation specifi cally discussing the concept 
and implications of the right to participation; even then none of this is purely 
about the right to participation per se. Th e oldest one is General Comment No. 25 
of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) entitled ‘Participation in Public Aff airs 
and the Right to Vote’ adopted in 1996. Th erein the Committee addressed the 
right to take part in the political and public conduct of one’s own country and 
to this extent it mainly focused on expounding the right to vote and stand for 
election under Article 25 of the ICCPR. Other than briefl y explaining the notion 
of political and public conduct and the nature of the obligations of the States in 
ensuring the rights of everyone to participate in election, it did not pay much 
attention to developing the general concept, status and content of the right to 
participation in international human rights law. It also did not discuss its 
specifi c signifi cance in the protection of the rights of those disadvantaged and 
marginalised individuals and groups in a society.
In its General Comment No. 12590, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) discussed few important aspects of the right to participation in relation 
to the rights of the child. In this General Comment, the Committee did not use 
the phrase ‘the right to participation’ but rather ‘the right to be heard’. It is only 
in the substantive discussion that it used the notion of participation, but not the 
right to participation. At some point it even seems to have suggested that the 
concept of participation is an evolving concept, somehow indicating the reason 
why it might have hesitated to formulate its general comment in terms of the 
right to participation. Such suggestion, if intended, would however be misplaced 
especially in the light of the rich body of law and jurisprudence as seen in the 
preceding discussions. Th e best that can be said is that in this General Comment, 
the Committee was essentially discussing the right to fair trial of the child and 
not the general right of participation. Indeed, the right of the child to be heard 
in all administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial decision-making process was 
the central focus of the General Comment although it did make some brief but 
important comments on certain of the elements constituting the general right to 
participation of children.
590 Adopted in its Fift y-fi rst Session (2009).
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General Recommendation No. 23591 issued by the Committee on Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) also deals with the right 
to participation in the context of the States parties’ obligation to eliminate de jure 
and de facto discrimination against women and girls and to instead ensure equality 
of participation in the political and public aff airs at various levels (local, national, 
regional and global). To this end, the Recommendation provides various steps 
and measures that should be taken to ensure the equal participation of women 
at all levels. Th ough crucial in itself, the Committee also did not provide us with 
the general notion, status and normative contents of the right to participation in 
international human rights law.
However, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
an international body directly responsible for the universal monitoring of the 
realisation and further development of the normative contents of ESC at the UN 
level, has not yet issued a specifi c general comment on the right to participation 
and its importance for the protection of ESC rights. Th is is somewhat surprising 
given its vital role in the protection of substantive ESC rights. It is true that 
the Committee has tangentially referred to the importance of ensuring the 
participation of individuals and groups and the general public in all of its previous 
general comments. But this does not replace the normative value of a separate 
general comment expounding the right to participation as a right in itself and its 
signifi cance in the eff ective realisation of substantive ESC rights and basic social 
justice – the primary, in fact, the grand objective of ESC rights regime.
It seems that the extensive eff orts of the Offi  ce of High Commission on 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in relation to the promotion and protection of ESC 
rights that have fi nally brought attention to the right to participation within the 
UN system. Th e OHCHR has put an immense eff ort in synthesising and creating 
logical synergy between all the references made to the right to participation in 
various works of the UN organs including the General Assembly and Human 
Rights Bodies. In this regard, the series of the relevant reports prepared by the 
OHCHR at diff erent times are worth mentioning.592 For instance, in its report 
concerning the implementation and monitoring of ESC rights, the OHCHR 
stated that international human rights standards prescribe that institutional and 
procedural frameworks be put in place by the States because the implementation 
of these rights should include mechanisms for, inter alia, the participation of 
the relevant stakeholders. It added that failure by a State to duly include such 
mechanisms to satisfy the procedural requirements of these rights may also 
591 Adopted in its Sixteenth Session (1976).
592 In this regard, the OHCHR has prepared and submitted to the HRCo/ECOSOC under 
diff erent topics. Pursuant to HRCo’s Resolution 27/24 (A/HRC/RES/27/24, para 6), it had also 
submitted an interesting report focusing on the best practices available and challenges and 
ways to address those challenges in the realisation of the right to participation during the 30th 
Regular Session of the HRCo. See A/HRC/30/26.
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amount to violation of its international obligations fl owing therefrom.593 In 
another report which it submitted a year later concerning preventable maternal 
mortality and morbidity and human rights, participation was presented as one 
of the seven core principles fl owing from the human rights values of dignity and 
non-discrimination, forming the bedrock of a human rights-based approach to, 
in this case, addressing maternal mortality and morbidity.594 It was specifi cally 
regarded as an operational principle of a rights-based approach that has come to 
be recognised as a right in itself. In stating this, the report drew on the Almata 
Declaration on Primary Healthcare and the works of the Independent Expert 
on the Right to Health.595 Also, in its 2011 report on the role of indicators for 
the implementation and monitoring of socioeconomic and cultural rights, 
participation is considered as one of the cross-cutting human rights principles 
(together with non-discrimination, equality, accountability and the right to 
remedy, all of which are the subject of discussion in this thesis) that must be 
taken into account in the collection and analysis of a given data of indicators on 
a certain right.596
A relatively detailed analysis by the OHCHR of the right to participation is 
presented in its 2014 and 2015 reports to the Human Rights Council (HRCo).597 
Interestingly, the reports recognise the fact that political and public participation 
rights play a crucial role in the promotion of democratic governance, the rule 
of law, social inclusion and economic development, advancement of all human 
rights, empowering individuals and groups, and as one of the core elements 
of human rights-based approaches aimed at eliminating marginalisation and 
discrimination.598 Read together, they address, inter alia, the concept, legal 
frameworks, challenges aff ecting and best practices in the realisation of the right 
to participation. In particular, the right to equal and eff ective participation in the 
public and political life is construed as constituting a central feature or hallmark 
of inclusive democracy and for the realisation of all human rights and human 
593 See E/2009/90, para 33 cum n19. In addition to this, it also mentions other important principles 
which have crucial relationships with the right to participation such as access to information, 
accountability, due process of law, and access to justice. ibid.
594 A/HRC/14/39, paras 32 and 59. As it stated, ‘Th e practical implications of the human rights 
values of dignity and non-discrimination result in a set of working principles that form 
the basis of a human rights approach. Th e treaty bodies and United Nations experts have 
clarifi ed the importance of seven such principles: accountability, participation, transparency, 
empowerment, sustainability, international cooperation and non-discrimination. Th ese 
principles have particular application when examining a human rights-based approach to 
addressing maternal mortality and morbidity as discussed in this section.’ ibid para 32. It is 
also interesting to note that these principles have expressly been endorsed by Human Rights 
Council and referred to it as underlying human rights principles in a number of its resolutions 
concerned with the realisation of socioeconomic and cultural rights. See particularly A/HRC/
RES/22/5, para 9, A/HRC/RES/22/11/, Preamble.
595 A/HRC/14/39, para 39.
596 OHCHR Report for HRCo, E/2011/90, para 21.
597 See A/HRC/27/29 & A/HRC/30/26.
598 A/HRC/27/29, para 2.
Chapter 5. Participation
Intersentia 187
rights-based strategies aimed at eradicating discrimination and inequalities. 
Th is is an interesting contribution to the conception of the role and notion of the 
right to participation. But both reports did not go deep enough in establishing 
its assertions on a more solid theoretical and legal foundation. Even if it made 
reference to some of the UN and regional human rights treaties recognising the 
right to participation, it failed to articulate the general legal status and constitutive 
elements of the right to participation under international human rights law. In 
fact, it seems to have been highly infl uenced by the works of some of the UN 
treaty bodies and independent experts, in particular, General Comment No. 
25 of HRC and General Recommendation No. 23 of CEDAW; moreover, a great 
deal of the discussions in both reports were unnecessarily eschewed towards the 
‘electoral rights’.599
In addition to the works of the OHCHR, the UN Offi  ce of the Secretary-
General has also been making important contributions to the clarifi cation of 
the concept and signifi cance of the right to participation both generally and in 
relation to the protection of ESC rights including the right to development. As 
many of the reports of the Secretariat pertaining to the right to participation draw 
on the works of the OHCHR just mentioned, it is not necessary to repeat the 
discussion here. It is suffi  cient to mention that in its 2012 report to the HRCo, the 
Secretariat had made reference to the right to participation along with six other 
human rights principles underlying the promotion and protection of the women’s 
ESC rights especially with respect to human rights-based approach to the problem 
of maternal mortality and morbidity.600 Similar reference was made to the right 
to participation in its 2014 report on the importance of the social protection fl oors 
in the realisation ESC rights in which it underlined the importance of ensuring, 
inter alia, the right to participation of the benefi ciaries in the process of designing, 
implementation and monitoring of social protection programs.601
As already referred to above, HRCo has also been playing an important 
role through series of its resolutions recognising the right to participation and 
demanding each Member States to eff ectively ensure the same for everyone within 
its jurisdiction and providing a normative basis for the works of other relevant 
UN bodies including those just mentioned above.602 It has repeatedly reaffi  rmed 
599 It would have been better had the High Commission further developed its conception of 
participation mentioned in paras 2 and 6 of the report with more theoretical and practical 
evidence.
600 A/HRC/22/24, para 60 (citing the works of High Commission) submitted per HRCo Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/19/5).
601 Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of the Realization in all Countries of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A/HRC/28/35, para 24–28.
602 For instance, it has already been noted that the aforementioned reports of both the High 
Commission and the Secretariat on the right to participation and generally on the question 
of the realisation of ESC rights are mostly initiated by specifi c resolutions of the HRCo; at 
times its resolution are inspired by certain relevant reports thereby giving normative force 
to the substance of the report. See for instance A/HRC/RES/4/1; A/HRC/RES/10/11; A/HRC/
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that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part, directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of public aff airs without any form of distinction 
and unreasonable restrictions and to have equal access to public service in his 
or her country. It has also emphasised that the right of everyone to equal and 
eff ective participation in the political, public and other aff airs of the society has a 
critical importance for democracy, the rule of law, social inclusion, development, 
gender equality and for the realisation of all human rights and social justice.603 
In particular, in one of its resolutions on human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law, the Council underlined that democracy is based on the freely expressed 
will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural 
systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives as well as the 
symbiotic relationship between democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
Th at democracy includes respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
including, inter alia, the right to directly or indirectly take part in the conduct of 
public aff airs and respect for the rule of law and that democracy is vital for the 
promotion and protection of all human rights.604
Th erefore, it is possible to conclude here by stating that the volume of works 
being done and the level of coordination and concerted eff orts towards the 
promotion and implementation of the right to participation at various levels 
indicate the clear recognition of its vital importance for the eff ective realisation 
of, in particular, ESC rights and social justice. Similar to the case law discussed 
above, the UN system has been paying due attention to the equal rights of all 
persons (men, women, minorities groups, indigenous, the disadvantaged, the 
marginalised, the deprived, the child, the elderly, people with disabilities) 
to directly or indirectly take part in all the political and public aff airs of their 
countries without any form of unjustifi able discrimination. Th is includes the equal 
right and opportunity of everyone to have a meaningful say in and contribution 
to all decision-making processes aff ecting their socioeconomic, political and 
other vital interests. In this regard, the right to participation is seen as essentially 
fl owing from (or as an extension or specifi cation of) the right of the people to 
freely determine their own socioeconomic, political and governance system and 
from the principle that recognises the freely expressed will of the people as the 
basic foundation of the authority of government.
RES/19/5, A/HRC/RES/19/11; A/HRC/RES/19/36; A/HRC/RES/22/4; A/HRC/RES/22/5; A/
HRC/RES/24/8; A/HRC/RES/25/11; A/HRC/RES/27/24.
603 See for instance, A/HRC/RES/19/11; A/HRC/RES/19/36; A/HRC/RES/27/24; A/HRC/
RES/24/8; A/HRC/RES/22/4.




Th is Chapter has shown that one of the important legal obligation of the State 
to respect and ensure the material conditions of a dignifi ed life consists in 
guaranteeing the eff ective participation of the individuals and groups in its 
decision-making processes aff ecting their vital socioeconomic rights and 
interests. In fact, guaranteeing this right is considered as a necessary and 
fundamental procedural prerequisite for the eff ective protection of substantive 
ESC rights. In addition, it also constitutes one of the practical expressions of the 
State’s respect for the equal rights and inherent dignity of all persons. In this 
regard, the discussion has shown the recognition by human rights courts and 
bodies that this right is both a cross-cutting right attesting to the indivisibility 
and interdependence of all human rights and an integral constitutive element 
of all ESC rights. Its paramount importance is underscored in relation to the 
protection of ESC rights of vulnerable persons as it provides them with the 
opportunity to control their aff airs in equal terms with other members of the 
society. It particularly plays a critical role in safeguarding their interests against 
various conditions of vulnerability by ensuring, inter alia, inclusive democracy, 
the rule of law and social inclusion. It reaffi  rms the equal and inherent dignity 
of human being and the emancipatory function of the very idea of human 
rights which asserts the rights of every person be treated with due and proper 
respect regardless of his or her identity and socioeconomic background. Th ere 
is no specifi c requirement under international law concerning the structure 
or manner of participation but it is required participation in a given decision-
making process be eff ective. Th is, in turn, obliges the State to ensure that it is 
relevant, meaningful, timely, transparent, respectful to the dignity and rights 
of participants and is conducted in good faith and in accordance with a pre-
established legal procedure. Th e State therefore bears both negative and positive 
obligations to guarantee the free, full and eff ective exercising and enjoyment of 






Th ere is no doubt, the right to access to justice holds a central place in the 
entire human rights protection system. It is in fact seen as the fulcrum of the 
eff ectiveness of the protection of human rights and the test (evidence) of the 
existence of the rule of law within a given State. Th is Chapter has accordingly 
two main purposes. First, it identifi es the major elements of the right to access to 
justice developed in the case law. Second, it develops a critical position on how 
each of these elements should be applied in the context of ESC rights. Given these 
two main purposes of the Chapter, it is necessary to somehow depart from the 
general structure of analysis adopted in the rest of the chapters in Part two, that 
is, referring to the case law of each tribunals and monitoring bodies turn by turn. 
Here, fi rst, the major elements of the right to access to justice are identifi ed and, 
then, their meaning and implications are discussed in the light of international 
ESC rights from across the jurisdictions. However, it should be noted that there is 
no substantive departure from the general methodological approach adopted in 
this Part but only in the structure of analysis.
6.2. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
ESC RIGHTS?
For many years, the right to access to justice has been identifi ed only with 
those rights commonly referred to as civil and political rights or the so-called 
negative rights. ESC rights were considered as mere programmatic rights which 
do not give rise to justiciable claims before the court of law or another tribunal. 
Th at is, ESC rights were not seen as ‘real’ human rights giving rise to the right 
to access to justice. Th is view, in turn, was behind the whole justiciability 
discourse which mainly concerned the question whether ESC rights bestow 
on individuals the right to claim and obtain remedy against violation of these 
rights.605 Interestingly, the debate on the justiciability of ESC rights is now 
605 Roach (n 12); Squires, Langford and Th iele (n 3).
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exhausted and, hence, of no interest for the discussion here.606 More importantly, 
the substantive argument on the justifi cation of ESC rights has already been 
provided in Chapter four. In substance, it was argued that all human rights drive 
their normative justifi cation from the principle of human dignity and that ESC 
rights are essentially concerned with guaranteeing basic material conditions of 
life which, in turn, are the constitutive element of a dignifi ed human life. As 
such, it is indispensable that individuals have access to justice in relation to their 
fundamental ESC rights. Moreover, the number of cases reviewed and discussed 
in Part two of this study as a whole even makes the argument against justiciability 
of ESC rights counterfactual. However, as a matter of principle, the following 
two points are worth emphasising. First, denying the applicability of the right to 
access to justice in relation to ESC rights is in eff ect denying individuals the right 
and opportunity to challenge the choices and decisions of their governments 
although it is indubitable that such choices and decisions will have signifi cant 
direct and immediate impacts on their lives. Second, it also undercuts the basic 
principle of the rule of law eff ectively leaving the fate of fundamental ESC rights 
of individuals in the unfettered discretion of government (politicians).607 In this 
regard, it should be noted that (also observable from the cases seen in Chapter 
fi ve and in the next chapters) the ever-increasing socioeconomic inequalities, 
exclusions and impoverishments have, by and large, to do with the choices and 
decisions of governments. Th ese are just few of the practical reasons making 
the right to access to justice indispensable in relation to ESC rights. From the 
perspective of human rights, it is quite unacceptable that the governmental 
discretionary power of such magnitude would go unchecked or that individuals 
606 See, inter alia, Langford (n 3); Langford and Nolan (n 3); Tara J Melish, ‘Th e Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity’ in M Langford (ed), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2008); Squires, Langford and Th iele (n 3); Melish, Protecting Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System : A Manual on 
Presenting Claims (n 13); Melish, ‘Rethinking the “Less as More” Th esis: Supranational 
Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas’ (n 12); Melish, ‘Counter-
Rejoinder: Justice Vs. Justiciability?: Normative Neutrality and Technical Precision, the Role 
of the Lawyer in Supranational Social Rights Litigation’ (n 12); Courtis (n 3); Dennis and 
Stewart (n 3); Coomans (n 3); Tinta (n 3); James L. Cavallaro & Emily Schaff er (n 12); Leila 
Choukroune, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Th e UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Review of China’s First Periodic Report on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights’ 
(2005) 19 Colubia Journal of Asian Law 30. For the historical genesis of the question of 
justiciability within the UN human rights draft ing history, see Annotations on the text of the 
draft  International Covenants on Human Rights (prepared by Secretary General), GA Doc 
A/2929 (July 1955); Commission on Human Rights Draft ing Committee, International Bill 
of Rights, ECOSOC Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 (11 June 1947); Report of the Commission 
on Human Rights to ECOSOC, Th ird Year Six Session, E/600 (December 1947); Morsink (n 
428).
607 CESCR General Comment No. 9 Th e Domestic Application of the Covenant, adopted in the 
Nineth Session (1998), para 3, 9–10.
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be denied the right and opportunity to vindicate against choices aff ecting their 
life and dignity. As the cases discussed in this study show, it is utterly impossible to 
ensure the eff ective protection of ESC rights without the right to access to justice. 
Th is means, the idea that the right to access to justice is alien to ESC rights is 
now a matter of the past. Th erefore, what is worthy of exploration is not about its 
applicability but rather about its basic contents and practical implications in the 
context of ESC rights.608 So the next section will examine, fi rst, the relationship 
between the State’s generic human rights obligation and the right to access to 
justice and, then, the basic elements and implications of this right in the context 
of international ESC rights case law.
608 Th ere is now rich body of case law and there are analytical reports concerning the signifi cance 
of the right to access to justice in relation to the protection of ESC rights. At the UN level, 
OHCHR and SG have issued diff erent reports. HRCo has also issued several resolutions 
emphasising the obligation to ensure the right to access to justice. With respect to the 
Inter-American Human Rights System, there is a rich body of case law, advisory opinion 
and analytical reports directly or indirectly dealing with the right to access to justice. In 
particular, the Inter-American Commission’s report on Access to Justice is one of its kind 
for it not only brings together important principles being developed through the system but 
also makes a sound legal and theoretical justifi cation of the (individual and collective) right 
to access to justice and the corresponding States party’s obligation to ensure the right within 
their respective jurisdictions. See IACoHR, Access to Justice as a Guarantee of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights. A Review of the Standards Adopted by the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 4, 7 September 2007 (hereaft er cited as 
IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 4, 7  September 
2007)). In addition, the following thematic reports of the Commission are also equally 
important in showing the signifi cance of the right to access to justice especially with respect 
to ESC rights. Access to Justice for Women Victims of Sexual Violence: Education and 
Health, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 65, 28 December 2011 (hereaft er cited as IACoHR’s Report on 
Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 65, 28  December 
2011)); Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter‐American Human Rights System, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009 (hereaft er cited as IACoHR’s Report on the Rights 
of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30  December 2009)); Th e 
Work, Education and Resources of Women: the Road to Equality in Guaranteeing Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143 Doc. 59, 3 November 2011 (hereaft er cited 
as IACoHR’s Report on the Road to Gender Equality in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143 Doc. 59, 
3 November 2011)); Legal Standards Related to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in the 
Inter‐American Human Rights System: Development and Application, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 143 
Doc. 60, 3 November 2011 (hereaft er cited as IACoHR’s Report on Legal Standards Related to 
Gender Equality and Women’s Rights (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 143 Doc. 60, 3 November 2011)); Th e 
Situation of People of African Descent in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 62, 5 December 
2011 (hereaft er cited as IACoHR’s Report on People of African Descent (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 
Doc. 62, 5 December 2011)); Guidelines for Preparation of Progress Indicators in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.132 Doc. 14, 19 July 2008 (hereinaft er 
cited as IACoHR’s Guidelines for Progress Indicators in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.132 Doc. 14, 
19 July 2008)).
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6.3. JURISPRUDENCE
6.3.1. THE OBLIGATION TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHT TO 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Before identifying and discussing its constitutive elements, it is important to 
fi rst see the connection between the States’ generic human rights obligation 
stated above and the right of to access to justice. Th us, as already argued above, 
international human rights law essentially prescribes certain generic obligations 
of the States: the obligation to respect and ensure (guarantee or give full domestic 
legal eff ect to) all the rights and freedoms for everyone within their jurisdictions. 
Th ese generic obligations give rise to other concrete obligations with respect to 
each of the substantive rights and the special needs and circumstances of the 
individuals concerned. One aspect of the generic obligation to ensure the free, 
full and eff ective exercise and enjoyment of all human rights is the obligation 
to guarantee the right to access to justice. Th at is, the right to access to justice 
directly fl ows from the States’ undertaking to respect and guarantee all human 
rights. It is one of the primary and immediate steps that the States are legally 
bound to take to ensure within their domestic legal systems.609 As the UN 
Secretary General’s report on access to justice for ESC rights clearly states, the 
right to remedy for violations of human rights is fundamental to the very notion 
of human rights.610 In the words of the African Commission, ‘Human rights law 
and the international law on State responsibility require that individuals should 
have an eff ective remedy when their rights are violated, and that the State must 
provide reparations for its own violations’.611 Th is means, the right to access to 
justice is an integral element of the very idea of human rights. As will be argued 
in this Subsection, the very fact of being party to a given human rights treaty 
necessarily implies the State’s legal obligation to ensure the right to access to 
justice through which individuals may avail themselves of the rights in order to 
assert and claim against acts of violations.
In this regard, there is no evidence in the case law that there should be a 
specifi c legal text or provision providing for (attesting to the existence of) the 
right to access to justice in a given human rights treaty. In the above-mentioned 
report612, the Secretary General seems to have advanced the old critic’s view of 
the absence of specifi c provision providing for the right to access to justice as 
a weakness of ICESCR but this is a misplaced view. In fact, the right to access 
609 See Introduction to Part Two above.
610 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of the Realization in all Countries of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A/HRC/25/31.
611 Noah Kazingachire et al v. Zimbabwe, para 127.
612 A/HRC/25/31, paras 2–6.
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to justice is now part and parcel of the customary international law norm.613 
A well-established jurisprudence of the IACtHR also shows that the obligation 
to guarantee human rights ‘implies the duty of the States party to organize all 
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which 
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free 
and full enjoyment of human rights’.614 In this way, the obligation to guarantee 
complements the obligation to respect human rights by requiring them to adopt 
all necessary measures to give practical eff ect to the rights and freedoms within 
their domestic systems.615 In this regard, there is no question that the manner of 
giving full domestic eff ect to human rights is relatively discretionary to each State. 
For one State, it may entail enactment of a new law; for another State, it may be 
revision of the already existing one to make it consistent with their international 
obligation. At the same time, it is equally important that each State ensures that 
the measure taken with the view to give practical eff ect to a human right complies 
with all the procedural and substantive principles of guaranteeing the free and 
full exercise of the rights and that the measure taken be eff ective.616 Above all, 
no State has a discretionary power to refuse to give a domestic legal eff ect to the 
rights it has recognised in various international treaties, for the failure to do so 
613 See generally, Francesco Francioni, ‘Th e Right of Access to Justice under Customary 
International Law’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Access to Justice as Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2007); Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and 
International Investment Law’ (2009) 20  European Journal of International Law; Dinah 
Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2005). See 
also Golder v. the United Kingdom (Application No. 4451/70), Judgment of 21 February 1975 
(hereaft er Golder v. United Kingdom), para 35.
614 See for instance, Velasquez-Rodriguezv. Honduras, para 166; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, para 61ff ; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 109–110; 
Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, paras 170–174.
615 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, para 168 cum paras 170–181. Th e Court stated this in 
explaining the function of Art 2 (Domestic Legal Eff ects) and Art 1(1) (obligation to respect and 
ensure) of ACHR. Comparing the obligations of the State enshrined in these two provisions, 
the Court stated that the obligations of the States under Art 1(1) is ‘more direct’ than the one 
in Art 2 because while the former directly requires that the rights be respected and ensured 
the later simply requires that States adopt mechanisms through which these be given eff ect to 
which, at a certain level, is discretionary to each State (ibid at 168). According to the Court, 
Art 2 is thus part and parcel of the substantive requirements implied by the obligation to 
respect and ensure the free and full exercise of the rights. For more on Court’s analysis of 
Arts 1 and 2 of ACHR, see for instance, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 
99–104 & 153; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 109–110 & 142–144; 
‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, paras 224–225; Vera Vera v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 19  May 2011, paras 41–42; Ximenes-Lopes v. 
Brazil, paras 83–85; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 265–268; the 
‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment 28  February 2003, para 
161–168.
616 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 99–108 & 153; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, para 109–110; CESCR General Comment No. 9.
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would in itself constitute a clear violation of its obligation to guarantee human 
rights within its domestic legal system.617
Th e review of the case law shows that ensuring eff ective access to justice 
requires that the domestic remedial mechanisms be designed in the light of its 
basic procedural and substantive elements.618 For instance, with respect to the 
substantive dimensions of the right to access to justice, the Secretary General’s 
report mentioned above states that a remedy should be adequate. A remedy is 
said to be adequate if it is accessible, aff ordable, prompt, eff ective, legitimate, 
predictable, transparent and compatible with the nature of the right in issue. 
It also adds that a remedy must be designed on the basis of equity in the sense 
that it is designed by taking into account the needs and interests of the ‘poorest 
and most disadvantaged and marginalized’ persons in a society. In relation to 
the procedural and institutional aspects, the report mentions the requirement of 
prompt, expeditious, eff ective, impartial and independent adjudication of a human 
right complaint by a remedial institution.619 Th e case law of the ECtHR also shows 
that everyone with arguable claims must have access to eff ective remedies.620 And 
the same is also true in the case law of the IACtHR. Per IACtHR, a remedy must 
comply with the requirements of due legal procedure and eff ectiveness. So, any 
remedy available at a domestic level must be substantiated in accordance with 
the rules of due process and be able to ensure eff ective recourse for violations 
of human rights. In particular, it requires that a remedy be accessible, simple, 
prompt, and eff ective and that the remedial institution (which can be either 
judicial or any other organ) be competent and independent to eff ectively redress 
the alleged violation, while also emphasising the indispensable nature of judicial 
617 See Introduction to Part two above. See particularly Arts 26 & 27 VCLT;  CESCR General 
Comment No. 3: the Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant), 
adopted in Fift h Session (1990); HRC General Comment No. 31: the Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted in Eightieth Session 
(2004); the ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 235; Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, para 136–137 
(citing, inter alia, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment of August 31, 2001, para 113), Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment of February 6, 2001, paras 134–137; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku 
v. Ecuador, para 261.
618 See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 140–141 cum nn 163–166; G.R. 
v. the Netherlands (Application No. 22251/07), Judgment of 10  January 2012, paras 44–50; 
McFarlane v. Ireland (Application No. 31333/06) [GC], Judgement of 10  September 2010, 
paras 107–108; Aksoy v. Turkey (Application no. 21987/93), Judgment of 18  December 1996, 
paras 51–54; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], paras 288–293; M.S. v. the United Kingdom 
(Application No. 24527/08), Judgment 3  May 2012, para 49; Noah Kazingachire et al v. 
Zimbabwe, paras 129–131.
619 See A/HRC/25/31, paras 25–26. cum nn 103–115 (referring to the practices of CESCR and 
other UN Committees and other regional human rights systems).
620 See, inter alia, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 288; G.R. v. the Netherlands, para 44; 
McFarlane v. Ireland, para 108; Golder v. United Kingdom, para 36.
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review under certain circumstances.621 Th e AfCoHPR in its part states that a 
remedy must fulfi l three general but basic criteria: it should be available, eff ective 
and suffi  cient. For the Commission, availability of a remedy essentially concerns 
whether it can be pursed without impediment; eff ectiveness is whether it ‘off ers a 
prospect of success’ and suffi  ciency is about whether it is capable of redressing the 
alleged violation, that is, whether it is appropriate and adequate.622
Another important point to note under this subsection is the scope of the 
State obligation to guarantee the right to access to justice. Th e question is whether 
the obligation to ensure the right to access to justice only applies to matters falling 
within the judicial proceedings (court of law) or to all kinds of proceedings such as 
administrative and other quasi-judicial proceedings. Th e general principle from 
the case law of international tribunals is that the State obligation to guarantee 
access to justice extends to all kinds of proceedings (that is, judicial, administrative 
or any other quasi-judicial bodies) dealing with arguable human rights claims 
of individuals although the specifi c application of each of the elements to be 
discussed below may need to be assessed on case-by-case basis. According to the 
ECtHR, it is not about the nature of the proceeding or institution that should be 
considered but rather whether a person has an arguable claim/ dispute concerning 
the determination of his/ her civil rights and obligations. Per the Court, the 
notion of civil rights and obligation has an autonomous meaning and, hence, 
does not depend on the classifi cation made by the respective national legislation. 
For instance, the main question involved in Feldbrugge v. Th e Netherlands and in 
Deumeland v. Germany was whether Article 6 para 1 is applicable to the decision 
concerning social security (health insurance) benefi ts regulated under public 
law schemes.623 According to the Court, the decisive element is not the formal 
621 ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 234–238; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 99–102; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 110ff ; Th e Dismissed 
Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 24 November 2006, paras 126 & 128–132; the Constitutional 
Court v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 31 January 2001, paras 88–91 & 66–75; 
the ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, paras 161–168; the 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment of 5 July 2004, para 180–194; Cesti-Hurtado v. Peru, merits, judgment of 
29  September 1999, paras 164–168 & 121; Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 4 July 2006, paras 170–174; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, paras 112–114 & 131, 134–135; Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, para 135; Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 141; Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 263; Furlan And 
Family v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
31 August 2012, para 209–212.
622 See Noah Kazingachire et al v. Zimbabwe, paras 129–131; Jawara v. Gambia, para 31; 
Communication 241/01: Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, decision on merits, 33rd Ordinary 
Session of the African Commission, May 2003 (hereaft er Purohit and Moore v. Gambia); 
Communication 323/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt, 
decision on merits, 10th Extra-Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 12 to 16 December 2011.
623 Feldbrugge v. Th e Netherlands (Application no. 8562/79), Judgment of 29 May 1986, 29 May 
1986; Deumeland v. Germany (Application No. 9384/81), Judgment of 29 May 1986.
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characterisation of the scheme as private or public law as such but the nature of 
the entitlement and the substantive impact of the outcome of a certain decision-
making procedure on the private life of the individual benefi ciary.624 In addition, 
the case law of the IACtHR and several reports of the IACoHR strongly establish 
that the State obligation to guarantee the right to access to justice applies to any 
kind of procedure and jurisdiction involving the determination of the rights and 
obligations of individuals regardless of the nature of the proceeding and the type 
of the institution concerned.625 Furthermore, this obligation is also not limited 
to the rights enshrined in international human rights treaties. It should also be 
guaranteed in relation to all the rights recognised through national legislations 
as well. Th at is, the State’s obligation to guarantee access to justice holds true 
irrespective of whether the right exists at national or international level. Th is 
in eff ect means that the State cannot justify its failure to ensure the right to 
access to justice on the basis of the fact that a given right is not recognised at an 
international level.626
Th erefore, with respect to the point at hand, it can be concluded that the 
obligation to guarantee the right to access to justice is an integral element of 
the State’s generic obligation to ensure the free, full and eff ective exercise and 
enjoyment of all human rights within its jurisdiction. While the existence of a 
positive law expressly providing for the right to access to justice may be useful, the 
consistent position established in the case law is that this right does not only fl ow 
from mere positive law but also and above all from the general principle of law 
and the rule of law governing democratic societies.627 Th us, the State is required 
to ensure this right in all kinds of proceedings involving the determination of the 
rights and obligations of individuals – the only necessary and suffi  cient condition 
624 See Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, paras 18–20, 29, 37 & 43; Deumeland v. Germany, paras 
59–60.
625 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 126ff ; Velásquez-Rodríguez v. 
Honduras, paras 170–181; ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 222ff ; Baena-Ricardo et al v. 
Panama, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 2 February 2001, paras 123–134 & 137; 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 61–63 cum 99–104, 108–109 & 117–118ff ; 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 77–112; IACoHR’s Report on Access 
to Justice in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 4, 7 September 2007). See also IACoHR’s Report 
on Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 65, 28 December 
2011); IACoHR’s Report on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 
Doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009); IACoHR’s Report on the Road to Gender Equality in ESCR 
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143 Doc. 59, 3 November 2011); IACoHR’s Report on Legal Standards Related 
to Gender Equality and Women’s Rights (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 143 Doc. 60, 3 November 2011); 
IACoHR’s Report on People of African Descent (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 62, 5 December 2011); 
IACoHR’s Guidelines for Progress Indicators in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.132 Doc. 14, 19 July 
2008).
626 See for instance, Dismissed Congressional Employee v. Peru, paras 106–107 & 119–132; 
Constitutional Court v. Peru, paras 66–85 & 88–96; IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in 
ESCR.
627 Golder v. United Kingdom), paras 34–37; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 139.
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for a given State to guarantee the right to access to justice in human rights law. It is, 
to this end, imperative that the domestic proceedings be designed in accordance 
with the fundamental procedural and substantive elements of access to justice 
(discussed in detail below).
6.3.2. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE
Th e discussion in the preceding subsection indicates that there are certain 
substantive and procedural elements of the right to access to justice developed 
in the case law. In general, it is possible to categorise these elements into the 
following fi ve basic elements: right to fair hearing (which, in turn, includes the 
right to accessible procedural and institutional framework, right to enjoy equality 
of arms and opportunities including the right to counsel, transparency and 
publicity), the right to prompt hearing (reasonable time), right to suitable and 
eff ective redress, the right to a competent, impartial and independent organ, and 
the right to full and prompt compliance.628 As it can be seen, while some of these 
elements concern the process (procedural aspect) of a remedy, others govern the 
substantive quality of a remedy; and still others govern the nature, conduct and 
organisation of the institution entrusted with a power of remedy. Th ese are basic 
constitutive elements of the right to access to justice in the sense that failure to 
adequately give eff ect to any one of these may seriously undermine the right to 
access to justice and, hence, the eff ective protection of the substantive rights it 
is meant to safeguard. Following the ECtHR, we can say that these guarantees 
together constitute the whole sum of the broad notion of the right to fair trial 
guaranteed under Art 6 and 13 of the ECHR which, in turn, is a foundation 
of the rule of law and the eff ective protection of human rights in a democratic 
society.629 And per IACtHR, they are the constitutive elements of the due process 
and judicial protection guaranteed under Articles 8 and 25 of the ACHR.630
a) Th e right to a fair hearing
Th e fi rst important element is the right to a fair hearing, that is, the right to have 
access to (institute a claim or initiate a proceeding) and have one’s cause heard 
628 Th ese elements are in one way or another generally recognised in academic writings on access 
to justice especially written in the context of civil and political rights. However, there is only 
a handful of literature on this topic written in the context of ESC rights in the sense and 
depth presented in this Chapter. Th e most interesting publication is the report of the IACoHR 
already cited above (IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in ESCR (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 
4, 7 September 2007)). See also generally Shelton (n 613); Squires, Langford and Th iele (n 3); 
Roach (n 12).
629 Golder v. United Kingdom, paras 34–36.
630 See Introduction to Part two above.
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by a competent organ. It is a gateway to the right to eff ective remedy. Th e most 
important authority in this regard is the judgment of the ECtHR in the Golder 
case. According to the ECtHR, the right to be heard, that its, the right to institute 
a complaint and hence initiate a proceeding before a competent tribunal for the 
purpose of asserting one’s right and obtaining an appropriate redress is the fi rst 
and primary element of the right to a fair trial.631 What is interesting in this case 
is that there is no specifi c text or provision in the Convention which specifi cally 
guarantees the right to initiate a proceeding. Th e Respondent State was keen to 
stress this point saying that the guarantees pertaining to the right to a fair trial 
applies only to the proceeding before a tribunal and, thus, does not extend to 
the one which the tribunal has not yet seized with. But according to the ECtHR, 
the right to access to a court is an integral element of the right to a fair trial 
which should be construed particularly in the light of the object and purpose of 
the Convention and the fundamental values of the rule of law and democracy 
enshrined in its preamble.632
Other human rights tribunals have also consistently followed the same suite. 
According to the case law of the IACtHR, for instance, the general obligation to 
respect and guarantee human rights implies, inter alia, ‘the rights to be heard 
by the Courts’.633 Th e African Commission also interprets the notion of a fair 
trial as being analogous with the concept of access to appropriate justice and 
thus requires that a cause be heard by a court.634 Particularly implied in this 
conception of the right to a fair hearing is fi rst and foremost the right to have 
access to a tribunal. Th is, in turn, touches upon a variety of issues including the 
accessibility of the institution and relevant laws and the fairness of the process 
and system as a whole. Th us, while it should be obvious that the existence of an 
institution and the system thereof is an important precondition for the right to a 
fair hearing and hence access to justice, its accessibility is also crucial to those in 
need. Seen in this light, the right to a fair hearing requires or even presupposes 
the positive obligation of a State to remove physical, procedural, and fi nancial 
or other kinds of barriers which may in one way or another hinder, diminish 
or frustrate the right to access to justice. Generally stated, physical accessibility 
means the remedial institutions should be available within a reasonable proximity 
whereas fi nancial accessibility entails that the expenses and fees related to the 
institution and conduct of a proceeding should be reasonable and aff ordable.635
However, in relation to ESC rights cases, physical and fi nancial accessibility are 
oft en intertwined. Th e reason is that violations of these rights disproportionately 
631 Golder v. United Kingdom, paras 34–36.
632 Ibid paras 25–36.
633 Constitutional Court v. Peru, paras 66–85; the ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 227; Baena-
Ricardo et al v. Panama, paras 123ff ; IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in ESCR, p 34ff .
634 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt, paras 216–217.
635 See for instance, A/HRC/25/31, paras 16–24; Furlan and Family v. Argentina, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 31 August 2012, paras 228–230.
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aff ect persons living in desperate socioeconomic conditions. A typical example 
for this is the case of people residing in a rural community who, though they 
constitute a sheer majority in their respective countries (particularly in the 
Global South), have rare access to the justice systems. Th ey are oft en forced to 
travel for several hours or days in order to have the fi rst contact with a tribunal. 
Th is is further exacerbated by their poor economic conditions oft en characterised 
by a struggle for survival. In addition, accessibility is also a crucial factor in the 
context of persons aff ected by other conditions of vulnerability such as disability, 
social exclusion, gender, marginalisation and poverty. For instance, absence 
of physical infrastructure suitable to accommodate the needs of persons with 
disability has been an overdue problem in all parts of the world and the worst in 
poor nations.636 Violence against women too oft en goes unaddressed because of 
diff erent factors working together including lack of close-by institutions, poverty 
and underlying cultural factors.637 In Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, the African 
Commission criticised the Respondent State because the remedies were accessible 
only to wealthy persons who can aff ord a private lawyer but not to persons with 
(mental) disability and poor economic background.638 It is in the light of all such 
compelling factors that one should appreciate the signifi cance of physical and 
fi nancial accessibility of the remedial institutions in addressing socioeconomic 
and cultural rights.639 Tthe UN Secretary General’s report has rightly emphasised 
that the physical and fi nancial accessibility are very important factors in the 
realisation of the right to access to justice in socioeconomic and cultural rights.640 
Not only this, the remedial mechanisms should also be designed on the basis 
of equity (that is equality and fairness) and aff ordability taking particularly into 
account the needs of the vulnerable persons; otherwise, it is likely that it may fall 
foul of the requirement of non-discrimination.641 Th e right to a fair hearing itself 
can be analysed in terms of the following four elements it specifi cally gives rise to.
i) Simple, Clear and Objective Procedural Framework
One of the basic implications of the right to a fair hearing concerns accessibility 
of the procedural frameworks. Th is is to say that it requires the existence of clear, 
simple and objective procedural frameworks usable by every ordinary person in a 
society.642 Th e IACtHR considers that the right of all persons to simple and prompt 
636 A/HRC/25/31, paras 16–24.
637 See particularly IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 65, 28 December 2011), p 45ff .
638 Paras 35–38.
639 See for instance G.R v. Th e Netherlands, paras 46–55 (addressing, inter alia, the fi nancial 
barriers to access to court).
640 See A/HRC/25/31, 17.
641 A/HRC/25/31 para 32; Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, paras 35–38.
642 A/HRC/25/31 para 16ff .
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recourse or any other eff ective remedy against violation of a right constitutes one 
of the basic pillars of the human rights protection system and the rule of law in 
a democratic society.643 So mere existence of a system is not suffi  cient to say that 
there is a right to fair hearing; it should also be designed in such a way that any 
ordinary person interested to assert his or her right can make use of the system. 
Th is among other things entails the removal of unnecessary and inaccessible 
formality requirements and linguistic complications oft en engrained in judicial 
and other proceedings. Th is is particularly important in relation to the protection 
of the rights of vulnerable persons. ‘Th e right to reasonably simple proceedings 
especially benefi ts those who have been historically discriminated against or those 
who are in particular circumstances of vulnerability’. Th is requires the ‘States to 
avoid proceedings that are complex, overly legalistic or employ legal jargon or 
use languages that make it diffi  cult for disadvantaged people to understand the 
proceedings and its consequences and interfere with their ability to demand the 
fulfi lment of their rights’.644 Th e requirement of a fair hearing also implies that 
the procedural frameworks should be stated with suffi  cient clarity and certainty 
not just in theory but also in practice. In particular, individuals should be able 
to know with relative ease where, how and when to present their claims and 
reasonably expect an appropriate resolution to their arguable claims. As it will be 
seen shortly, this is also a crucial factor in assessing the promptness, suitability 
and eff ectiveness of a remedy as a whole. For instance, a vaguely formulated 
remedy or the one whose availability is doubtful may not qualify as a remedy at 
all for such remedies lack the requisite of accessibility and eff ectiveness.645
In essence, one of the critical impediments laying at the heart of the denial 
of access to justice in ESC rights has to do with an unjustifi able legislative and 
administrative complications in or, at times, prohibition against fi ling complaints 
before the relevant and competent judicial institution.646 For instance, in the 
Purhoit and Moore v. Gambia case, the African Commission found that there 
was no clear law providing for persons with disabilities the right to challenge 
and have a judicial review of the decision of medical experts of the assessment 
about their mental state leading to detention; in addition, it also found that some 
of the remedies said to be available were inaccessibility to the applicants for 
they were scattered in various laws and require skilled legal expertise to make 
643 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 260–264; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 
139–142; Furlan and Family, para 211; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
para 112.
644 A/HRC/25/31, para 33 cum n137.
645 McFarlane v. Ireland, para 107; Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, paras 32–38; Jawara v. Gambia, 
paras 34–35. Communication 334/06: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. 
Egypt, decision on merits, 9th Extra-Ordinary Session, 23 February to 3 March 2011, paras 87 & 
93.
646 See A/HRC/25/31, para 23; CESCR General Comment No. 9: Th e Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, adopted in its Nineteenth Session (1998).
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use of them.647 In another case, the African Commission also declared that in 
the presence of a legislation prohibiting an appeal from a military court to a 
regular court, the remedy available at the domestic level cannot be regarded as 
an eff ective remedy.648 Also, according to the IACtHR, a legislative or any other 
prohibition to have access to judicial recourse (especially when other mechanisms 
are ineff ective) is contrary to due process guarantees.649 As it underscored in the 
Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru case, there should not be any law in 
a democratic society which prohibits a contestation by any interested person of 
the eff ect of the application or interpretation of the law or denies a genuine and 
eff ective access to justice of those aff ected by the law in question for the right 
to access to justice ‘cannot be arbitrarily restricted, reduced or annulled’.650 In 
this case, the Court stated that lack of judicial protection and legal certainty due 
to the legislative prohibition of a legal action clearly made the victims not to 
have any recourse for several years.651 Accordingly, the violations they suff ered 
‘took place within the framework of practical and normative impediments to 
a real access to justice and a general situations of absence of guarantees and 
ineff ectiveness of the judicial institutions to deal with the facts such as the 
instant case’.652
Th e Airey case also sheds important light on the eff ect of indirect legislative 
hurdles to the right to access to justice. In this case, the existence of stringent, 
complicated and prohibitive procedural hurdle concerning judicial separation 
and divorce was one of the crucial factors in the complaint, in addition to of 
course the fi nancial constraints in meeting the requirements. It appears that this 
legislative hurdle was intentionally installed with the view to discourage divorce 
and separation. Th e level of complication was of such a nature that it could not 
be utilised by ordinary persons like Airey without assistance from a qualifi ed 
legal expert which the applicant could not aff ord owing to her personal economic 
situations (unemployed and dependent on state support for living). In eff ect, both 
the legal and factual conditions have resulted in lack of practical access to justice 
647 Paras 50–54.
648 See Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Egypt, paras 87–98.
649 ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, para 138. see also Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits and Reparations, Judgment of 26 May 2010, para 166.
650 Th e Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 24 November 2006, para 119 cum n70.
651 Ibid para 121.
652 Ibid para 129. Th us, having analysed all the prevailing legal and institutional circumstances 
underlying the violations of their right to access to justice, the Court concluded that because 
of the legal and practical impediments to a real access to justice and particularly because of 
‘the climate of legal uncertainty promoted by the norms that restricted complaints against 
the evaluation procedure and the eventual dismissal of the alleged victims, it is clear that the 
latter had no certainty about the proceeding they should or could use to claim the rights they 
considered violated, whether this was administrative-law, or by an action for amparo’. ibid. 
(emphasis in the original).
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to assert her right to respect for her private or family life.653 Th e same can be said 
with respect to most of the land-related violations of the rights of indigenous and 
tribal communities entertained in the Inter-American and African human rights 
systems. One of the crucial facts present in each case is the absence of clear and 
simple procedural and institutional mechanisms required to address their claims 
as well as an indirect, systematic prohibition of their right to access to justice due 
to lack of proper legal recognition of their specifi c circumstances. As a result, they 
oft en do not have a forum through which they can assert their ESC rights and 
seek remedies against infringement by their respective States or other agents.654 
Th us, it is obvious that the State’s action to install laws with the intention to make 
the right to access to justice diffi  cult or impossible and thereby to avoid scrutiny 
and accountability by and before an independent organ is simply a fl agrant and 
serious violation of its clear international obligation to respect and guarantee the 
full and eff ective enjoyment of human rights by everyone within its jurisdiction.655
A related problem that could be mentioned here is the case of abrupt and 
unjustifi ed changes to domestic legislations aimed at or having the eff ect of 
denying basic ESC rights. Th is, of course, is not an argument against a legal 
change or progression. It is rather to argue that a sudden change to a law with 
the eff ect of denying individuals their basic ESC rights and the opportunity 
to challenge its impact would certainly off end the requirement of objectivity 
signifi ed by the right to a fair hearing. Th us, although there may be no right to an 
established legal system, there is necessarily the right not to have one’s right and 
legal position abruptly removed without due process of law because the principle 
of legal certainty and objectivity are among the crucial elements of the rule of law 
standing at the back of the right to access to justice.656
ii) Fair and Equal Process
Th e right to a fair hearing also entails the State’s obligation to ensure the fairness 
of the process and equality of the parties. Generally speaking, the principle of 
procedural fairness and equality of arms are well-established principles of the 
653 Airey v. Ireland, paras 24–28. ‘Th e Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and eff ective […] Th is is particularly so of 
the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by 
the right to a fair trial.’ (internal citations omitted). ibid para 24.
654 For instance, this is particularly the central problem in the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador; Endorois v. Kenya.
655 See generally Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 127–146; ‘Five 
Pensioners’ v. Peru, paras 125–126; Dismissed Congressional Employee v. Peru, paras 122–
132.
656 Dismissed Congressional Employee v. Peru, paras 122–132; Constitutional Court v. Peru, paras 
66–85; ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, paras 93–121.
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right to a fair trial but their signifi cance to the protection of ESC rights is not 
properly appreciated. It is clear that these principles require that all parties to a 
given proceeding be treated in a fair and equal manner. Th us, the parties must 
enjoy the same right and opportunity throughout the proceedings in terms of, for 
instance, production, examination and rebuttal of evidences; access to necessary 
information or fi les; and correction of errors and disadvantages in the submission 
of relevant documents and so on. To this extent, the principles are closely related 
to and reinforce the requirement of the impartiality of those in charge of a given 
proceeding. In this regard, it should also be noted that the question of the fairness 
of a proceeding (judicial, administrative, etc.) refers to the entire process taken as 
a whole including an appellate and other subsequent procedures available within 
a legal system.657
In this regard, it is worth noting that the requirements fl owing from both 
principles are essentially formal. But with respect to ESC rights this strictly 
formal approach may, though crucial, not always hold true or be advantageous 
from a human rights point of view. In fact, it is even doubtful if this formal 
approach should be a rule or an exception in relation to these rights. Th ere are 
two major reasons for this view. First, as already been stated above, ESC rights 
claims usually involve vulnerable members of the society and, oft en, the principal 
condition of vulnerability behind such claims has more to do with poverty and 
related socioeconomic factors. Second, ESC rights complaints are oft en directed 
against the State who are not only in a better place to access relevant information 
and offi  cial documents but also have a great deal of infl uence in dictating what 
should be publicly accessed or not particularly with respect to certain relevant 
policy documents, decisions or other measures which, in turn, are normally 
technical to be understood by ordinary persons. Added to this problem is the 
complex nature of the issues, both in legal and factual terms, involved in the 
institution and litigation of a case concerning ESC rights claims. Th e eff ect of this 
is even greater if it is diffi  cult to access or produce certain relevant information 
indispensable to a given case but which is under the control of the authorities. 
Th us, the complex nature of the issues and lack of access to relevant information 
may eff ectively function as serious barrier to the right to access to justice. Th e 
intersection of these factors with other socioeconomic conditions of vulnerability 
would even create a far greater disadvantage for individuals concerned in 
terms of their ability to exercise their right to access to justice.658 For all these 
reasons, it is very diffi  cult to strictly follow the principle of the presumption of 
fairness and equality in disputes involving the State and vulnerable members 
of a society for whom the State also bears a special responsibility under human 
rights law. In this regard, the State is responsible to ensure that individuals are not 
657 ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 222ff ; Feldbrugge v. Th e Netherlands, paras 44–46; 
IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in ESCR, pp 48–52; A/HRC/25/31, paras 22–24.
658 See Airey v. Ireland, paras 24–26; Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, paras 50–54.
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disadvantaged and hence unfairly treated (in the substantive sense of the term) by 
lack of access to vital information or expertise to assert their ESC rights claims. 
Th is responsibility applies to its judicial and other organs which must take due 
care that neither the State’s nor the individual’s position unduly undermines the 
existence of substantive equality and fairness of the proceeding.
Th erefore, it has instead been suggested that there should be a presumption 
of inequality and hence shift ing of a burden of proof especially in a dispute 
concerned with a matter under the exclusive or partial control of the authorities.659 
In the case law, this has been referred to as the principle of reverse presumption 
or adverse inference. Human rights tribunals have relied on this principle 
when it comes to the production of necessary evidence under the knowledge 
or control of authorities. According to this approach, if an individual makes a 
prima facie allegation against the State in relation to violation of his or her rights, 
it falls upon the State concerned to establish the veracity of such allegation by 
adducing necessary evidence. If the State fails to adduce necessary evidence 
against the claim, the tribunals will normally consider as being established to 
the advantage of the individual. In this way, the presumption of inequality and 
reverse presumption against the State can play an important role in furthering 
the eff ectiveness of the right to access justice in cases concerning ESC rights 
given particularly the vulnerability of individuals, the dominant position of the 
State, the nature of issues and the structure of litigation.660 In addition, it is also 
possible that a tribunal may, out of its own motion, establish a commission for the 
purpose of producing expert evidence on the relevant dispute between parties. 
Judicial and other quasi-judicial practices, both national and international, 
clearly show that court-appointed experts or amicus curie briefs are oft en used 
for the purpose of clarifying and establishing certain facts essential to disposing 
a given case. Th ere is no reason why this approach cannot be applied in the 
adjudication of ESC rights claims. In fact, in the case of ESC rights litigation, the 
importance of experts or amicus curie briefs cannot be limited to the resolution of 
a specifi c dispute for they can also play a positive role in enhancing the standard 
of legitimacy of the outcomes for future State actions and in inducing some form 
of legislative or policy reforms.661
659 A/HRC/25/31, para 33 cum n 138: ‘In considering the principle of equality of arms, United 
Nations experts have signalled the importance of not presuming conditions of equality 
between the parties in a dispute when practice and experience have shown otherwise. Th e 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stressed the need to include measures 
to balance inequalities between parties, including provision for shift ing the burden of proof. 
Th e Committee has stated, in that regard, that “where the facts and events at issue lie wholly, 
or in part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities or other respondent, the burden of 
proof should be regarded as resting on the authorities, or the other respondent, respectively.”’ 
ibid.
660 See Fadeyeva v. Russia, para 131; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, paras 178–181.
661 For more on this, see generally, Christopher Tarver Robertson, ‘Blind Expertise’ (2010) 85 
New York University Law Review 174; Karen Butler Reisinger, ‘Court-Appointed Expert 
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iii) Th e Right to Legal Counsel (Legal Aid)
Th e right to legal counsel or legal aid is one of the basic constitutive elements of 
the right to eff ective access to justice in general and fair hearing in particular. 
Th is is seen as among the fundamental procedural rights of accused persons in 
criminal cases. Th e justifi cation for this essentially draws on the nature of the 
interest at stake (life, security and liberty of the individual) as well as on the de 
facto position of the State. It is seen as an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring 
both the formal and substantive equality of arms between the parties and the 
fairness of the proceeding.662
However, it is also argued above that the interests that ESC rights seek to 
guarantee are also equally vital especially when it concerns the critical material 
conditions of life such as health care for a patient in critical health condition 
and the survival in3come (basic necessities) for the poor. In fact, for some, such 
material conditions of life are oft en a matter of life and death. At the same time, 
the de facto position of the individual and the State in the general structure of 
ESC rights litigation is also quite similar to that of criminal litigation: as it is the 
case with the latter, the litigation is between the State and the individual where 
the State is de facto in a better position in every sense of the term. Th us, it should 
be said that the right to counsel in ESC rights claims can be as important as it is in 
criminal cases particularly in guaranteeing real equality of arms between parties 
and the fairness of the process thereby in avoiding those undue disadvantages and 
injustices that may result from the de facto position of the individual compared 
to that of the State. Th is is not to suggest that there should be an automatic 
entitlement to the right to counsel. As it is true with most of the rights, the right to 
counsel can and should be subject to certain conditions. Among other things, the 
identity of the person as to his or her age, economic status, social background and 
literacy level and the complexity of the case are all relevant factors in assessing 
whether one should be provided with some form of legal assistance or not. But 
as a matter of human rights, fairness and justice, it cannot be denied that the 
right to counsel also constitutes a crucial element of the right to access to justice 
in ESC rights claims. As stated by the IACtHR, the right to counsel or adequate 
representation is particularly crucial for the eff ective presentation and defence 
of the individuals’ vital socioeconomic interests and claims before a tribunal.663 
Th is is even more so in relation to those cases involving vulnerable persons who 
Panels: A Comparison of Two Models’ (1998) 32 Indiana Law Review; Daniel Peat, ‘Th e Use of 
Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice’ [2014] Th e British Yearbook 
of International Law 1.
662 See generally Guide on Article 6: Th e Right to Fair Trial (crim limb) (ECtHR, 2014), pp. 276–298; 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Egypt, paras 179–185; Abdel Hadi et al 
v. Sudan, paras 85–90.
663 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 108, not sure, 117–119 cum nn80–85.
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may not be able to assert their rights without some form of legal assistance from 
the government or other institutions.
Th is, in turn, establishes a vital linkage between the right to access to justice and 
other substantive ESC rights. Hence, it is arguable that a failure by the State to ensure 
the right to counsel may raise issues of discrimination on the basis of economic or 
social status in the exercise of the right to access to justice thereby engaging the 
positive obligation of the State.664 Th e principle is that the right to access to justice 
must be available to everyone on equal footing. Th is, in turn, implies that the State 
is obliged to take certain positive measures such as providing free or aff ordable 
legal assistance to those in need and to remove economic and other barriers to the 
right to access to justice. But if, for instance, individuals cannot avail themselves of 
their right to access to justice because of fi nancial reasons or poverty, then there is 
a clear case of discrimination on the basis of economic status which can hardly be 
justifi ed under human rights law. In this respect, it is not suffi  cient that formal laws 
or systems guaranteeing access to justice exist in theory, for these systems are, in 
fact, inaccessible and hence unusable by those without adequate fi nancial means.665
In this regard, the cases of Airey, and Purohit and Moore are important 
authorities in shedding some light on how lack of access to counsel may 
signifi cantly undermine the full and eff ective enjoyment of substantive ESC 
rights. In Airey, the facts of the case show that the applicant, at the material 
time, did not have adequate income to meet her subsistence needs let alone to 
aff ord a private lawyer. At the same time there was no free legal assistance or 
other affi  rmative measure available in her Country for cases like hers. Although 
the State argued that the applicant could have appeared in person before the 
relevant domestic court, the ECtHR noted that owing to the complexity of the 
issues involved therein her personal appearance could not have been a viable 
choice. Th e State also denied that it had a legal obligation to positively provide a 
free legal aid to the applicant but according to the Court the obligation to ensure 
eff ective access to courts (access to justice) directly fl ows from its undertaking 
to guarantee the eff ective respect for the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Convention. Th e Court underscored that this obligation not merely compels the 
State to abstain from arbitrary interference but may also require it to positively 
take some necessary practical measures. In this regard it is worth mentioning 
that the positive obligation to provide free legal assistance was only one part of 
the positive obligation to guarantee access to justice for the applicant; the State 
could have achieved similar result through other alternative measures such as 
removal of excessively restrictive procedural hurdles including the reduction of 
the standard of proof required in judicial separation and divorce proceedings.666 
664 See A/HRC/25/31, para 19 cum n74; IACoHR’s Report on Access to Justice in ESCR, pp 9–13; 
Guide on Article 6: Right to Fair Trial (civil limb) (ECtHR, 2013), paras 61–70.
665 A/HRC/25/31, para 22–24; Airey v. Ireland, paras 24–26; McFarlane v. Ireland, para 124; G.R v. 
the Netherlands, paras 46–55; Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, paras 50–54.
666 Airey v. Ireland, paras 24–28. See also G.R v. the Netherlands, paras 46–55.
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In Purohit and Moore, absence of free legal assistance for vulnerable persons was 
one of the reasons behind violation of their right to access to justice. Although the 
applicants wanted to contest the decision to detain them at a psychiatric institution, 
they were unable to do so because there was no automatic right to judicial review 
or appeal procedure and that some of the other available remedies were only 
accessible to wealthy persons.667 As noted earlier, in addition to their health 
conditions, the applicants were of poor economic and social background with no 
assistance whatsoever. As a result, they could not use other available avenues to 
challenge their detention and the conditions thereof without legal aid. But it was 
noted that only persons charged with ‘Capital Off ences’ were entitled free legal 
assistance from the Government.668 For this reason, the African Commission 
concluded that there was no eff ective remedy available for vulnerable persons like 
the applicants aff ected by such conditions as mental disability and poverty.669
iv) Transparent and Public Process
Th e fi nal point which can be identifi ed with the right to fair hearing is the right 
to have a transparent and public proceeding. In the context of access to justice, 
transparency is not just about the mere proceeding but also of the justifi cation 
for arriving on certain outcomes. Th is requires the tribunals to provide an 
adequate reason and explanation for the positions taken in a given decision. To 
this extent, it can be said that transparency is essentially about the quality of 
a decision. However, in relation to ESC rights, it is also part and parcel of the 
right to meaningful participation and accountability. In particular, it should be 
noted that the purpose of the right to access to justice is not merely limited to 
its immediate outcomes but also concern securing the non-recurrence of similar 
violations in the future. In addition, a transparent and open proceeding is also 
a form of public accountability of the State and its agencies. So, it is important 
that such proceedings be conducted openly so that everyone interested can have 
access to the process and outcomes and that everyone including the authorities 
could know the underlying normative and factual justifi cations supporting a 
judicial argument in a case. In this way, a transparent decision can contribute to 
the entrenchment and penetration of ESC rights within a given legal system.670 
Th ere may be some good reasons to avoid public proceeding of a human rights 
litigation in certain exceptional cases. But those common grounds of limitations 
as privacy, public morals or national security can hardly justify the private nature 
of the proceedings concerned with ESC rights claims. Accordingly, there should 
always be a strong presumption in favour of a transparent and public nature of the 
667 Paras 50–54 cum 72.
668 Ibid para 52.
669 Ibid paras 37–38, 53 & 72.
670 A/HRC/25/31, para 34.
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proceeding especially given the contribution of the public proceeding in ensuring 
the overall accountability the State and its offi  cials in the realisation of ESC rights 
in general. In other words, the State should be required to make a strong case as 
to why a given ESC rights litigation should not be conducted in public.
b) Competent, Impartial and Independent Organ
Th e second basic element of the right to access to justice concerns the nature, 
composition and organisation of the remedial institutions. Th us, the right 
to access to justice implies the existence of a competent, an independent and 
impartial organ entrusted with the power to make a fi nal determination on 
the complaints concerning the rights and obligations of the individuals and to 
provide an adequate remedy in case a violation is established. Th ese requirements 
refer both to the institution and the personnel of the remedial institution.671
Th e idea of competence relates to the mandate or power of the institution 
to address and make a fi nal determination on all the facts and merits of the 
issues involved in certain human rights complaints and to enforce its decisions 
against all persons and entities responsible for a given violation. Related to this 
is the competence (qualifi cation) of the personnel responsible for the eff ective 
functioning of the remedial institutions. In order to ensure the right to access 
to justice in practice, it is also essential the that State assigns qualifi ed personnel 
who have an adequate understanding of the issues and evidences and are 
therefore capable of settling a given human rights dispute. In this respect, the 
State has a positive obligation to provide judges with adequate, comprehensive 
and continuous training programmes on human rights in general and ESC rights 
in particular.672
Th e requirement of impartiality and independence are closely related to 
each other. Impartiality requires that individuals should be heard and treated 
objectively in presenting their complaints as well as throughout the entire 
proceeding. Hence, it is imperative that no prejudice or arbitrariness be allowed 
or tolerated in a case and that all decisions should be rendered in accordance with 
the available legal rules and facts.673 Independence concerns absence of any form 
of external pressure or infl uence on the institution and its personnel including 
direct or indirect political or administrative interference in the decision-making 
671 For instance, in the Golder v. United Kingdom, para 35, it was clearly underscored that the 
right to fair trial under Article 6 paragraph 1 of the ECHR does not just imply the right to any 
tribunal but to an impartial, independent and competent tribunal entrusted with the power to 
determine the rights and obligation of the individuals and can provide an eff ective redress. To 
this extent, it is said that the provision in question also regulates the organisation, composition 
and mandate of the tribunal in question.
672 A/HRC/25/31, para 27 nn 116–118.
673 See for instance, the ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, paras 199ff  (where the IACoHR put before 
the Court an argument regarding the arbitrary nature of domestic judicial proceedings).
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process. Human rights adjudications and remedies thereof should not be aff ected 
by fear, threat or any other factors from higher offi  cials of the State. Th is is so 
because, as stated elsewhere, the very purpose of adjudicating alleged violations 
of a right is to have a credible and independent organ monitoring the legal 
compliance of a State and its actors with its human rights obligations.674 Th is 
of course touches upon wide-ranging practical factors such as budgetary and 
functional independence of the institution from the executive organ of the State 
as well as the appointment and security of tenure of its personnel. In this regard, 
the existence of legislation is not suffi  cient per se. It is required that impartiality 
and independence of the remedial institutions and their personnel be guaranteed 
in practice as well.675
In ESC rights cases, the importance of these requirements is crucial particularly 
because it is the State’s act or omission in the area of its social, economic, 
administrative and policy programmes and performance which directly or 
indirectly comes under judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny. Sometimes, violations 
of ESC rights may in fact be due to deliberate actions or omissions of authorities. 
So, while a judicial scrutiny of such conducts can be seen as a sensitive issue, it is 
also a test not just of the independence and impartiality of the institution but also 
of the functioning of the rule of law and accountability system as a whole in the 
country concerned. Th is is because, as emphasised by the IACtHR, ‘the safeguard 
of the individual in the face of the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the State is the 
primary purpose of the international protection of human rights’ and this is even 
more the case when it directly or indirectly concerns the assessment of the actions 
or omissions of the authorities in question.676 For instance, lack of institutional 
independence of the judiciary and the personal independence and impartiality of 
the judges were among critical issues in several cases entertained by the IACtHR. 
For instance, in the Constitutional Court and Dismissed Congressional Employees 
cases, the Court stated that because of the general situation created by the actions 
of the Respondent State directly aff ecting the independence of the judiciary and 
judges, none of the remedies available to the applicants were eff ective but rather 
illusory.677 In the Dismissed Congressional Employees case, it was stated as one 
of the proven facts that the ‘independence and impartiality of the Constitutional 
Court, as a democratic institution guaranteeing the rule of law, were undermined 
by the removal of some of its justices, which violated erga omnes the possibility of 
exercising the control of constitutionality and the consequent examination of the 
674 ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, para 126ff ; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
paras 111–113; Constitutional Court v. Peru, paras 89–99.
675 A/HRC/25/31, para 28.
676 ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, para 126 cum nn 151–152 (citing, inter alia, Constitutional Court v. 
Peru, paras 89); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, merits, judgment of 25 November 2000, para 
191ff ); Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, paras 107ff .
677 Constitutional Court, paras 89–97; Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, para 107–132.
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adaptation of the State’s conduct to the Constitution’.678 According to the Court, 
the judiciary in the State party ‘lacked total and absolute independence from the 
Government’.679 Th is in turn, the Court noted, had ‘resulted in a general situation 
of absence of guarantees and the ineff ectiveness of the Courts to deal with the 
facts such as those of the instant case, as well as the consequent lack of confi dence 
in these institutions at the time’.680 Th us, the competence, independence and 
impartiality of the remedial institutions are decisive in ensuring the right to 
access to justice both in law and practice and hence the eff ective protection of ESC 
rights. Without these institutional guarantees being put in place, the protection 
of ESC rights simply becomes nothing but illusory.
c) Promptness
Th e principle of promptness implies the resolution of human rights complaints 
within a reasonable time framework. It has been well-recognised in the case 
law that time is one of the most important determinant factors of a fair trial 
particularly in cases concerning the life, well-being, security and liberty of 
a human being. As mentioned above and also to be seen below, in ESC rights 
claims, the life, dignity, survival and well-being of vulnerable persons are at stake 
because such complaints mostly concern such vital interests as access to food, 
health, water, housing and education. It is for this very reason that the principle 
of promptness, that is, timely disposal of ESC rights claims, should be seen as one 
of the most important elements of the procedural aspect of ESC rights regime. 
Stated diff erently, lack of promptness in ESC rights decision-making process will 
not only frustrate the whole system of access to justice but can also result in an 
irreparable damage to the life, dignity and well-being of the claimants. Th e UN 
Secretary General’s report on access to justice for ESC rights clearly appreciates 
this fact when it states that for ‘the fulfi lment of economic, social and cultural 
rights is oft en linked to the livelihood of rights holders, remedies require special 
diligence, celerity and expeditious decisions in order to be eff ective’.681 So the 
State has an utmost responsibility to make sure that claims involving vital 
socioeconomic interests are handled and resolved with exceptional due diligence 
implied by the principle of promptness.
To this end, human rights tribunals have particularly identifi ed four general 
factors or standards through which the reasonableness of the time taken in 
disposing a given human rights claim should be assessed. Th ese are the nature 
or complexity of a case, the procedural conduct of the parties including State’s 
authorities with relevant contact with a case, the nature of the right and interest at 
678 Para 109.
679 Ibid para 127.
680 Ibid paras 109–110 cum 127 & 129.
681 A/HRC/25/31, para 30 cum n126.
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stake and the adverse impact of the passage of time on the claimant(s).682 While 
these are important standards for assessing the due diligence of the conducts of 
the State and its remedial institutions, the specifi c signifi cance and implications of 
each of these elements is a matter to be determined in relation to the context of all 
the relevant circumstances in a given case. In this regard, it is specifi cally recognised 
in the case law that even when delay is foreseeable in a given proceeding on account 
of, for instance, the complexity involved in the case, the State concerned is bound 
to provide a provisional or preventive remedy aimed at safeguarding the life and 
dignity of the individuals especially the vulnerable persons.683 Th is is particularly 
important when the claim in issue concerns, for instance, the right to access to 
medical treatment, life-saving medicines, food, water, shelter, basic social security 
and assistance and education. In relation to this, the principal approach adopted 
in the case law is that the more serious impacts the passage of time will have on the 
parties, the more diligence and the shorter the time period the authorities should 
take to resolve the human rights dispute in question.684 It is also a well-established 
principle in the case law of the ECtHR that States must show exceptional diligence 
if what is at stake is fundamental to the parties in a given case.685 Th is is because in 
such cases the conditions of vulnerability threaten the life and dignity of human 
being and may result in unnecessary and irreparable damage to the individual 
concerned. Th e State bears a special responsibility to safeguard, as a matter of 
priority, the rights and interests of those vulnerable persons in a society.686
Seen in this light, the lack of due diligence and hence promptness has been 
one of the major reasons behind the violation of the right to access to justice 
and eff ective remedy in several cases. For instance, in Ximenes-Lopez, despite the 
nature of the right (life, dignity and health of a vulnerable person) and the gravity 
of the situation (death of the victim in a health care institution), the State party 
failed to discharge its duty of exceptional due diligence required by the urgency 
of the case which, in turn, was essentially due to the utter failure of the authorities 
to investigate the death of the victim as well as lack of due diligence from judicial 
authorities.687 Th e IACtHR noted that the judicial procedure in the Ximenes-Lopez 
case was fl awed with a combination of inactions and lengthy and unnecessary 
adjournments for a number of years without taking any measures whatsoever. For 
the Court, the case was neither complex to require extraordinary action nor could 
the conduct of the complainants justify excessive inactions or delays on the part 
682 Ibid, paras 30–31; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 132–138; Furlan and 
Family v. Argentina, para 152 cum 156–159, 164–175, 179–190, 194–205; Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, paras 65–98; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 
82–98; Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, para 191; Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, paras 195–205.
683 A/HRC/25/31, para 9.
684 Furlan and Family v. Argentina, para 194; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 136.
685 See generally Guide on Article 6: Right to Fair Trial (civil limb) (ECtHR, 2013), paras 270–302.
686 Furlan and Family v. Argentina, para 196.
687 Paras 189–106.
214 Intersentia
Part Two. Th e Legal Obligations of the State under ESC Rights
in the Light of International ESC Rights Jurisprudence
of the judicial authorities.688 Th e same was true in the case of Furlan and Family. 
Th is case concerned the right to health and medical treatment and well-being of 
a minor who was rendered disabled at the age of fourteen due to a fault attributed 
to the State party. In this case, the Court, reiterating its earlier judgments and that 
of the ECtHR, particularly emphasised the adverse impact that failure to dispose 
the claim for compensation has had on the life, well-being and integrity of the 
victim as well as on the well-being of the victim’s family.689 Th e authorities were 
fully aware of the gravity of the victim’s suff erings and yet they failed to provide 
the victim with timely medical treatment. Nor were there any mechanisms to 
remedy the defects and resultant damages to his health particularly on account 
of the failure of the relevant proceedings. Th ere was no due diligence taken by 
authorities required by the special vulnerability of the victim.690
In almost all of the complaints concerning indigenous communities, lack of 
due diligence on the part of the authorities (both administrative and judicial) to 
resolve the claims within a reasonable time was one of the major factors resulting 
in the violation of the right to eff ective remedy and other substantive ESC rights. 
As will also be seen in the next chapters, although the central element of these 
complaints was the right to restitution of their ancestral territories, it was obvious 
that their claims were also intimately and immediately linked with matters very 
essential for the life, survival and development of their respective members and 
community as a whole. Th is, in turn, obviously engages the positive obligation 
of the State to take necessary measures including the adoption of provisional 
measures to address the vital needs of the respective communities and those 
vulnerable members in need of special protection and care such as minors, 
elderlies, women and those who had fallen ill. On the contrary, the conduct of the 
authorities in many of these cases were characterised by such terms as passivity, 
inactivity, little diligence and lack of responsiveness, lack of sensitivity, and 
systematic and protracted delay; the authorities were in fact said to be taking 
deliberate measures with the view to obstruct or systematically delay or frustrate 
the communities’ right to access to justice even though in many of these cases 
their situations were subjected to the state of emergency.691
d) Suitable and Adequate Remedy
Th e suitability and adequacy of a remedy are also recognised in the case law as 
essential constitutive elements of the right to access to justice. In abstract, a given 
remedy is said to be both suitable and adequate if it is able to guarantee the result 
it is designed to achieve. In the context of the right to access to justice, suitability 
688 Paras 195 cum 199. See also ‘Five Pensioners v. Peru, para 141.
689 Paras 152–205 (examining each of the elements of reasonable time frame).
690 Furlan and Family v. Argentina, para 204.
691 See for instance, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 134; Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 85–89.
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and adequacy are inextricably related to each other. Both are also regarded as 
important determinants of the eff ectiveness of a remedy: a remedy which is 
unsuitable or inadequate cannot be regarded as eff ective by any standard. Th is is 
the main reason why these two elements are oft en mentioned together and also 
equated with the notion of eff ectiveness of a remedy both in the literature and 
case law. ‘Th e right to eff ective remedy entails that the remedy must be capable 
of providing adequate reparations for the violations’.692 But it is generally worth 
noting that suitability specifi cally refers to the appropriateness and practical 
relevance of a remedy to a specifi c violation in question whereas adequacy refers 
to whether a remedy is suffi  cient enough to prevent a violation and proportional to 
fully redress (restore, repair) the damage suff ered by the individual, and whether 
it is capable of guaranteeing the non-recurrence of similar violations in the future 
and thereby ensuring the full and free enjoyment of the right concerned. Th us, 
taken together, suitability and adequacy determine the eff ectiveness of a remedy 
and of the very essence of the right to access to justice in general.693
In essence, therefore, these principles make clear that a given remedy may 
not always be suitable and adequate for all kinds of human rights violations 
and hence there should not be a one-size-fi ts all approach to remedies; nor can 
its mere existence in a certain legislative and institutional form always satisfy 
the requirement of adequacy and suitability. Generally speaking, a remedy can 
be provided through legislative, judicial or administrative mechanisms and its 
contents may vary from preventive measures to material compensation (both 
fi nancial and in kind), restitution, just satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition (injunction).694 It is in fact less relevant as to the kind of mechanisms 
the State establishes (administrative, judicial or legislative) for redressing human 
rights violations. What is more important is rather the extent to which a given 
mechanism can be regarded as suitable in establishing a meaningful institutional 
accountability of the State concerned for its acts or omissions resulting in 
human rights violation and accordingly provide an adequate reparation for the 
victim(s) and thereby guarantee its full and eff ective enjoyment.695 Th us, the 
suitability and adequacy of a remedy in terms of its form, content and scope 
692 A/HRC/25/31, at para 11; Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, paras 63–66; Jawara v. Gambia, 
paras 31–35.
693 McFarlane v. Ireland, para 107–108; G.R v. the Netherlands, para 44; Vintman v. Ukraine 
(Application No. 28403/05), merits, judgment of 23  October 2014 paras, 66, 110 & 115–116; 
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland (Application No. 5809/08), Judgment 
of 26 November 2013 [not fi nal due referral to GC], paras 123–125; Esmukhambetov and Others 
v. Russia (Application No. 23445/03), Judgment of 29 March 2011, paras 97 & 158–159; Aksoy v. 
Turkey, paras 95 & 98; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 139–168. See 
also Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 61ff ; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, para 113; Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, paras 62–63; Manuel 
Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, paras 136–137.
694 A/HRC/25/31, paras 11–12.
695 See Vintman v. Ukraine, para 110; Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, paras 139; A/HRC/25/31 
para 13.
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are essentially matters that should be assessed relative to the context in which it 
operates including, inter alia, the nature of a right in question, its importance to 
the person(s) and the degree of violation thereto and the identity of the person(s) 
aff ected, that is, whether he or she is a minor, persons with disabilities and other 
vulnerable persons.
Having said this, lack of suitability and adequacy also accounts as among the 
major reasons behind the State’s violation of the obligation to ensure eff ective 
remedy. For instance, in one case, the ECtHR held the following in responding to 
the State’s contention of lack of exhaustion of domestic remedy by the applicant. 
According to the Court, the ‘only remedies which [should be] exhausted are those 
that relate to the breach alleged and are available and suffi  cient’. Interestingly, 
it emphasised that ‘existence of such remedies must be suffi  ciently certain not 
only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite 
accessibility and eff ectiveness’. And per the Court, the burden is on the State to 
show with clear evidence that the remedy available within its domestic system 
satisfi es the conditions of availability, certainty, accessibility and eff ectiveness, 
that is, being suitable and adequate.696 An assertion of or a reference to the 
existence of some form of abstract or vague remedies may not be compatible with 
the positive obligation of the State to eff ectively ensure the practical enjoyment of 
human rights within its domestic legal system. It is particularly incumbent upon 
the State concerned to show that such remedies also function in practice.697
In this regard, there are several cases in which violations were found despite 
the existence of formal remedies at the national level. For instance, López Ostra 
and Fadeyeva, there was no dispute that the applicants have had available to them 
various kinds of formal remedies (legislative and institutional). Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR found that because of combinations of factors attributable to the respective 
national authorities including lack of sensitivity to the interests of the individuals, 
unresponsiveness of the offi  cials and the narrow construction of States’ human 
rights obligations by the national tribunals, those remedies were neither suitable 
nor eff ective to redress substantive complaints asserted by the applicants. In López 
Ostra, the domestic tribunals held the view that the Convention did not impose 
a positive obligation on the State to protect her private and family life from the 
nearby polluting plant.698 In Fadeyeva, which was more or less similar with the 
former, aft er series of domestic legal battles, the only remedy the applicant could 
obtain was nothing other than to be placed on a waiting list which was in fact 
declared to be of no practical value whatsoever.699 According to the ECtHR, in 
both of these cases, the appropriate and adequate remedy could have been either 
the relocation of the applicants from the pollution sites, regulation of the conducts 
696 McFarlane v. Ireland, para 107.
697 Vintman v. Ukraine, para 110 & 115–116.
698 For domestic court’s view, see for instance, López Ostra v. Spain, para 11, 14 & 15.
699 Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 27, 28 & 63.
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of the plants or adequate pecuniary compensations for the damages they suff ered 
as a result of the resultant pollution.700
Th e same can be said in relation to the case of Oyal. In this case, the ECtHR 
acknowledged that the applicants have had formal remedies but given the extent 
of the suff ering of the victim and the consequent costs of his continued treatment 
for his family due to the faults directly attributable to the State, the Court declared 
that the redress aff orded to the applicants was far from satisfactory in the light 
of the State’s positive obligation to protect the right to life. It was neither suitable 
nor adequate in order to be considered as eff ective. In the opinion of the Court, 
the most appropriate remedy in the circumstance of the case should have been for 
the domestic courts to have ordered the payment of all treatment and medication 
expenses of the victim to be borne by the State during his lifetime, in addition to 
the non-pecuniary damage.701
Th ere are numerous cases in which the IACtHR declared violations due to 
the ineff ectiveness of certain formally available remedies. For instance, having 
examined several forms of remedies said to be available to the victims in the 
cases of ‘Five Pensioners’, Dismissed Congressional Employees and Constitutional 
Court, the Court declared that they were both ineff ective and illusory especially 
due to the subsequent norms which rendered them practically useless. As the 
Court observed, the victims in these cases were simply put in the situation of legal 
uncertainty as far as the right to seek an appropriate remedy to their infringed 
rights was concerned.702 It goes without saying that a resort to an ineff ective and 
illusory remedy is nothing but a useless formality. Th at is why it is imperative for 
the State to ensure the eff ective functioning of the remedies in practice. Th e Court 
emphasises that a remedy ‘must be truly eff ective in establishing whether there 
has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress’ to those in need.703 
Among many authorities, its judgement in the Sarayaku case clearly expresses the 
Court’s position on this point. Th us,
the Court has indicated that Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in general 
terms, the obligation of the States to guarantee eff ective judicial remedies for acts that 
violate fundamental rights. When interpreting the text of Article 25 of the Convention, 
the Court has held on other occasions that the obligation of the State to provide a 
judicial remedy is not satisfi ed by the mere existence of courts or formal procedures 
or even the possibility of having recourse to the courts. Rather, the State has the duty 
to adopt affi  rmative measures to guarantee that the judicial remedies it provides are 
truly eff ective in establishing whether or not a human rights violation has occurred 
700 López Ostra v. Spain, paras 56–58; Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 88, 123 & 134 (and generally para 
116ff ).
701 See Oyal v. Turkey (Application No. 4864/05), Judgment of 23 March 2010, paras 67–77.
702 ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, paras 35–138; Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, para 129; 
Constitutional Court v. Peru, paras 93 & 96–97.
703 ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 235 cum n44.
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and providing redress. Th us, the Court has declared that the inexistence of an eff ective 
remedy for violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a violation 
of the Convention by the State Party in which this situation occurs.704
Th e suitability and adequacy of a remedy and hence its practical eff ectiveness can 
be undermined by several factors. Here, in addition to those already discussed 
under other elements of the right to access to justice, lack of sensitivity to the 
specifi c contexts and needs of a person or group of persons can be mentioned 
especially in terms of its signifi cance for the protection of the ESC rights of 
vulnerable persons. In fact, it can be said that the requirement of sensitivity on 
the part of the State authorities including the judiciary is the most important 
factor determining their responsiveness to a given human rights violation. Here, 
it is worth noting that to be sensitive means to take human rights claims and all 
the relevant circumstances of the case (the nature of claim, its urgency or gravity, 
the identity of parties concerned) very seriously and to accordingly respond to 
the claim by taking necessary appropriate and proportional measures to avert the 
situation and to eff ectively redress the violation(s) thereof. It is particularly one of 
the decisive factors in assessing the principle of promptness.
In this regard, we have already seen the impact of lack of sensitivity on the 
part of the State organs in several of the cases discussed so far. To stress the point 
further, sensitivity as an element of suitability and adequacy of a remedy requires 
the State to take due account of the specifi c circumstances and needs of, in 
particular, vulnerable persons. Th ere is no question that all human rights claims 
should be responded to within a reasonable period of time but it is even more 
so when the right in question threads on vital and urgent needs of vulnerable 
persons who, by virtue of their specifi c situation, may suff er an irreparable harm 
to their life, dignity and well-being.705 Not only this, sensitivity to the background 
situations leading to ESC rights violation is also very important in designing a 
suitable (an appropriate and relevant) remedy for it compels the authorities to 
closely look at the nature and structure of the problems resulting in the violations 
and, if necessary, to review the adequacy of the reparation in place. In particular, 
in determining the suitability and eff ectiveness of a given remedy, it is necessary 
that a question be asked as to whether the root-cause of a given violation has to 
do with structural problems aff ecting a large number of persons or is simply an 
isolated individual case. Remedies designed to provide an individual redress for 
violations rooted in structural, systemic defect may not be regarded as a suitable 
704 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 261 cum nn 318–319.
705 See for instance, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 63 & 93–98 (the Court 
reaffi  rming its established position on the kind of obligation that Article 25 of ACHR imposes 
taken together with Articles 1(1), 2 and 8 of the same); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
v. Nicaragua, para 113; Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, para 136; 19 Merchants v. Colombia, para 191; 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 83–102; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, paras 140–168; Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 262; Oyal v. Turkey, para 89.
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and eff ective remedy because it is neither appropriate (does not address the major 
issue behind the violation but merely treats the symptoms) nor adequate for it can 
hardly guarantee the non-recurrence of the violation in the immediate future. 
In relation to this, we should note that a ‘failure to comply with State obligations 
in the fi eld of economic, social and cultural rights oft en aff ects groups of right 
holders in a similar situation, allowing for collective or group remedies is, in 
many cases, indispensable for the realization of the right to eff ective remedy’.706 
Th us, designing appropriate and adequate remedies for violations of ESC rights 
requires sensitivity to the background conditions leading to such violations.
e) Prompt and Eff ective Compliance
Th e fi nal element worth mentioning is the principle of prompt and eff ective 
compliance with reparation orders given by the competent remedial institutions. 
Th is is also referred to as the principle of enforcement or execution of judgement. 
Undoubtedly, the State’s compliance with the decisions of a remedial organ is 
a crucial aspect of the right to access to justice. In fact, it is the very object and 
purpose of the right to access to justice and as such an integral element of the 
right to fair trial.707 Hence, without prompt and eff ective compliance with a given 
ruling redressing a human rights violation, the idea of the right to access to justice 
would lose its essence. In addition to this, the principle of compliance is also 
directly connected to the practical test of independence, integrity and power of 
the remedial institutions and, ultimately, it is a fundamental constitutive element 
and proof of the eff ective functioning of the rule of law in the state concerned. 
Promptness should be understood here as implying a reasonable time period to 
be assessed in the light of the relevant factors mentioned above, in particular, 
the nature of the right violated and its importance to the party, the gravity of 
the violation in question and the urgency of the need aff ected through the act of 
violation. Eff ective compliance entails that the integrity of the redress (reparation) 
aff orded to the victim of a human rights violation should be maintained: it 
requires that the implementation of a reparation order must be complete, perfect 
and comprehensive.708
706 A/HRC/25/31, para 8.
707 A/HRC/25/31, para 35 cum n142.
708 Oyal v. Turkey, para 74ff ; Furlan and Family v. Argentina, para 210ff ;‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, 
para 138ff ; In Furlan and Family, the Court clearly referred to it as the principle of execution 
of judgement, also outlining the standards that should be followed in this respect (raised in 
connection with the principles as judicial protection, due process, legal certainty, judicial 
independence, and the rule of law). Drawing on the case law of ECtHR, it stated that for the 
full eff ectiveness of a judgment, its implementation must be complete, perfect, comprehensive 
and without delay. ibid para 210 cum n348. According to the Court, the question of the 
due implementation of the judgment, essentially an integral element of the guarantees 
and consequent to the obligations enshrined in Articles  1(1), 2, 8 and 25, are constitutive 
elements or directly connected to the independence and integrity of the judicial or other 
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It should be emphasised that the relationship between prompt and eff ective 
compliance, the rule of law and the denial of access to justice is fundamental 
especially in the context of the protection of ESC rights. Th is is so because, as 
noted above, most ESC rights claims directly or indirectly involve a review of the 
State’s actions and omissions including, to a certain extent, its socioeconomic and 
policy programs. So, ESC rights claims bring the performance of the government 
and its agencies under direct scrutiny which, for some offi  cials, can be seen as 
personal trial. Th is, in turn, tests the practical existence of judicial independence 
and the rule of law at two levels. Th e fi rst, as already discussed, is at the level of the 
examination of the merits of the case. Th e second is at the level of ensuring prompt 
and eff ective compliance with the reparation order against the government or 
entity responsible for the violation. Accordingly, the lack of compliance with 
the reparation order, including through unnecessary and systematic delay, not 
only creates frustration of the right to access to justice of a given victim but also 
undermines the eff ectiveness of the entire human rights protection system and 
the very foundation of the due process of law and the rule of law in a democratic 
society. Th e reason for this is that,
a fi nal judgment (res judicata) provides certainty concerning the right or dispute 
examined in the specifi c case and, therefore, one of its eff ects is the requirement 
or obligatory nature of compliance. Th e proceedings should lead to achieving the 
protection of the right recognized in the judicial ruling, by the proper application of 
that ruling. Consequently, the eff ectiveness of the judgments and the judicial orders 
depends on their execution. Anything to the contrary would entail the denial of the 
right concerned.709
Hence, without State’s prompt and eff ective compliance with the judgements 
of human rights tribunals and the reparation orders thereof, the right to access 
remedial institutions. Accordingly, it is imperative that the independence of the judicial 
order be guaranteed and that timely execution of their judgements be ensured without any 
form of interference or delay from other branches of the government and that the binding 
and obligatory nature of the decisions of last resort also be guaranteed. ibid para 211. Th at 
the judicial decisions are taken seriously by everyone concerned and ensure their prompt 
executing without hindering the scope, content and purpose of the decision is the principal 
foundation and guarantee of the system based on the rule of law and judicial integrity. ibid.
709 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 263. In ‘Five Pensioners’ case, for instance, the Court noted that 
there was clear evidence of non-compliance by the Government of Peru with several domestic 
rulings in violation of both the substantive and procedural rights including the right to judicial 
protection. As noted by the Court, compliance with the rulings of the judiciary was merely 
discretionary to the relevant Peruvian authorities; the judiciary did not have a mechanism to 
enforce its judgements against the relevant authorities implied in its rulings. It stressed that 
lack of compliance with the decisions of the relevant remedial institution, literally translates 
itself as denial of justice by the State in practical transgression of its international obligation 
to respect and ensure the full and eff ective enjoyment and exercise of all the rights it has 
undertaken to guarantee for everyone within its jurisdiction (ibid). ‘Five Pensioners’ v. Peru, 
paras 138 & 141.
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to justice is simply an empty and illusory notion. Th e eff ectiveness of the entire 
human rights protection system in fact depends on the degree to which the State 
takes the rulings of the tribunals establishing human rights violations seriously 
and complies with its obligation to eff ectively execute the judgements in due 
time. In relation to ESC rights in particular, lack of eff ective compliance with 
the judgements of tribunals should be taken very seriously as it is not only the 
question of the rule of law and democratic accountability but also of fundamental 
social justice especially given the fact that, as repeatedly argued above, such claims 
usually refl ect certain existing background socioeconomic injustices aff ecting 
a great deal of persons or group of persons as opposed to isolated individual 
problems existing at a given point in time.
6.4. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
Th e rich body of case law from across international jurisdictions clearly establish 
that the right to access to justice is an integral element of the State’s generic human 
rights obligation to respect and ensure the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of 
all human rights within its jurisdiction. Th e right to access to justice is not only 
indispensable for the eff ective protection of human rights but also a practical 
expression of the existence of the rule of law and democratic values within a 
given legal system. It is a fundamental procedural right providing for the right 
to assert an arguable claim before and obtain an eff ective redress from an organ 
entrusted with a remedial power. Although there is no evidence in the case law 
(nor in human rights law) that there should be a specifi c form of organ entrusted 
with the remedial power, it is required that the organ and its procedure should 
be designed in terms of the bundles of basic procedural and substantive elements 
of the right to access to justice. In this regard, the principal approach in the case 
law is that the State is obliged to guarantee this right for all persons with arguable 
claim concerning an alleged violation of their rights regardless of the nature of 
the institution or proceeding concerned.
Th e elements of the right to access to justice discussed above essentially apply 
to all human rights but this Chapter has argued for a contextual treatment of 
each of the elements in relation to the State’s obligation to realise the inherent 
material conditions of life. Th us, having carefully examined each of the elements 
and their implications, it is concluded that there is a need to take a more cautious 
and proactive approach in applying these elements into the adjudication of ESC 
rights. Th e reason is that the adjudication of ESC rights oft en concerns the claim 
against the State by vulnerable persons who oft en suff er from multiple forms of 
marginalisation, discrimination, exclusion and structural poverty resulting in one 
way or another from the choices and decisions taken by the State itself. A narrow 
and formal application of each of these core elements of the right to access to 
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justice may therefore result in frustrating the very interest that the right to access to 
justice seeks to protect in the fi rst place. For instance, it was argued that the State’s 
obligation to provide an accessible procedural framework should be construed 
as also implying the special positive obligation of the State to ensure that those 
individuals in need are either exempted from the cost of litigation or are provided 
with free legal aid. It was also shown that, given the dominant position of the State 
and its exclusive control on some decisively relevant information and evidence as 
well as the vulnerable position of the individuals concerned, the right to fair and 
equal process should be supported by the principle of reverse presumption, the 
presumption of inequality of the parties and the appointment of experts by the 
tribunals concerned.
Overall, the contextual treatment of the essential elements of the right to 
access to justice has indicated the following three points. First, they directly 
or indirectly engage the positive obligations of the State to take necessary and 
special care to make sure that the strict procedural application of the principles 
would not result in destroying the very essence and purpose of the right to access 
to justice. Second, they require the State to be sensitive and responsive to the 
needs and interests of the specially vulnerable individuals in a given case. Th ird, 
they also compel the State to ensure and guarantee the principle of the rule of law 
and democratic accountability by promptly and eff ectively complying with the 





Accountability is both an essential ingredient and the ultimate objective of all 
human rights. As Hunt (the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health) 
repeatedly emphasised, without eff ective system of ‘accountability human rights 
can become no more than window-dressing’. According to Hunt, in which ever 
socioeconomic and political context they are applied, accountability remains to 
be the core essence of the eff ective protection and realisation of human rights, or 
else, they would risk to be left  to the unfettered discretion of national authorities 
contrary to the very object and purpose of international human rights norms.710 
Accountability is an ubiquitous term especially in the academic writings focusing 
on public administration, political science, administrative, constitutional and 
international (human rights) law. However, there is no agreement on its specifi c 
meaning and implications nor will this Chapter engage in its conceptual debate. 
Consistent with the overall aim of this Part of the study, the purpose of this 
Chapter is to discuss how international human rights courts and monitoring 
bodies have dealt with the question of the State accountability for the realisation of 
ESC rights. For the reasons to be explained shortly, the realisation of the material 
conditions of life raises particularly complex issues with the accountability of the 
State. So, the specifi c concern of this Chapter is to discuss the justifi cation and 
implications of the human rights accountability of the State. Th e cases discussed 
in this Chapter particularly distinguish between individual (subjective) and 
institutional (objective) form of accountability and establish the latter as the 
central aspect of international human rights monitoring system.
710 See for instance, UN Doc. A/63/263, para 8. ‘Whether human rights are applied to development, 
poverty reduction, trade, health systems, neglected diseases, maternal mortality, HIV/ AIDS 
or anything else, they require that accessible, transparent and eff ective mechanisms of 
accountability be established’.
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7.2. THE CONCEPTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
But fi rst it is important to introduce its general conceptual notion. Accountability 
is a broad normative concept with ‘ever-expanding’ meanings and implications.711 
In fact, scanning through diff erent academic writings seems to give the impression 
that its meaning and implications vary with the specifi c purpose and context 
in which it is raised or discussed. Sometimes it is used with the sense of (or as 
interchangeable with) responsibility, public explanation (transparency), liability, 
bureaucratic (administrative) control, transparency, (public, open, democratic) 
dialogue or deliberation, or bearing shame and blame in public for or in relation 
to a given act or omission.712 However, there is a general agreement that the 
core concept of accountability presupposes the existence of relationship (formal, 
informal, moral) between two parties whereby one party holds a power to (or 
is entitled to) demand from another party to account for its action or omission 
(performance) in relation to certain task(s) assigned to the latter. Th is shows that 
the accountability relationship is predicated upon the duty of one party to execute 
(implement, perform) a given task or set of tasks with the view to achieve a certain 
result(s), objective(s) or outcomes in accordance with pre-established procedures 
and performance standards and the power (right, entitlement) of the other party 
711 Richard Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public 
Administration 555.
712 See, for instance, Jonathan GS Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the 
Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”’ (2005) 65 Public Administration Review 
94; Anna Grear and Burns H Weston, ‘Th e Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency of 
Universal Corporate Accountability: Refl ections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape’ (2015) 15 
Human Rights Law Review 21; Federico Fabbrini, ‘Th e European Court of Human Rights, 
Extraordinary Renditions and the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross 
Human Rights Violations Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism’ (2014) 14 Human Rights 
Law Review 85; Helen Potts, Accountability and the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (University of Essex Human Rights Centre 2008); Peter Newell and Joanna Wheeler 
(eds), Rights, Resources and Politics of Accountability (Zed Books 2006); Siri Gloppen, Roberto 
Gargarella and Elin Skaar, ‘Introduction: Th e Accountability Function of the Courts in New 
Democracies’ in Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (eds), Democratization and 
the Judiciary: Th e Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies (Frank Cass 2004); 
Richard Mulgan, ‘Th e Processes of Public Accountability’ (1997) 56 Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 25; Mulgan (n 711); Burt Perrin, ‘Bringing Accountability up to Date 
with the Realities of Public Sector Management in the 21st Century’ (2015) 58 Canadian 
Public Administration / Administration Publique Du Canada 183; Gisela Hirschmann, 
‘Guarding the Guards: Pluralist Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
Organisations’ (2019) 45 Review of International Studies 20; Jenny M Lewis, ‘Individual and 
Institutional Accountability: Th e Case of Research Assessment’ (2015) 73 Australian Journal 
of Public Administration 408; Jonathan Kuyper, Karin Backstrand and Heike Schroeder, 
‘Institutional Accountability of Nonstate Actors in the UNFCCC: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ 
(2017) 34 Review of Policy Research 88; Anders Hanberger, ‘Democratic Accountability in 
Decentralised Governance 1’ (2009) 32 Scandinavian Political Studies 1; Kate Macdonald, ‘Th e 




to hold the former accountable for the achievement of the goal(s) against the 
prescribed procedures and performance standards.713
Based on this description, it is possible to distinguish between diff erent forms 
or types of accountability. For example, based on the degree of control implied 
in the relationship, it is possible to distinguish between strong and weak (loose) 
form of accountability; based on the mechanism governing the relationship, 
one can diff erentiate between political, democratic, legal, professional, social 
and ethical form of accountability; and, based on the nature of accountability 
bearer, it is possible to distinguish between individual (subjective, personal) and 
institutional (objective) accountability. Th e merits in the analysis of each form or 
type of accountability depends on the purpose it is purported to serve. Th ere is 
no doubt that for the eff ective realisation of human rights the combination of the 
diff erent forms of accountability has important role to play. However, given the 
overall objective of this Part and specifi c purpose of this Chapter, the concern here 
is the strong sense of accountability signifi ed by international human rights law 
and jurisprudence in which the institutional accountability of the State occupies 
the central place. Th is strong sense of the State accountability, in turn, draws on 
the traditional narrow sense of accountability.714 In its traditional narrow sense, 
the core meaning of accountability entails a hierarchical relationship in which 
the party entrusted with the power (authority) is justifi ed to rightfully request 
an explanation or a justifi cation about the steps taken and the performance 
thereof from the party entrusted with certain task(s). Th e authority holder uses 
information (accounts) gained through the process to monitor and evaluate 
the performance of the party entrusted with the task, rectify the problems and 
sanction the failures thereof. To this end, it has the power of inquiry, investigation, 
monitoring, evaluation and sanction the agent’s performance against the 
procedures and specifi ed expectations.715
In international human rights law, this accountability relationship refers to the 
relationship between the State and individuals whereby the former is obliged to 
respect and ensure the eff ective enjoyment of all human rights recognised within 
its jurisdictions.716 Th e right-holders are entitled to make a demand on the State 
that these rights be duly realised and the State bears the overall responsibility to 
put in place the systems or mechanisms through which individuals can demand 
713 And the variation in the literature results from the interpretation of the elements of the core 
concepts in the defi nition and the nature or model of accountability and the mechanisms and 
consequences thereof.
714 Th is view was explained in detail and defended by, inter alia, Mulgan (n 711). But see Perrin 
(n 712).
715 Perrin (n 712) 184ff ; Hirschmann (n 712) 22; Lewis (n 712) 408–409; Kuyper, Backstrand and 
Schroeder (n 712) 89; Hanberger (n 712) 3–6; Macdonald (n 712) 427–428; Mulgan (n 711).
716 See Who Will Be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
(OHCHR and Centre for Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 2013) (hereaft er, OHCHR, 
Who Will Be Accountable?), pp ix-x & 10–12. See generally A/HRC/14/39, paras 32ff .; Fredman 
(n 30) 103–113.
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justifi cations, rectifi cations and sanctions for failure to give eff ect to the rights in 
issue. In short, the idea of human rights accountability involves a complex system 
for governing the process through which the eff ectiveness of the State’s human 
rights legal, institutional and policy measures are formally justifi ed and failures 
are corrected and sanctioned.
Th is sense of human rights accountability is well-recognised by many 
authors.717 For instance, according to Potts, accountability is described as a 
process which requires the government to show, explain and justify how it has 
discharged its obligations and through which rights-holders understand how 
it has discharged its obligations as well as to vindicate their rights to eff ective 
remedies if it is established that it has failed to do so. To this end, Potts identifi es 
two dimensions of accountability. On the one hand, accountability is said to have 
a prospective (proactive) dimension in the sense that ‘it draws attention to its 
potential to improve performance: to identify what works, so it can be repeated, 
and what does not, so it can be revised’. On the other hand, it is also said to have a 
retrospective dimension in the sense that ‘it draws attention to the remedies that 
should be available when there has been failure on the part of government to fulfi l 
its obligations’.718
For the OHCHR, the principle of accountability is recognised as one of 
the seven core international human rights principles. In fact, it considers 
accountability as one of the core fundamental human rights principles fl owing 
from the values of human dignity and non-discrimination.719 It also conceives 
accountability as signifying a complex process essentially concerned with 
addressing past grievances and correcting systemic failures to prevent future 
human rights violations, as can be seen from the following text.
Accountability from a human rights perspective refers to the relationship of 
Government policymakers and other duty bearers to the rights holders aff ected 
by their decisions and actions. Accountability has a corrective function, making it 
possible to address individual or collective grievances, and sanction wrongdoing 
by the individuals and institutions responsible. However, accountability also 
has a preventive function, helping to determine which aspects of policy or service 
delivery are working, so they can be built on, and which aspects need to be adjusted. 
Accountability principles and mechanisms can improve policymaking by identifying 
systemic failures that need to be overcome in order to make service delivery systems 
more eff ective and responsive.720
717 See OHCHR, Who Will Be Accountable?; HDR (2002): Deeping Democracy in a Fragmented 
World, p 65; Siri Gloppen and others, Courts and Power in Latin America and Africa (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010) 12–18; Gloppen, Gargarella and Skaar (n 712) 1; Fredman (n 30) 103–105; 
Potts (n 712) 13; Newell and Wheeler (n 712) 1–30.
718 Potts (n 712) 13–16.
719 See A/HRC/14/39, para 32.
720 OHCHR, Who Will be Accountable? pp ix & 10.
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Th is makes it clear that, unlike other procedural principles identifi ed above, human 
rights accountability, properly understood, essentially concerns systemic (macro-
level) issues more than specifi c individual (micro-level) problems. For instance, 
the principle of accountability does not, strictly speaking, concern itself with the 
kind of remedy that should be provided for the violation of a given right of an 
individual nor does is it concern itself with ensuring the right of an individual to 
participate in a given decision-making process aff ecting his or her right. It rather 
deals with fundamental overarching questions aff ecting the overall designing and 
operationalisation of the mechanisms (legal and institutional systems) and the 
eff ectiveness of the same in ensuring the practical realisation of all human rights 
recognised by the State.
Th erefore, understood in this sense, accountability is not only crucial but also 
raises several complex issues in relation to, in particular, the positive obligation 
of the State to give practical eff ect to ESC rights. Th e reasons for the complexities 
involved in this regard are well-captured by Fredman.
Th is is because positive duties require action to be taken in a context where several 
choices might be available. Taking action in one direction might foreclose other 
policy choices; it may require distributive decisions; and it may necessitate removing 
resources from some to give to others. In addition, because the steps have yet to be 
taken, decisions are based on prognosis or the ability to judge the future. Th is is 
particularly true when positive duties are programmatic, in the sense that the duty 
requires the State to ‘roll out’ its programme progressively over time.721
Th at is, in order for the State to discharge its positive human rights obligations, 
there is not a single course of action but rather many competing networks of 
actions. To this extent, accountability cannot be used to dictate a specifi c form 
of action or policy choice upon the State. Th e principle of accountability only 
requires that, fi rst, the measures taken should be justifi ed as reasonable (supported 
by weighty public policy arguments) and eff ective, second there should be an 
eff ective mechanism (system) through which all relevant actors can be held to 
account for their respective performances in the realisation of human rights. So, 
even if accountability processes may not lead to specifi c individual remedies, the 
availability of the system through which the State and its agents can be compelled 
to justify their choices, rectify the failures and hold those entities or offi  cials 
responsible for the failures is of paramount importance for the overall realisation 
of human rights.722
721 Fredman (n 30) 103.
722 Ibid 103–105.
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7.3. JURISPRUDENCE
Th e Velásquez-Rodriguez case is an interesting authority wherein the IACtHR 
distinguished between subjective and objective approach to the international 
human rights accountability of the State. In this case, the Court held that
Violations of the [American Convention on Human Rights] cannot be founded upon 
rules that take psychological factors into account in establishing individual culpability. 
For the purposes of analysis, the intent or motivation of the agent who has violated the 
rights recognized by the Convention is irrelevant – the violation can be established even 
if the identity of the individual perpetrator is unknown. What is decisive is whether a 
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or 
the acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to take place 
without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible. Th us, the Court’s 
task is to determine whether the violation is the result of a State’s failure to fulfi ll its duty 
to respect and guarantee those rights, as required by Article 1 (1) of the Convention.723
Th e ideals refl ected in this case in fact refl ect a consistent and unifi ed position 
of all international human rights tribunals. Th e Court’s judgment compares 
and contrasts two major types of accountability: individual and institutional 
accountability.724 Th e individual accountability draws on the personal fault of 
individuals, offi  cials or entities directly responsible for the failure to ensure the 
eff ective realisation of human rights. For the Court, the international human 
rights accountability of the State cannot depend on the nature of the conduct or 
intent of its agents or offi  cials.725 Th e institutional accountability in its part fl ows 
from the generic human rights obligations of the State discussed above.726 Th is 
means that, under international law, the State bears a total responsibility both for 
the action and omission of its offi  cials and institutions, regardless of the legality of 
the action or omission in issue and of the nature and function (public and private) 
of the institutions concerned, and for all actions and behaviours of private persons 
and entities aff ecting human rights within its jurisdictions. Th us, the sole and 
723 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, paras 173. See also generally ibid paras 160–188.
724 Th e notion of individual and institutional accountability has been deployed by several authors. 
See Lewis (n 712); Kuyper, Backstrand and Schroeder (n 712). However, the sense in which the 
Court deployed in the Velásquez-Rodriguez case is somewhat diff erent from Lewis’ and others.
725 See for instance, Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, paras 83–90.
726 See the discussion in the Introduction to Part II above. See also Al-Dulimi and Montana 
Management Inc. v. Switzerland; Ireland v. UK, M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium [GC], para 287; 
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, paras 206 & 232; Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, para 83ff ; Sarayaku 
v. Ecuador, paras 260–263; Vera v. Ecuador, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and 
costs, judgment of 19 May 2011, paras 41–42; Abdel Hadi et al v. Sudan, paras 91–92; Darfur 
case v. Sudan, para 227; Communication 379/09: Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir 
Suliman (represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan, decision on merits, 15th Extra Ordinary 




relevant question in relation to the objective responsibility of the State is not the 
identity or fault of the actor but rather whether there is an act or omission which 
can be attributable to the State or not under international (human rights) law.727 
Th e State is of course free to establish any system it deems appropriate (judicial, 
administrative or any other) but it remains to be fully accountable for the action 
or omission of its agents and private entities within its jurisdiction.
Th e obligation to realise ESC rights forms part and parcel of an integral 
element of the institutional function of the State in a political society. Th is, in 
turn, makes the institutional accountability of the State particularly signifi cant 
especially in countering arguments associated with the problem of diff usion of 
accountability within the State’s administrative structures or the privatisation of 
some essential public functions.728 Th at is, although specifi c measures relevant 
for the realisation of ESC rights are obviously carried out through various 
departments and agencies, (both private and public) – making it diffi  cult to 
determine who should account for what, how and when – the idea of institutional 
accountability of the State does not concern itself with these complexities as it 
can be seen from the following cases. Generally speaking, international ESC 
rights jurisprudence shows the existence of three basic scenarios leading to the 
institutional accountability of the State: accountability for the acts of agents, for 
private parties with formal-functional relationship with the State and for private 
parties with no formal relationship with the State.729 Each of this is treated one 
by one as follows.
727 For instance, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, para 162, the IACtHR held that ‘Each claim 
alleging that one of those rights has been infringed necessarily implies that Article 1(1) [to 
respect and ensure all rights and freedoms] of the Convention has also been violated’. In 
Ireland v. UK, paras 238–241, the ECtHR also held that Article 1 ECHR is one of the many 
provisions attesting its binding character of the Convention, setting apart the Convention 
undertaking from other classic treaties by requiring the States to secure the rights and that its 
violation fl ows automatically from failure to secure one of the substantive rights guaranteed in 
the Convention. In Abdel Hadi et al v. Sudan, para 91, the AfCoHPR also held that ‘a violation 
of any provision of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights] by a State Party 
automatically engages its responsibility under Article 1’. And in Jawara v. Gambia, para 46, it 
also stressed that ‘Article 1 gives the Charter the legally binding character always attributed 
to international treaties of this sort. Th erefore, a violation of any provision of the Charter, 
automatically means a violation of Article 1. If a State party to the Charter fails to recognise 
the provisions of the same, there is no doubt that it is in violation of this Article. Its violation, 
therefore, goes to the root of the Charter’.
728 For more on privatization and human rights, see generally Antenor Hallo De Wolf, Reconciling 
Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 2011).
729 Among many authorities, see Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, paras 83–90; Oyal v. Turkey, paras 
53–56 & 58; Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, para 169–185; Marangopoulos Foundation for 
Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece (Complaint No. 30/2005), paras 191–193 & 203.
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7.3.1. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACTS OF STATE AGENTS
Th e fi rst is when the act or omission resulting in violation of human rights is due 
to its own organs. In this case, it is immaterial as to which organ or department 
of the State is said to be actually responsible for the violation of a given human 
right because all acts of its agents are the acts of the State for all legal intents and 
purposes.730 Indeed, various State departments and agencies are responsible for 
designing and implementing relevant laws, policies, programmes and strategies 
deemed necessary for the realisation of ESC rights. For instance, it is common that 
States assign the provision of health services to a specifi c entity or department. But 
this functional (administrative) division is irrelevant under international human 
rights law for the failure of the organ to eff ectively realise the right to health still 
falls on the shoulder of the State. It is even immaterial whether or not the entity 
acted in line with the relevant domestic laws and guidelines.731 According to the 
IACtHR, the human rights obligation of the State ‘is independent of whether the 
organ or offi  cial has contravened provisions of internal law or overstepped the 
limits of his authority’ because ‘under international law a State is responsible for 
the acts of its agents undertaken in their offi  cial capacity and for their omissions, 
even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or violate internal 
law’.732 It is the responsibility of the State ‘to organize’ its ‘governmental apparatus 
and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so 
that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights’.733 Per the Court, ‘any exercise of public power that violates the rights 
recognised by the Convention is illegal’. Th us, ‘[w]henever a State organ, offi  cial 
or public entity violates one of those rights, this constitutes a failure of the duty to 
respect the rights and freedoms set forth in [human rights instruments]’.734
Seen in this light, we can say that complaints alleging human rights violations 
by the actions or omissions of its offi  cials or within its institutional apparatus 
and functions (that is, legal, administrative, executive and judicial functions) all 
necessarily concern direct human rights accountability of the State. For instance, 
in Adam v. Saudi Arabia case735, the CRPD found that the prison authorities failed 
to provide the applicant with urgent surgery needed for the injury he sustained in 
the prison on his right ear. As a result, the applicant completely lost his hearing 
730 Ibid.
731 Following the AfCoHPR, it should be noted that the human rights obligation of the State is not 
limited to mere recognition of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the relevant international 
instruments but rather includes the obligation to give practical legal eff ect to those rights and 
freedoms within its legal system. See Noah Kazingachire et al v. Zimbabwe, para 141.
732 Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, para 170.
733 Ibid para 166–167.
734 Ibid para 169.
735 Munir al Adam v. Saudi Arabia (Communication No. 38/2016, UN Doc. CRPD/C/20/D/38/2016), 
decision on merits of 20 September 2018 (hereaft er Adam v. Saudi Arabia).
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on his right ear and became permanently disabled. In this case, the accountability 
of the State was engaged on account of four major reasons.
First, the injury was caused by the prison offi  cials who tortured the applicant to 
secure confession from him; second, the offi  cials refused to provide the applicant 
with urgent medical care which could have prevented his hearing disability; third, 
being a person under custody, the duty to care for the health and well-being of 
the applicant completely rest on the shoulder of the prison institution; fi nally, 
despite repeated complaints from applicant’s family and representative, the State 
did not conduct any meaningful investigation into the case and provide him with 
eff ective remedy. All these engaged the general obligation of the State to respect 
all human rights and the specially heightened obligation to care for the health and 
well-being of the vulnerable persons under its custody.736
In connection with this, it should be noted that the act of the State or State 
organs also covers judicial procedures and decisions. Th us, the State bears the 
ultimate responsibility to ensure that all its legislative, administrative and judicial 
institutions operate in compliance with its international human rights obligations. 
For instance, the violations found by the CRPD in the cases of J.H. v. Australia737, 
Beasley v. Australia738, Lockrey v. Australia739, Given v. Australia740, H.M. v. 
Sweden741, Bujdoso et al v. Hungary742, Makarov v. Lithuania743, F v. Austria 
and Bacher v. Austria744 were all due to the direct actions of the State parties’ 
legislative, administrative and/or judicial organs. In the case of Bacher v. Austria, 
the responsibility of the State was in part engaged because of the judicial practices 
completely ignoring the special needs of persons with disabilities in disputes 
involving their interests and fundamental rights.745 For the CRPD, the failure 
736 Paras 11.6 cum 11.2–11.5
737 J.H. v. Australia (Communication No. 35/2016, UN Doc. CRPD/C/20/D/35/2016) decision on 
merits of 31 August 2018.
738 Gemma Beasley v. Australia (Communication No. 11/2013, UN Doc. CRPD/C/15/D/11/2013) 
decision on merits of 1 April 2016 (hereaft er Beasley v. Australia).
739 Michael Lockrey v. Australia (Communication No. 13/2013, UN Doc. CRPD/C/15/D/13/2013) 
decision on merits of 1 April 2016 (hereaft er Lockrey v. Australia).
740 Fiona Given v. Australia (Communication No. 19/2014, UN Doc. CRPD/C/19/D/19/2014) 
decision on merits of 16 February 2018 (hereaft er Given v. Australia).
741 H.M. v. Sweden (Communication No. 3/2011, UN Doc. CRPD/C/7/D/3/2011) decision on merits 
of 19 April 2012.
742 Zsolt Bujdoso et al v. Hungary (Communication No. 4/2011, UN Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011) 
decision on merits of 9 September 2013 (hereaft er Bujdoso et al v. Hungary).
743 Boris Makarov v. Lithuania (Communication No. 30/2015, UN Doc. CRPD/C/18/D/30/2015) 
decision on merits of 18 August 2017 (hereaft er Makarov v. Lithuania).
744 Simon Bacher v. Austria (Communication No. 26/2014, UN Doc. CRPD/C/19/D/26/2014) 
decision on merits of 16 February 2018 (hereaft er Bacher v. Austria).
745 Paras 9.7 & 9.9. ‘In the present case, the role of the Committee is to assess whether the decisions 
adopted by the courts of the State party have enabled the respect of the rights of [the applicant] 
under article  9, read alone and in conjunction with article  3 of the Convention’. ibid para 
9.7. See also para 9.9 where the Committee noted the fact that the impugned decision of the 
given State party’s court ‘adopted the same line as the previous decisions of the courts of the 
State party in the present case: it did not make a thorough analysis of the special needs of 
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to adequately take into account the special needs of persons with disabilities in 
any dispute between them and other private or public parties amounts to denial 
of justice. Th us, in reaching its conclusion in Bacher v. Austria, the Committee 
stated that
Th e multidimensional consequences of the decisions adopted by State party’s 
authorities on the accessibility rights of [the applicant] were therefore ignored, leaving 
to his family the responsibility of fi nding ways to enable his access to his home 
and to the external public services that he needs for his daily life. Th e Committee 
therefore considers that the decision of the [Court in issue], read in the context of 
the previous judicial decisions adopted by the courts of the State party in the case, 
constitutes a denial of justice for [the applicant], in violation of article 9, read alone 
and in conjunction with article 3 of the Convention.746
It is therefore incumbent upon the State to structure its institutional governance 
system in such a way that all its agents, institutional apparatuses and procedures 
function in accordance with its international human rights obligations. Th e State 
cannot absolve itself from being accountable for the violations by raising, for 
instance, that the impugned action was taken or prohibited because of the order 
of the court of law nor can it be exonerated on account of the fact that the action 
concerned was illegally taken by an offi  cial.
7.3.2. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACTS OF ENTITIES WITH 
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE
Th e second scenario concerns the acts or omissions of certain private entities 
or agencies authorised through legislative or other arrangements to perform 
some public functions such as the provision of health care, housing, education, 
electricity and water to the public. When the acts or omissions of these private 
entities result in the violation of ESC rights, it is a consistently held position of 
all human rights courts and monitoring bodies that the delegation by the State of 
such essential public functions to third parties cannot be considered as a transfer 
of its international human rights obligations. Nor does it absolve the State from 
[the applicant], despite the fact that they had been clearly referred to by his parents, as in all 
previous court hearings and summons. Th e State party’s authorities instead considered that 
the subject matter of the judicial proceedings “had nothing to do with the rights of persons 
with disabilities” and focused on the resolution of the property rights issue at stake’. (internal 
citation omitted).
746 Para 9.9. Cf. Marie-Louise Jungelin v. Sweden (Communication No. 5/2011, UN Doc. CRPD/
C/12/D/5/2011) decision on merits of 2  October 2014 (hereaft er Jungelin v. Sweden), paras 
10.5–10.6; A.F. v. Italy (Communication No. 9/2012, UN Doc. CRPD/C/13/D/9/2012) decision 
on merits of 27 March 2015, paras 8.4–8.5 (where the Committee concluded that the respective 




accountability for the conducts of such entities are still deemed to be the conducts 
of the State for all legal and practical purposes. Th e basic reason for this is that 
the State retains or should retain eff ective supervisory role over the conducts and 
operations of the third parties acting on its behalf. For instance, in the Oyal case, per 
the ECtHR, the responsibility of the State was engaged because the agent directly 
responsible for the contamination of the blood of the victim with HIV/AIDS was 
acting on behalf of the State as a service providing entity within certain legislative 
framework.747 In SERAC case, the African Commission found the State’s violation 
of its positive obligation to protect the right to health, housing, food, development 
and healthy environment because, in addition to directly participating through 
its security agents in the violation, it had also failed to regulate the activities of the 
oil company (a joint venture between Nigeria’s National Oil Company and Shell) 
in the Ogoniland.748 In Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) 
v. Greece (Complaint No. 30/2005), the Respondent State argued that the acts of 
pollution and its eff ects could not be attributed to the State as the plant emitting 
pollution operates under its domestic private law.749 Th e facts of this case indicate 
that the Respondent State was the majority shareholder of the plant and hence 
may raise issues as to whether it is purely a private organ or not. But for the Social 
Rights Committee, these facts are irrelevant because irrespective of the domestic 
legal status of economic actors whose conduct is in issue, the State is required 
to ensure the compliance of all actors (entities) within its jurisdictions with its 
undertakings under the Social Charter. Th e State was therefore held accountable 
for its failure to act with reasonable due diligence to regulate the plant’s operations 
and thereby prevent the risks created to the life and health of the surrounding 
populations from the excessive pollution emissions emanating from the plant.750
And the same was also true in the case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil whereby a 
privately owned hospital was contracted by the State to provide psychiatric services 
within its single health care system in the sense that the hospital’s activities 
were conducted on behalf of the State. Interestingly, the State acknowledged its 
international responsibility for failure to take necessary measures to prevent the 
conditions that allowed the mistreatments, suff erings and subsequent death of 
the victim at the hospital. According to the Court, the State did not discharge its 
positive duties required by the circumstances of the case, namely, the duty to care 
and ensure decent hospitalisation for patients with particular vulnerability as the 
victim; to regulate and properly supervise the operation of the hospital; and to 
investigate and bring proper accountability for the death of the victim.751
Th is all makes it clear that under the second scenario the accountability of the 
State essentially draws on the State’s obligation to regulate, supervise (monitor) 
747 Oyal v. Turkey, para 53–56.
748 SERAC v. Nigeria, paras 53–55, 58, 62–63 & 66–67.
749 MFHR v. Greece (Complaint No. 30/2005), para 191.
750 Ibid paras 192–221.
751 Paras 63, 66 & 131–150.
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and evaluate the operation and performance of the entities entrusted with the 
responsibility to provide those essential services and to investigate and remedy 
the failures (violations) identifi ed therein.
7.3.3. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES
Th e third scenario concerns the accountability of the State for the conducts of 
the private parties within its jurisdiction but with no specifi c formal relationship 
with the State. Human rights scholars have extensively been debating the scope 
of the application of human rights obligations to private parties, the so-called 
the horizontal application of human rights.752 Th eis is particularly interesting 
in relation to the positive obligation of the State arising from ESC rights with 
substantial resource implications. While the academic debate especially in 
relation to the obligation to directly provide essential goods and services is yet to 
settle, it is clear that private parties have the negative obligation not to interfere 
with or obstruct the free and full exercise of these rights. Even in this latter case, 
the State remains ultimately responsible for making sure that all actors within 
its jurisdiction conduct themselves in a manner compatible with human rights 
standards.753 Th is accountability of the State draws on its general obligation of 
due diligence which consists in taking necessary reasonable steps required to 
prevent, investigate and remedy the conducts of the entities from encroaching 
upon human rights.
Th ere are many cases in which States were found in violation of its due 
diligence obligation to regulate, investigate or remedy the acts of private entities 
infringing ESC rights. Just to mention some of them, it was noted above that 
the case of Fadeyeva concerned the violation of the right to home and private 
life guaranteed under Article  8 of the ECHR due to pollution emission from 
a close by plant. Th e ECtHR noted that at the relevant time the said plant was 
not owned, controlled, or operated by the State.754 Th us, the complaint was not 
about direct interference by the State but rather by a private entity. Referring 
to its earlier case law, the Court reiterated that ‘the State’s responsibility in 
environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry’. Th is, 
in turn, engages a positive duty of the ‘State to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to secure’ the rights guaranteed, in this case, under Article 8 paragraph 
752 See generally John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human 
Rights (1st edn, WW Norton and Company 2013); Wolf (n 728) 185–195; John H Knox, 
‘HORIZONTAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’ (2008) 102 Th e American Journal of International 
Law 1; DJ Harris and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2009) 18–21.
753 Ruggie (n 752) 81ff ; Wolf (n 728) 195–197 & 351–352.
754 Fadayeva v. Russia, para 89.
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1 of the Convention.755 Having analysed all the material evidences in the case 
with respect to the measures taken by the State, the Court held, inter alia, that 
the State failed to approach the problem with the required due diligence vis-à-vis 
the polluting activities of the plant aff ecting the applicant and the surrounding 
communities.756 Th e Court had already held the same in its earlier judgment in 
López Ostra case where the authorities failed to regulate the pollution activities 
of a waste-treatment plant just few metres away from the applicant’s home which 
had severe impact on the health of her family and her private life.757
Th e above mentioned Ximenes-Lopez case also provides us with important 
principles to draw on as far as the institutional responsibility of the State is 
concerned both generally and in relation to health care and detention institutions. 
In this case, the Court identifi ed three important obligations of the State with 
respect to the acts of private parties encroaching upon human rights within its 
jurisdiction: the duty to regulate and supervise, the duty to ensure the existence of 
adequate quality of care for all patients in health care and psychiatric institutions 
and the duty to investigate and remedy those acts (or omissions) found to be 
incompatible with basis human rights of the service recipients.758 In this case, it 
was noted that the State was fully aware of the precarious conditions at the care 
institution in terms of the physical violence regularly committed against mental 
patients; the maintenance, preservation and sanitary conditions; inadequacy 
of proper rooms both qualitatively and quantitatively; chronic shortage of 
necessary health equipment, facilities, and professionals; and the existence of 
mismanagement by the owner of the hospital; and, more specifi cally, the fact that 
the death of the victim was directly attributable to violence, neglect and lack of 
proper care. In addition, the State was also fully aware of similar previous cases 
in the same institution.759 It was accordingly held accountable for its failure to 
755 Ibid.
756 Ibid paras 124ff .
757 López-Ostra v. Spain, para 56–58.
758 Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, paras 137–148. In this regard, it should be mentioned here that the 
health care institution where the act was committed is a private hospital contracted by the 
State to provide psychiatric services within the scheme of the Single Health Care System. It 
operated as a public health care unit in the name and on behalf of the State. It was, at the 
material time of this Judgement, the only institution, public or private, off ering inpatient or 
outpatient services for persons with mental disabilities in the region of Sobral (ibid paras 
112(55) cum para 142). Th e analysis of the Court therefore takes largely into account the public 
aspect of the hospital for all intents and purposes. Nevertheless, the principles (except duty of 
care – the duty to directly care for the patients) are essentially the same and hence are directly 
applicable to any acts of private entities providing similar services.
759 Ibid paras 120–122, 141–148 & 112 (56–59). In particular, the Court established as one of the 
proven facts in the submissions of the parties that ‘At Casa de Reposo Guararapes (Guararapes 
Rest Home) there was an atmosphere of violence, aggression, and maltreatment, where many 
inpatients frequently suff ered injuries to their upper and lower extremities, which were 
infl icted by the employees of Casa de Reposo Guararapes; nurses’ aides and security guards used 
patients to restrain others; applied the “gravata” (a restraint method which carries the risk of 
asphyxiation) to some patients, who thought that such practice “was the law” or was intended 
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regulate, investigate and remedy the activities of the private health institution 
concerned.760
Th e Sarayaku case is also very important in this regard. We have already 
discussed this case extensively in the previous chapter but with respect to the issue 
at hand it was argued that the State knowingly allowed a private oil company to 
install heavy explosives in the territory of the Sarayaku People putting their life and 
survival at risk. Th e American Commission on Human Rights particularly argued 
that the detonation of the explosives resulted in, inter alia, the destruction of their 
forests, water sources, and sacred cultural sites as well as in the migration of animals 
signifi cantly impairing their ability to secure their subsistence and disrupting their 
life cycle.761 It was well-established in the case law of the Court that the right to 
life imposes both negative and positive obligations. Th e Sarayaku case engaged the 
positive obligation of the State to protect the risks posed to the life and survival of 
the Community due to the placement of explosives in their ancestral land and its 
subsequent impact on their livelihood and cultural life. According to the Court, 
the State will be held responsible particularly if it can be established that it knew or 
should have known the existence of the situation threatening the life of an individual 
or a group but failed to take necessary reasonable measures to avert the risk posed 
by the situation.762 In this case, the Court observed that the State allowed the oil 
company to place the explosives in the said territory with full acquiescence and 
protection. Not only this, the also failed to protect the Community from violence 
from other indigenous groups or investigate and punish the perpetrators of the 
violence against them. Th is all denied them access to their traditional land upon 
which their subsistence, medicinal and cultural life essentially depends. It therefore 
held the State accountable for the acts of the private parties which endangered the 
life, survival and well-being of the Community as a whole.763
Moreover, it is also possible to see the accountability of the State being engaged 
in several of the cases decided by UN human rights monitoring bodies.764 In both 
Djazia and Bellili v. Spain and Bacher v. Austria cases, the respective State party 
argued that the issues raised by the applicant involved a purely private dispute 
(matter) between the applicant and another individual which the State should 
“to maintain order”; physical restraint was indiscriminately used, regardless of whether such 
procedure had been ordered by the physician in charge, and physical confrontations between 
patients were encouraged’. ibid para 112(56).
760 Ibid para 150.
761 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 233.
762 Ibid para 245.
763 Ibid paras 246–249 & 265–271.
764 See for instance Bacher v. Austria. See also Y v. United Republic of Tanzania (Communication 
No. 23/2014, UN Doc. CRPD/C/20/D/23/2014) decision on merits of 31 August 2018; X v. United 
Republic of Tanzania (Communication No. 22/2014, UN Doc. CRPD/C/18/D/22/2014) decision 
on merits of 18 August 2017; Mohamed Ben Djazia and Naouel Bellili v. Spain (Communication 
No.5/2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/2015) decision on merits of 20 June 2017 (hereaft er Djazia 
and Bellili v. Spain).
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not interfere. At the domestic level, the Djazia and Bellili v. Spain case concerned 
an eviction enforcement measure following the expiry of the rental contract 
whereas the Bacher case concerned the refusal of the applicant’s neighbour to 
allow him construct the passage (easement) to his home and public life which 
was, in turn, needed because of his disability condition. However, in both cases, 
it was underscored that while every private legal relationships and disputes are 
regulated through its legal order, the State remains ultimately responsible to 
guarantee that the human rights it has recognised are respected by all actors 
within its jurisdiction and ‘that the decisions adopted by its authorities do not 
infringe upon the rights of the Convention’.765 According to the CESCR,
States parties do not only have the obligation to respect Covenant rights, and, it 
follows, to refrain from infringing them, but they also have the obligation to protect 
them by adopting measures to prevent the direct or indirect interference of individuals 
in the enjoyment of these rights. If a State party does not take appropriate measures to 
protect a Covenant right, it has a responsibility even when the action that undermined 
the right in the fi rst place was carried out by an individual or a private entity. Th us, 
although the Covenant primarily establishes rights and obligations between the State 
and individuals, the scope of the provisions of the Covenant extends to relations 
between individuals. An eviction related to a rental contract between individuals 
can, therefore, involve Covenant rights. Accordingly, the State party’s argument that 
the communication deals with a dispute that is exclusively between individuals and 
therefore does not fall under the Covenant does not stand.766
Th e CRPD applied the above reasoning to the Bacher case. It held that
States parties are obliged not only to respect Convention rights and, it follows, to refrain 
from infringing upon them, but also to protect those rights by adopting measures to 
prevent the direct or indirect interference of individuals in the enjoyment of those rights. 
Th us, although the Convention primarily establishes rights and obligations between the 
State and individuals, the scope of the provisions of the Convention extends to relations 
between individuals. […] A property right issue linked to the exercise of a contract 
between individuals and the confl ict arising from it therefore has to be interpreted 
through the Convention. Accordingly, when the courts of the State party intervened to 
resolve the confl ict between the parties, they were bound by the Convention. Th e State 
party’s argument that the communication deals with a dispute that is exclusively between 
individuals and therefore does not fall under the Convention therefore does not stand.767
It is, therefore, not possible for the State to rely on private law regimes (contractual, 
property or other private law rights) as an excuse for their failure to protect the 
violation of ESC rights of individuals ensuing from private parties. It also does not 
765 Bacher v. Austria, para 9.2; Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, para 14.1.
766 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, para 14.2.
767 Bacher v. Austria, para 9.3.
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suffi  ce to put legislative and judicial procedures in place. It indispensable for the 
State to make sure that the laws and judicial decisions governing private relations 
also practically uphold the human rights of individuals. In other words, it should 
eff ectively regulate, monitor, investigate and remedy the behaviours and actions 
of the private parties and the offi  cial decisions thereof in the light of international 
human rights norms.768 Otherwise, it will be held accountable regardless of the 
fact that its agents are not directly responsible for the impugned actions of the 
private entities contravening the human rights of individuals.
7.4. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
Th e eff ective realisation of the inherent material conditions of life cannot be 
possible without the existence of the system through which the State can be held 
accountable for its actions or omissions as well as for the actions and omissions 
of the private parties within its jurisdiction. Th is is what has been confi rmed in 
international ESC rights case law from across jurisdictions. In particular, the 
principle of accountability gives practical procedural expression (concreteness) to 
the State’s obligation to respect and ensure the material conditions of life required to 
live a dignifi ed life, for without it the promises of human rights would remain only 
empty rhetoric.769 In particular, the principle of accountability constitutes the core 
overarching procedural obligation of the State to put in place the system through 
which individuals and group of individuals can demand justifi cations for its choices, 
rectifi cation of the failures in making the choices or in the implementation of the 
measures adopted, and sanctioning agents or entities responsible for the failures. 
It fl ows from the generic obligation of the State to respect and ensure the free, full 
and eff ective enjoyment of human rights for all persons within its jurisdictions. But 
while there are various conceptions of accountability in play, international human 
rights law and jurisprudence put special emphasis on the strong and institutional 
form of the State accountability whereby it bears an ultimate legal responsibility 
for all the acts or omissions obstructing the eff ective realisation of human 
rights within its jurisdiction, that is, regardless of its internal constitutional and 
administrative division of powers and functions and the identity of the entities in 
question. Th e discussion in this Chapter has particularly shown the justifi cations 
and the three major scenarios leading to the institutional accountability of the 
State. It is argued that, taken together, this idea of the institutional accountability 
of the State responds to the problem of diff usion of accountability inherent in the 
practical realisation of ESC rights.
768 See also Y v. United Republic of Tanzania, paras 8.1ff .; X v. United Republic of Tanzania, paras 
8.1ff .





Th e preceding three chapters have examined the procedural dimension of the 
State obligation to give practical legal eff ect to the inherent material conditions of 
life. Th is and the next chapter will continue to discuss its substantive dimension 
in the light of ESC rights jurisprudence. As explained in the introductory section 
of Part two, the substantive dimension of the State obligation to respect the 
material conditions of life basically concerns ensuring the essential minimum 
guarantees provided through ESC rights regime. Th e core aspect of this obligation 
particularly consists in the State’s obligation to secure, both in law and fact, a 
dignifi ed life (dignifi ed existence) for every human being within its jurisdiction. 
Th is, in turn, has two major components. Th e fi rst component concerns the 
general obligation of the State to ensure these essential material conditions of 
life for every person; the second component concerns the specially aggravated 
obligation of the State towards vulnerable persons. Th is Chapter will deal with the 
fi rst one and the second one will be considered in the next Chapter. Accordingly, 
this Chapter will examine the content and scope of the State’s obligation to ensure 
a dignifi ed life in the light of ESC rights jurisprudence. Th e discussion starts with 
brief explanation of the conception of a dignifi ed life with the view to help the 
reader appreciate the justifi cations behind the selection of the cases discussed in 
this Chapter and the nature and scope of the State obligations examined in the 
subsequent sections. However, because of the broad nature of the notion of the 
dignifi ed life and its implications on the scope of the obligation of the State, it 
is hardly possible to exhaustively discuss all the relevant cases to this eff ect. So, 
the discussion here will focus mainly only on the general and major aspects of 
its contents and implications. Th en, the next Chapter will examine its further 
imports in the context of the rights of vulnerable persons.
8.2. THE CONCEPTION OF DIGNIFIED LIFE
Th e notion of a dignifi ed life deployed in this Chapter and throughout this study 
is drawn from the case law of the IACtHR. Th ere are also other terms which 
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signify similar meaning such as dignifi ed existence, decent living, humane life, 
humane or dignifi ed treatment, dignifi ed living and life in dignity.770 But I found 
that the notion of a dignifi ed life not only embraces all these terms but also better 
expresses the substantive idea of the principle of human dignity defended in 
Chapter four above. In Chapter four, it was particularly argued that, practically 
speaking, there is no dignity in human life if its moral and material conditions 
are not adequately available and that it is not possible to ensure respect for the 
dignity of human being without fi rst securing the basic moral and material 
conditions of human life. Th is is the basic underlying justifi cation driving the 
holistic approach to the protection of human rights since its inception at the UN 
level.771 And it is this substantive relationship that the notion of dignifi ed life is 
intended to express both in this Chapter and throughout this writing. Th at is, the 
notion of a dignifi ed life is deployed as an overarching notion expressing a rather 
broad interpretation given to the idea and inherent value of human life in the 
case law: the life in which all of its moral and material conditions are available 
and enjoyable fully and freely. It denotes, following Nussbaum and Sen, a human 
life worth living, a life worthy of human dignity, a life in which all of its basic 
capability needs are fulfi lled to a certain threshold level (a level below which it is 
not worth living).772
Human rights courts and monitoring bodies have used this idea of a dignifi ed 
life to develop the traditional academic conception of the right to life and the right 
to dignity under international human rights law.773 Traditionally, the right to life 
was narrowly construed as implying the negative obligation of the State to refrain 
from causing unlawful or arbitrary loss of life.774 Th at is, the State would be held 
responsible if its agents, particularly security forces, arbitrarily killed or caused an 
unlawful loss of life of a person. In addition, the right to dignity (sometimes also 
the right to be treated with dignity, the right to humane treatment) was narrowly 
construed as prohibiting the State from physically torturing or mistreating 
770 See for instance, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; ‘Street Children’ v. 
Guatemala.
771 For instance, as it was mentioned earlier, rejecting the political-ideological categorisation 
arguments during the codifi cation process of International Bill of Rights, the UN General 
Assembly issued a resolution underscoring the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights aimed at ensuring the ideal of free human being. It stated that “the enjoyment 
of civil and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected 
and interdependent” and that “when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights man 
does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal 
of the free man”. GA Resolution 421(V), Section E (adopted at its 5th Session, 1950). See also 
GA Resolution 543 (VI) (adopted at its 6th Session, 1952) (emphasising the unity of the aim of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights which is ensuring universal respect for and 
observance of inherent dignity and life of human being).
772 Nussbaum, Froniters of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership (n 114); Sen (n 3).
773 See also Chapt 4.7.3 above (discussing the sense of dignity as an absolute human right).
774 See particularly Jo M Pasqualucci, ‘Th e Right to a Dignifi ed Life (Vida Digna): Th e Integration 
of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System’ (2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1; Wicks (n 29).
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(abusing) individuals. In eff ect, both the right to life and the right to dignity were 
narrowly conceived as falling within the traditional liberal understanding of civil 
and political rights. For this reason, they did not have any role in the protection 
of ESC rights.
However, human rights courts and monitoring bodies have progressively 
moved away from this narrow construction to also embrace the socioeconomic 
conditions of life and dignity. Th is approach has, in turn, played a great role in the 
development of the jurisprudence of ESC rights. Th is robust understanding of the 
right to life and the right to dignity, and the corresponding obligations of the State 
have now been well-established in international human rights jurisprudence. As 
such, the notion of a dignifi ed life refers to a quality of life or existence in its 
full sense.775 It expresses an ideal of human life wherein all its basic material 
and moral conditions are available and freely enjoyable by every human being 
regardless of his/ her identity and status. In this way, it has justifi ed to take an 
integrated (holistic) approach to the protection of civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights by rejecting the traditional academic divide between these 
categories of human rights.776
Th is jurisprudential development is essentially the refl ection of the normative 
status and value attached to the right to life and dignity of human being. In 
particular, it has been reaffi  rmed in the case law that the right to life and dignity 
constitute the bedrock, the raison d’être of human rights law and the rule of law. 
For instance, the ‘Street Children’ case is one of the earlier cases clearly indicating 
the importance attached to the right to life and dignity in the practice of the 
IACtHR.777 According the Court, the right to life is a fundamental human right. 
It is the mother and fundamental basis of all other human rights. Without the 
right to life being duly and eff ectively respected and guaranteed, all other human 
rights will lose any sense or meaning at all778 or as it puts in another important 
case, they ‘disappear, because the person entitled to them ceases to exist’.779 Th is 
position, established fi rst in the ‘Street Children’ case, is now a solid foundation 
of the Inter-American System of Human Rights upon which essentially all other 
substantive ESC rights are grounded.780
775 Pasqualucci (n 774) 2 & 31.
776 Pasqualucci (n 774); Wicks (n 29).
777 However, the right to life and dignity were also addressed in the earlier judgments of the 
Court. See for instance Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, paras 154–158, 175 & 187–188.
778 ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala, para 144.
779 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 161. See also Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, para 130.
780 Hence, among many authorities, see Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 244; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, paras 150–155; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 
161; Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, para 124; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 186; 19 Merchants v. Colombia; para 153; the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, 
preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, judgment of 2  September 2004, paras 
156 – 163; Vera Vera v. Ecuador, para 18.
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Likewise, the right to life and the norms protecting the life and dignity of human 
being are attached the utmost importance in the European Human Rights 
System.781 In particular, the ECtHR regards Articles  2 (the right to life) and 3 
(prohibition of torture) of the ECHR as among the most fundamental provisions 
of the Convention expressing the most basic values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe.782 Th e ECSR also sees human dignity as one 
of the fundamental underlying values of the European Social Rights Charter783 
and more generally as ‘the fundamental value and indeed the core of positive 
European human rights law [both] under the European Social Charter [and] the 
European Convention of Human Rights’.784
Th e same is also true in relation to the African Human Rights System. As 
already referred to above, in the SERAC case, the African Commission referred 
to the right to life as ‘the most fundamental of all human rights’.785 In another 
case, the Commission referred to it as ‘the supreme right of the human being’. 
‘It is basic to all human rights and without it all other rights are without 
meaning’. In the same paragraph it also noted with affi  rmation that ‘the term 
“life” itself has been given a relatively broad interpretation … to include the 
right to dignity and the right to livelihood’.786 For the Commission, the ‘right 
to life constitutes a norm of customary international law and is one of the 
781 In particular the Court considers that ‘Th e very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom and the notions of self-determination and personal autonomy are 
important principles underlying the interpretation of its guarantees’. Jehovah’s Witnesses of 
Moscow and Others v. Russia (Application No. 302/02), Judgment of 10  June 2010, para 135; 
I. v. Th e United Kingdom (Application No. 25680/94), Judgment of 11  July 2002, para at 70; 
Orchowski v. Poland (Application No. 17885/04), Judgment of 22 October 2009, paras 120 & 153; 
M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium [GC], paras 220–221, 233, 253 & 263.
782 M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], para 218: ‘Th e States must have particular regard to Article 3 
of the Convention, which enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies 
and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct’.
783 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. the Netherlands (Complaint No. 47/2008), 
decision on merits of 20  October 2009 (hereaft er DCI v. the Netherlands (Complaint No. 
47/2008)), para 34, stating that ‘Th e Committee recalls that the Charter was envisaged as a 
human rights instrument to complement the European Convention on Human Rights. It is a 
living instrument dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, autonomy, equality, 
solidarity and other generally recognised values. It must be interpreted so as to give life and 
meaning to fundamental social rights’. (internal citation omitted). In the same Complaint, it 
also held the following in relation to the right to shelter: ‘Th e Committee considers that the 
right to shelter is closely connected to the right to life and is crucial for the respect of every 
person’s human dignity’. ibid para 47.
784 Th e International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France (Complaint No. 
14/2003), decision on the merits of 8 September 2004 (hereaft er FIDH v. France (Complaint No. 
14/2003), para 31. See also DCI v. the Netherlands (Complaint No. 47/2008), para 73 (‘human 
dignity, which is a recognised fundamental value at the core of positive European human 
rights law, must be respected’).
785 SERAC v. Nigeria, para 67.
786 Darfur case v. Sudan, para 147.
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central rights recognized in international human rights treaties’.787 Reiterating 
its decision in Forum of Conscience v Sierra Leone, it stressed that ‘the right 
to life is the fulcrum of all other rights. It is the fountain through which all 
other rights fl ow and any violation of this right without due process amounts 
to arbitrary deprivation of life. Th e right to life is therefore the foundational, or 
bedrock human right’.788
In short, because of the fundamental nature of the right to life and dignity 
and the core position the norms thereof occupy, it is universally held that no 
restrictive approach should be admitted in construing the content and the 
nature of the obligations it gives rise to.789 Th is approach has signifi cantly 
expanded the scope of the State obligation both generally and in relation to 
vulnerable persons. It particularly enjoins the State to continuously create, 
preserve and promote, at the very minimum, socioeconomic and political 
conditions necessary to live a life worthy of human dignity.790 So, while the 
State should negatively refrain from causing arbitrary loss of life and physically 
abusing individuals, it is also required to ensure the material conditions of life 
such as food, health care, education, safe and healthy environment, potable 
water and the like.791
Th e following discussion and the next Chapter show that the scope of this 
obligation is constantly expanding. It has particularly been applied in various 
areas including in the context of detention and prison conditions, health care, 
social security, refugee, immigration, environmental pollution, housing, eviction, 
extreme poverty (destitution) and education. Th us, in addition to its negative 
sense, it is seen as signifying wide-ranging positive obligations of the State 
including the duty to prevent a (threat to) loss of life, to diligently investigate the 
arbitrary loss of life, to prosecute the perpetrators, and to remedy the arbitrary 
787 Noah Kazingachire et al v. Zimbabwe, para 137.
788 Ibid para 138.
789 See for instance, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 186 (‘Th e Court 
has indicated that the right to life is a fundamental human right, whose full enjoyment is a 
prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other human rights. Should this right be disrespected, 
all other rights are meaningless. Th erefore, restrictions on this right are not admissible.’); 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 161 (‘Th is Court has asserted that the 
right to life is crucial in the American Convention, for which reason realization of the other 
rights depends on protection of this one. When the right to life is not respected, all the other 
rights disappear, because the person entitled to them ceases to exist. Due to the basic nature 
of this right, approaches that restrict the right to life are not admissible. Essentially, this right 
includes not only the right of every human being not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life, but 
also the right that conditions that impede or obstruct access to a decent existence should not 
be generated.’).
790 For more, see Pasqualucci (n 774); Wicks (n 29); Steven R. Keener and Javier Vasquez, ‘A Life 
Worth Living: Enforcement of Th e Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 40 Columbia Human Rights Law Revew 595.
791 See particularly Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 186–214; ‘Street 
Children’ v. Guatemala, para 144, 191 & 196. See also Pasqualucci (n 774); Wicks (n 29); Steven 
R. Keener and Javier Vasquez (n 790).
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loss of life regardless of the source and nature of factors threatening a dignifi ed 
human life.792 Th ese obligations, undoubtedly, imply wide-ranging measures 
that the State should take in order to eff ectively secure the enjoyment of dignifi ed 
life but the focus of this Chapter is to show that at the heart of such necessary 




In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, which is one of the most 
important cases in which the IACtHR dealt with ESC rights in great detail in the 
light of the right to life and humane treatment, the direct responsibility of the 
State was engaged essentially because it failed to ensure the eff ective protection 
of the right to ancestral land of the Community, the basis for the livelihood and 
well-being (subsistence, medicinal, cultural and ways of life) of its members. It 
also failed to eff ectively attend to the subsequent events that unfolded threatening 
their life and survival despite its declaration of the state of emergency following 
their relocation to diff erent places due to the precarious and life-threatening 
conditions. Underlining the preeminent and fundamental nature of the right 
to life, the Court reiterated that the generic obligations of States enshrined in 
Article 1(1) of the ACHR, read together with Article 4 of the same, entails ‘the 
obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions that are required to prevent 
violations of this inalienable right’, which among other things, ‘requires States to 
take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life’.793
792 Th e landmark case in this development is particularly McCann and others v. United Kingdom 
(Application No 18984/91), Judgment of 27 September 1995 where the Court outlined for the 
fi rst time that the right to life enshrined under article  2 ECHR implies the duty to refrain 
from unlawful killing (by Agents of a State), the duty to investigate suspicious deaths and, 
if required, prosecute the perpetrators of unlawful killing (by private party or entity) and 
the positive duty to take steps to prevent the avoidable loss of life. In the ‘Street Children’ v. 
Guatemala, para 144, the IACtHR underscored that ‘the right to life is a fundamental human 
right. It is the mother and fundamental basis of all other human rights. Other rights makes 
no sense without it at all or their values disappear’ and held that the right consists of ‘not only 
the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right 
that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignifi ed 
existence’. In SERAC v. Nigeria, para 67, the ACoHPR referred to the right to life as ‘the most 
fundamental of all human rights’. See generally, Pasqualucci (n 774); Wicks (n 29); Robin 
CA White and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: Th e European Convention on Human 
Rights (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2010); Harris and others (n 752); Javaid Rehman, 
International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Pearson 2010); Jayawickrama (n 3).
793 Para 187. ‘For this reason, States have the obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions 
that are required to prevent violations of this inalienable right and, in particular, the duty to 
prevent its agents from threatening that right. Th e observance of Article 4 with relation to 
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Th e Court has already made it clear that not every condition, including 
social and economic conditions, threatening the life of individuals would give 
rise to State obligation. It is of the opinion that due to inherent complexity and 
diffi  culty in socioeconomic planning and execution, it is not possible to hold 
the authorities to an absolute standard. Nevertheless, the State is responsible for 
those life-threatening conditions resulting from its direct or indirect conducts as 
well as for those in which, though it has or, at least, ought to have the knowledge 
of their existence and real and immediate eff ects, it has failed to take necessary 
reasonable measures of due diligence to avert the risks posed to the life of persons 
within its jurisdictions.794 In the Xákmok Kásek case, it was established by the 
Court that the precarious living conditions threatening their life and survival 
were the result of both actions and inactions of the State authorities. Th e State 
authorities to the highest level had full knowledge of the situations and the 
precarious living conditions unfolding over years. In particular, the authorities 
knew that the Community had no access to those conditions required for their 
‘dignifi ed existence’ such as water, food, health care, and education. Even the 
state of emergency meant to address the situation as a matter of priority failed 
to produce any adequate and eff ective results especially in meeting their urgent 
needs for food, water, health care and medical facilities.795
Th ese fi ndings of the Court are more or less the same with its judgments in 
similar cases concerning several indigenous communities. For instance, in the 
case of Sarayaku, the State violated the right to life of the Community by, among 
other things, deliberately allowing the placement of explosives and subsequently 
preventing them from having access to their traditional land on which they 
fully depended for their livelihoods and well-being.796 In the Sawhoyamaxa 
case, the Community was subjected to extremely unbearable living conditions 
on the roadside. Th e Community was forced to abandon their traditional estates 
(which was owned by a private party) especially because of the extreme poverty 
characterised by poor health conditions and medical care, exploitative working 
conditions, and the restrictions imposed on them to own crops and rear cattle 
and on their freedom to exercise their traditional subsistence activities by the 
owners of their estates.797 Since then, they were living in extreme destitution 
Article 1(1) of the Convention not only assumes that no person should be arbitrarily deprived 
of life (a negative obligation), but that in addition, it requires States to take all appropriate 
measures to protect and preserve the right to life (a positive obligation), in keeping with 
the duty to guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights of all individuals under their 
jurisdiction, without discrimination.’ ibid.
794 Ibid para 188 (also citing, inter alia, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para. 
155); see also Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 245; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
para 161.
795 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 194–234.
796 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 246–249.
797 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 73(61ff ) describing their living 
conditions at the material time.
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without having access to any type of essential goods such as shelter, food, water, 
health and medical care, sanitation and education798; nor did the authorities 
(though fully aware of the extreme poverty and hardship on their estates as well 
as subsequent to their settlement) take adequate and suffi  cient measures to avert 
the risk created to the life of the Community.799 At one point, the Court even 
described their extreme living conditions as follows.
In the instant case, together with the lack of lands, the life of the members of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Community is characterized by unemployment, illiteracy, morbidity 
rates caused by evitable illnesses, malnutrition, precarious conditions in their dwelling 
places and environment, limitations to access and use health services and drinking 
water, as well as marginalization due to economic, geographic and cultural causes.800
We have already noted in the Chapter seven above the nature of State’s positive 
obligation fl owing from the right to life and dignity outlined in some detail while 
discussing the case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil in relation to the right to health. 
Th is case underlined that owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, 
the ‘States have the duty to ensure the creation of conditions required to prevent 
the violations of this inalienable right’. Th is ranges from the duty to maintain 
eff ective regulatory and supervisory standards required to ensure the practical 
existence of adequate standard of health care and treatment both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms to the duty to directly, as ultimate guarantor of human 
rights, provide medical care and other treatments for all persons in need.801 Also 
in the Vera Vera case, reiterating its earlier jurisprudence, the Court held that 
the right to access to appropriate health care is directly and closely linked to the 
right to life, personal integrity and humane treatment. Th us, ‘lack of appropriate 
medical care’ is contrary to ‘the minimum material requirements of humane 
treatment due because of a person’s nature as a human being’.802 In this regard, 
it should be noted that the Vera Vera case concerns the death of the victim in 
the State custody as a result of lack of an appropriate and timely medical care 
proportionate to the wound he suff ered by a gunshot during his arrest and the 
complications following therefrom. Th e Court particularly observed the existence 
798 Ibid para 73 (61ff ) cum 156ff .
799 Ibid particularly at paras 156–159, 166–169 & 177–178. ‘Th e Court fi nds that the State violated 
Article 4(1) of the American Convention, as regards to Article 1(1) thereof, since it has not 
adopted the necessary positive measures within its powers, which could reasonably be 
expected to prevent or avoid risking the right to life of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Community.’ ibid para 178.
800 Ibid para 168.
801 Para 125. See also ibid paras 124–150.
802 Vera Vera v. Ecuador, para 44. See also ibid paras 39–44 (where it addressed medical care as 
part of the right to life and personal integrity of detainees and prisoners).
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of gross neglect and medical negligence in the hands of the State agents (the police 
and medical experts).803
Th e case of Furlan and Family also adds important perspectives to the scope 
of the positive obligation of the State to protect the right to life. In this case, 
the victim, Sebastián Furlan, had suff ered health damage at the age of fourteen 
and became disabled when a heavy beam belonging to the State military fell 
on him rendering him unconscious and, subsequently, disabled for his entire 
life. Th e accident happened at the time the victim, who was playing in the fi eld, 
was trying to hang on one of the crossbeams in the vicinity of the installation. 
Th ere was no fence or warning sign to prevent those like the victim from the 
faulty installation.804 Although the victim and his family fi led an application 
for compensation due to the damage suff ered, the extreme passivity, inactivity 
and lack of due diligence on the part of the State agents frustrated the claim 
for several years.805 Also, his families did not have the means to cover those 
medical expenses required by his condition. As the result, the victim was unable 
to receive adequate health care and psychiatric treatments.806 According to 
the Court, ‘health care must be available to everyone who needs it’.807 And, in 
principle, the health care service and treatment should be proportionate to the 
care required by the nature of their specifi c conditions and needs. In relation 
to persons with disability, for instance, it underscores that ‘all treatment for 
people with disabilities should be in the best interest of the patient, should aim 
to preserve their dignity and independence, reduce the impact of the disease, 
and improve their quality of life’.808 In this case, it was found that the State was 
responsible both for the damage to the victim’s health and subsequent suff erings 
by the victim and his family. Th erefore, the Court ordered the State to provide 
the victim with comprehensive measures aimed at rehabilitating the health 
of the victim and restoring to the extent possible his life projects as well as 
psychological and other necessary treatments for the suff erings endured by the 
victim’s family free of charge.809
8.3.2. AfCoHPR
Th ere are several cases in which the African Commission found grave violation 
of the positive obligation to guarantee a dignifi ed life. Particularly noteworthy 
are its decisions in the following communications: Malawi Africa Association 
803 See particularly paras 48–79.
804 Furlan and Family v. Argentina, paras 71–77.
805 See for instance ibid paras 189–190 cum 196, 202–204, 211–212, 261, 265 & 283.
806 Ibid paras 197 & 283.
807 Ibid para 282.
808 Ibid (citing also the case of Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, para 109).
809 Ibid paras 282–288.
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et al, Darfur case, SERAC and DRC case.810 Elsewhere, I have already described 
these cases as concerning the situation of humanitarian crisis (in fact, human 
crisis) resulting from a constitutional crisis (systemic failures) or armed confl ict. 
Th is characterisation fl ows from the nature of the facts of each case and all 
the background circumstances leading to the violations therein including the 
scope and manner of the respective States’ participation.811 For instance, in 
Malawi Africa Association et al, the Commission held, inter alia, that denying 
the people access to food and medical attention, burying them in sand and 
subjecting them to torture to the point of death show a shocking lack of respect 
for life.812 At the background of this case lies a massive and wide-spread act of, 
among other things, detention, torture, killings, discriminations, expulsions, 
confi scations and destructions of livestock, harvests and villages, all with the 
active participation of the State machineries particularly military forces just 
because the victims happen to be members of a certain ethnic groups other than 
those in power.813
Th e violation of the right to life and dignity recorded in SERAC case is 
equally grave and egregious. In deciding to embark on the oil exploration project, 
the then military junta had no regard to the basic rights and interests of the 
population living in the Ogoniland. As I argued elsewhere, the Ogoni population 
had endured double suff erings.814 One was the suff ering from contamination of 
their air, soil and water by the toxic substances and hazardous wastes from the 
oil exploration and hence practically destroying their wellbeing and livelihoods. 
Th is had, as the case shows, exposed the population to serious short- and long-
term health impacts including skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory 
ailments, and increased risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive 
problems. In fact, the Commission, having visited the area, observed that the 
pollution and environmental degradation was to the level humanly unacceptable 
that it practically made living in the region a nightmare.815 Th e other suff ering 
was caused by ruthless military operations and other agents who engaged in 
destruction of homes, villages, source of foods (farms, water sources, crops and 
810 Communications 54/91–61/91–96/93–98/93–164/97–196/97–210/98, Malawi Africa Association 
et al v. Mauritania (joined), decision on merits, 27th Ordinary Session of ACoHPR, 11  May 
2000 ((hereaft er Malawi Africa Association et al v. Mauritania); Darfur case v. Sudan; SERAC 
v. Nigeria; Communication 27/99, Democratic Republic of Congo/Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, 
decided on merits, 33rd Ordinary Session of ACoHPR, 03 May 2003 (hereaft er DRC v. Burundi et 
al).
811 Mosissa (n 15) 76–80.
812 Malawi Africa Association et al v. Mauritania, para 120; ibid 77–78.
813 Ibid paras 115–122. Overall, the Commission ‘Declare[d] that, during the period 1989–1992, 
there were grave or massive violations of human rights as proclaimed in the African Charter; 
and in particular of Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c) and 7(2)(d), 9(2), 10(1), 11, 12(1), 
14, 16(1), 18(1) and 26,’ essentially fi nding violation by the State party of the entire substantive 
provisions of the African Charter for all practical intents and purposes.
814 Mosissa (n 15) 78–79.
815 SERAC v. Nigeria, para 42 cum paras 51–54 & 67.
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animals) and causing massive displacements, evictions, detentions, torturing, 
killings and other forms of ill-treatments and terrorisations.816 According to the 
Commission, these and similar brutalities not only persecuted individuals in 
Ogoniland but also shattered the life of the Ogoni population as a whole contrary 
to their right to life, dignity, health, food, shelter and healthy environment.817
Th e Darfur case also concerns violent acts directed against the Darfur 
population by State agents and militias sponsored by the State.818 Th e facts of 
the case show that these agents had carried out forced displacements, evictions, 
looting, destruction of homes, villages, foodstuff s, crops, livestock; poisoned 
their wells as well as denied access to other water sources; and destroyed public 
facilities and private properties.819 According to the Commission, these acts and 
State’s failure to protect the population clearly amount to cruel and inhuman 
treatment which threatened the very essence of their dignity, right to life and 
humane treatment guaranteed under the African Charter.820 And in the DRC case, 
the Commission found that the Respondent States were responsible for violation, 
inter alia, of life, dignity, health and education of the people by conducting such 
acts as besieging and damaging of the hydro-dam; stopping of essential services 
in the hospital leading to deaths of patients; and the general disruption of the 
life of the population under their control contrary to their obligation under the 
African Charter and Geneva Conventions.821
8.3.3. ECSR
As stated above, human dignity is at the core of ECSR’s jurisprudence as 
well. In several of its decisions, it has consistently held that eff ective access to 
adequate health care, shelter and minimum income as well as the protection 
against homelessness, poverty and social exclusion are essential prerequisites to 
guarantee respect for human life and dignity.822 For instance, it has already been 
816 Ibid paras 55 & 61–67.
817 Ibid paras 54, 55, 58 & 62–67.
818 Mosissa (n 15) 79–80.
819 Darfur case v. Sudan, particularly paras 145–168 cum 205–216.
820 Ibid para 164.
821 DRC v. Burundi et al, paras 79–89; Mosissa (n 15) 78.
822 See for instance, FIDH v. France (Complaint No. 14/2003, para.30; DCI v. the Netherlands 
(Complaint No. 47/2008; ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008); COHRE v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 58/2009); COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010); IMATDFW v. France (Complaint 
No. 33/2006); European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless 
(FEANTSA) v. France (Complaint No. 39/2006), decision on merits of 5  December 2007 
(hereaft er FEANTSA v. France (Complaint No. 39/2006)); European Roma Rights Centre v. 
Bulgaria (Complaint No. 31/2005), decision on merits of 18 October 2006 (hereaft er ERRC v. 
Bulgaria (Complaint No. 31/2005)), MFHR v. Greece (Complaint No. 30/2005); ERRC v. Greece 
(Complaints No.15/2003); European Roma Rights Centre v. Italy (Complaint No. 27/2004), 
decision on merits of 7 December 2005 (hereaft er, ERRC v. Italy (Complaint No. 27/2004)).
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shown above that respect for human dignity was at the core of its assessments 
in COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009) and COHRE v. France (Complaint 
No. 63/2010) where it found an aggravated violation of the Social Charter owing 
to the nature and gravity of the acts committed against the Roma and Sinti 
populations. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR823, the Committee 
stated that an aggravated violation occurs when there are measures specifi cally 
aimed at certain vulnerable groups and that public authorities not only fail to 
prevent but also directly contribute to a violence against certain groups.824 It was 
found that in both complaints there were series of targeted legislative, policy and 
other administrative measures taken against the said groups. In particular, they 
were subjected to manifest discrimination in housing and other essential public 
services; exposed to segregation and extreme substandard living conditions in 
camps or ‘ghettos’; had suff ered extreme violence and inhumane treatment in the 
hands of police and other agents who forcefully evicted them without any regard 
to their dignity or due process of law. In addition, the authorities actively incited 
violence against them through, for instance, public speech and mass media.825 
So ‘In view of the information available in the case fi le, the Committee holds that 
these criteria are met in the instant case, and fi nds an aggravated violation of the 
Revised Charter’.826 In this regard, it reiterated that although it had already found 
violations of the rights of the same ethnic groups by the respective Respondent 
States (Italy and France) in other complaints827, both States failed to bring the 
situation into conformity with the Revised Social Charter but rather exacerbated 
the situation. In the words of the Committee as stated in COHRE v. France 
(Complaint No. 63/2010), para 53,
Having regard to the adoption of measures, which are incompatible with human 
dignity and specifi cally aimed at vulnerable groups, and taking into account the 
active role of the public authorities in framing and implementing this discriminatory 
approach to security, the Committee considers that the relevant criteria [COHRE v. 
Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), para 76] have been met and that there was an aggravated 
violation of human rights from the standpoint of Article 31§2 of the Revised Charter. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Committee also takes into consideration the fact that 
it has already found violations in its decision of 19  October 2009 on the merits of 
[ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008)].
In addition, the Committee also held that the manner they were treated and the 
conditions in which they were evicted from camps as well as the accompanying 
823 See COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), para 75.
824 Ibid paras 74–79; COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), paras 48–55.
825 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), para 66–78; COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 
63/2010), paras 41–54.
826 COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), para 77. See also COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 
63/2010), paras 53.
827 ERRC v. Italy (Complaint No. 27/2004); ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008).
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violence against them were incompatible with the obligation to respect the 
dignity of human being and the prohibition of non-discrimination.828 In fact, 
the Committee went further to indicate that the gravity of the violations not just 
aff ected the rights of the victims but also the very foundation of the values and 
interests of the Council of Europe. It therefore urged the Member States to take 
certain immediate measures to avert the situation.
Th e measures in question also reveal a failure to respect essential values enshrined in 
the European Social Charter, in particular human dignity, and the nature and scale 
of these measures set them apart from ordinary Charter violations. Th ese aggravated 
violations do not simply concern their victims or their relationship with the respondent 
state. Th ey also pose a challenge to the interests of the wider community and to the 
shared fundamental standards of all the Council of Europe’s member states, namely 
those of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Th e situation therefore requires 
urgent attention from all the Council of Europe member states.829
8.3.4. ECtHR
As it has already been seen, the ECtHR also attaches a signifi cant place to the 
norms protecting the right to life and dignity. Th e Court emphasises that the 
very essence of the Convention is the protection of the life and dignity of human 
being.830 So the principle of dignifi ed life (that is respect for life and dignity of 
human being), thus, serves as a principal regulative principle in its assessment 
of both the procedural and substantive guarantees enshrined in the ECHR and 
the protocols thereto. Th is is, for instance, true in the case of M.S.S. It is well-
recognised principle that Article 3 of ECHR (where the principle of respect for 
human dignity constitutes the conceptual essence of the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)831 prescribes an absolute 
obligation of the States. Th is means that no reason whatsoever can be adduced 
as a justifi cation or excuse for failure to discharge the obligations enshrined 
under this provision.832 Th e case law of the Court clearly shows that this absolute 
prescription of Article 3 is not limited to physical treatment but also extends to 
socioeconomic conditions. As such, Article 3 has been interpreted as requiring 
the State to ensure that the detention facilities are compatible with the principle 
of respect for the dignity of human being. Th is, among other things, entails 
828 COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), paras 45–53; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 
58/2009), paras 58–59, 71 & 73–75.
829 COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010), para 54; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009), 
para 78.
830 See for instance, I v.UK, para 70; Jehovah’s Witness of Moscow and others v. Russia, para 135.
831 Para 218–220.
832 Ibid paras 218 & 223.
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the obligation to secure the health and well-being of detainees; to provide the 
detainees with adequate food, sanitation, recreation and family visitation.833
In M.S.S case, the fact that the applicant was subjected to material poverty 
and extreme destitution was particularly crucial in the Court’s assessment of 
Greece’s obligation under Article 3.834 According to the Court, owing to both the 
deliberate action and inaction of the authorities, the applicant was exposed to an 
extreme material poverty which reached the level of severity and anguish required 
under this Article: the deprivation was incompatible with human dignity and 
the applicant had therefore suff ered a degrading treatment. As it observed, the 
applicant had to live in the most extreme poverty for months without being able 
to cater for his basic needs such as food, hygiene and place to live, in addition to 
the ever-present security threats to his life and uncertainty about the likelihood 
of improvement to his extreme destitution. Th e authorities did not examine his 
asylum applications nor did they provide him with alternative solutions pending 
his application; he had no other source of support whatsoever and also faced other 
practical issues as language and unfavourable job market.835 For all these reasons,
the Court considers that the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the 
applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because 
of their inaction, for the situation in which he has found himself for several months, 
living in the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any 
means of providing for his essential needs. Th e Court considers that the applicant 
has been the victim of humiliating treatment showing a lack of respect for his dignity 
and that this situation has, without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or 
inferiority capable of inducing desperation. It considers that such living conditions, 
combined with the prolonged uncertainty in which he has remained and the total lack 
of any prospects of his situation improving, have attained the level of severity required 
to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.836
833 Ibid 221. In connection with the detention of asylum seekers, the Court has particularly held 
that the following conditions are contrary to the obligation of the State to respect the dignity 
of human being: confi ning an asylum seeker to a prefabricated cabin for two months with no 
communication with relatives; absence of the opportunity to take an open air; lack of clean 
sheets and suffi  cient hygiene conditions; detention for six days in a confi ned space with no 
possibility of outside walk; lack of free access to a toilet; detention of an asylum seeker for three 
months with no access to any recreational facilities and without proper meals; detention of an 
asylum seeker for three months in an overcrowded place in appalling hygiene conditions with 
broken and unusable sanitary facilities; letting the asylum seeker to sleep in extremely fi lthy 
and crowded conditions. ibid para 221–222. See also ibid paras 225–233 (describing in detail 
the applicant’s specifi c situations vis-à-vis the obligations under Article 3 of ECHR). Th ese all 
situations in one way or the other describe violations of ESC rights guarantees such as right to 
food, right to health, right to recreation, right to clean and healthy living environment.
834 Ibid para 251 cum 231 & 263.
835 Ibid para 252–264.
836 Ibid para 263.
Chapter 8. Dignifi ed Life
Intersentia 253
In addition, the Court has time and again indicated that the scope of the 
State’s positive obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR (the right to life) to take 
necessary appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction 
has wide-ranging applications.837 For instance, in the case of Oyal, reiterating 
its jurisprudence regarding the applicability of the obligation to public health 
sectors838, the Court stated that pursuant to Article 2 the State is required, inter 
alia, to provide legislative frameworks compelling hospitals, whether public or 
private; to adopt necessary measures and standards for the protection of the lives 
of patients; to establish eff ective mechanisms required to address infringements 
to the life and well-being of patients; and to provide adequate medical treatments 
for those who suff ered life threatening diseases.839 In Oyal, there was no dispute 
that the State was directly responsible for its failure to protect the life by not 
taking preventive measures against the spread of HIV through blood transfusions 
and by not conducting an eff ective investigation against those responsible for 
the infection of the fi rst applicant.840 Th e major source of contention before the 
Court pertains to the eff ectiveness of the remedy (adequacy and appropriateness) 
off ered to the victim and his family at the domestic level compared to the nature 
of the violation in question. Th e ineff ectiveness of the remedy was expressed in 
such a way that the pecuniary damage awarded by the domestic courts could 
not even cover a one-year medical expenses and treatment of the victim. As the 
result, ‘the family was left  in debt and poverty and unable to meet the high costs 
of the continued treatment and medication’. In view of all the circumstances of 
the case and, in particular, the right and interest of the victim that was at stake 
and the degree of State responsibility engaged under Article 2, the Court held that 
the State must be liable ‘to pay for the treatment and medication expenses of the 
[victim] during his lifetime’ as well as for the ‘non-pecuniary damages’.841
Th e cases of Budayeva and Oneryildiz are important authorities with 
respect to the State’s positive obligation to protect individuals against the risks 
posed to their lives and well-being ensuing from such factors as dangerous 
activities or disaster.842 In Budayeva, which basically developed the principles in 
Oneryildiz843, the State was held responsible for the loss of life and threat to the 
physical integrity of numerous others aff ected by the massive mudslide disaster 
837 Among many authorities, see Oyal v. Turkey, paras 53–56; Budayeva and others v. Russia 
(Applications Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02) (joined), Judgment of 
20 March 2008, paras 128–145; Öneryildiz v. Turkey (Application no. 48939/99) [GC], Judgment 
of 30 November 2004, paras 69, 71–73 & 89–96.
838 Oyal v. Turkey, para 54.
839 Ibid paras 54–56.
840 Ibid paras 69, 72 & 74–77.
841 Ibid 69–72.
842 Budayeva and others v. Russia; Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC].
843 Budayeva and others v. Russia, paras 128–145 (summarising its jurisprudence pertaining, in 
particular, to the scope of State’s positive obligation fl owing from the right to life guaranteed 
under Article 2 of ECHR). See also Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], paras 71–73 & 89–96.
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because the authorities failed to provide an adequate mud-defence infrastructure, 
establish eff ective early warning systems or any other eff ective measures which 
could have prevented or at least mitigated the impact of the disaster on human 
life.844 Although the authorities were fully aware in advance of the fact that 
certain level of devastation was to come, they ‘ended up by taking no measures at 
all up to the day of the disaster’.845 As stated above, the robust understanding of 
the State’s obligation to ensure a dignifi ed life implies, inter alia, the obligation to 
take necessary steps to avoid unnecessary and preventable loss of life regardless 
of the source or nature of the threat or risks to life. In these cases, the State was, 
therefore, found in violation of both the substantive and procedural aspects of 
the positive obligation enshrined under Article  2 of the ECHR to protect and 
safeguard the lives and physical well-being of the individuals concerned.846
8.3.5. UNHRS
As argued in the Chapter four above, the principle of respect for the inherent 
life and dignity of human being is expressly provided as the foundation of all 
human rights recognised within UN human rights system. It has also been seen 
that the realisation is directly linked to the States parties’ obligation to create 
socioeconomic and political conditions necessary for ensuring the dignifi ed 
life for all human beings.847 Th e general comments, resolutions and case law of 
diff erent UN human rights bodies relating to ESC rights consistently underscore 
this obligation of the State. For instance, the HRC has identifi ed violations the 
right to life (Art 6), prohibition of torture, and the right to humane treatment (Art 
10) on the ground of, inter alia, poor detention and prison conditions. In several 
of the cases brought against Algeria, the Committee held that ‘Th e Covenant 
demands that the State party concern itself with the fate of every individual 
and treat every individual with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person’. In particular it emphasised that ‘persons deprived of their liberty may 
not be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the 
deprivation of liberty and that they must be treated with humanity and respect 
for their dignity’.848 It also reached the same conclusion in the case of Abdullayev 
v. Turkmenistan.849 For the Committee, subjecting inmates to deplorable prison 
844 Budayeva and others v. Russia, paras 146–160. See also Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], paras 97–110.
845 Budayeva and others v. Russia, para 156. See also Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], paras 100–103.
846 Budayeva and others v. Russia, paras 161–165. See also Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], paras 111–118.
847 See Chapter 4.7 above.
848 HRC Annual Report (2015), para 105 (discussing its fi ndings in the cases of Boudehane v. 
Algeria, Bouzeriba v. Algeria, Fedsi v. Algeria, Bousseloub v. Algeria, Zaier v. Algeria, Kroumi 
v. Algeria, Dehimi and Ayache v. Algeria, Ammari v. Algeria, Louddi v. Algeria, Allioua and 
Kerouane v. Algeria).
849 Annual Report (2015), para 108. In this case, ‘the Committee noted the author’s detailed claims 
concerning the deplorable prison conditions [where he was held]. He claimed, for example, 
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conditions is a violation of the right to be treated with humanity and respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person.850 In Quliyev v. Azerbaijan, having 
considered the size of prisons cells, absence of opportunities for work, education, 
vocational training or sports for individuals serving life sentences and the strict 
limitations imposed on the same regarding family visitations, the Committee 
concluded that ‘the author’s conditions of detention […] violated his right to be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person, and were therefore contrary to article 10 (1)’.851 In more general sense, 
it emerges from the case law of the Committee that the principle of human 
dignity (humane treatment) requires the State parties to ensure access to, inter 
alia, hygiene prison conditions (such as clean toilet, bath rooms, sleeping places, 
clothing, etc.), basic health care, including regular visitation from physicians, 
adequate and nutritious food, clean water (both for drinking and cleaning 
purposes) and to the outside world (including regular family contact and open 
air and sun).
Similar to other human rights courts and monitoring bodies discussed above, 
the CRPD’s emerging jurisprudence is also generating interesting principles in 
connection with the nature of treatment that persons with disabilities ought to 
have in and in relation to detention or prison centres. In this regard, the CRPD 
reiterates the State party’s obligation to ensure, inter alia, accessible infrastructures, 
facilities and public services relative to their specifi c disability conditions and 
individualised needs in the light of the principle of reasonable accommodation.852 
that the isolation block lacked basic hygiene, there were around 40 inmates in one cell, a metal 
barrel emptied once a day served as a toilet in the cell; and that, during the day, inmates had to 
sit on the concrete cell fl oor and that at night-time they were given dirty blankets, insuffi  cient 
in number. Th ese allegations were not contested by the State party. Th e Committee recalled 
that persons deprived of their liberty may not be subjected to any hardship or constraint other 
than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty […]’.
850 Ibid.
851 HRC Annual Report (2015), para 107.
852 In this regard, it should be noted that accessibility and reasonable accommodation runs 
throughout the substantive rights of vulnerable persons enshrined in the CRPD. Article 9(1) 
partly provides that ‘To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate 
fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with 
disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, 
to information and communications, including information and communications technologies 
and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban 
and in rural areas’. And per Article  2 of the same, ‘“Reasonable accommodation” means 
necessary and appropriate modifi cation and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or 
undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the 
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. Th is same provision also states that denial of reasonable accommodation is an 
aspect of discriminatory treatment. According to the CRPD, accessibility is unconditional and 
therefore should be ensured when it is requested. Reasonable accommodation is personal and 
requires making every eff ort without however incurring undue burden or cost. See F v. Austria 
(Communication No. 21/2014, UN Doc. CRPD/C/14/D/21/2014) decision on merits of 21 August 
2015, para 8.4–8.5; H.M. v. Sweden, paras 8.3–8.4; Bacher v. Austria, paras 9.4–9.5.
256 Intersentia
Part Two. Th e Legal Obligations of the State under ESC Rights
in the Light of International ESC Rights Jurisprudence
It is incumbent upon the State party to ensure that they are treated humanely and 
with due respect for the inherent dignity of human being. Th ese, among other 
things, imply the duty to care for their security and to provide adequate safeguard 
against ill-treatment, abuse, exploitation and violence and the provision of 
customised health care and support services required by each of persons with 
disabilities in custody. Failure to ensure a reasonable accommodation in all fi elds 
of life on the basis of equality and without any kind of discrimination would result 
in the violation of their right to a dignifi ed treatment. Th is was, for instance, 
the conclusion the CRPD reached in the cases of Adam v. Saudi Arabia, X v. 
Argentina853 and Noble v. Australia854 where it found violation of the obligation 
to ensure reasonable accommodation within the detention and prison centres.855
Moreover, the CRPD has also consistently held that the State party has the 
obligation to ensure that persons with disabilities have ‘equal access to all goods, 
products and services that are open or provided to the public in a manner that 
ensures their eff ective and equal access and respects their dignity’ both in the 
public and private sector.856 Th at is, the fact of their disability should not in any way 
disadvantage or lead to excluding them from equally enjoying their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Th e principles and values and the specifi c rights recognised 
in the Convention require that the State laws, policies and practices should be 
guided by the principle of respect for the inherent dignity and, as such, should 
aim at promoting the autonomy, independence, full and eff ective participation 
and inclusion in the society in equal terms with other members of the society.857
Th e CESCR858 also recognises that ensuring access to, at the very least, minimum 
socioeconomic conditions without any form of discrimination and irrespective of 
the level of available resources is a fundamental principle of ESC rights guaranteed 
853 Communication No. 8/ 2012, UN Doc. CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, decision on merits of 11  April 
2014.
854 Marlon James Noble v. Australia (Communication No. 7/2012, UN Doc. CRPD/C/16/D/7/2012), 
decision on merits of 2 September 2016 (hereaft er Noble v. Australia).
855 See generally Adam v. Saudi Arabia, paras; 11.2–11.6; X v. Argentina, paras 8.5–8.6 & 8.9; Noble 
v. Australia, paras 8.3–8.10.
856 Bacher v. Austria, para 9.6 cum paras 9.4–9.4–9.5.
857 See for instance Liliane Gröninger v. Germany (Communication No. 2/2010, UN Doc. CRPD/
C/D/2/2010) decision on merits of 4 April 2014 (hereaft er Gröninger v. Germany), para 6.2. And, 
among several other authorities, see Bacher v. Austria; F v. Austria; Bujdoso et al v. Hungary; 
H.M. v. Sweden; Szilvia Nyusti and Péter Takács v. Hungary (Communication No. 1/2010, UN 
Doc. CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010) decision on merits of 16 April 2013 (hereaft er Nyusti and Takács v. 
Hungary); J.H. v. Australia; Gemma Beasley v. Australia; Lockrey v. Australia.
858 For an interesting discussion of the Committee’s emerging jurisprudence under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, see particularly Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Between Sovereignty and 
Accountability: Th e Emerging Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights under the Optional Protocol’ (2020) 42 Human Rights Quarterly 
48 (who provides a helpful account of the Committee’s overall approach to the individual 
communications under the Optional Protocol including the four landmark cases discussed 
below. See particularly pp 65–82). I am particularly grateful to Prof. Ssenyonjo for bringing 
this material to my attention.
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under ICESCR. For instance, in Calero v. Ecuador859 and Rodríguez v. Spain860 
which concerned the right to social security, the CESCR in substance held that 
guaranteeing ‘the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of this 
right’ by designing and implementing ‘a social security scheme that provides a 
minimum essential level of benefi t, without discrimination of any kind’ is essential 
in ensuring an adequate standard of living compatible with the dignity of human 
being. To this end, it is imperative that the State party guarantees the rights of 
individuals to have equal access to benefi ts which must be adequate to enable them 
to enjoy at least basic health care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, 
foodstuff s, and the most basic forms of education.861 Similarly, in Djazia and 
Bellili v. Spain and I.D.G. v. Spain862 which, in turn, concerned the right to housing 
(eviction related complaints in particular), it underscored that ‘Th e human right 
to adequate housing is a fundamental right central to the enjoyment of all’ human 
rights recognised in ICESCR and ICCPR. As such, it ‘should be ensured to all persons 
irrespective of income or access to economic resources’ and that any eviction 
enforcement measures for whatever reasons must pay due regard to the principle 
of respect for the dignity of human being and necessary procedural safeguards. In 
particular, the CESCR stresses that eviction should not under any circumstances 
result in rendering individuals homeless.863 Interestingly, in all these cases, the 
CESCR reiterated the views it has already established in the general comments that 
the State obligation to ensure the minimum essential level of benefi ts protected by 
the Covenant rights does not depend on the level of resource or development. ‘In 
order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum 
core obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate that every 
eff ort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal in an eff ort to 
satisfy, as a matter of priority, these minimum obligations’.864
Th erefore, the State’s obligation to respect and guarantee the dignifi ed life for 
all persons generally and for those in a particularly vulnerable position including 
detainees, prisoners, persons with disabilities (see also next chapter) is well-
recognised in the jurisprudence of UN human rights bodies. It has been seen that 
this obligation requires, inter alia, ensuring, at the very least, minimum essential 
economic and social benefi ts which must be adequate to guarantee access to basic 
health care, food, housing, clean water and education as well as removing legal 
and structural barriers to full and eff ective participation in all fi elds of societal life.
859 Marcia Cecilia Trujillo Calero v. Ecuador (Communication No. 10/2015, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/63/D/10/2015) decision on merits of 26 March 2018 (hereaft er Calero v. Ecuador).
860 Miguel Ángel López Rodríguez v. Spain (Communication No.1/2013, UN Doc. E/C.12/57/D/1/2013) 
decision on merits of 4 March 2016 (hereaft er Rodríguez v. Spain).
861 Calero v. Ecuador, paras 11.1–11.2 & Rodríguez v. Spain, paras 10.1–10.4.
862 Communication No. 2/2014, UN Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014, decision on merits of 17 June 2015.
863 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, paras 13.1–13.4 & I.D.G. v. Spain, paras 11.1–12.4 cum 10.5.
864 Calero v. Ecuador, para 14.3 cum 13.3. See Rodríguez v. Spain, para 10.6; Djazia and Bellili v. 
Spain, paras 13.1 & 15.3–15.5; I.D.G. v. Spain, para 11.1; CESCR General Comment No. 3, paras 
11–12.
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8.4. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
Th e discussion in this Chapter has shown in detail that international human 
rights courts and monitoring bodies consider that ensuring a dignifi ed life 
for every human being constitutes one of the core substantive human rights 
obligations of the State. In relation to the ESC rights regime, this obligation 
particularly consists in securing for every person access to minimum essential 
material conditions required to adequately enjoy the substantive core of such 
rights as health care, food, housing, drinking water, sanitation and education 
without any kind of discrimination. In particular, it was seen that the right to 
a dignifi ed life, which is based on the richer conception of the right to life and 
the right to dignity, signifi es a holistic approach to the protection of all human 
rights thereby expanding the scope of the State negative and positive obligations. 
Th is means that, on the one hand, the State has a negative obligation to refrain 
from interfering directly or indirectly in the dignifi ed life of individuals; on the 
other hand, it is positively required take all necessary and appropriate measures 
with the view to ensure that all individuals within its jurisdiction have access to 
these conditions of life. Th e ESC rights cases discussed above show that these 
basic obligations of the State have been applied in wide-ranging socioeconomic 
contexts wherein the life and dignity of human being is said to be threatened by 
such factors as extreme destitution (poverty), ill-health, homelessness, pollution, 
natural disaster, displacement, unemployment, detention and prison conditions. 
In substance, it is a well-established principle that the State should not under any 
circumstances cause, tolerate or let any person within its jurisdiction to inhuman 




AND THE PROTECTION OF 
VULNERABLE PERSONS
9.1. INTRODUCTION
As it was seen in Chapter four, the principle of human dignity signifi es an 
unconditional respect for the inherent life and value of human being. It 
accordingly proscribes any form of hierarchical or discriminatory treatment of 
human beings both generally and in relation to the realisation of the essential 
material conditions of life. In particular, it requires that a special attention be 
given to the socioeconomic needs of vulnerable persons in a society.865 It was 
also seen that international human rights law compels the States to respect and 
ensure to ensure the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of all human rights for 
everyone within their jurisdiction.866 Th is implies that the States are required 
to guarantee the rights on the basis of the principle of equality and non-
discrimination. Th e principles of equality and non-discrimination have special 
signifi cance particularly in ensuring the ESC rights of vulnerable persons both 
in their procedural and substantive aspects.867 We have already considered 
above their procedural aspects in connection with the procedural dimensions of 
the protection of ESC rights (Chapters fi ve through seven). And some of their 
substantive imports were also considered, though indirectly, while discussing the 
right to dignifi ed life in Chapter 8 above. Th e purpose of this Chapter is now to 
provide a detailed examination of international ESC rights jurisprudence with 
the view to see their specifi c substantive implications in understanding (the scope 
of) the obligation of the State in the realisation of the essential material condition 
of life of the vulnerable persons. But before discussing this, it is necessary to fi rst 
clarify the sense in which the notion of equality and non-discrimination and 
vulnerable persons are deployed in ESC rights case law.
865 Malpas (n 30) 25.
866 See Introduction to Part two above.
867 Yeshanew (n 69) 344ff .
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9.2. THE CONCEPTION OF EQUALITY AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION
As it can be seen from the discussion below, the notions and implications of 
equality and non-discrimination have signifi cantly expanded over the course of 
time. In my view, this interesting development can be justifi ed as an accurate 
understanding (refl ection) of the nature and implications of the underlying 
principle of human dignity. Th us, following Dworkin, everyone in a political 
society has the right to equality of respect and concern in the designing of the 
institutions that govern their socioeconomic and political life; to equally benefi t 
from the fruits of these institutions; to have equal concern and care for the 
interest of others; and to rightfully expect the same level of concern and care from 
other fellow human beings.868 Th is also implies that by virtue of being a member 
with equal dignity and rights, every person is equally entitled to have access and 
opportunity to enjoy all the material resources and opportunities available in 
his/her country. Gould elucidates this point using her notion of equal positive 
freedom. And according to Gould, the principle of equal positive freedom, that 
is, the right to have equal access to and practically enjoy those material and 
social conditions necessary for the realisation of one’s short-term and long-term 
projects of life is the substantive foundation of social justice and democracy.869 
Th is explains the close normative relationship between the principle of equality, 
non-discrimination and the protection of vulnerable persons against various 
conditions of vulnerability. Interestingly, this relationship is also well-recognised 
and developed in ESC rights jurisprudence. Th e substantive relationship between 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination has already been established 
elsewhere and that these two principles are oft en regarded as interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing human rights norms. In fact, one is seen as the corollary of 
the other and, for this reason, they are oft en referred to as the twin human rights 
principles.870
868 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 8) 180–182.
869 Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (n 90) 37–39 & 71–74.
870 See CESCR General Comment No. 16: Th e Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment 
of all Economic, Social and Cultural rights (art. 3), adopted in its Forty-fourth Session (2005), 
para 10; CESCR General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and 
cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), adopted in its Forty-second Session (2009), paras 1–6; HRC General Comment No. 
18: Non-discrimination, adopted in its Th irty-seventh session (1989); General comment No. 
28: Article 3 (Th e Equality of Rights between Men and Women), adopted in its Sixty-eighth 
session (2000) (which updated and replaced its former General Comment No. 4: Article  3 
(Equal right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Civil and Political Rights), adopted in 
its Th irteenth session (1981)); CRPD General Comment No. 1: Article 12 (Equal Recognition 
before the Law), adopted in its Eleventh Session (2014). For more on the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination, see generally OHCHR Report, UN Docs E/2008/76; Fredman (n 
30); Sandra Fredman, ‘Th e Public Sector Equality Duty’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 
Chapter 9. Equality, Non-Discrimination and the Protection of Vulnerable Persons
Intersentia 261
Th e principle of equality is based on and, at the same time, prescribes the 
normative ideal that likes be treated alike and unlikes be treated diff erently.871 
In human rights jurisprudence, this is understood as implying two broad but 
interrelated notions of equality: formal (de jure) and substantive (de facto). Th e 
distinction between the two notions may not always be bright but it is clear at 
least in theory that formal equality is said to be mainly concerned with ensuring 
the equality of everyone before the law and the equal protection of law regardless 
of the social, economic or other kinds of diff erences between individuals. Th e 
fundamental aspect of formal equality is therefore ensuring the neutrality and 
objectivity of the legal systems, that is, the proscription of discrimination against 
individuals through legislations. Substantive equality, on the other hand, is 
concerned more with equality of practice or equality on substantive grounds.872 
Th is is based on the understanding that formal equality may not necessarily result 
in or eff ectively guarantee the achievement of equality of persons in fact. Formal 
equality is thus simply an important means but not an end in itself. Accordingly, 
the function of substantive equality is to point to this impotence of formal equality 
and to prescribe that all relevant diff erences and circumstances negatively aff ecting 
the full and eff ective enjoyment by everyone of his or her human rights should 
also be taken into account in redressing socioeconomic conditions of inequality. 
If not, formal equality would merely result in the perpetuation of the status quo of 
inequality and injustice already in place.873
Th e principle of non-discrimination complements the principle of equality 
from a diff erent angle. According to the CESCR, discrimination can be defi ned as 
‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other diff erential treatment 
that is directly or indirectly based on prohibited grounds of discrimination and 
which has the intention or eff ect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on equal footing, of covenant rights.’874 Th is can occur 
both in law (de jure discrimination) and in practice (de facto discrimination). 
So, the principle of non-discrimination has both a formal and a substantive 
aspect. In the formal sense, it concerns the existence of discrimination justifi ed 
through legislations whereas in the substantive sense it concerns the existence 
405; Mathew Craven, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on Its Development (Oxford University Press 1995).
871 CESCR General Comment No. 16, CESCR General Comment No. 20; HRC General Comment 
No. 18; HRC General Comment No. 28. See also Bilchitz, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic 
Crisis, and Legal Doctrine’ (n 17) 58–59; Craven (n 870) 155; Fredman (n 30) Chapt 7.
872 CESCR General Comment No. 16, CESCR General Comment No. 20; HRC General Comment 
No. 18; HRC General Comment No. 28.
873 CESCR General Comment No.16, paras 6–15. See also E/2008/76; Bacher v. Austria, paras 
9.4–9.5; J.H. v. Australia, para 7.7; Beasley v. Australia, paras 8.4–8.6; Lockrey v. Australia, 
paras 8.4–8.6.
874 CESCR General Comment No.16, para 10–14; CESCR General Comment No.20, para.7.
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of discrimination in practice usually engrained in the historical, socioeconomic, 
cultural, political and institutional backgrounds and practices of a society.875
Discrimination can also be categorised as direct, indirect or systemic. Direct 
discrimination occurs when an individual or a group is treated less favourably 
than those in a similar situation whereas indirect discrimination takes place 
when a practical application of a seemingly neutral measure (law or policy) 
practically results in discriminating certain individuals or group of individuals. 
Th is particularly results from laws or policies adopted without taking due account 
of unfavourable background conditions disproportionately aff ecting vulnerable 
persons in a society.876 According to the ECSR, indirect ‘discrimination may 
arise by failing to take due and positive account of all relevant diff erences or by 
failing to take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages 
that are open to all are genuinely accessible by and to all.’877 Th us, the adoption 
of legislative or other measures without the eff ective participation of vulnerable 
persons would certainly perpetuate the disadvantaged positions of the vulnerable 
persons and as such fall foul of the prohibition of indirect non-discrimination, 
however neutral such measures may seem on their face value.878 For this reason, it 
has been underscored that ‘In a democratic society, human diff erence should not 
only be viewed positively but should be responded to with discernment in order 
to ensure real and eff ective equality’.879
Finally, discrimination is regarded as systemic when it is engrained not just 
in legislations and practices but has also become pervasive, persistent and deeply 
entrenched in the social and organisational behaviours, attitudes, perceptions 
and practices in a society.880 According to the CESCR,
discrimination against some groups is pervasive and persistent and deeply entrenched 
in social behaviour and organisation, oft en involving unchallenged or indirect 
discrimination. Such systemic discrimination can be understood as legal rules, 
policies, practices or predominant cultural attitudes in either the public or private 
sector which create relative disadvantages for some groups, and privileges for other 
groups.881
875 CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 8–9; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, paras 268–274; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, preliminary objections, merits, reparations 
and costs, judgment of June 23, 2005, paras 184–187.
876 CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 10 & 12; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, para 271; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, para 185; X v. United Republic of Tanzania, para 8.4; 
Y v. United Republic of Tanzania, para 8.4; H.M. v. Sweden, paras 8.3–8.4; Bujdoso et al v. Hungary, 
para 9.3–9.4; Bacher v. Austria, paras 9.4–9.5; J.H. v. Australia, para 7.3; Beasley v. Australia, paras 
8.3; Lockrey v. Australia, paras 8.3; Noble v. Australia, para 8.3; V.F.C. v. Spain, paras 8.4–8.5; 
Nyusti and Takács v. Hungary, para 9.4; F v. Austria, para 8.5; Given v. Australia, pars 8.5–8.9.
877 ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 83.
878 CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 10–14.
879 ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 83.
880 X v. United Republic of Tanzania, paras 8.2–8.3; Y v. United Republic of Tanzania, para 8.2–8.3.
881 CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 12. See also HRC General Comment No. 28, para 5.
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Individuals may also suff er from multiple forms of discrimination (and therefore 
referred to as multiple discrimination, intersectional discrimination or cross-
sectional discrimination) because of their identity and social status.882 For 
instance, a disabled Roma women may suff er multiple forms of discrimination 
due to her identity as a female, as a women of Roma origin and as women with 
disability and on account of her poor economic situation and the like.883 Th is 
implies the State’s obligation to take due and positive account of individual 
circumstances in designing eff ective measures aimed at redressing diff erent forms 
and practices of discrimination in a society. In particular, it should be emphasised 
that the State obligation to respect and ensure all human rights for all persons on 
the terms of equality and non-discrimination is now considered as a fundamental 
rule of general international law.884 Th is position is well-summarised by the 
IACtHR as follows.
Th e principle of the equal and eff ective protection of the law and of non-discrimination 
constitutes an outstanding element of the human rights protection system embodied 
in many international instruments and developed by international legal doctrine and 
case law. At the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental 
principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens. 
Th e juridical framework of national and international public order rests on it and it 
permeates the whole juridical system.
Th is principle is fundamental for the safeguard of human rights in both international 
and national law; it is a principle of peremptory law. Consequently, States are obliged 
not to introduce discriminatory regulations into their laws, to eliminate regulations 
of a discriminatory nature, to combat practices of this nature, and to establish norms 
and other measures that recognize and ensure the eff ective equality before the law 
of each individual. A distinction that lacks objective and reasonable justifi cation is 
discriminatory.885
882 See for instance, Calero v. Ecuador, paras. 19.1–19.6 (where the CESCR analysed the applicant’s 
right to social security in terms of gender, health, age, economic condition and unpaid former 
domestic worker).
883 CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 17 & 27. ‘Some individuals or groups of individuals 
face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited grounds, for example women belonging 
to an ethnic or religious minority. Such cumulative discrimination has a unique and specifi c 
impact on individuals and merits particular consideration and remedying.’ ibid para 17. ‘A 
person’s social and economic situation when living in poverty or being homeless may result 
in pervasive discrimination, stigmatization and negative stereotyping which can lead to the 
refusal of, or unequal access to, the same quality of education and health care as others, as well 
as the denial of or unequal access to public places.’ ibid para 35. See generally, ibid paras 15–35 
(discussing several prohibited grounds of discrimination under ICESCR).
884 VDPA 1993, para.15; CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 2–3 & 7; HRC General Comment 
No. 28, para 3; HRC General Comment No. 18, paras 1 & 3; CRPD General Comment No. 1, 
para 1.
885 YATAMA v. Nicaragua, paras 184–185 cum nn 154–155 (listing international instruments 
recognising the right to equality and non-discrimination, and its jurisprudence). See also 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 268–274.
264 Intersentia
Part Two. Th e Legal Obligations of the State under ESC Rights
in the Light of International ESC Rights Jurisprudence
Th us, equality and non-discrimination are fundamental principles of higher 
normative status and profound practical implications permeating through the 
entire national and international legal order. Taken together, they prescribe 
multifaceted obligations of the State especially in addressing both the root-causes 
and eff ects of inequalities and discrimination.
9.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
VULNERABLE PERSONS
What are the implications of the principle of equality and non-discrimination in 
understanding the notion of socioeconomic vulnerability and the corresponding 
rights of vulnerable persons? First, it should be noted that while there is so far no 
clear and comprehensive defi nition of vulnerable persons under international 
human rights law, it is generally understood that the phrase vulnerable 
persons encompasses those persons or group of persons who have suff ered or 
continue to suff er from historical disadvantages, exclusions, discriminations or 
marginalisation and as a result are prevented from participating in or benefi ting 
from all socioeconomic advantages and opportunities available within their 
society on equal terms with others. Th e list of persons falling under this category 
is constantly changing but it generally includes women, children, persons 
with disabilities, older (elderly) persons, indigenous communities, minorities, 
migrants, internally displaced persons, HIV/AIDS victims, the poor and so 
on.886
886 For instance, the ACoHPR defi nes as follows: ‘Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are 
people who have faced and/or continue to face signifi cant impediments to their enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups include, but are 
not limited to, women, linguistic, racial, religious minorities, children (particularly orphans, 
young girls, children of low-income groups, children in rural areas, children of immigrants 
and of migrant workers, children belonging to linguistic, racial, religious or other minorities, 
and children belonging to indigenous populations/communities), youth, the elderly, people 
living with, or aff ected by, HIV/AIDS, and other persons with terminal illnesses, persons 
with persistent medical problems, child and female-headed households and victims of natural 
disasters, indigenous populations/communities, persons with disabilities, victims of sexual 
and economic exploitation, detainees, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and intersex 
people, victims of natural disasters and armed confl ict, refugees and asylum seekers, internally 
displaced populations, legal or illegal migrant workers, slum dwellers, landless and nomadic 
pastoralists, workers in the informal sector of the economy and subsistence agriculture, persons 
living in informal settlements and workers in irregular forms of employment such as home-
based workers, casual and seasonal workers.’ See ACoHPR Principles and Guidelines on ESC 
Rights, para 1(e). Th e synthesis of the European Committee of Social Rights’ understanding 
of vulnerable persons as indicated in its Conclusions and Statement of Interpretations and 
jurisprudence gives as the following lists: women, children, people with disabilities, young 
people with problems, young off enders, young and older workers, unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers and migrants, invalids, large families and elderly persons, children from minorities, 
children seeking asylum, refugee children, children in hospital, children in care, pregnant 
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Th e socioeconomic and political consequences of the the practices of 
inequality and discrimination are particularly pervasive on the vulnerable 
members of society. Th e principles of equality and non-discrimination aims to 
counter such negative impacts by requiring that persons in an identical situation 
be treated identically and those in a diff erent situations be treated diff erently.887 
Hence, in the context of ESC rights, the practical importance of the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination lies in the fact that they are able to clearly point 
to the specifi c needs of the vulnerable persons and the protections that should 
be aff orded to them by the States concerned. Th is is true especially with respect 
to ensuring de facto equality and the prohibition of de facto discrimination 
which directly point to the negative eff ects of the conditions of vulnerability on 
the enjoyment of human rights. Th us, while these principles prohibit all forms 
of arbitrary and unjustifi ed diff erential treatment of individuals or groups 
situated in similar socioeconomic conditions, they also require the adoption of 
necessary and objective measures specifi cally aimed at preventing, eliminating or 
remedying the disadvantages suff ered by the vulnerable persons.888
Th erefore, as far as the substantive protection of ESC rights are concerned, 
we can say that the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and the protection 
of individuals against socioeconomic conditions of vulnerability (in short, the 
protection of vulnerable persons) are all concerned with ensuring the rights of the 
most disadvantaged and marginalised persons or group of persons in a society. 
To this extent, these principles require that due and special emphasis be placed on 
the specifi c circumstances or background factors aff ecting all vulnerable persons 
and hence jeopardising the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of their ESC rights 
in equal terms with other persons in a society. One may say that the diff erence 
between these principles is only a matter of viewpoint and emphasis than of 
substantive content but this in itself is crucial as far as the practical protection of 
ESC rights is concerned.
teenagers, teenage mothers, children deprived of their liberty, individuals and families suff ering 
exclusion and poverty, low-income persons, unemployed, single parent households, persons 
with disabilities including mental health problems, persons internally displaced due to wars 
or natural disasters. See Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights, 
1 September 2008, paras 287, 420, 450, 463, 502, 666(67) & 668. See also its Conclusions XIV-2, 
Statement of Interpretation on Article 9, p. 56–61; Conclusions 2006, Moldova, pp. 122 – 123; 
Conclusions 2005, Statement of Interpretation on Article 14§1; Conclusions 2005, Bulgaria, 
pp. 32–33; Conclusions 2003, Statement of interpretation on Article 17, France, p. 174; Autisme 
Europe v. France (Complaint No. 13/2002), para 53; Conclusions 2003, Italy, p. 342.
887 See ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), paras 81–83; See also Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) v France (Complaints No.50/2008), decision on merits of 
9 September 2009 (hereaft er CFDT v France (Complaints No.50/2008), paras 38 & 42; Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 271; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, para 185.
888 See ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), paras  81–83; Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) v France (Complaints No.50/2008), decision on merits of 
9 September 2009 (hereaft er CFDT v France (Complaints No.50/2008), paras 38 & 42; Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 271; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, para 185; 
YATAMA v. Nicaragua, paras 185–186.
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It should be stressed that while equality and non-discrimination put due 
emphasis on the nature of treatments that ought to be prohibited or promoted 
through legislative and other practical measures, the principle of the protection of 
vulnerable persons enables us to identify those negative practical socioeconomic 
conditions of vulnerability undermining the free and eff ective enjoyment of ESC 
rights and hence ought to be redressed both in law and practice. It should also be 
noted that the most common conditions of vulnerability such as marginalisation, 
exclusion, stigma, poverty, gender, age, health, ethnicity, language, culture, religion 
and other barriers usually originate from and operate in complex historical, 
sociocultural, political or structural factors aff ecting vulnerable persons.889 Th is, in 
turn, makes it clear that, in one sense, the principle of the protection of vulnerable 
persons has to do with the practical extension and application of the normative 
ideals of equality and non-discrimination to the specifi c economic, social, cultural, 
political or institutional circumstances undermining the enjoyment of ESC rights 
by vulnerable persons. In another sense, it implies the obligation of the State to 
take due and positive account of and hence promote the specifi c socioeconomic 
interests of individuals or groups aff ected by various conditions of vulnerability.890 
Th is, in turn, expresses the principle of solidarity (mutuality) which should exist 
between members of a society constituted on the value of respect for the inherent life 
and dignity of human being.891 In a modern political society, the State principally 
shoulders this solidaristic function towards the vulnerable persons as an ultimate 
defender and guarantor of the inherent life and dignity of human being and the 
rights thereof. In substance, it can be argued that the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination signify the special obligation of every State to take positive 
measures aimed at ensuring the full and equal enjoyment by the vulnerable 
persons of their ESC rightsn as a matter of priority.892 As it can be seen from the 
889 See particularly CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras 15–35; ACoHPR Principles and 
Guidelines on ESC Rights, paras 19, 31–38 & Part IV (under sections entitled ‘Vulnerable 
Groups, Equality and Non-Discrimination’).
890 See generally CESCR General Comment No. 16; CESCR General Comment 20; UN Doc. 
E/2008/76; Mosissa (n 15) 53–54.
891 For general discussion on solidarity in the context of international law, see Vicente Marotta 
Rangel, ‘Th e Solidarity Principle, Franscisco de Victoria and the Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ in Holger P Hestermeyer and others (eds), Co-existence, Cooperation and Solidarity 
(Martinus Nijhoff  2012); Abdul G Koroma, ‘Solidarity: Evidence of Emerging International 
Legal Principle’ in Holger P Hestermeyer and others (eds), Co-existence, Cooperation and 
Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff  2012); Holger P Hestermeyer, ‘Reality or Aspiration? Solidarity in 
International Environmental Law and World Trade Law’ in Holger P Hestermeyer and others 
(eds), Co-existence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff  2012); Pier Francesco Lotito, 
‘Solidarity’ in William BT Mock and Gianmario Demuro (eds), Human Rights in Europe: 
Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Carolina Academic 
Press 2010); Holly Cullen, ‘Th e Collective Complaints Systems of the European Social Charter: 
Interpretative Methods of the European Committee of Social Rights’ (2009) 9 Human Rights 
Law Review 61.
892 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para 12; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
paras 271–273.
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following discussion, this special obligation of the States towards all vulnerable 
persons has been well-developed in international ESC rights jurisprudence.
9.4. JURISPRUDENCE
9.4.1. IACtHR
Th e IACtHR has found violation of the rights of vulnerable persons in many cases 
especially in the context of indigenous communities, persons with disabilities 
and children and in such contexts as detention conditions and reproductive 
health programmes. As noted in the introduction to this Part, in all cases, it is 
the principled approach of the Court that by virtue of Article 1(1) and Article 2 of 
the American Convention, States parties have a generic obligation to respect and 
guarantee the free and full enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms within their 
domestic legal system.893 From this follow other special obligations on account 
of the particular needs of the right holders due to either unfavourable personal 
circumstances or the specifi c situations in which they fi nd themselves such as 
extreme poverty, destitution, social exclusion, childhood and so on.894 And, the 
Court has increasingly been developing the practical implications of these generic 
obligations and the specially aggravated responsibility of each State towards 
vulnerable persons in its contentious and advisory jurisdictions.
Th us, in the case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, the central theme of the 
application was about the applicants who could not participate in their country’s 
electoral process representing their indigenous communities because of the 
electoral law requirement that all candidates be members of a certain political 
party. Th e applicants argued that such a requirement constituted, inter alia, a 
violation of the right to non-discrimination both against the victims and their 
communities which are the indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic 
Coast of Nicaragua.895 Th e fact that the victims were members of the indigenous 
and ethnic communities and that indigenous and ethnic communities generally 
suff er from ‘serious diffi  culties that place them in a situation of vulnerability 
and marginalization’ were among the important considerations in the Court’s 
analysis.896 It held that requiring members of indigenous and ethnic groups to 
form a political party as a precondition for candidacy is an undue restriction 
constituting an act of a discrimination against candidates proposed by YATAMA 
893 See for instance, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 152–155 & 109–111.
894 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 154–155; Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para 
244; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 161ff ; Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, para 
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(an organisation representing the said communities). Th is, in turn, aff ected not 
only the candidates in question but also their communities who diff er from the 
rest of the population in terms of their customs, language and organisation and 
to whom the notion of a political party is alien to their tradition. Th us, by failing 
to take their unique situation into account, the requirement has indirectly denied 
them the right and opportunity to participate in the election process and hence 
systematically prevented them from taking part in the government and public 
aff airs of their country. Th e State is obliged to take all necessary positive measures 
including the removal of the legal and practical discrimination aff ecting diff erent 
social groups to guarantee full and eff ective exercise of the right to participation. 
To this end, it is essential that the State pays due regard to the specifi c obstacles 
or barriers preventing the indigenous communities from equal participation in 
decision-making process aff ecting their rights and development in the society.897
Th e Court has extensively dealt with the violation of several ESC rights in 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay case, also referred to in the 
previous chapters. Th is case particularly indicates the signifi cant relationship 
between socioeconomic conditions of vulnerability and the violation of the 
right to dignifi ed existence of individuals and their Community. In this regard, 
it is important to see the way the Court characterised the gravity of the living 
conditions of the Community. In several places in the case, it referred to their 
condition using the following phrases: ‘acute vulnerability,’ ‘misery,’ ‘extreme and 
particular vulnerability,’ ‘extreme vulnerability,’ ‘miserable living conditions,’ 
‘demonstrated condition of extreme vulnerability,’ ‘special vulnerability’. Th ese 
characterisations by the Court clearly express the gravity of their extreme 
conditions that the members of the Community were exposed to which, in turn, 
not only threatened but actually violated their ‘right to dignifi ed existence’.898 As 
previously noted, the main reason behind the violation of their ESC rights was the 
loss of their traditional land and, subsequent to their displacement, the failure of 
the State to ensure access to basic conditions of life required by the degree of their 
vulnerability. Th e loss of their traditional land and access to the natural resources 
therein had deprived the Community of all the traditional sources of food, 
water, shelter, and medicine. Th e State also did not take necessary and adequate 
measures to avert the conditions threatening their dignifi ed existence.899
Similarly, the Court has also given due consideration to the extremely 
vulnerable situations of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community in fi nding 
violation of, inter alia, the right to life. In this case, the State was fully aware of the 
actual risk posed by their situation of vulnerability especially to their children, 
pregnant women and the elderly.900 Th is, in turn, should have triggered its 
897 Paras 201–229.
898 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, paras 214, 215, 227, 239, 244, 259, 270 & 273.
899 Ibid para 196.
900 Para 156–159.
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responsibility to take prompt and special positive measures aimed at responding 
to their urgent needs and reversing the risks posed to their lives.901 Also in this 
case, the principal cause of their vulnerability was attributable to the State’s 
failure to promptly resolve their ancestral land claims as well as to unacceptable 
levels of unemployment, illiteracy, illnesses and lack of access to essential 
services such as shelter, food, health care services, water and sanitation while 
they were living on the roadside. More generally, it is the result of a long-term 
marginalisation of the Community as a whole. Th ese conditions, in turn, had 
severe and disproportionate impacts on the lives of their children and pregnant 
women which the State failed to address in any meaningful manner.902 Owing 
to all of these problems, the Court ordered the State to, inter alia, establish 
within two years a community development fund specifi cally responsible for 
implementing educational, housing, agricultural and health projects as well 
as for providing drinking water and building sanitation infrastructure for the 
benefi t of the Community.903
In a related Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay case, the Court’s 
analysis also drew heavily on the special vulnerability of the Community and 
the corresponding heightened responsibility of the State to ensure a decent 
living condition compatible with human dignity. According to the Court, lack 
of access to the right to health, food and clean water have a major impact on 
the right to a decent existence and the exercising of other human rights such as 
the right to education and culture. With respect to indigenous communities, in 
particular, to deny them access to their traditional land and natural resources is 
to eff ectively deprive them of the ability to obtain those basic conditions of life.904 
In this case it was a proven that the Community was living in extremely destitute 
conditions as a consequence of lack of land and access to natural resources and 
that they were living in a dire temporary settlement conditions (along a roadside) 
without having access to adequate food, water, health care, shelter, sanitation and 
education. Th e State party was therefore held responsible for failure to provide 
the Community with decent living conditions compatible with their inherent 
dignity.905 In addition, the Court also held that the State did not take additional 
901 Ibid para. 189. ‘Specially, the State is bound to guarantee to those persons in situations of 
vulnerability, exclusion and discrimination, the legal and administrative conditions that may 
secure for them the exercise of such right, pursuant to the principle of equality under the law.’ 
ibid.
902 Ibid para 168–78. ‘Th us, on the one hand, the State must undertake more carefully and 
responsibly its special position as guarantor, and must adopt special measures based on the 
best interest of the child. Th e aforesaid cannot be separated from the likewise vulnerable 
situation of the pregnant women of the Community. States must devote special attention and 
care to protect this group and must adopt special measures to secure women, especially during 
pregnancy, delivery and lactation, access to adequate medical care services.’
903 Ibid para 224. See also ibid paras 204–247.
904 Paras 167–168.
905 Ibid para 164 & 168.
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special measures towards most vulnerable groups in the Community such as 
children, the elderly and those who have fallen into illness.906 As whole, it held 
that none of the steps taken by the State were commensurate and appropriate with 
the gravity of their vulnerability.907 Consequently, and similar to Sawhoyamaxa 
case, the State was ordered to, inter alia, establish a community development fund 
devoted to providing the community with essential public services and, in the 
meantime, to immediately and on a regular basis provide them with water, food, 
medical care, medicines, and school facilities.908
Beyond these structural problems aff ecting indigenous communities, there are 
also other contexts in which the special responsibility of the States was engaged. 
In particular, the Court has held in several occasions that the State bears a special 
kind of responsibility towards persons under its custody (including those in the 
medical and detention institutions) to ensure their physical health and welfare 
compatible with their right to life and dignity. For instance, in Ximenes-Lopez, 
the Court held that
Due to their psychological and emotional condition, persons with mental illness are 
particularly vulnerable to any health treatment, and such vulnerability is greater 
when they are admitted to mental health institutions. Th is increased vulnerability 
is due to the imbalance of power between patients and the medical staff  responsible 
for their treatment, as well as to the high degree of intimacy which is typical of the 
treatment of psychiatric illnesses.909
Th e existence of conditions of vulnerability, of course, applies to all patients at all 
levels and all kinds of health care institutions and to all persons within the State 
custody. According to the Court, this fact generates a special positive duty of care 
to provide for essential conditions of life necessary to lead a decent human life.910 
It is because of this fact that, in the context of prison or detention institutions, the 
State assumes the utmost responsibility for the basic needs and physical health 
of the prisoners and detainees.911 And, in relation to medical institutions, this 
special responsibility of the State includes the obligation to adopt legislative and 
other practical measures required to guarantee the availability of adequate care 
and treatment and to safeguard all patients against diff erent kinds of potential 
risks of abuses.912 Th us, it was already seen in chapter 7 above that in Ximenes-
Lopez case, the State was held responsible for failure to positively prevent abuses 
and maltreatments committed against the victim by the health care workers and 
906 Ibid para 174–176.
907 Ibid paras 169 & 176.
908 Ibid paras 205 & 234.
909 Para 129.
910 Ibid para 138–140.
911 See for instance, Vera Vera v. Ecuador, paras 42.
912 Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil paras 137–150.
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to improve the substandard conditions of the care institution which was found to 
be practically lacking the qualities required to provide the patients with proper 
care and decent hospitalisation.913
9.4.2. AfCoHPR
Th ere are also several decisions of the AfCoHPR dealing with the rights of 
vulnerable persons. However, and as I have indicated elsewhere in relation to the 
right to health, most of these decisions concern complaints made in the context 
of detention situations whereas few of them concern complaints fi led in relations 
to violations committed during certain humanitarian crisis or civil unrest in a 
given State party as opposed to pure claim for ESC rights.914 Th e Commission 
emphasises that the very ‘concept of human rights is based on a typical recognition 
that every human being is equal and also recognizes the inherent dignity and 
worth of every human being’.915 It recognises the principle of equality and non-
discrimination as constituting the ‘core principles in international human rights 
law’ and hence as underlying the protection of all human rights guaranteed in 
the African Charter.916 In the view of the Commission, the equality and non-
discrimination guarantees under the Charter ‘are non-derogable and therefore 
must be respected in all circumstances in order for anyone to enjoy all the other 
rights provided for under the African Charter’.917
Th e substantive meaning and implications of both principles have been 
elaborated in several of its decisions. Th us, for instance, it held that the right 
to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law recognised under 
the Charter ‘guarantees fair and just treatment of individuals within the legal 
system of a given country, whereby every individual is equal before the law and 
guaranteed equal protection of the law’.918 In relation to the right to equality 
before the law, it held that
Th e most fundamental meaning of equality before the law under Article 3(1) of the 
Charter is the right by all to equal treatment under similar conditions. Th e right to 
equality before the law means that individuals legally within the jurisdiction of a State 
913 Ibid para 150.
914 Mosissa (n 15) 73ff .
915 EIPR and Interights v Egypt (Communication 323/06), para 155.
916 EIPR and Interights v Egypt (Communication 323/06), para 175; Communication 294/04: 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development 
(IHRDA) (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Republic of Zimbabwe, 6th Extra-Ordinary 
Session of the ACoHPR, April 2009 (hereaft er Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and other v. 
Zimbabwe), para 91, 96–97 & 99–100.
917 Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, para 49. See also Articles 2 and 3 ACHPR.
918 Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and other v. Zimbabwe, para 96; EIPR and Interights v 
Egypt (Communication 323/06), para 77 & 73.
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should expect to be treated fairly and justly within the legal system and be assured of 
equal treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights available to all other 
citizens. Its meaning is the right to have the same procedures and principles applied 
under the same conditions. Th e principle that all persons are equal before the law 
means that existing laws must be applied in the same manner to those subject to them. 
Th e right to equality before the law does not refer to the content of legislation, but 
rather exclusively to its enforcement. It means that judges and administration offi  cials 
may not act arbitrarily in enforcing laws.919
And with respect to the right to equal protection of the law, the Commission 
stated that this right guarantees ‘that no person or class of persons shall be denied 
the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or class of 
persons in like circumstances’ in relation to ‘their lives, liberty, property and in 
their pursuit of happiness. It simply means that similarly situated persons must 
receive similar treatment under the law.’920
Th e Commission therefore underscores that the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination entails that those persons in factually or objectively similar 
situations must be treated alike and those aff ected by diff erent conditions of 
vulnerability should be treated accordingly both in law and in practice. Both 
principles, the Commission notes, call for the equal, fair and just treatment of all 
persons due to their inherent dignity, that is, regardless of their social, economic 
and other factors.921 Th e State party is therefore obliged to outlaw any form of 
discrimination and to guarantee to all individuals equal and eff ective protection 
against discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under 
international human rights law. To this end, the State has a negative duty to refrain 
from directly engaging in acts of discrimination or inciting discrimination against 
any person or group of persons within its jurisdiction and a positive duty to take 
all necessary measures to prohibit discrimination and instead ensure equality of 
all both in law and practice.922
Also, the Commission gives due emphasis to the fact that the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination have close substantive relationships. 
For instance, in the case of EIPR and Interights v Egypt, where gender-based 
violence against women political activists were seen as the central theme 
of the complaint, it expressed this relationship stating ‘that freedom from 
discrimination is also an aspect of the principles of equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law under Article 3 of the African Charter because both 
919 Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and other v. Zimbabwe, para 96; EIPR and Interights v 
Egypt (Communication 323/06), para 73.
920 Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and other v. Zimbabwe, para 99; EIPR and Interights v 
Egypt (Communication 323/06), para 74.
921 See for instance, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, paras 49 cum 57.
922 Zimbabwe Lawyers for human Rights and other v. Zimbabwe, paras 95–100; EIPR and Interights 
v Egypt (Communication 323/06), paras 173–177.
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present a legal and material status of equality and non-discrimination’.923 In the 
case of Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, where the State party failed to give equal 
protection to persons with mental disability or judicially interdicted persons 
owing to their mental health conditions, the Commission held that such a 
discriminatory treatment is contrary to the obligation of the State to respect 
and guarantee the equal and inherent dignity of every person guaranteed in 
the Charter and in international human rights law.924 Th is is particularly so 
because
Human dignity is an inherent basic right to which all human beings, regardless of 
their mental capabilities or disabilities as the case may be, are entitled to without 
discrimination. It is therefore an inherent right which every human being is obliged to 
respect by all means possible and on the other hand it confers a duty on every human 
being to respect this right.925
In EIPR and Interights v Egypt case stated above, the Commission agreed with 
the complainants’ arguments that all the diff erent kinds of ill-treatments the 
women-victims suff ered at the hands of the security agents during the civil riots 
and subsequently in the detention centre amounts to gender-based violence, that 
is, their special vulnerability is based on the fact that they were all women and 
this was the very reason they were all targeted by the perpetrators. Th is, in turn, 
constituted a discriminatory and inhuman and degrading treatment.926 Not only 
this, the State was also found in violation of its special duty towards vulnerable 
persons (in this case, women-victims) to respect and protect their right to health 
enshrined under Art. 16(1) of the Charter. According to the Commission, the ‘[v]
ictims were physically and emotionally traumatized as a result of sexual violence 
and assaults on their person’ and ‘[t]he trauma and injuries sustained has aff ected 
their physical, psychological and mental health clearly in violation of Article 16(1) 
of the African Charter’.927
In relation to persons under detention, the Commission, like all other human 
rights tribunals, specifi cally stresses that the special vulnerability of detained 
persons fl ows from the fact of detention itself because it creates the situation of 
complete and absolute dependency of these persons on the State. Accordingly, 
the State bears an aggravated responsibility to care for their entire livelihood 
and well-being including the provision of adequate food, water, health care and 
hygiene services. Th is responsibility even becomes more aggravated if detention 
923 Communication 323/06, para 179.
924 Para 49 cum 57.
925 Ibid para 57.
926 Communication 323/06, paras 159–166, 178–180 & 201–208.
927 Ibid 261–266.
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intersects with other conditions of vulnerability as disability, old age, chronic ill-
health, pregnancy and the like.928
Furthermore, the Commission has also considered the implications of 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination and the obligation to protect 
vulnerable persons in the context of complaints where certain parts of the 
population were rendered vulnerable due to direct, indirect or systematic actions 
of the States parties to the Charter.929 For instance, in the series of complaints 
lodged against Mauritania, the Commission found gross and widespread 
violations of, inter alia, ESC rights of certain ethnic communities following the 
military coup in the Country. 930 In this case, the Commission, among many 
others, found that some of the persons arrested were detained in extremely 
harsh, deplorable and inhumane conditions referred to as ‘death camps’; that the 
livestock, harvests and villages of individuals were destroyed simply because they 
were members of certain ethnic groups in Mauritania.931 Th e violations of, inter 
alia, various ESC rights found by the Commission in the SERAC v. Nigeria case 
had also occurred in the context of the then military junta’s decision to embark 
in oil exploration in Niger Delta against the opposition of the Ogoni people 
owing particularly to the impact of the project on their health and physical 
environment. Th is, in turn, resulted in the gross violations of various ESC rights 
of the individuals and of Ogoni people such as the right to food, shelter, water, 
health and healthy environment through such systematic acts as destruction 
of their homes, villages and crops; contamination of water sources; killing of 
animals; evictions, detentions and other forms of ill-treatment.932 Similarly, in 
the Darfur case v. Sudan,, the Commission found violations of several ESC rights 
due to the Respondent State’s active role in such acts as forced displacement and 
evictions of civilians, destruction of crops, killing of livestock, contamination of 
water sources and the like.933
As discussed in Chapter fi ve above, in the case of Endorois v. Kenya, it was 
found that the Respondent State failed to give due and proper regard to the unique 
way of life and needs of the Endorois Indigenous Peoples before embarking into 
928 See Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, 50–54, 60, 70–72 & 81–85; Communications 105/93–128/94–
130/94–152/96 – Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda 
and Constitutional Rights Project/Nigeria (joined), decided on merits, 24th Ordinary Session, 
31 October 1998 (hereinaft er Media Rights Agenda et al v. Nigeria.), para 91; Communications 
137/94–139/94–154/96–161/97 – International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil 
Liberties Organisation and Interights (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jnr.)/Nigeria (joined), 
decided on merits, 24th Ordinary Session, 31 October 1998 (hereinaft er International PEN et al 
v. Nigeria.), para 112; Malawi Africa Association et al, para 120 and 122; EIPR and Interights v 
Egypt (Communication 323/06), paras 163–190 and 209–232.
929 See Malawi Africa Association et al v. Mauritania; DRC v. Burundi et al; SERAC v. Nigeria; 
Darfur case v. Sudan. For more on these, see also Mosissa (n 15) 74ff .
930 Malawi Africa Association et al v. Mauritania.
931 See Malawi Africa Association et al v. Mauritania, paras 115–122; Mosissa (n 15) 77–78.
932 See at paras 54–67 cum paras 1–9; ibid 78–79.
933 See, for instance, at paras 145–168, 205, 224 & 216.
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designating their ancestral land and forest as game reserve. As the result, they 
lost access to their traditional land up on which their livelihood depended for 
many years.934 Accordingly, the Commission held that ‘the respondent state has a 
higher duty’ not only to take ‘positive steps to protect groups and communities like 
Endorois, but also to promote cultural rights including creation of opportunities, 
policies, institutions or other mechanisms that allow for diff erent cultures 
and ways of life to exist, develop in view of the challenges facing indigenous 
communities’.935 In particular, it stressed the fact that ‘the respondent state bears 
the burden for creating conditions favourable to [the] people’s development’ 
and to ensure that ‘they are not left  out of development process or benefi t’.936 
Summarising the core of some of the critical challenges due to their vulnerability 
as indigenous peoples, the Commission stated the following.
Th ese challenges include exclusion, exploitation, discrimination and extreme poverty; 
displacement from their traditional territories and deprivation of their means of 
subsistence; lack of participation in decisions aff ecting the lives of the communities; 
forced assimilation and negative social statistics among other issues and, at times, 
indigenous communities suff er from direct violence and persecution, while some even 
face the danger of extinction.937
Above all, and most interestingly, the Commission has extensively dealt with 
the principle and implications of the protection of vulnerable persons in the 
context of ESC rights in its Principles and Guidelines on ESC Rights in the 
African Charter and in the Tunis Reporting Guidelines.938 In substance, both the 
Principles and Guidelines, and the Tunis Reporting Guidelines underscore the 
following important points. First, the Commission considers the principle of the 
protection of vulnerable persons as the corollary or at least fundamental aspect of 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Th is is particularly indicated 
by the fact that, in relation to each generic state obligations (as obligations to 
respect, protect, fulfi l) and the substantive rights recognised in and through the 
Charter, the Commission has provided for specifi c statements of principles and 
recommendations concerning the rights of vulnerable persons under a separate 
section designated as ‘Vulnerable Groups, Equality and Non-Discrimination’.939 
934 For instance, in connection with art 22, the Commission stated that the Endorois community 
‘faced substantive loss – the actual loss in well-being and the denial of benefi ts accruing from 
the game reserve. Furthermore, the Endorois have faced signifi cant loss in choice since their 
eviction from the land’. ibid para 297.
935 Ibid para 248.
936 Ibid para 298.
937 Ibid para 248. See also paras 290ff  (in relation to their right to development under Article 22 
ACHPR).
938 As I have mentioned elsewhere, these two documents are the notable products of the 
Commission’s Working Group on ESCR. See Mosissa (n 15) 82.
939 See generally ACoHPR Principles and Guidelines on ESC Rights; see also Tunis Reporting 
Guidelines.
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For instance, in the part dealing with equality and non-discrimination, the 
Commission underscored that ‘ensuring eff ective equality in the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights,’ requires the States parties to the Charter to 
‘pay particular attention to members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.’ In 
this regard, it notes the fact that ‘Such individuals are oft en disproportionately 
aff ected by a failure of the State to ensure economic, social and cultural rights and/
or are direct victims of discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices’. 
Th us, in order to ensure equal access to and protection of ESC rights requires 
the States to provide ‘basic social services (such as water, electricity, education 
and health care) and equitable access to resources (such as land and credit) to 
members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’.940
Second, the Commission treats the principle of the protection of vulnerable 
persons as constituting one of the core elements of each of the ESC rights 
guaranteed in and through the African Charter and its protocols. To this end, 
the Commission requires the States to specifi cally indicate, particularly with 
disaggregated data to diff erent kinds of conditions of vulnerability, the extent 
to which the ESC rights of vulnerable individuals and groups within their 
jurisdiction are ensured under each substantive provisions of the Charter.941
Th ird, the Commission sees that the prioritisation of the interests and needs 
of vulnerable persons forms one of the key contents of the States’ minimum core 
obligations which should be realised immediately and regardless of their level of 
economic development. Th is, in turn, means that when it comes to the protection 
of essential ESC rights of vulnerable persons, States cannot rely on the defence of 
progressive realisation, that is, as something which can be met over the course of 
time, because it is imperative that the ‘essential needs of members of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups should be prioritised in all resource allocation 
processes’ and at all times.942 As the following paragraph makes it clear, this 
obligation remains intact even during dire economic situations aff ecting a given 
country.
Where the State does suff er from demonstrable resource constraints, caused by 
whatever reason, including economic adjustment, the State should still implement 
measures to ensure the minimum essential levels of each right to members of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, particularly by prioritising them in all 
interventions. While the obligation to realise the minimum core content of the rights 
means that the state should prioritise the realisation of the rights for the poorest and 
most vulnerable in society it does not remove the obligation to progressively realise 
the rights for all individuals.943
940 ACoHPR Principles and Guidelines on ESC Rights, paras 32–33.
941 Ibid Part IV (dealing with substantive contents of ESC rights recognised in the Charter); Tunis 
Reporting Guidelines, para 3.
942 Ibid para 14.
943 Ibid para 17.
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Finally, the Commission, alike other tribunals, makes it clear that the principle 
of the protection of vulnerable persons signifi es the specially compelling or 
aggravated obligation of the States. Th is in essence means that States are required 
to treat the particular interests and needs and hence the realisation of the ESC 
rights of the vulnerable persons within their jurisdiction with utmost priority. 
Th is includes but not limited to the adoption of special temporary measures 
or affi  rmative action programmes. Th e fundamental aim of such measures is 
achieving de facto or substantive equality and removal of structural or systemic 
obstacles particularly aff ecting each vulnerable persons and groups. Th e 
special measures should therefore aim at, inter alia, removing the conditions of 
vulnerability hampering the eff ective enjoyment of their ESC rights; accelerating 
the improvement of their positions so that they can enjoy eff ective and equal 
access to diff erent kinds of opportunities and resources open to everyone within 
their society; and securing the free, full and equal enjoyment of their ESC rights 
without discrimination of any kinds other than those objectively permitted under 
relevant provisions. Th us, compliance with the special obligations fl owing from 
the principle of the protection of vulnerable persons functions as a litmus test in 
the assessment of the States’ human rights obligations both generally and under 
each substantive ESC rights.944
9.4.3. ECSR
As noted above, in some sense, the principle of equality, non-discrimination and 
protection of vulnerable persons signify the value of solidarity. Th is is expressly 
recognised in the case law of the ECSR and ECtHR especially in connection the 
principle of non-discrimination. Th e ECSR considers solidarity as one of the 
principal underlying values of the European Social Charter along with human 
dignity, equality, non-discrimination and autonomy.
Th e Committee emphasises that one of the underlying purposes of the social rights 
protected by the Charter is to express solidarity and promote social inclusion. It 
follows that States must respect diff erence and ensure that social arrangements are 
not such as would eff ectively lead to or reinforce social exclusion. Th is requirement is 
exemplifi ed in the proscription against discrimination […] and in its interaction with 
the substantive rights of the Charter.945
Cullen, who rightly notes the fact that the value of solidarity puts due emphasis 
on the social nature of human beings, refers to this view of the Committee, that 
944 Ibid paras 31–38.
945 ERRC v. Greece (Complaints No.15/2003), para 19; Roma Rights Centre v. Portugal (Complaint 
No. 61/2010), decision on merits of 30 June 2011 (hereaft er ERRC v. Portugal (Complaint No. 
61/2010)), para 18.
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is, its recognition as one of the core values of the Charter, as remarkable.946 In 
this regard, two important points deserve attention. Th e fi rst is the relationship 
between solidarity and non-discrimination. Drawing on the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and ECSR, solidarity is considered as one of the higher values of 
the democratic society that ought to be promoted and achieved. Hence, similar 
to equality and non-discrimination, solidarity also puts special emphasis on 
the particular circumstances of the vulnerable persons.947 Th e second, but 
related to the fi rst point, is the fact that the linkage of solidarity to democratic 
values shows that the principle of solidarity has important substantive 
relationship with the right to participation which the Committee considers as 
a fundamental instrument for overcoming systematic or structural exclusion 
and marginalisation of vulnerable persons from socioeconomic decision-
making processes.948 In fact, for the Committee, the right to participation is 
not just a decisive element of the eff ective realisation of ESC rights but also an 
integral element of each of the rights guaranteed in the European Social Charter. 
Accordingly,
Th e Committee considers that the reference to the social rights enshrined in Article 30 
should not be understood too narrowly. In fact, the fi ght against social exclusion is 
one area where the notion of the indivisibility of fundamental rights takes a special 
importance. In this regard, the right to vote, as with other rights relating to civic and 
citizen participation, constitutes a necessary dimension in social integration and 
inclusion and is thus covered by article 30.949
946 Cullen (n 891) 80–81.
947 For instance, the ECSR found violations because of lack of proper regard to the particular 
situations of the respective vulnerable persons in the following set of cases: ERRC v. 
France (Complaint No. 51/2008), paras 84, 89, 95 & 102–104; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 58/2009), paras, 58–59, 74, 84–86, 98–100, 113 & 115–116; Complaints No.52/2008, 
para 87, ERRC v. Italy (Complaint No. 27/2004), para 46; ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 
31/2005), paras 55–57; Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), para 54; MDAC 
v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007), para 54; European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. 
Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008), decision on merits of 18 February 2009 (hereaft er ERRC v. 
Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008), para 45; European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Bulgaria 
(Complaint No. 46/2007) decision on merits of 3 December 2008 (hereaft er ERRC v. Bulgaria 
(Complaint No. 46/2007)), para 51; Fédération européenne des Associations nationales 
travaillant avec les Sans-abri (FEANTSA) v. Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008), decision on 
merits of 8 September 2009 (hereaft er FEANTSA v. Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008)), para 
74.
948 For instance, this is what has been established by the ECSR in Austin-Europe v. France 
(Complaint No.13/2002), para 53; ERRC v. Greece (Complaints No.15/2003), paras 19–26; 
IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), paras 60, 67, 128–130 & 163–169; MDAC 
v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007), para 39. See also Cullen (n 891) 92. Per Cullen, the 
Committee’s elaboration of solidarity as a value supporting inclusion and protection against 
vulnerability constitutes among the generous interpretation of the rights guaranteed in the 
Social Charter (Revised) based on its understanding of the values of the Charter. ibid.
949 ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 99. See also COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 
58/2009), para 105.
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In this regard, Complaint No.51/2008 and Complaint No.58/2009 are particularly 
important. As already discussed in Chapter fi ve above, in both complaints, the 
Committee found that the fact of segregation and poverty aff ecting most of the 
Roma and Sinti population in the respective States was specifi cally linked to 
the fact of civil marginalisation. Consequently, it held that the States concerned 
should take comprehensive empowerment strategies which would encourage 
their participation in the society in order that they would be able to overcome 
those disadvantages ensuing from lack of representation.950 Nolan notes that this 
interpretation of the Committee is consistent with the view of the UN human 
rights bodies that participation forms the heart of all economic and social rights. 
According to Nolan, ‘Th e implications of the Committee’s identifi cation of 
a right to civil and political participation under the Revised Charter are wide 
ranging. Perhaps the most signifi cant, however, is that move’s confi rmation of the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all civil, economic, political, cultural and 
social rights.’951
Th ere are also many other cases in which the Committee found violation 
of the equality, non-discrimination, and protection of vulnerable persons in 
relation to the right to education, health, housing, social assistance, protection 
against poverty and social exclusion. For instance, the Committee has found 
serious violations of the right to non-discrimination in many complaints 
concerning the right to housing.952 In Complaint No.15/2003, the substandard 
and inhumane living condition of large number of Roma People in camps was 
regarded as racial-discrimination953 which is also true in numerous subsequent 
complaints on behalf of the Roma, Sinti and Travellers.954 In Complaint 
No.13/2002 and Complaint No. 41/2007, where lack of access to education 
for persons with disability was an issue, the Committee emphasised that the 
principle of equal citizenship, independence, social integration and participation 
in the lives of the community are the underlying principles of the provisions of 
the Social Charter guaranteeing the rights of persons with disabilities. Th us, in 
Complaint No.13/2002, it held that the State had failed to make any measurable 
progress over a long period of time towards ensuring the right to education 
950 ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008), para 93–96 & 99–105; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 
58/2009), paras 103–110.
951 Nolan (n 560) 354–355.
952 ERRC v. Greece (Complaints No. 15/2003); ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008); COHRE 
v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009); COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010); FEANTSA v. 
Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008); DCI v. the Netherlands (Complaint No. 47/2008); ERRC v. 
Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008); FEANTSA v. France (Complaint No. 39/2006); IMATDFW 
v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006).
953 ERRC v. Greece (Complaints No. 15/2003), paras 42–43.
954 See for instance, ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008); COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 
58/2009); COHRE v. France (Complaint No. 63/2010); ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 
48/2008); FEANTSA v. France (Complaint No. 39/2006); IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 
33/2006).
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accessible for children and adults with autism on terms of equality with other 
children.955 And, in Complaint No. 41/2007, it found that the education system 
in the Respondent State was neither accessible to children with intellectual 
disabilities nor was it adapted to respond to their special needs. In fact, it noted 
with regret that there was no prospect that the condition would improve in the 
foreseeable future.956
In this regard, it is the principal approach of the Committee that the protection 
of vulnerable persons must always remain a matter of priority in all socioeconomic 
policies of the States.957 It accordingly stresses that social and economic benefi ts 
must target those vulnerable persons and therefore be designed by taking due 
account of their specifi c needs.958 Th e degree to which the vulnerable persons 
are aff orded adequate protection within a given national system, both in theory 
and practice, is thus one of the major considerations in its assessment of the 
conformity of the national practices to the States parties’ obligations under the 
Social Charter. In fact, this is regarded as an irreducible minimum threshold 
requirement which functions as a litmus test that a given measure should pass in 
order to be deemed reasonable under the Charter.959 Even when the realisation of 
a given ESC right is said to be complex and expensive, the Committee requires, 
while of course allowing for progressive realisation, that a proper protection be 
aff orded to the rights and interests of vulnerable persons as a matter of priority. 
Otherwise, it is very likely that any State actions will be regarded as falling short 
of their basic obligations under the Charter.960
For instance, in relation to the right to housing, the Committee has consistently 
held that this right entails the State’s obligation to prevent, reduce and eliminate 
homelessness; to make housing prices aff ordable to those without adequate 
resources and, to this extent, the need to primarily reserve social housing for 
the poorest households and individuals.961 Th us, in Complaint No. 53/2008, it 
stated that in order to establish that measures taken to make the price of housing 
955 Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), para 48–49.
956 MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007), para 35–37.
957 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008), decision 
on merits of 22 June 2010 (hereaft er COHRE v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008)), paras. 87–89; 
FEANTSA v. Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008), para 72; IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 
33/2006), paras 63–65; ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008), para 37–38.
958 See for instance ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008), para 37–43; ERRC v. Bulgaria 
(Complaint No. 46/2007), paras 41–45 & 47–51.
959 See COHRE v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008), paras 64–66 & 85–89; FEANTSA v. Slovenia 
(Complaint No. 53/2008), paras 70–72; IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), paras 60, 
67 & 163–174.
960 Th is has been particularly the case in the following complaints: Austin-Europe v. France 
(Complaint No.13/2002); MFHR v. Greece (Complaint No. 30/2005); ERRC v. Bulgaria 
(Complaint No. 31/2005); MDAC v. Bulgaria (Complaints No.41/2007); COHRE v. Croatia 
(Complaint No. 52/2008); FEANTSA v. Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008); COHRE v. Italy 
(Complaint No. 58/2009).
961 See particularly IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), paras 130–133; FEANTSA v. 
France (Complaint No. 39/2006), paras 142–147.
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accessible to those without adequate resources, it is not suffi  cient for the State to 
show the average aff ordability ratio of all those applying for housing but whether 
the aff ordability ratio of the poorest applicants is compatible with their level of 
income or not.962 Moreover, it also considers that the right to housing implies 
the State obligation to protect individuals against eviction or when eviction is 
necessary and justifi ed on objective grounds, the eviction process be carried 
out with due regard to the respect for human dignity and due process of law. In 
any event, it is the well-established position of the Committee that States should 
not create homelessness through eviction.963 Th is is particularly important 
because, in the context of vulnerable persons, the aff ordability of housing and 
the risks of eviction are substantially interconnected in that eviction is quite 
oft en the result of poverty and its impact is even more grave when it intersects 
with other conditions of vulnerability such as illness.964 It is also related to the 
obligation of the State to protect individuals against poverty, social exclusion and 
discrimination on economic grounds. For these reasons, States are required to 
adopt an overall and coordinated policy and strategic measures that specifi cally 
target those vulnerable members of their society by duly taking into account 
their individual circumstances and diff erences.965 In fact, in all of its decisions, 
States parties have been found in violation of the Charter because of their failure 
to satisfy this underlying requirement in their social and economic policies or 
programmes.966
962 FEANTSA v. Slovenia (Complaint No. 53/2008), para 72.
963 IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), paras 77–78; FEANTSA v. France (Complaint 
No. 39/2006), paras 87–88. See also particularly CESCR General comment No. 4: Th e Right to 
Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), adopted in its Sixth Session (1991) (hereaft er 
CESCR General Comment No. 4), paras 8(a), 17 & 18; CESCR General comment No. 7: Th e right 
to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant): Forced Evictions, adopted in its Sixteenth 
Session (1997) (hereaft er CESCR General Comment No. 7), paras 13–16.
964 IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), para 78; FEANTSA v. France (Complaint No. 
39/2006), para, 88 (defi ning eviction as the deprivation of housing which a person occupied, 
on account of insolvency or wrongful occupation). See also CESCR General Comment No. 7, 
para 3; CESCR General Comment No. 4, para 8(c) & 18.
965 See Austin-Europe v. France (Complaint No.13/2002), para. 52; COHRE v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 58/2009), paras 113–116 cum 34–47; IMATDFW v. France (Complaint No. 33/2006), para 
150; COHRE v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008), paras 87 & 163–169. See also DCI v. the 
Netherlands (Complaint No. 47/2008), paras. 29, 37, 47–48 & 66.
966 Th e following complaints concern, inter alia, the problem of poverty and social exclusion for 
which reason the respective State parties were found in violation of their Charter obligations 
due to absence of overall and coordinated policy and strategic measures specifi cally targeting 
the most vulnerable (group of) persons within their jurisdiction: Austin-Europe v. France 
(Complaint No.13/2002); COHRE v. Italy (Complaint No. 58/2009); IMATDFW v. France 
(Complaint No. 33/2006); COHRE v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008); FEANTSA v. Slovenia 
(Complaint No. 53/2008); ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 31/2005); FEANTSA v. France 
(Complaint No. 39/2006); ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 46/2007); ERRC v. Italy (Complaint 
No. 27/2004); ERRC v. Bulgaria (Complaint No. 48/2008); ERRC v. Greece (Complaints 
No.15/2003); ERRC v. France (Complaint No. 51/2008).
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9.4.4. ECtHR
Th e ECtHR has a rich jurisprudence concerning the protection of vulnerable 
persons via the principle of non-discrimination, the right to life, prohibition of 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to respect for private and 
family life, the right to property and education guaranteed under the ECHR. 
And it is worth recalling that many of the Court’s cases discussed in the previous 
chapters were all decided in the context of the rights of vulnerable persons.967 
Moreover, the constantly increasing number of cases alleging the violation of 
various ESC rights of vulnerable persons before the Court clearly shows the 
fundamental and cross-cutting nature of the State’s obligation to ensure the 
rights of vulnerable persons within their jurisdictions. Th is can be seen from 
the following categories of vulnerable persons that the Court has increasingly 
been seized with for the protection of, inter alia, their ESC rights through 
the Convention system in diff erent contexts: detained persons, persons with 
disabilities, elderly persons, women, migrants, accompanied and unaccompanied 
migrant children in detention, Roma and Travellers, persons living with HIV/
AIDS and persons deprived of basic minimum income (i.e., persons living in 
extreme poverty).968
For instance, the case of Gaygusuz v. Austria969 concerned an application 
against the State party’s refusal to grant to the applicant an emergency assistance 
on the ground of nationality.970 Th e facts of the case show that in the Respondent 
State, unemployed persons and persons considered to be unfi t for work are 
generally entitled to receive unemployment benefi ts and, having exhausted other 
unemployment benefi ts, to receive emergency social assistance. Th e applicant’s 
claim for emergence assistance was rejected because he was not a national of the 
State party nor did he fall under any category excepted from this requirement. 
In its judgement, the Court agreed with the applicant that this act of the State 
constituted an unreasonable discriminatory treatment within the meaning of 
967 Th is is, for instance, true in the cases of Golder v. the United Kingdom; Airey v. Ireland; G.R. v. 
the Netherlands; Oyal v. Turkey; Feldbrugge v. Th e Netherlands; Deumeland v. Germany; D.H. 
and Others v. the Czech Republic; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece; McFarlane v. Ireland; Fadeyeva 
v. Russia already discussed in Chapts 5 through 8.
968 Th e following series of factsheets are just indicative of the volume of cases appearing before 
the Court. See Factsheet on Detention Conditions and Treatment of Prisoners (ECtHR, January 
2018); Factsheet on Prisoners’ Health-Related Rights (ECtHR, November 2017); Factsheet on 
Detention and Mental Health (ECtHR, July 2017); Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR, January 2018); Factsheet on Elderly People 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR, October 2016); Factsheet on Gender 
and Equality (ECtHR, January 2018); Factsheet on Roma and Travellers (ECtHR, January 2018); 
Factsheet on Austerity Measures (ECtHR, December 2017).
969 Application No. 17371/90, Judgment of 16 September 1996.
970 Ibid paras 33 & 10–11.
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under Articles 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 1.971 
Th e Court also reached the same conclusion in the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia972 
which involved the same issues as Gaygusuz. In substance, the applicant argued 
that the denial of access to social security benefi ts in equal terms with the nationals 
of the Respondent State constitutes a discriminatory treatment under Article 14 
ECHR and taken in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 1.973 According the 
Court, the diff erence of treatment exclusively based on the sole requirement of 
nationality failed to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness and hence violated 
the applicant’s right to non-discrimination in respect of social security benefi ts.974 
In relation to this, it is also worth mentioning here the case of Klein v. Austria975 
where the Court balanced a complete deprivation of an old-age pension benefi t 
against disciplinary (professional) regulation. Admittedly, this case involved the 
applicant’s loss of social security benefi t as a consequence of his conviction.976 
But still it can be argued that the Court’s emphasis on the nature of the interest 
in issue (an old-age pension benefi t) and the gravity of the measure on the life 
of the applicant (that is, the complete deprivation of the benefi t) show that the 
vulnerability of the applicant was the underlying reason behind its substantive 
conclusion. Th us, the Court, in substance, held that the complete deprivation of 
the applicant of all of his entitlements to a pension imposed an excessive burden 
on the applicant and therefore violated his pecuniary right guaranteed under 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.977
In the Belane Nagy v. Hungary, decided in the line of cases like Gaygusuz, 
Adrejeva and Klein concerning social security benefi ts, the Court addressed an 
important issue as to whether the State party can justify a total deprivation of 
the rights of vulnerable persons to receive pension benefi ts by introducing a new 
legislation with more onerous eligibility criteria.978 As the facts of the case show, 
the applicant was assessed as disabled person unfi t to work and accordingly was 
receiving a disability pension for some time. But owing to the new law which 
introduced new disability assessment methods and hence eligibility criteria, 
971 Ibid paras 42–52. ‘It considers, like the Commission, that the diff erence in treatment between 
Austrians and non-Austrians as regards entitlement to emergency assistance, of which Mr 
Gaygusuz was a victim, is not based on any “objective and reasonable justifi cation”.’ Ibid 50.
972 Application No. 55707/00 [GC] Judgment of 18 February 2009.
973 Although it is not a fundamental requirement in the Court’s case law, the applicant in this case 
has the status of a ‘permanently resident non-citizen’ of Latvia. See ibid para 88.
974 Ibid paras 85–90.
975 Application No. 57028/00), Judgment 3 March 2011.
976 Th e applicant was a former lawyer who was convicted of embezzlement which subsequently 
resulted in his loss of the right of membership to his former professional association (Vienna 
Chamber of Lawyers). At the material time, the relevant domestic law governing the 
association required that in order for a member to be entitled to an old-age pension benefi t, a 
lawyer should be a member of the association at the time of the application. For details, see ibid 
paras 7–29.
977 Ibid 41–57.
978 Application No. 53080/13) [GC] Judgment of 13 December 2016.
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her health condition was reassessed and fi nally declared ineligible to receive the 
pension because her level of disability was said to be lower than the standard 
required by the law.979 Th is was however despite the fact that there was no 
signifi cant improvement in her health conditions.980 It was also observed that 
the applicant was not given any alternative social security allowances or source of 
income to subsist on given particularly her special conditions.981
According to the Court, in this particular case, the national authorities should 
have carefully weighed and fairly balanced the special need and interest of the 
applicant as a disabled person against the legitimate public interest pursued 
through the new legislation. Th is would have meant a proportional reduction of 
the amount she used to receive by the number of days she fell short of (her social-
security cover was only 148 days short of the required length) under the new 
legislation rather than ‘a complete deprivation of any entitlements’ under the old 
regime. To this end, the Court paid particular attention to the fact that she ‘did 
not have any other signifi cant income on which to subsist’ and that she clearly ‘had 
diffi  culties in pursuing gainful employment and’ and therefore ‘belonged to the 
vulnerable group of disabled persons’.982 Th us, alike other cases discussed above, 
the Court’s reasoning makes it clear that a complete denial of a vulnerable person 
to receive essential minimum material support would off end the core principles 
of the rule of law and legal certainty inherent in each of the rights recognised by 
the Convention and hence would make the guarantees thereof mere theoretical 
and illusory.983 In particular, the Court reiterated its established principle that 
social security schemes are not merely concerned with designing mechanical 
eligibility conditions; rather, they ‘are an expression of a society’s solidarity with 
its vulnerable members’. Th is, inter alia, entails that any decision to withdraw 
or reduce such a crucial benefi t or to reform the system conferring the benefi ts 
should not only focus on the numerical amounts received by individuals but also 
the overall circumstances surrounding each cases and the subsequent impacts it 
would have on the rights and lives of certain individuals aff ected or likely to be 
aff ected through a given decision. In particular, it is imperative to make sure that 
no person bears excessive burden compared to the rest of the society as the result 
of the measures taken by the State concerned.984
In the case of Sahin v. Turkey985, the Court found violation of the obligation 
to guarantee the right to education of persons with physical disabilities on equal 
979 Ibid paras 97 cum 101–109.
980 Ibid para 97.
981 Ibid paras 123–124 cum 117 & 104. For instance, although it was recommended by the domestic 
tribunals that the applicant be rehabilitated and thus be provided with rehabilitation allowance, 
the benefi t the Court considered to be closely related to disability pension benefi t and therefore 
could have resolved here issues, the authorities never acted up on this recommendation. ibid.
982 Ibid paras 123–126.
983 See particularly ibid para 89 & 99.
984 Ibid paras 112–118.
985 Application No. 23065/12, Judgement of 30 Jan 2018.
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footing with other persons. As the facts of the case show, Mr. Sahin, a fi rst-year 
university student of mechanics, became a paraplegic due to an injury he sustained 
in an accident in 2005. As the result, he was forced to suspend his education 
awaiting his recovery. In 2007, he requested the university to adapt the facilities 
to his new situation so that he could resume his studies. However, the university 
authorities replied that they could not adapt the facilities within the short-term 
citing budgetary reasons and instead off ered to appoint him a personal assistance. 
But the applicant refused this university’s off er as it would amount, inter alia, 
to invasion of his right to privacy. His application to domestic administrative 
tribunals for review of the university’s decision was also in vain.986
In this case, the Court underlined the importance of the rights of ‘persons 
with a disability to live independently and fully develop their sense of dignity 
and self-worth’ and this goes with the very essence of the Convention which is 
concerned with ensuring ‘respect for human dignity and human freedom, which 
necessarily includes a person’s freedom to make his or her own choices’.987 Based 
on this, the Court observed that the university’s off er to appoint a personal 
assistant to help the applicant move around its three-story building could not 
be regarded as reasonable under Article  8 of the Convention. In this regard, 
the Court could not fi nd any evidence in the case as to whether or not the said 
university’s measure was proposed by taking due account of the actual needs 
of the applicant and the measure’s ‘potential impact on his safety, dignity and 
independence’; it rather appears to have ‘disregarded the applicant’s need to live 
as independent and autonomous a life as possible’.988 Furthermore, the Court also 
criticised the domestic tribunals for failing to make suffi  cient assessment of the 
right to education and corresponding needs of the applicant as well as the possible 
mechanisms through which the State party may comply with its obligation to 
make a reasonable accommodation ‘that would have enabled the applicant to 
resume his studies under conditions as close as possible to those provided to 
students with no disability’.989 Accordingly, the Court, found that the facts in 
the case disclose a violation of the right to non-discrimination guaranteed under 
Article  14 of the Convention read in conjunction with the right to education 
enshrined under Article 2 Protocol No. 1.990
986 For more on the background of this case, see ibid paras 6ff . See also ‘Impossibility for a Paraplegic 
Person to Gain Access to University Buildings: Discrimination Regarding the Right to Education,’ 
Press Release, ECHR 037 (2018), Registrar of ECHR (30 January 2018); Factsheet on Persons 
with Disabilities and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR, January 2018).
987 Sahin v. Turkey, para 63.
988 Ibid paras 64–65.
989 Ibid paras 66–67.
990 Ibid para 68. ‘Consequently, the Court found that the Government had not demonstrated that 
the national authorities, and in particular the university and judicial authorities, had reacted 
with the requisite diligence in order to ensure that Mr Şahin could continue to enjoy his right 
to education on an equal footing with other students. Th e fair balance to be struck between 
the competing interests at stake had thus not been achieved, and the Court found a violation 
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In the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, discussed in detail in Chapter 
eight above, the Court particularly stressed the fact that it ‘attaches considerable 
importance to the applicant’s status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of 
a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special 
protection’.991 Not only this, it also emphasised that the suff erings the applicant 
had endured for several months were all linked to his status as an asylum seeker 
which the State’s party authorities should have seriously taken into account.992 It 
particularly held that
the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as an 
asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation 
in which he has found himself for several months, living in the street, with no resources 
or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential 
needs.993
For the Court, given the authorities’ awareness of the applicant’s particular state 
of insecurity and vulnerability, they should have duly taken positive steps and 
resolved his asylum requests as well as other positive measures which could 
have prevented him from living in the situation of most extreme poverty for 
several months.994 It concluded that by deliberately failing to act, the authorities 
deliberately subjected the applicant to ‘humiliating treatment showing a lack of 
respect for his dignity and that this situation has, without doubt, aroused in him 
feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation’ contrary 
to their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.995
Finally, the failure of national authorities to take adequate account of the 
vulnerable position of individuals belonging to ethnic Roma, Gypsies and 
Travellers and to provide special consideration to their interests and needs in 
measures aff ecting these groups such as eviction orders and demolition of 
their houses were the major reasons in fi nding violations under Article 8 of the 
Convention guaranteeing the right to private and family life.996 According to the 
Court, serious interference with the individual’s rights under Article 8 requires 
‘particularly weighty reasons of public interest by way of justifi cation and the 
margin of appreciation to be aff orded to the national authorities must be regarded 
of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention.’ ibid.
991 Para 251.
992 See ibid particularly paras 249–264.
993 Ibid para 263.
994 Ibid para 259. ‘In any event, given the particular state of insecurity and vulnerability in which 
asylum seekers are known to live in Greece, the Court considers that the Greek authorities 
should not simply have waited for the applicant to take the initiative of turning to the police 
headquarters to provide for his essential needs.’ ibid.
995 Ibid paras 262–264 cum 259.
996 See for instance Connors v. United Kingdom (Application No. 66746/01), Judgment of 27 May 2004.
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as correspondingly narrowed’ as it is especially concerned with guaranteeing 
‘rights of central importance to the individual’s identity, self-determination, 
physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a 
settled and secure place in the community’.997 Th erefore, in striving to strike a 
fair balance between the rights of the individuals and the legitimate public interest 
through a given socioeconomic policy measures, the States parties have the duty 
to take into account the particular circumstances of the individuals concerned 
and their special needs.998 Th e Court specifi cally stressed that ‘Th e vulnerable 
position of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should 
be given to their needs and their diff erent lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory 
framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases’.999 To this end, Article 8 
of the Convention imposes on each State party a positive obligation to, inter 
alia, facilitate the gypsy way of life.1000 Moreover, in series of cases concerning 
the systemic segregation of Roma children in the so-called special schools or 
classes or Roma-only classes, the Court found violations of the State obligation 
to prohibit discrimination in relation to the right to education guaranteed under 
Article 2 of Protocol No.1.1001 According to the Court, the national authorities 
have the duty to give due considerations to the special needs of Roma children 
as members of a disadvantaged group and to adopt measures which will prevent 
them against social exclusion and promote their full integration into the general 
society.1002
Overall, whether it concerns detention, disability, age, minority or other 
socioeconomic conditions of vulnerability, it is clearly established in the case 
law of the Court that the State has an additional (aggravated) responsibility to 
take due and adequate account of the special needs of the vulnerable persons 
in the society while taking socioeconomic policy decisions and other measures 
substantially aff ecting their ESC rights and, to this extent, should strive to 
strike a reasonable and fair balance between the needs of the individuals and 
general public interest. In addition, the Court has also recognised the State’s 
duty of care for the vulnerable persons as directly fl owing from the principle of 
respect for the dignity of human being and the principle of solidarity associated 
with it.
997 Ibid para 82.
998 Ibid.
999 Ibid para 84; Orsus And Others v. Croatia [GC], para 148; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic 
[GC], para 182; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], para 96; Buckley v. United Kingdom 
paras 76.
1000 Connors v. United Kingdom, para 84.
1001 See among many authorities, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC]; Orsus And Others 
v. Croatia (Application no. 15766/03) [GC], Sampanis and Others v. Greece (Application No. 
32526/05, Judgment of 5 June 2008.
1002 See D.H and Others v. the Czech Republic, paras 205–210; Orsus and Others v. Croatia, paras 143ff .
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9.4.5. UNHRS
Th e UN human rights bodies have played a signifi cant role in articulating and 
promoting the State party’s general obligations towards the vulnerable persons 
especially through series of general comments. We have also seen that the Human 
Rights Committee pays due regard to special obligation of the State to guarantee 
the availability of adequate socioeconomic conditions (health care, diet, clothing, 
sleeping space, hygienic conditions, contact with family and outside world, etc.) for 
persons under its custody.1003 In addition, there also interesting emerging case law 
of the CESCR and CRPD concerning the rights of vulnerable persons. Th us, in the 
Rodríguez v. Spain case, the Committee underscored the importance of ensuring the 
rights of individuals to receive minimum essential levels of socioeconomic support 
in such forms as social security schemes so as to enable every person and his or her 
families ‘to acquire at least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water 
and sanitation, foodstuff s, and the most basic forms of education’.1004 Reiterating 
the principles developed in its various general comments regarding the obligation 
of the States parties towards vulnerable persons, it particularly stated that
States parties are also obliged to provide the right to social security when individuals 
or a group are unable, on grounds reasonably considered to be beyond their control, 
to realize that right themselves, within the existing social security system with the 
means at their disposal. To this end, they must establish non-contributory schemes or 
other social assistance measures to provide support to those individuals and groups 
who are unable to make suffi  cient contributions for their own protection.1005
Th e Rodríguez case concerned a complaint by a person with disability held in prison 
against the reduction of his disability benefi ts. Th e State argued that the reduction 
in the amount of the disability benefi t was proportional to the complainant’s cost 
of upkeeping during his stay in prison. In providing its underlying approach to 
the matter concerning the rights of persons with disability to such benefi ts as 
social security, the Committee held that
In the case of persons with disabilities who, owing to disability or disability-related 
factors, have temporarily lost or received a reduction in their income or have been 
denied employment opportunities or have a permanent disability, social security and 
1003 See particularly Chapter 8.3.5 above.
1004 Rodríguez v. Spain, para 10.3. ‘Th e Committee recalls that while the realization of the right 
to social security carries signifi cant fi nancial implications for States parties, the latter have 
an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of this 
right enunciated in the Covenant. Among other things, they are required to ensure access to 
a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefi ts to all individuals 
and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential health care, basic shelter and 
housing, water and sanitation, foodstuff s, and the most basic forms of education.’ ibid.
1005 Ibid para 10.4.
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income-maintenance schemes are of particular importance and should enable such 
persons to have an adequate standard of living, to live independently and to be included 
in the community in a dignifi ed manner. Th e support provided should cover family 
members and other individuals who undertake the care of a person with disabilities.1006
Alike other human rights monitoring bodies, the Committee underscored that, 
with respect to the right to social security benefi ts, the State’s emphasis should not 
be on the reduction in the amount of benefi ts granted to individuals but rather 
whether the amount they receive in fact are compatible with the principle of 
respect for the dignity of human being and hence enables every person concerned 
to lead and maintain an adequate standard of living on equal footing with other 
persons. As such, States parties are required to ‘pay full respect to the principle 
of human dignity’ and ‘the principle of non-discrimination’ in all their decisions 
concerning especially the ESC rights of vulnerable persons ‘so as to avoid any 
adverse eff ect on the levels of benefi ts and the form in which they are provided’. 
Th e Committee underscores that ensuring the rights of individuals to have access 
to and receive minimum essential level of income plays ‘an important role in 
preventing social exclusion and promoting social inclusion’.1007
In the case of Calero v. Ecuador, the Committee also addressed the State’s 
obligation to ensure the right to social security for all persons regardless of his or 
access to income or resources. In its decision, the Committee took an issue with the 
reasonableness of the conditions and, more, generally with the State’s obligation 
to ensure social security for those deemed vulnerable persons.1008 On the one 
hand, it stressed that the State has the general obligation to ensure that its social 
security (retirement) systems are effi  cient, sustainable and accessible for everyone 
and that the conditions set for contributory social security systems are reasonable, 
proportional and transparent. On the other hand, it has also a special obligation 
to design and implement alternative comprehensive social support and assistance 
system for those persons who cannot benefi t from contributory systems. Th e 
vulnerability of the applicant in this case resulted from three intersectional factors: 
she spent most of her life time in unpaid domestic work (thus unable to make regular 
1006 Ibid para 10.5 cum nn. 11–13.
1007 Ibid paras 10.1–10.2. See also generally ibid 10.1–11.3.
1008 Calero v. Ecuador, paras 16.1ff . As far as it is relevant here, although the applicant had made 
voluntary contribution to the special retirement pension, the relevant national authority 
refused to grant her request for special retirement pension stating that she did not comply with 
all the conditions of the relevant law. Th e decision for refusal was particularly based on the fact 
that the applicant did not at some point make her voluntary contributions for consecutive six 
months and this, according to the authority concerned, led to her being disqualifi ed from the 
membership. However, it was not disputed before the CESCR that the decision was not timely 
communicated to the applicant and that at the time she was informed of the decision she had 
already made contributions for over fi ve years. In eff ect, the authority’s decision retrospectively 
invalidated the fi ve years contribution and, consequently her right to legitimate expectations 
for special retirement pension. In general, the facts of the case show that she had complied with 
most part of the requirement.
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contribution); she is a female mostly aff ected by burden of unpaid domestic work; 
and she could no longer be able to re-enter the labour market due to old-age.1009 
All these conditions signify the special obligation of the State to guarantee that the 
applicant and other persons in similar situations have access to alternative measure 
that can guarantee an adequate standard of living during an old age.1010 In relation 
to the applicant in particular, the Committee found that the legal conditions (which 
were deemed unreasonable and disproportional) imposed on the applicant failed 
to take into account her specifi c circumstances (gender and nature of work) and, 
therefore, constituted a discriminatory treatment.1011 In short, the State violated 
its obligation towards the applicant for failing to ensure the reasonableness and 
proportionality of the contributory conditions as well as for failing to provide an 
alternative social security schemes required by her specifi c condition.1012
Moreover, in the cases of Djazia and Bellili v. Spain and I.D.G. v. Spain, the 
State obligation towards vulnerable persons was engaged in the context of the right 
to housing. In the former case, the applicants and their children were rendered 
homeless due to eviction enforcement measures following the termination 
of their rental contracts. Th e applicants did not have adequate income to look 
for another rent nor were they off ered alternative social housing, despite their 
repeated requests to the authorities. According to the CESCR, in general, eviction 
of persons in rental housing may be justifi ed if it is prescribed by law, carried out 
as a last resort and accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards.1013 However, 
these does not in any way absolve the State from its core general obligation to 
ensure access to adequate housing for everyone regardless of income or access to 
resources and, to this extent, provide access to those persons and families in need 
of special protection and to protect everyone against homelessness.1014
In particular, evictions should not render individuals homeless. Where those aff ected 
do not have the means to acquire alternative housing, States parties must take all 
appropriate measures to ensure, where possible, that adequate alternative housing, 
resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is available. States parties 
should pay particular attention to evictions that involve women, children, older 
persons, persons with disabilities or other vulnerable individuals or groups who are 
subjected to systemic discrimination. Th e State party has a duty to take reasonable 
measures to provide alternative housing to persons who are left  homeless as a result 
of eviction, irrespective of whether the eviction is initiated by its authorities or by an 
individual such as the lessor.1015
1009 Calero v. Ecuador, paras 19.1–19.6.
1010 Calero v. Ecuador, para 18.
1011 Calero v. Ecuador, para 19.6.
1012 Calero v. Ecuador, paras 18 cum 16.3–17.1.
1013 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, paras 15.1 cum 13.2–14.2. See also I.D.G. v. Spain, para 11.2 & 12.1–
12. 2.
1014 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, paras 13.1 & 15.3–15.5; I.D.G. v. Spain, paras 11.1 & 11.3.
1015 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, para 15.1.
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In this regard, it should be noted that even though the scope of this obligation, 
like in all other rights, is determined by the extent of its available resources, the 
burden is on the State to demonstrate with clear and strong evidence that it has 
taken all necessary measures to the maximum of all available resources by taking 
due and prior account of the specifi c needs of the vulnerable persons within its 
jurisdictions. It is especially bound to show that it has taken measures which 
could be deemed specifi c, targeted and eff ective (as opposed to mere general 
legislative and policy frameworks) in addressing the housing rights of those most 
in need.1016 Th erefore,
In the event that a person is evicted from his or her home without the State granting 
or guaranteeing alternative accommodation, the State party must demonstrate that it 
has considered the specifi c circumstances of the case and that, despite having taken 
all reasonable measures, to the maximum of its available resources, it has been unable 
to uphold the right to housing of the person concerned.1017
Th e case law of the CRPD particularly shows that the obligation of the State 
towards persons with disabilities, as a specially vulnerable categories of 
persons, consists in aff ording them the right to accessibility and reasonable 
accommodation which are prerequisites in order to enable them eff ectively enjoy 
all their fundamental human rights in all fi elds of life on the basis of equality and 
without discrimination of any kind. Th is approach has wide ranging implications 
and signifi cant role especially in giving practical relevance and eff ect to the 
Convention guarantees in diff erent socioeconomic and political contexts, as 
seen in several of its decisions.1018 In both the general comments and case law, 
the Committee reiterates that while accessibility is an unconditional obligation 
pertaining to persons with disabilities as whole, reasonable accommodation is 
assessed against the requirements of reasonableness (necessary and appropriate) 
and proportionality of accommodation measures (no disproportionate or undue 
burden). Both principles aim at achieving equality and elimination of all forms of 
discrimination aff ecting persons with disabilities in all socioeconomic and other 
fi elds of life.1019 It follows from this that the State party is obliged to identify and 
eliminate all legal, technical, physical, structural and other barriers existing both 
1016 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, paras 15.4–15.5.
1017 Djazia and Bellili v. Spain, para 15.5.
1018 For instance, the Committee has expressly referred to the State’s obligation to ensure 
accessibility and reasonable accommodation in the following several decisions. Bacher v. 
Austria, F v. Austria; Bujdoso et al v. Hungary; H.M. v. Sweden; Nyusti and Takács v. Hungary; 
J.H. v. Australia; Beasley v. Australia; Lockrey v. Australia; Noble v. Australia; Adam v. Saudi 
Arabia; X v. Argentina; Gröninger v. Germany; V.F.C. v. Spain (Communication No. 34/2015, 
UN Doc. CRPD/C/21/D/34/2015) decision on merits of 2 April 2019; Given v. Australia.
1019 See, for instance, Given v. Australia, para 8.5ff .; Bacher v. Austria, paras 9.4–9.7; V.F.C. v. Spain, 
para 8.4ff .
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in private and public sectors particularly undermining their right to independent, 
equal and dignifi ed life in the society.
Th us, in Nyusti and Takács v. Hungary, the State party was found in violation 
of its obligation to ensure electronic banking services (ATM cards) for visually 
impaired customers.1020 In H.M. v. Sweden, the State party was found in violation 
of its obligation to ensure reasonable accommodation in its planning and building 
permits. In this case, the applicant requested a permit to build a hydrotherapy 
pool deemed to be the only eff ective means to meet her critical health conditions 
but the authorities refused to grant the permit on the ground that it was against 
its relevant law. However, for the Committee, the decision of refusal did not pay 
due regard to the applicant’s specifi c conditions and health needs as required by 
the principle of reasonable accommodation.1021 In the case of Given v. Australia, 
the Committee held that failure to provide a visually impaired applicant with 
electronic voting platform (already available within the country) which could 
have enabled the same to cast a vote without revealing her choice to a third party 
is contrary to the State’s obligation to, inter alia, reasonable accommodation 
and accessibility.1022 And, fi nally, in three other cases against Australia which 
concerned the authorities’ decision to exclude them from jury service owing to 
their request to be provided with translator, the Committee held that the failure 
to provide them with translation service so that they could discharge their 
professional and public functions eff ectively and in equal terms with others was 
contrary to the requirement of reasonable accommodation and prohibition of 
discrimination.1023
Th erefore, it can certainly be seen that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination have been interpreted by UN human rights bodies as signifying 
wide-ranging special obligations of the State towards vulnerable persons. In 
particular, these principles have served as a justifi cation for the respective 
Committees to require the States to make sure that all vulnerable persons have 
access to those essential material conditions indispensable to enjoy an adequate 
standard of living compatible with their inherent human dignity and to eliminate 
all forms of socioeconomic and structural barriers preventing them from free and 
full enjoyment of their fundamental rights in equal terms with others.
1020 Paras 9.2–9.6.
1021 Paras 8.2–8.9.
1022 Paras 8.5–8.10. See also Bujdoso et al v. Hungary, paras 9.2ff  (where the Committee held that 
automatic disqualifi cation of the applicants from electoral register and hence participation 
in the voting process on the ground of their mental disability, whether actual or perceived, is 
contrary to the State’s obligation to ensure equal and non-discriminatory access to voting).
1023 J.H. v. Australia, paras 7.2ff ; Beasley v. Australia, paras 8.2ff ; Lockrey v. Australia, paras 8.2ff .
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9.5. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
It follows from the discussion in this Chapter that, in the context of ESC rights, 
the twin principles of equality and non-discrimination get their substantive 
meaning in the practical context of the rights of vulnerable persons. As shown, 
these principles have multifaceted socioeconomic and policy implications which 
the State must take with the view to ensure their full and eff ective participation 
in all fi elds of life by, in particular, removing all legal, technical, physical, 
socioeconomic, structural and attitudinal barriers undermining the enjoyment 
of their human rights. In this regard, reforming institutional and procedural 
obstacles hindering vulnerable persons from eff ectively enjoying their ESC rights 
is particularly crucial. It can be inferred from the cases discussed that human 
rights courts and monitoring bodies justify this obligation of the State on the 
fundamental principle that all vulnerable persons have equal right to be treated 
with due respect for their inherent dignity and, to this extent, must have access 
to all goods and services in equal terms with others and without any kind of 
discrimination. At the same time, it was shown that the principle of respect for 
human dignity also prescribes a specially compelling (an aggravated) obligation 
of the State to take due and proper account of the specifi c needs of each categories 
of vulnerable persons in all of its socioeconomic measures as a matter of priority. 
Th is, among other things, requires that its legislative, policy or administrative 
measures should not impose an undue burden on the vulnerable members of 
the society. It also obliges the State to safeguard the vulnerable persons against 
poverty, social exclusion and marginalisation. Th is, in turn, implies the obligation 
to provide, promote and facilitate the provision of essential material conditions 
for all persons who cannot aff ord or are unable to secure for themselves and 
their families due to reasons beyond their control. In particular, the State bears 
an utmost responsibility to guarantee that the vulnerable persons are in no case 
denied or deprived of, at the very least, their basic subsistence level. In ESC rights 
jurisprudence, this obligation constitutes an unconditional and irreducible 







Th e principal question raised and examined in this research is what normative 
justifi cation can be provided for economic, social and cultural human rights 
(ESC rights) guaranteed under international law and how can or should this 
justifi cation impact the State obligations emerging from these rights. Th e 
specifi c research questions needed to be answered in this regard were whether 
and in what manner human dignity provides a viable normative justifi cation 
for economic, social and cultural human rights guaranteed under international 
law, and what concrete legal obligations of the State party fl ow from these rights 
and how these obligations are refl ected in the jurisprudence of international 
human rights monitoring bodies from across jurisdictions. Th is also implied 
the question concerning the kind of legal obligations the State bears towards the 
vulnerable persons within its jurisdiction. Th ese questions are born out of the 
current limitations and lack of substantive progress in both the academic debate 
and practical enforcement of ESC rights. Th is study has accordingly examined in 
detail the nature, justifi cation and scope of the State obligations fl owing from ESC 
rights enshrined in international law.
To this end, the study had fi rst examined the diff erent conceptions of human 
rights and their implications on ESC rights as human rights. It then undertook 
a brief assessment of the existing major human rights theories. Next it analysed 
in detail if and in what sense the principle of human dignity can and should 
be considered as the normative foundation of ESC rights and, fi nally, analysed 
the concrete State’s legal obligations fl owing from these rights. Th e research 
background, questions, objectives, methods and the structure of the dissertation 
are provided in detail in the Chapter one of the study.
Addressing the above research questions required the step-by-step 
development of a chain of arguments. Th e fi rst step was a careful re-examination 
of how diff erent existing conceptions of the idea of human rights have negatively 
impacted the ESC rights regime in general. It has shown the diffi  culties in 
justifying the human rights status of ESC rights within the existing dominant 
conceptions of human rights. Th is required an alternative conception that fully 
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captures the practical and holistic view of human rights. Th is study suggests 
and defends such alternative. Th e second step was conducting a brief excursion 
into the existing human rights theories with the view to identify the basic value 
assumptions behind their conception of human rights and explain the critical 
limitations of these theories and the assumptions thereof in justifying ESC rights 
as inherent human rights. To provide a more robust theoretical understanding 
of the idea and function of human rights, and as a third and in fact the most 
important step, a detailed examination of the idea and principle of human dignity 
as a normative foundation of all human rights was conducted. As a fourth and 
fi nal step this study has analysed what can be considered as the specifi c legal 
content of ESC rights if approached on this normative basis. Th e fi rst three steps 
were accomplished in Part one of the study containing chapters two through 
four whereas the fi nal step was undertaken in Part two of the study containing 
chapters fi ve through nine.
Chapter two has identifi ed two important interrelated conceptions of human 
rights that have directly and indirectly aff ected the normative status and practical 
signifi cance of ESC rights. Th e fi rst is the hierarchical conception. Rooted in the 
positivist-constitutionalist view of rights, the hierarchical conception of human 
rights considers any moral rights not recognised in the positive law (such as in the 
constitution) as devoid of any normative (legal) signifi cance. Th e implication of 
this view is particularly pervasive for ESC rights as they are rarely recognised in 
the constitution or any positive law as fundamental human rights. Against this 
view, it was argued that the status and signifi cance of a given human right should 
be assessed and determined in the light of the underlying normative (moral) 
principle upon which it is justifi ed, and not according to its formal place in the 
ladder of hierarchies within a given legal system.
Th e second is the dichotomised conception of human rights. It was shown 
that at the back of this conception mainly stands an ideological division between 
liberal-individualist and collective-welfarist view of human rights. According to 
this liberal-individualist view, real (true, genuine) human rights are only those 
which require negative actions (forbearance, abstention or no action) from the 
State. It thus sees human rights as negative rights of individuals which essentially 
provide them with the right (power) to keep the State away from their life. For this 
view, ESC rights are not real human rights for they essentially require the State 
to take certain positive actions as opposed to abstaining from actions; if any, they 
are mere discretionary policy programs and, hence, do not provide individuals 
with any entitlement against the State. However, it was argued that this formal 
understanding of the idea and function of human rights does not help us in 
addressing the most fundamental questions of human life in a political society: it 
is a view which is too abstract and highly disconnected from the practical social 
life of individuals. Accordingly, this study, especially relying on the interesting 
contribution of MacCallum and Alexy, suggested that human rights should better 
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be conceived as a triadic (three-point) normative relationship between individuals 
and their (social) environment. It was shown that, for the triadic view of human 
rights, the basic question is not the action or in action of the State but rather 
whether a given person is free to live a dignifi ed human life or not. Th us, if a given 
human being lacks access to essential material conditions such as food, health 
care and housing, that person is neither free nor living a dignifi ed human life, 
regardless of the reason(s) for the lack of access to these conditions. Th e triadic 
conception is therefore found to be a more robust and comprehensive view of 
the idea of human rights which takes into account several factors undermining 
the life and dignity of human being and the corresponding role of the State as a 
principal social institution in addressing those factors. In addition, it was also 
noted that this triadic conception fully embraces the general idea of human rights 
recognised under international law.
Chapter three went further and examined the controversies raised by the 
hierarchical and dichotomised conceptions in the light of the existing major 
theories of human rights. Th e discussion in Chapter three was essentially 
concerned with two basic points: the fi rst was identifying the underlying 
value assumptions (claims) driving each of the theories and the second was 
understanding their views of the relationship between individual rights and 
interests and the State (general public) interests. Th is is based on the conviction 
that, in essence, the disagreement on the idea, nature and function of human 
rights revolves around these two basic points. In relation to the fi rst point, it was 
found that while some of the theories are based on and, hence, seek to promote 
the idea of an autonomous human being, others are concerned with and, hence, 
seek to defend and promote the collective interests. But it was shown that both the 
idea of autonomy and collective interest are too narrow to explain and justify what 
human rights are and what they are for in a comprehensive manner. In relation to 
the second point, it was found that both autonomy-based and collective interest-
based theories promote, in one way or another, a separationist (antagonistic) view 
of the relationship between individual human rights and collective interests. It 
was therefore concluded that because of these two inherent major limitations 
none of the theories can provide us with a holistic understanding of the nature 
and practical implications of human rights for a political society.
Th is implies that there is a need for a theory of human rights which should be 
(re-)constructed on the basis of richer and inclusive value assumption justifying 
both the individual human rights and collective interests as one coherent and 
undivided whole. But this also requires us to, fi rst, reconceive and explain the idea 
of human rights as a social idea and, second, examine and defend the practical-
intuitive understanding and implications of the principle of human dignity. To 
this end, this study introduced and discussed the idea of the social conception of 
human rights in the second-half of Chapter three. Th e social conception of human 
rights was a valuable thought framework in developing the central tenets and 
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orientation of the practical social idea of human rights, that is, the idea of human 
rights as essentially having a social foundation and function. Th e narrative for 
this was explained as follows: the idea of human rights is born out of humanity’s 
need to respond to practical social necessities aff ecting the life of human being 
in a political society. It is thus rooted in and originated from the practical and 
complex social relations that human beings constitute between themselves and 
their environment. It is mainly coined as a normative language of struggle and 
resistance against various forms of indignation, exclusion, abuse, discrimination, 
injustices and the like aff ecting human beings in the process of living together as 
a political (relational) beings. In substance, therefore, it was shown that, per this 
view, human rights are nothing but the result of social relations.
Th is argument, in turn, assumed and relied on the relational nature of 
human beings. Based on this, Chapter three presented and defended the idea 
of social relations as essentially moral relations defi ned by humanity’s need 
for the protection, preservation and promotion of its inherent moral value. It 
was accordingly maintained that the modern idea of human rights recognised 
in several human rights instruments are essentially the advancement of this 
relational-moral nature of humanity and that the human rights norms thereof 
are refl ections and further specifi cations of the underlying moral principle and 
assumptions behind social relations. Th is also led us to argue that the primary 
social function or raison d’être of human rights and human rights norms in a 
given political society are nothing but the protection, preservation and promotion 
of human life and its inherent value. However, the justifi cation of the idea of social 
relations as moral relations (in the sense relevant for the social conception of 
human rights) is not possible without a central organising and an overarching 
normative (moral) principle.
Chapter four was accordingly concerned with the detailed examination of 
the fundamental moral principle behind social relations and hence the social 
idea of human rights: the principle of human dignity. But as already noted in 
Chapter three, in order to consider the principle of human dignity as a foundation 
of human rights, it should be shown, fi rst, that dignity is itself an inherent 
moral value of every human being; second, that it is present in each and every 
person equally unconditionally and at all-time and, fi nally, that it is regarded as 
a universal value. With this in mind, it was necessary to discuss in detail the 
historical-philosophical conception and current practical usage of the idea of 
human dignity. Th e historical-philosophical excursion revealed that there were 
two basic conceptions of dignity developed over the course of time: as rank and 
status, and as inherent (intrinsic) moral value of humanity. It was shown that 
the transition in its conception as rank and status to as inherent moral value of 
every human being had passed through complex processes of intellectual history. 
Nevertheless, it was seen that the fundamental normative meaning engrained in 
its very notion, the principle of respect, remained unchanged over the course of 
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time. Th e diff erence was that in the rank and status dignity the ideal of respect 
was said to be due only to a certain category of persons (such those who occupy 
a given social position or possess such attributes as rationality) whereas in the 
case of dignity as inherent moral value of humanity, this ideal of respect was 
considered to be the due of every human being regardless of his or her rank 
(status) or capacity for rational thinking or morality.
Th e discussion in Chapter four has also shown that there are several competing 
theoretical arguments concerning the justifi cation of dignity as unconditional 
and inherent moral value of humanity, ranging from religious arguments to that 
of highly abstract metaphysical arguments off ered by Immanuel Kant. Having 
indicated the critical problems and limitations associated with such arguments, 
this study has off ered an alternative perspective arguing that the justifi cation 
of dignity as inherent value of humanity requires us to take a more practical 
approach which should start from a practical-intuitive understanding of the 
nature of human being and the complex social relations they constitute between 
themselves and their environment. Th is meant that the idea of dignity should 
be dissociated from abstract, arbitrary and contingent factors and, instead, be 
justifi ed on a rather stable and universally valid ground commonly possessed by 
every human being. In this regard, it was stressed that the only one thing that 
human beings naturally and invariably possess in common is the fact of being 
human or their humanity. So, relying on the views of Sulmasy and Nussbaum, 
it was argued that dignity should be conceived as an inherent and unconditional 
value that pertains to every human being just by the mere fact of being a human 
person. Th at is, to be human is the only necessary and suffi  cient condition to 
have this inherent and unconditional value for it is the value that humans have by 
virtue of being the kind of being that they are: that they are humans.
Th us, it was argued that in the practical-intuitive sense, humanity (the 
fact of being human) is constituted of two indissociable fundamental natures: 
the biological (physical) and moral nature. Hence, humanity is a being which, 
at once, has both the biological and moral existence. Th e biological fact of 
humanity explains its animal nature. As an animal being, humanity has physical 
existence and personality and hence the corresponding inherent biological needs 
constituting necessary and indispensable material conditions of dignifi ed human 
life. Th e moral fact of humanity, on the other hand, explains its moral nature. 
Humanity has accordingly a moral existence and personality and therewith the 
corresponding inherent moral needs constituting necessary and indispensable 
moral conditions of dignifi ed human life. Humanity’s moral personality 
particularly consists in the idealisation of the physical personality of humanity 
through the operation of the system of rights and obligations underlying the 
structure of every legal system. Interestingly, it is also this moral nature that 
defi nes humanity as necessarily a relational being for morality is essentially 
concerned with human being’s relationship with the self, the social and the wider 
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world. In short, dignity as fundamental, inherent and unconditional value of 
humanity pertains equally and at once to both the biological and moral aspect 
of being human.
In addition, it was shown that the normative principle engrained in the notion 
of human dignity, the principle of respect, asserts an unconditional respect for the 
inherent life and value of humanity. Th e discussion in this Chapter particularly 
indicated that the principle of respect is a relational normative principle which not 
only requires but also presupposes the existence of dynamic relationship between 
human beings. In addition, it was also shown that this principle of human dignity 
is characteristically an evaluative normative principle in the sense that, on the 
one hand, it prescribes actions and treatments which ought to be compatible 
with the value of humanity and, on the other hand, it proscribes those which are 
disrespectful or antithetic to the value of humanity. In this way, the principle of 
human dignity introduces a fundamental ethical-moral dimension to the idea of 
social relations through which permissible and impermissible actions, behaviours 
and practices can be distinguished across all spectra of human life and relations.
Upon close refl ection, the ideal of unconditional respect for the life and value 
of humanity consists in being attentive to the inherent biological and moral needs 
of humanity. Th is, in turn, implies that both the biological and moral needs of 
humanity are indissociable constitutive elements of a dignifi ed human life. Th at 
is, they are basic material and moral conditions which must be fulfi lled as a matter 
of respect for the inherent life and value of humanity. It follows from this that the 
fundamental demands of the principle of respect is concerned with asserting an 
unconditional respect for these inherent biological and moral conditions required 
to live a dignifi ed human life. Th is forms the normative basis for insisting on the 
obligation of the State and other relevant actors to ensure the inherent material 
and moral conditions required by the principle of human dignity.
Now these core demands of human dignity are by and large articulated in the 
form of specifi c human rights guaranteeing economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights both at international and national level. Generally speaking, the 
inherent material conditions (biological needs) of human beings are essentially 
the central subjects of guarantees provided through economic, social and cultural 
rights regimes whereas those inherent moral needs of human beings are the core 
subjects of guarantees provided through civil and political rights regimes. Th is, 
in turn, established two crucial points central to this research. First, various kinds 
of human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil or political rights) recognised 
in various human rights instruments are nothing but specifi c articulations of 
what the principle of respect for the life and value of human being entails for a 
political society. Second, economic, social and cultural human rights are rooted 
in (fl ow from) the same underlying normative principle as civil and political 
rights and, hence, equally prescribe compelling human rights obligations of the 
State. In essence, these obligations of the State essentially consist in securing for 
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every human being those material conditions required to live a dignifi ed human 
life. Th is, in turn, implies that the problem of ESC rights cannot be the problem 
of justifi cation (substance) but rather the problem of articulating their specifi c 
implications in practice: that is, it has to do with the problem of identifying the 
concrete legal obligations the State bears in order to fulfi l the normative demands 
of the principle of human dignity in the context of ESC rights. Th is was the topic 
systematically addressed in detail in Part two of the study.
It is one thing to say that the principle of human dignity entails the obligation 
to respect for the inherent material conditions of life but it is another thing to 
identify the concrete legal obligations which the State has to adhere to in order 
to satisfy the very demands arising from the principle of human dignity. In this 
regard, this study chose to take a practical inductive approach to this issue. Part 
two of this study therefore provided an in-depth analysis of the legal obligations 
of the State as developed in international ESC rights jurisprudence. Th us, having 
extensively reviewed the practices of international human rights tribunals 
entrusted with the mandate to adjudicate ESC rights claims, this research 
has identifi ed that, in concrete terms, the State’s legal obligation to ensure the 
essential material conditions of life guaranteed through ESC rights regime has 
two principal constitutive dimensions: procedural and substantive.
Th e procedural dimension is concerned with ensuring the due process 
guarantees indispensable for the eff ective protection of ESC rights. In relation 
to this, it was identifi ed that there are three fundamental procedural rights 
constituting the core of the due process guarantees: the right to participation, 
access to justice and accountability.
Participation seeks to guarantee the rights of everyone to take part in and 
have a meaningful say in all decision-making processes aff ecting one’s rights and 
vital interests. It is recognised as forming part and parcel of the general principle 
of international law and as a fundamental principle aimed at eliminating or at 
least countering the practices of exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination. 
In other words, guaranteeing the right to participation is the practical expression 
and reaffi  rmation of the equal dignity and rights of all human beings in a 
political society. As shown in Chapter fi ve, it plays a signifi cant role especially 
in safeguarding the vulnerable persons against discrimination, social exclusion 
and marginalisation. In terms of its scope, it was seen that the State is obliged to 
ensure the eff ective participation of all those aff ected in all of its decision-making 
processes aff ecting their vital socioeconomic interests. Th e eff ectiveness of the 
participation of individuals in a given decision-making process is determined 
by the extent to which it is conducted in accordance with its basic constitutive 
elements. Th at is, participation in a given decision-making process is of no 
practical eff ect unless it is relevant, meaningful, timely, transparent, and respectful 
of the dignity and basic rights of individuals concerned and is conducted in good 
faith and in accordance with pre-established legal standards. In this regard, the 
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discussion under this Chapter has clearly shown how the State’s failure to engage, 
in particular, the vulnerable persons in its decision-making processes in the light 
of these requirements has resulted in the violations of several ESC rights.
Access to justice is considered to be the core of the very notion of human 
rights. It directly fl ows from the generic legal obligation of the State to guarantee 
the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of all human rights for everyone within its 
jurisdiction. It seeks to guarantee that everyone with an arguable claim has access 
to a remedy against violation of one’s human rights. Generally speaking, access to 
justice contains bundles of procedural and substantive requirements, also referred 
to as the whole sum of the right to fair trial, which the State is bound to ensure 
in all cases involving the determination of the arguable claims of individuals 
regardless of the nature of the institution or proceeding concerned. International 
human rights law indeed does not prescribe any specifi c form of institution or 
procedure but it clearly requires the State to ensure that both the institution and 
its procedures be designed in the light of the basic elements of access to justice 
(examined in detail in this study). In Chapter six, having carefully examined the 
contents and implications of the elements of access to justice in general, this study 
has shown the need to take a more cautious and contextual approach in applying 
them to ESC rights adjudications. Th is, in turn, is justifi ed on the basis of the 
nature of issues involved in the ESC rights claims and the vulnerable position 
of the (group of) individuals claiming these rights. On the one hand, ESC rights 
claims are by and large claims against the State and its socioeconomic choices 
and decisions over which it oft en has exclusive access to the relevant information 
or evidence. On the other hand, the claims are usually brought by those persons 
oft en suff ering from poverty, discrimination, exclusion, or marginalisation. 
Th us, the State bears a positive obligation to make sure that the narrow and 
formal approach to access to justice would not result in the frustration of the 
very interests it seeks to protect. Th e State is also required to be sensitive and 
responsive to the special needs and interests of the vulnerable persons in ESC 
rights proceeding and to uphold the principle of the rule of law and democratic 
accountability by promptly and eff ectively complying with reparation orders, if 
any. Overall, the discussion under Chapter six has underscored that, in relation 
to ESC rights, access to justice particularly signifi es the obligation of the State to 
carefully design both the institutional structures and procedural requirements 
by taking due and proper account of the rights and specifi c needs of the diff erent 
categories of vulnerable persons within its jurisdiction. Th e cases discussed under 
this Chapter clearly show the problem of both the denial of access to justice and 
the failure of the State to properly take a cautious and contextual approach to each 
of the elements of the right to access to justice in relation to ESC rights claims.
Th e principle of accountability generally entails a complex normative 
relationship between human rights holders and the State. It is a fundamental 
principle justifi ed on the basis of the State’s generic legal obligation to respect and 
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ensure the free, full and eff ective enjoyment of human rights for all persons within 
its jurisdictions. It is essentially concerned with and hence gives concreteness to 
the overall (overarching) human rights obligation of the State. It as such requires 
the State to design and put in place the system through which individuals and 
group of individuals can demand justifi cations for its choices, rectifi cation of the 
failures in making the choices or in the implementation of the measures adopted, 
and for sanctioning its agents or other entities responsible for the failures. In 
addition, the principle of accountability also requires the State to make sure 
that the conducts of the private entities within its jurisdiction do not obstruct 
the enjoyment of ESC rights. Th us, the eff ective protection of any human rights 
without the existence of the system of accountability is utterly impossible. Th is 
is even more so in the context of ESC rights claims in which the socioeconomic 
choices and decisions of the State and its agents are the main causes of or at least 
background reasons for those claims. Chapter seven has examined the approaches 
of international human rights courts and monitoring bodies to the accountability 
of the State for ensuring the material conditions life. It was accordingly shown 
that the human rights courts and monitoring bodies particularly draw on the 
ideal of the institutional (objective) accountability of the State as opposed to that 
of subjective accountability. Th e main tenet of this approach is that it does not 
concern itself with the internal constitutional and administrative divisions of 
powers and functions of the State. Nor does it concern itself with the fault of the 
(public) offi  cials, institutions and other entities in establishing the overall human 
rights accountability of the State. It rather concerns itself with whether or not the 
(group of) individuals are eff ectively guaranteed the right to have access to and 
enjoy their ESC rights. Th is Chapter has underscored the paramount importance 
of this approach especially for the realisation of ESC rights. Th e cases discussed 
under this Chapter has provided the justifi cations for and three major scenarios 
underlying this institutional human rights accountability of the State under 
international law.
Th e substantive dimension of the State’s legal obligation in its part is concerned 
with securing the essential minimum guarantees of the basic material conditions 
of life required to live a dignifi ed human life. In relation to this, this study has 
identifi ed and discussed four basic human rights principles constituting the 
substantive core of ESC rights guarantees. Th ese are the principle of dignifi ed 
life, equality, non-discrimination and the protection of individuals against 
vulnerability. In general, the discussion in Chapters eight and nine has shown 
that there are essentially two interrelated obligations of the State fl owing from the 
substantive dimension of the State obligation to respect and ensure the material 
conditions of life. First, the State is required to make sure that every human being 
has access to an essential threshold level of the material conditions of life on 
the basis of equality and without any kind of non-discrimination. Second, it is 
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required to give due and proper regard to the minimum essential socioeconomic 
needs of the vulnerable persons.
It was seen in Chapter eight that the State’s obligation to ensure a dignifi ed life 
entails a broad substantive human rights obligation of the State. It was particularly 
noted that this ideal of dignifi ed life underscores the richer view of the right to 
life and dignity and, to this extent, the holistic approach to the protection of all 
human rights. It especially requires the State to guarantee that all individuals have 
an unconditional access to those minimum essential material conditions needed 
to live a life worthy of human dignity. Th is, in turn, entails wide-ranging negative 
and positive obligations of the State in relation to socioeconomic conditions or 
circumstances threatening the life and dignity of human being regardless of the 
nature and sources of these conditions. In particular, the State is bound to make 
sure that its socioeconomic choices and decisions do not under any circumstance 
deprive the (group of) individuals of the enjoyment of the substantive core of their 
ESC rights and to take all necessary and eff ective measures to avert the conditions 
or circumstances threatening human life and dignity. Th e cases discussed under 
this Chapter has shown how human rights courts and monitoring bodies have 
applied the State’s obligation to respect and ensure a dignifi ed life in ever-
expanding socioeconomic conditions ranging from prison (detention) conditions 
to environmental factors.
Chapter nine has shown the multifaceted implications of the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination and the obligation to guarantee a dignifi ed life 
in relation to the vulnerable persons. Th us, by virtue of these principles, the State 
is especially bound to remove all forms of obstacles or impediments hampering 
their equal participation in all fi elds of life in equal terms with other persons; to 
ensure that all vulnerable persons have access to and enjoy all goods, services 
and opportunities open to all persons; to take due and proper account of the 
specifi c needs and interests of each categories of the vulnerable persons in all 
of its socioeconomic decisions; to guarantee that its decisions do not impose 
unnecessary and undue burden on the vulnerable persons within its jurisdiction; 
and to safeguard all vulnerable persons against social exclusion, marginalisation 
and poverty. In particular, Chapter nine has shown that human rights courts 
and monitoring bodies consider that the State has an aggravated obligation to 
ensure a dignifi ed life for all vulnerable persons as a matter of priority. Th at is, 
it bears an utmost responsibility to take due and proper account of the negative 
socioeconomic conditions aff ecting diff erent categories of vulnerable persons and 
to design concrete and targeted positive measures aimed at removing or mitigating 
the impacts of these conditions on their ability to freely and fully enjoy their ESC 
rights in equal terms with other persons. Above all, it is obliged to make sure that 
the specifi c needs of the vulnerable persons are given due priority in the provision 
of basic goods and services even at the time of dire economic conditions. Th is, in 
turn, is regarded as an irreducible minimum core obligation of the State and as 
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a litmus test for the overall legitimacy of its general socioeconomic policies and 
institutional measures.
10.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Th e main conclusions reached in this study are provided as follows. Th e holistic and 
practical conception of the nature and implications of human rights necessarily 
needs the governing ideal of what it means to be and live as a free and dignifi ed 
human being in a political society and the recognition and critical refl ection on 
the social-political (relational) nature of human beings. Th e social conception of 
human rights thus takes a practical approach to the idea of human rights and 
freedom, and of a dignifi ed human life by locating their origin and signifi cance 
within the complex relationality that defi nes human life. In a political society, 
the entire aspect of human life is constituted by complex and practical social 
relations. In essence, the social relations constituting human life are essentially 
moral relations in that they are rooted in humanity’s self-consciousness and self-
attribution of values and, hence, concern the need for the protection, preservation 
and promotion of its inherent life and value. Within this idea of social relations, 
the essential characteristic feature of humanity, both collective and individual 
interests and values are inseparably interwoven and hence exist as one undivided 
whole. It is this that provides a more robust and coherent foundation for the 
normative theory of human rights than the narrow formal or ideological approach 
identifi ed in relation to the traditional and discourse theories of human rights.
In this approach, the idea of human dignity emerges as a foundational and 
an evaluative normative principle. Th at is, it serves as a justifi cation for the 
inherent rights and freedoms individuals should have and enjoy in a political 
society qua human beings and as a standard against which the legitimacy of 
actions, behaviours and practices in the society vis-à-vis the life and value of 
human beings can be assessed and judged. In particular, the principle of human 
dignity prescribes an unconditional (absolute) right of every human being to be 
respected and treated with humanity, that is, in the manner compatible with the 
inherent value of a human being. In other words, the principle of human dignity 
prescribes how we should see and treat ourselves and other fellow human beings 
in all fi elds of our personal, socioeconomic, cultural, political and institutional 
relations. However, this idea of respect does not have any meaningful eff ect unless 
it is shown how it charts with the practical-intuitive view of the inherent nature 
(being) of humanity. In essence, the inherent being of humanity consists in its 
physical and moral being. Accordingly, it was concluded that the ideal of respect 
for human being must be construed as pertaining both to the physical (biological) 
and moral aspect of being human. Th erefore, in practical terms, respecting and 
ensuring respect for the inherent life and value of human being indistinguishably 
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(inseparably) consists in guaranteeing those basic material and moral conditions 
required to live a dignifi ed human life.
Upon refl ection, these material and moral conditions of life refer to those 
socioeconomic, cultural and political interests guaranteed through ESC rights 
and civil and political rights regimes. Th is means that, alike moral conditions 
guaranteed through civil and political rights, the material conditions guaranteed 
through ESC rights equally constitute part and parcel of the inherent life and 
value of human being. Th at is, without securing these material conditions at an 
adequate level, it is utterly impossible to respect or ensure respect for the inherent 
life and value of human being. Th is has, on the one hand, proved the invalidity 
of the hierarchical and categorisation arguments voiced against ESC rights 
and, on other hand, established ESC rights on the same underlying normative 
principle as civil and political rights. Understood in this way, all specifi c human 
rights currently recognised in the form of civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social human rights in various international human rights instruments give 
concreteness to the meaning and implications of what it means for the State to 
practically respect and ensure respect for the inherent life and value of human 
being.
However, what does the obligation to respect and ensure the material 
conditions of life required by the principle of human dignity actually entail for 
the State in concrete legal terms? Th is study has answered this question by taking 
an inductive approach. Th us, aft er an in-depth review and analysis of the relevant 
international ESC rights jurisprudence, it concluded that the State’s obligation 
to respect and ensure the material conditions of life has the procedural and 
substantive aspects. Th e procedural obligation of the State is restated in terms of 
the three basic human rights principles concerned with due process guarantees: 
participation, access to justice and accountability. Th e substantive obligation of 
the State to guarantee the material conditions of life is, in turn, restated in terms 
of four basic human rights principles (dignifi ed life, equality, non-discrimination 
and the protection of vulnerable persons) signifying the State’s legal obligation 
to guarantee an unconditional access to minimum essential material conditions 
for every human being and to safeguard vulnerable persons against conditions 
of vulnerability as a matter of priority. Th ese procedural and substantive 
requirements, taken as a whole, give meaning (concreteness) to the State’s generic 
legal obligation to respect and ensure the essential material conditions of life 
signifi ed by the principle of human dignity. Th e detailed examination of the 
international ESC rights case law from across jurisdictions has overwhelmingly 
shown that the violations of the ESC rights were, in one way or another, due to 
the State’s failure to adhere to one or more of these procedural and substantive 
legal requirements.
I believe that the approaches, analyses, fi ndings and conclusions of this study 
instils a fresh and structured way of thinking about the contents and scope of 
Chapter 10. General Summary and Conclusions
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protections guaranteed through international ESC rights regimes. Th e arguments 
developed on the basis of the principle of human dignity and the rich body of 
case law from across the jurisdictions certainly bring coherence to the academic 
discourse regarding their nature and status and practical legal implications. Th e 
argument from the principle of human dignity has eff ectively established the 
substantive linkage between the inherent life and value of human being and ESC 
rights. Th e arguments inductively generated from the international ESC rights 
jurisprudence have interestingly restated their contents and implications in 
terms of a well-established legal principles. Th is suggests that it is not possible 
for the State to easily dismiss these rights as programmatic rights nor can it 
evade its obligation on account of the charge of ambiguity or resource scarcity 
(aff ordability).
Th us, notwithstanding its other inputs for the general human rights 
scholarship, the specifi c contributions of this study can be stated in terms of the 
following major points. First, it can provide solid justifi cations for the courts and 
the tribunals at all levels to assume jurisdictions over and eff ectively dispose the 
ESC rights claims. Second, it can assist human rights lawyers and advocates in 
making a strong case against the State in relation to its legal obligations under 
specifi c ESC rights. Th ird, it can serve as the source of inspiration in the struggle 
against poverty, discrimination, inequality, exclusion and marginalisation and 
in the quest for social justice for all. Fourth, it can guide the State agents and 
other decision-making organs in (re-)assessing the legitimacy or impacts of their 
socioeconomic choices and decisions against the ESC rights of those aff ected by 
the outcome of their choices and decisions. Fift h, it can help the (national and 
international) human rights bodies to take a viable and coherent approach in 
monitoring the practical performance of the State in the realisation of these rights 
and in providing trainings to the relevant actors dealing with ESC rights.
Having said these, there are however much works to be done especially in 
order to make the fi ndings of these research practically useful at the grassroots 
(national) level. Th e main one is conducting a (comparative) legal research into 
each of the procedural and substantive principles identifi ed above from the 
national legal systems’ point of view. Th e other is enriching the contents and 
implications of each of the principles through further academic discourse. Th e 
next is developing the principles into an accessible and usable toolkit for the 
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SAMENVATTING
De centrale vraag in dit onderzoek was welke normatieve rechtvaardiging kan 
worden gevonden voor in het internationaal recht gegarandeerde economische, 
sociale en culturele mensenrechten (ESC rechten) en hoe deze rechtvaardiging 
van invloed is, of zou moeten zijn, op verplichtingen van Staten die voortvloeien 
uit deze rechten. De specifi eke rechtsvragen de beantwoord moesten worden 
waren of en op welke wijze menselijke waardigheid (human dignity) een aan-
vaardbare normatieve rechtvaardiging kan zijn voor internationale ESC rechten, 
welke concrete verplichtingen hieruit voortvloeien voor Staten en op welke wijze 
deze verplichtingen zichtbaar zijn in de jurisprudentie van internationale instel-
lingen die toezicht houden op de naleving hiervan. Dit omvatte ook de vraag naar 
de aard van de juridische verplichtingen van Staten ten opzichte van kwetsbare 
personen binnen hun jurisdictie. Deze vragen komen voort uit de huidige beper-
kingen en inhoudelijke voortgang in het academische debat, alsmede de beperkte 
afdwingbaarheid van ESC rechten in de praktijk. De doelstelling van deze studie 
was om een nieuw perspectief te bieden op de normatieve rechtvaardiging en de 
eff ectieve implementatie van ESC rechten in de praktijk; in andere woorden de 
studie beoogde om te verduidelijken hoe we de normatieve rechtvaardiging en de 
aard van ESC rechten moeten begrijpen en wat de concrete juridische verplichtin-
gen zijn die hieruit voortvloeien zowel in algemene zin als in de specifi eke context 
van kwetsbare groepen.
De beantwoording van bovenstaande vragen en het verwerkelijken van de 
doelstelling van de studie vereisten een stap-voor-stap ontwikkeling van een 
keten van argumenten. Ten eerste, is onderzocht hoe de verschillende bestaande 
opvattingen over het idee van mensenrechten een negatieve impact hebben gehad 
op het regime van ESC rechten in het algemeen. In dit opzicht liet het de moeilijk-
heden zien om binnen de gangbare mensenrechtenopvattingen de status van ESC 
rechten als mensenrechten te rechtvaardigen. Hieruit volgde de behoeft e aan een 
alternatieve opvatting die een praktische en holistische kijk op mensenrechten 
omvat. Daarom werd in deze studie een alternatief voorgesteld en verdedigd. Ten 
tweede omvatte deze studie een beknopte bespreking van de belangrijkste men-
senrechtentheorieën. De reden voor deze bespreking was het identifi ceren van 
de essentiële waarden die ten grondslag liggen aan de kijk op mensenrechten in 
deze theorieën en om te laten zien wat de tekortkomingen zijn van deze theorieën 
en hun waarden voor de rechtvaardiging van ESC rechten als inherente men-
senrechten. Als derde, en in feite de meest belangrijke stap, is in deze studie een 
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gedetailleerd onderzoek gedaan naar het idee en beginsel van menselijke waar-
digheid als de normatieve grondslag van alle mensenrechten om hiermee een ste-
viger theoretisch onderbouwing van het idee en de functie van mensenrechten 
te geven. Tot slot analyseerde deze studie de specifi eke inhoud van de juridische 
verplichtingen voor de Staat die voortvloeien uit ESC rechten indien benaderd op 
basis van het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid. De eerste drie stappen werden 
in Deel 1 van de studie uitgewerkt in Hoofdstukken 2 t/m 4 en de laatste stap in 
Deel 2 van de studie, in Hoofdstukken 5 t/m 9.
Om dit te kunnen doen werden twee niveaus van analyse (onderzoeksmetho-
den) gebruikt. Op het eerste niveau, in Deel 1 van de studie, werden de theo-
retische problemen bij de eff ectieve realisering van ESC rechten besproken. De 
bespreking in dit Deel verduidelijkte hoe we de normatieve kern en rechtvaar-
diging van ESC rechten kunnen opvatten en wat hun praktische belang is in het 
licht van het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid. Op het tweede niveau werd een 
inductieve benadering gekozen om de internationale ESC rechten jurisprudentie 
te analyseren om de normatieve betekenis en vereisten van het beginsel van men-
selijke waardigheid te beoordelen, alsmede de concrete en dwingende juridische 
verplichtingen voor Staten bij de verwerkelijking van ESC rechten op basis van 
respect voor het leven en waarde van mensen. De discussie in Deel 2 probeerde 
daarmee inhoud te geven (te concretiseren) wat Statelijke verplichtingen zijn om 
een waardig menselijk leven te respecteren en te verzekeren in het kader van ESC 
rechten.
Hoofdstuk 2 benoemde twee belangrijke en gerelateerde opvattingen over 
mensenrechten die direct en indirect de normatieve status en praktische beteke-
nis van ESC rechten hebben beïnvloed. De eerste is de hiërarchische opvatting 
die, geworteld in de positief-constitutionalistische kijk op rechten, geen juridisch 
belang toekent aan morele rechten die niet zijn erkend in het positieve recht. 
Aangezien ESC rechten zelden worden erkend in moderne constituties of positief 
recht als fundamentele mensenrechten, is het nauwelijks mogelijk om deze rech-
ten als inherente mensenrechten te rechtvaardigen en te verdedigen op basis van 
deze hiërarchische opvatting over mensenrechten. Als tegenargument is betoogd 
dat de status en betekenis van een mensenrecht beoordeeld en bepaald zou moe-
ten worden op basis van de onderliggende normatieve (morele) beginselen waar-
mee het wordt gerechtvaardigd in plaats van de formele plaats op de hiërarchische 
ladder in een rechtssysteem. De tweede opvatting vloeit voort uit het gedicho-
tomiseerde ideologische onderscheid tussen de liberaal-individualistische en 
collectief-welfaristische kijk op mensenrechten. Volgens de liberaal-individua-
listische opvatting zijn de enige individuele rechten de negatieve rechten die de 
Staat verplichten individuen met rust te laten. ESC rechten zijn geen werkelijke 
mensenrechten omdat zij van de Staat vereisen om positieve actie te ondernemen 
in plaats van zich te onthouden van activiteiten. Echter, beargumenteerd is dat 
een formeel begrip van mensenrechten dat gestoeld is op deze opvatting niet helpt 
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bij het oplossen van de meest fundamentele vraagstukken van menselijk leven 
in een politieke maatschappij, aangezien het een opvatting is die te abstract is 
en in hoge mate ontkoppeld is van het praktische sociale leven van individuen. 
Daarom suggereerde deze studie, daarbij ondersteund door MacCallum en Alexy, 
dat mensenrechten beter gezien kunnen worden als een normatieve triadische 
verhouding (driehoeksverhouding) tussen individuen en hun (sociale) omgeving. 
In de triadische kijk op mensenrechten is de belangrijkste vraag of een persoon 
vrij is om een waardig menselijk leven te leiden. Iemand die geen toegang heeft  
tot essentiële materiële voorwaarden om te leven zoals voedsel, gezondheidszorg 
en huisvesting, is noch vrij, noch in staat een waardig menselijk leven te leiden, 
ongeacht de reden(en) voor het gebrek aan toegang tot deze voorwaarden. Der-
halve geeft  de triadische opvatting een robuustere en praktischere kijk op het idee 
van mensenrechten en de rol van de Staat in een politieke maatschappij.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht de controverses die voortkwamen uit de hiërarchi-
sche en gedichotomiseerde kijk op mensenrechten in het licht van de belang-
rijkste bestaande mensenrechtentheorieën. De bespreking in dit Hoofdstuk was 
vooral gericht op door het benoemen van de drijvende kracht van de onderlig-
gende waarden in elk van deze theorieën om daarmee inzicht te verwerven hoe 
in elk van deze theorieën de relatie is tussen individuele rechten aan de ene kant 
en algemene publieke belangen aan de andere kant. Dit is gebaseerd op de over-
tuiging dat het fundamentele verschil van mening over het idee, aard en functie 
van mensenrechten in de kern draait om deze twee kernpunten. Met betrekking 
tot het eerste punt is gevonden dat waar sommige van deze theorieën het idee van 
autonomie en autonome mensen verdedigen en ondersteunen, andere theorieën 
collectieve (algemene publieke) belangen benadrukken. Echter, aangetoond werd 
dat zowel op autonomie gebaseerde als de op het collectieve belang gebaseerde 
theorieën te beperkt zijn om in veelomvattende zin te kunnen verklaren en recht-
vaardigen wat mensenrechten zijn en waarvoor zij bedoeld zijn. Met betrekking 
tot het tweede punt is gevonden dat zowel de op autonomie gebaseerde theorieën 
als de op collectieve belangen gebaseerde theorieën op enigerlei wijze een onder-
scheidende (antagonistische) kijk op de relatie tussen individuele mensenrechten 
en collectieve belangen bevorderen. Aangezien dit ernstige beperkingen vormen 
van de besproken theorieën, kan geen daarvan een holistische verklaring geven 
voor de aard en functies van mensenrechten in een politieke maatschappij. Dit 
impliceert dat er behoeft e is aan een mensenrechtentheorie die ge(re)construeerd 
zou moeten worden op basis van diepere en inclusieve waarden en die individu-
ele mensenrechten en collectieve belangen als een samenhangend en ongedeeld 
geheel kan rechtvaardigen.
Om dit te kunnen bereiken is het noodzakelijk om, ten eerste, het idee van 
mensenrechten als een sociaal idee te herformuleren en uit te leggen en, ten 
tweede, om het begrip en implicaties van een praktisch-intuïtieve benadering van 
menselijke waardigheid te onderzoeken en te verdedigen. Het tweede deel van 
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Hoofdstuk 3 introduceerde en besprak hiervoor het idee van een sociale opvat-
ting van mensenrechten als een waardevol gedachtenkader voor de ontwikkeling 
van de kernelementen en doeleinden van het praktische sociale idee van men-
senrechten. De sociale opvatting van mensenrechten beschouwt het idee van 
mensenrechten als geworteld in de menselijke behoeft e te reageren op praktische 
sociale noden die het leven van mensen in een politieke maatschappij beïnvloe-
den. Dit vloeit voort uit de praktische en complexe sociale relaties die mensen 
opbouwen tussen elkaar en met hun omgeving. Als zodanig is het idee van men-
senrechten vooral gemunt in een taal van strijd en verzet tegen verschillende vor-
men van vernedering, uitsluiting, misbruik, discriminatie, onrechtvaardigheid 
enzovoorts, die mensen raken in het proces van samenleven als een politiek (rela-
tioneel) wezen. Deze benadering veronderstelt en steunt op het relationele karak-
ter van het menszijn. Beargumenteerd werd dat dit sociale relaties opvat als in 
wezen morele relaties aangezien deze noodzakelijkerwijs gevormd worden door 
de menselijke behoeft e aan bescherming, voortbestaan en bevordering van hun 
inherente morele waarde. Dit verklaart ook de primaire sociale functie of de rai-
son d’être van de normatieve idee van mensenrechten in een politieke samenle-
ving. Op deze wijze is het mogelijk om het moderne idee van mensenrechten zoals 
erkend in verschillende mensenrechten instrumenten, te zien als de bevordering 
van de relationeel-morele aard van mensen, en de specifi eke mensenrechten nor-
men daarin als een weerslag en verdere concretisering van onderliggende morele 
beginselen en vooronderstellingen in sociale relaties.
De rechtvaardiging van het idee van sociale relaties als morele relaties vereist 
een centrale organiserend en overkoepelend moreel beginsel. Derhalve werd in 
Hoofdstuk 4, het belangrijkste hoofdstuk van de studie, dit fundamentele morele 
beginsel in detail onderzocht: het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid. Echter, 
om het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid de normatieve grondslag te laten 
zijn van mensenrechten, moet aangetoond worden, ten eerste, dat waardigheid 
zelf een inherente morele waarde is van ieder mens; ten tweede, dat waardigheid 
gelijkelijk, onvoorwaardelijk en altijd aanwezig is in iedere persoon; en ten slotte 
dat waardigheid gezien wordt als een universele morele waarde.
Dit maakte het noodzakelijk om in detail de historisch-fi losofi sche opvatting 
en het hedendaags praktisch gebruik van het idee van menselijke waardigheid te 
onderzoeken. Het historisch-fi losofi sche onderzoek liet zien dat er twee kernop-
vattingen zijn ontwikkeld in de loop der tijd: waardigheid als rang en status en 
waardigheid als een inherente (intrinsieke) morele menselijke waarde. De over-
gang van waardigheid als rang en status naar waardigheid als inherente morele 
waarde heeft  zich voltrokken in een complex proces in de intellectuele geschie-
denis. Echter, ondanks deze in de loop van de tijd ontwikkelde verschillende 
opvattingen, werd aangetoond dat de normatieve kernbetekenis van deze notie 
hetzelfde bleef, namelijk het beginsel van respect. Het verschil was dat waar waar-
digheid in rang en status verwijst naar respect voor bepaalde categorieën van per-
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sonen (zij die een bepaalde sociale positie bekleden of over bepaalde kenmerken 
beschikken zoals de rede), verwijst waardigheid als een inherent moreel menselijk 
beginsel naar respect voor elk mens, ongeacht zijn of haar sociale rang (status) of 
(beperkte) capaciteit tot rationeel denken (zoals kinderen of geestelijk beperkten). 
Er zijn inderdaad verschillende tegenstrijdige theorieën over de rechtvaardiging 
van waardigheid als inherent morele menselijke waarde, variërend van religieuze 
argumentaties tot de metafysische argumentaties van Immanuel Kant. Hoofdstuk 
4 liet de ernstige tekortkomingen en beperkingen zien die samenhangen met deze 
benaderingen en bood een alternatief perspectief door te beargumenteren dat 
de rechtvaardiging van waardigheid als een inherente waarde ons verplicht een 
meer praktische benadering te kiezen gebaseerd op een intuïtieve interpretatie 
van de aard van mensen en de complexe sociale relaties die zij onderhouden met 
elkaar en hun omgeving. Dit betekende dat het idee van waardigheid zou moeten 
worden losgemaakt van dergelijke abstracte, arbitraire en beperkende factoren 
en daarentegen zou moeten worden gerechtvaardigd op basis van een stabiele en 
universeel geldige grondslag die gewoonlijk elk mens bezit. Het werd benadrukt 
dat het enige natuurlijke en onveranderlijke bezit van mensen het feit is van hun 
menszijn of hun menselijkheid. In navolging van Sulmasy en Nussbaum betoogde 
Hoofdstuk 4 dat waardigheid gezien moet worden een inherente en onvoorwaar-
delijke waarde die toebehoort aan elk mens vanwege het zijn van een menselijke 
persoon. In de praktisch-intuïtieve zin, bestaat menselijkheid (het feit van het 
mens zijn) uit twee onlosmakelijk verbonden elementen: het biologische (fysieke) 
element en het morele element. Het biologische element van menselijkheid volgt 
uit zijn dierlijke karakter. Mensen hebben een fysiek bestaan en persoonlijkheid 
en daarmee overeenkomende biologisch noodzakelijke en onmisbare materi-
ele behoeft en waaraan moet worden voldaan voor een waardig menselijk leven. 
Het morele aspect van menselijkheid, aan de andere kant, verklaart haar morele 
karakter. Mensen hebben een moreel bestaan en persoonlijkheid en daarmee de 
overeenstemmende noodzakelijke en onmisbare morele voorwaarden voor een 
waardig menselijk leven. Op deze wijze claimt het beginsel van menselijke waar-
digheid een onvoorwaardelijk respect voor zowel het biologische (fysieke) als het 
morele aspect van menszijn.
Dit laat zien dat het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid zowel een relationeel 
als een in essentie evaluatief normatief beginsel is. Als relationele norm vereist en 
zelfs veronderstelt het de aanwezigheid van dynamische en wederzijdse relaties 
tussen mensen; als een evaluatieve norm vereist het activiteiten en handelingen 
de overeenstemmen met de waarde van menselijkheid en verbiedt deze wanneer 
ze tegenstrijdig zijn aan de waarde van menselijkheid. Op deze wijze voegt het 
beginsel van menselijke waardigheid een fundamenteel ethisch-morele dimensie 
toe aan het idee van sociale relaties waarin toegestane en verboden activiteiten, 
gedragingen en praktijken onderscheiden kunnen worden in alle spectra van het 
menselijk leven en sociale relaties. Diepgaande beschouwing liet zien dat het ide-
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aal van onvoorwaardelijk respect voor het leven en de menselijke waardigheid 
bestaat uit het zorg dragen voor de biologische en morele behoeft en van menszijn. 
Hieruit volgde dat het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid (dan wel het ideaal 
van respect) een onvoorwaardelijk respect veronderstelt voor de biologische en 
morele voorwaarden voor een waardig menselijk leven.
Tegenwoordig zijn de kernvereisten voor menselijke waardigheid grotendeels 
geformuleerd in de vorm van specifi eke nationale en internationale economische, 
sociale, culturele, burgerlijke en politieke mensenrechten. Het is daarmee moge-
lijk om te stellen dat, in het algemeen, de materiële (biologische) voorwaarden 
een centraal voorwerp zijn van garanties op het gebied van economische, sociale 
en culturele rechten, terwijl de inherente morele voorwaarden de kern vormen 
garanties op het gebied van burgerlijke en politieke rechten. Hieruit volgden twee 
cruciale punten die centraal stonden in dit onderzoek. Ten eerste, verschillende 
soorten mensenrechten (economisch, sociaal, cultureel, burgerlijk of politiek) die 
erkend zijn in diverse mensenrechteninstrumenten zijn niets meer dan de speci-
fi eke verwoording van wat het beginsel van respect voor het leven en de mense-
lijke waardigheid betekent in een politieke maatschappij. Ten tweede, ESC rech-
ten zijn gegrondvest in (volgen uit) hetzelfde onderliggende normatieve beginsel 
als burgerlijke en politieke rechten en schrijven Staten derhalve evenzeer dwin-
gende verplichtingen voor. Deze verplichtingen van Staten bestaan in essentie uit 
het voor ieder mens verzekeren van de materiële voorwaarden voor een mens-
waardig leven. Daarom kan het probleem van ESC rechten niet het probleem van 
de rechtvaardiging (inhoud) zijn, maar veeleer het probleem van het verwoorden 
van de specifi eke praktische toepassing; in andere woorden, het probleem betreft  
de moeilijkheid om te identifi ceren welke concrete juridische verplichtingen er 
rusten op Staten om de vereisten van het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid te 
verwezenlijken waar het de ESC rechten betreft . Dit onderwerp werd systema-
tisch onderzocht in Deel 2 van de studie.
Het is inderdaad één ding om te stellen dat het beginsel van menselijke waar-
digheid een onvoorwaardelijk respect voor de inherente materiële voorwaarden 
voor leven betekent, maar het is iets anders om aan te geven waaruit de ver-
plichtingen de Staat bestaan ter verzekering van de specifi eke vereisten die uit 
het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid voortkomen. In deze studie is gekozen 
voor een inductieve benadering van dit probleem. Derhalve werd in Deel 2 een 
diepgravende analyse gemaakt van de juridische verplichtingen van Staten zoals 
ontwikkeld in ESC jurisprudentie. Na een grondige analyse van de praktijk van 
internationale mensenrechten tribunalen belast met de beslechting van geschillen 
over ESC rechten, concludeerde en argumenteerde deze studie dat de juridische 
verplichtingen van Staten om zorg te dragen voor de essentiële materiële levens-
voorwaarden zoals gegarandeerd in ESC rechten regimes, twee dimensies omvat-
ten: procedureel en inhoudelijk.
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De procedurele dimensie bestaat uit de het zorgen voor eerlijke procedures 
(due process) die onmisbaar zijn voor de eff ectieve bescherming van ESC rechten. 
In verband hiermee onderscheidde deze studie drie fundamentele procedurele 
rechten waaruit de kern van het recht op eerlijke procedures bestaat: het recht 
op participatie (participation), toegang tot de rechter (access to justice) en ver-
antwoording (accountability). Participatie ziet toe op het recht van iedereen om 
deel te nemen aan en een betekenisvolle stem te hebben in alle besluitvormings-
processen die iemands rechten en vitale belangen raken. Het is erkend als een 
onderdeel van internationaal recht en als een fundamenteel beginsel gericht op 
de uitbanning of op zijn minst het tegengaan van uitsluitingspraktijken. Het ver-
zekeren van het recht op participatie geeft  daarmee een praktische invulling en 
bevestiging van de gelijke waardigheid en rechten van alle mensen in een poli-
tieke maatschappij. In Hoofdstuk 5 werd aangetoond dat het een betekenisvolle 
rol speelt in de bescherming van kwetsbare personen tegen discriminatie, sociale 
uitsluiting en marginalisatie. Met betrekking tot de reikwijdte werd vastgesteld 
dat de Staat verplicht is om te eff ectieve participatie bewerkstelligen van iedere 
betrokkene in alle besluitvormingsprocedures die essentiële sociaaleconomische 
belangen betreff en. De eff ectiviteit van participatie van individuen in een bepaald 
besluitvormingsproces wordt evenwel bepaald door de wijze waarop het wordt 
uitgevoerd in overeenstemming met de onderdelen waaruit het beginsel bestaat. 
Dat wil zeggen dat de participatie van (een groep van) individuen in een bepaald 
besluitvormingstraject betekenisloos is tenzij het relevant, zinnig, tijdig, transpa-
rant, met respect voor de waardigheid en de fundamentele rechten van de betrok-
ken individuen en te goede trouw wordt uitgevoerd in overeenstemming van 
tevoren vastgestelde juridische standaarden. De bespreking in Hoofdstuk 5 liet 
duidelijk zien hoe het falen van Staten om bepaalde kwetsbare groepen te betrek-
ken in besluitvormingsprocessen in het licht van deze vereisten heeft  geresulteerd 
in ernstige schendingen van diverse ESC rechten.
Toegang tot de rechter vormt de kern van alle mensenrechten. Het vloeit 
direct voort uit de generieke juridische verplichting van de Staat om het vrije, 
volledige en eff ectieve uitoefening van mensenrechten te verzekeren voor ieder-
een binnen zijn jurisdictie. Het kerndoel is om te garanderen dat iedereen met een 
klacht betreff ende de schending van mensenrechten toegang heeft  tot een eff ec-
tieve remedie. Het internationaal recht schrijft  niet een specifi eke institutionele of 
procedurele vorm voor. Het vereist niettemin dat, zoals in Hoofdstuk 6 in detail 
besproken, de Staat moet verzekeren dat zowel de instituties als de procedures 
ingericht zijn op basis van de basiselementen waaruit het recht op toegang tot de 
rechter bestaat. Daarom werd in Hoofdstuk 6, na grondige analyse van de inhoud 
en gevolgen van de elementen van toegang tot de rechter, beargumenteerd dat 
bij toepassing op rechtspraak betreff ende ESC rechten het nodig is een welover-
wogen en contextuele benadering te kiezen welke is gebaseerd op de aard van de 
problemen met ESC rechten en de kwetsbare positie van de (groepen van) indivi-
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duen die klagen. Aan de ene kant zijn er klachten over ESC rechten op grond van 
sociaaleconomische keuzes of besluiten van de Staat waarbij de Staat exclusieve 
controle of toegang heeft  tot de relevante en noodzakelijke informatie of bewijs 
die noodzakelijk is om de schending van de rechten vast te stellen; aan de andere 
kant worden dergelijke klachten vaak ingediend door personen die gebukt gaan 
onder armoede, discriminatie, uitsluiting of marginalisatie. Om deze redenen 
rust op de Staat een positieve verplichting om te zorgen dat een strikte en formele 
benadering van het recht op toegang niet resulteert in de een ondermijning van 
het specifi eke te beschermen belang; dat de toegang passend en tegemoetkomend 
is voor de specifi eke noden en belangen van kwetsbare personen in procedures 
over ESC rechten; en dat recht gedaan wordt aan het beginsel van rechtsstatelijk-
heid (rule of law) en democratische verantwoording door zorg te dragen voor 
prompte en eff ectieve naleving van toegekende van schadevergoeding. De bespro-
ken zaken in dit Hoofdstuk lieten duidelijk de problemen zien met betrekking 
tot zowel het weigeren van toegang tot de rechter als het falen van de Staat om 
een adequate weloverwogen en contextuele benadering te kiezen voor elk van de 
elementen van het recht op toegang in relatie tot ESC rechten.
Het beginsel van verantwoording omvat in het algemeen een complexe nor-
matieve relatie tussen houders van mensenrechten en de Staat. In essentie betreft  
en geeft  het concrete inhoud aan de algemene (overkoepelende) mensenrechten-
verplichtingen van de Staat. Als zodanig verplicht het de Staat om een systeem 
te ontwerpen en te realiseren dat (groepen van) individuen in staat stelt om een 
rechtvaardiging te vragen voor zijn keuzes, om fouten recht te zetten bij het maken 
van de keuzes of in de implementatie van maatregelen, en voor het sanctioneren 
van zijn vertegenwoordigers of andere entiteiten die verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
gemaakte fouten. Het beginsel van verantwoordelijkheid verplicht de Staat ook 
om ervoor te zorgen dat het gedrag van particuliere entiteiten binnen zijn juris-
dictie niet de uitoefening van ESC rechten belemmeren. Het is absoluut onmoge-
lijk om een eff ectieve bescherming van mensenrechten te realiseren zonder een 
systeem voor verantwoordelijkheid. Dit geldt juist ook voor ESC rechten waarbij 
sociaaleconomische keuzes en besluiten van de Staat en zijn vertegenwoordigers 
meestal de oorzaak zijn of achtergrond vormen van schendingen van deze rech-
ten. Met dit in gedachten onderzocht Hoofdstuk 7 de benaderingen van inter-
nationale mensenrechtenhoven en toezichthoudende instellingen van de verant-
woordelijkheid (accountability) van de Staat bij het verzekeren van de materiële 
levensvoorwaarden. Dit liet zien dat de mensenrechtenhoven en toezichthou-
dende instellingen in het bijzonder terugvielen op het ideaal van de institutionele 
(objectieve) verantwoordelijkheid van de Staat in plaats van op de inhoudelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid. Het belangrijkste kenmerk van deze benadering is dat het 
zich niet bezighoudt met de interne verdeling van constitutionele en bestuurlijke 
bevoegdheden en functies van de Staat; ook houdt het zich niet bezig met fouten 
van (publieke) gezagsdragers of andere actoren. Het richt zich vooral op de vraag 
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of de rechthebbenden een eff ectief recht hebben op toegang tot en naleving van 
ESC rechten. Aangetoond werd hoe deze benadering van verantwoordelijkheid 
van groot belang is voor in het bijzonder de realisatie van ESC rechten. Bovendien 
lieten de zaken besproken in Hoofdstuk 7 in het bijzonder de rechtvaardigin-
gen en de drie belangrijkste scenario’s zien die leiden tot de institutionele ver-
antwoordelijkheid van de Staat. Zo geeft  de in de mensenrechtenjurisprudentie 
ontwikkelde gedachte van institutionele verantwoordelijkheid van de Staat een 
eff ectief antwoord op het probleem van de verdeling van verantwoordelijkheid bij 
de praktische realisatie van ESC rechten.
De inhoudelijke dimensie van de verplichting van Staten om de materiële 
levensvoorwaarden te respecteren en te verzekeren richt zich op essentiële mini-
mumstandaarden om een menswaardig leven te leiden. Deze studie onderscheidde 
en besprak vier fundamentele mensenrechtenbeginselen die de inhoudelijke kern 
van het ESC rechten vormen. Dit zijn het beginsel van een waardig leven, gelijk-
heid, non-discriminatie, en de bescherming van individuen tegen kwetsbaarheid. 
In dit opzicht lieten Hoofdstukken 8 en 9 zien dat er uit de materiële verplichtin-
gen van de Staat in essentie twee onderling samenhangende verplichtingen van de 
Staat voortvloeien. Ten eerste, de verplichting om te zorgen dat elk mens binnen 
zijn jurisdictie op basis van gelijkheid en zonder enige vorm van discriminatie 
toegang heeft  tot een minimum niveau van materiële levensvoorwaarden. Ten 
tweede, de verplichting om voldoende en passende aandacht te hebben voor de 
minimaal noodzakelijk sociaaleconomische behoeft en van kwetsbare personen 
in de samenleving.
De verplichting van de Staat om een waardig leven te verzekeren omvat een 
brede inhoudelijke mensenrechtelijke verplichting van de Staat. Zoals Hoofdstuk 
8 liet zien, onderstreept het ideaal van een waardig leven een veelomvattender 
kijk op het recht op leven en waardigheid en in dit opzicht de holistische benade-
ring van de bescherming van alle mensenrechten. Het vraagt in het bijzonder de 
Staat om te verzekeren dat alle individuen een onvoorwaardelijke toegang hebben 
tot minimum levensvoorwaarden om met menselijke waardigheid hun leven te 
leiden. Dit omvat brede negatieve en positieve verplichtingen van de Staat met 
betrekking tot sociaaleconomische voorwaarden en omstandigheden die het leven 
en de waardigheid van mensen bedreigen, ongeacht de aard en oorzaken van deze 
bedreigingen. De Staat is verplicht om te zorgen dat zijn sociaaleconomische keu-
zes en beslissingen onder geen enkele omstandigheid (groepen van) individuen 
de kern van de ESC rechten ontnemen. De in Hoofdstuk 8 besproken zaken geven 
een overtuigend bewijs hoe mensenrechtenhoven en toezichthoudende instanties 
de verplichtingen van de Staat om een waardig leven te garanderen hebben toe-
gepast binnen de steeds uitbreidende sociaaleconomische vereisten variërend van 
omstandigheden in gevangenissen (detentie) tot milieuvoorwaarden.
Hoofdstuk 9 onderzocht de veelzijdige toepassingen van het beginsel van 
gelijkheid en non-discriminatie en de verplichtingen van de Staat om kwetsbare 
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personen een waardig leven te garanderen. Op grond van deze verplichtingen 
dient de Staat alle obstakels en beperkingen te verwijderen die een belemmering 
zijn om op voet van gelijkheid met anderen te deel te nemen aan alle aspecten 
van het leven; te verzekeren dat alle kwetsbare personen toegang hebben tot en 
gebruik kunnen maken van alle goederen, diensten en kansen die open staan 
voor alle mensen; om voldoende en passende aandacht te geven aan de specifi eke 
behoeft en van elke categorie van kwetsbare personen bij al zijn sociaaleconomi-
sche beslissingen; te verzekeren dat zijn besluiten geen onnodige en oneigenlijke 
last vormen voor kwetsbare personen; en om alle kwetsbare personen te bescher-
men tegen sociale uitsluiting, marginalisatie en armoede. In het bijzonder liet 
Hoofdstuk 9 zien dat mensenrechtenhoven en toezichthoudende instanties de 
opvatting hebben dat de Staat een zware verplichting heeft  om prioriteit te geven 
aan de zorg voor een waardig leven voor alle kwetsbare personen. Voor alles is 
de Staat verplicht om ervoor te zorgen dat passende prioriteit gegeven wordt aan 
hun specifi eke behoeft en, zelfs onder moeilijke economische omstandigheden. 
Dit wordt bij uitstek gezien als een minimum kernverplichting van de Staat en 
daarmee als een lakmoesproef voor de algehele legitimiteit van zijn algemene 
sociaaleconomische beleid en maatregelen.
Op grond van al deze theoretische en jurisprudentiële argumenten heeft  deze 
studie in Hoofdstuk 10 een aantal aanbevelingen geformuleerd. Een holistische 
en praktische opvatting van mensenrechten behoeft  noodzakelijkerwijs een ide-
aalbeeld van wat het betekent om te zijn en te leven als een vrij en waardig mens 
in een politieke maatschappij, evenals voorkennis van en kritische refl ectie op 
de relationele aard van mensen. Dit is een belangrijke bijdrage vanuit de sociale 
opvatting van mensenrechten omdat deze benadering het idee en de functie van 
mensenrechten plaatst in de context van sociale relaties in een politieke maat-
schappij. Sociale relaties zijn in essentie morele relaties geworteld in menselijke 
zelfb ewustzijn en zelfattributie van waarden en de behoeft e aan bescherming, 
behoud en bevordering van een waardig leven. Opmerkelijk is dat in de relatio-
nele kijk op menselijkheid er geen onderscheid of tegenstelling is tussen individu-
ele en collectieve rechten en belangen aangezien beide bestaan als een ongedeeld 
geheel. Dit geeft  een sterkere en meer samenhangende basis voor een veelomvat-
tende mensenrechtentheorie dan welke wordt geboden door de traditionele en 
discourse theorieën die in Deel 1 van de studie zijn besproken.
De belangrijkste reden voor het vasthouden aan het beginsel van menselijke 
waardigheid als normatief fundament van mensenrechten is het ideaal van respect 
dat het vertegenwoordigd. In theorie bestaat het ideaal van respect uit het verze-
keren van fundamentele materiele en morele levensbehoeft en om een menswaar-
dig leven te kunnen leiden. In juridische zin omvat de verplichting van de Staat 
om materiële levensbehoeft en te verzekeren een procedurele en een inhoudelijke 
dimensie. De procedurele verplichting van de Staat is geherformuleerd in termen 
van drie fundamentele mensenrechtenbeginselen op het gebied van zorgvuldige 
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procedures (due process): participatie, toegang tot de rechter en verantwoording. 
De inhoudelijke verplichtingen van de Staat om de levensbehoeft en te verzekeren 
zijn geformuleerd in termen van vier fundamentele mensenrechtenbeginselen 
(waardig leven, gelijkheid, non-discriminatie, bescherming van kwetsbare per-
sonen) welke duiden op de juridische verplichting van de Staat on onvoorwaar-
delijke toegang tot essentiële levensbehoeft en te verzekeren en prioriteit te geven 
aan het beschermen van kwetsbare personen. Daarmee geven deze procedurele 
en inhoudelijke vereisten, in samenhang, een concrete invulling van de generieke 
verplichtingen van de Staat die voortvloeien uit ESC rechten.
Het is te hopen dat de benaderingen en argumenten in deze studie een ver-
nieuwend en samenhangend inzicht geven in het denken en discussiëren over de 
inhoud en reikwijdte van de bescherming die wordt geboden door internationale 
ESC rechte regimes. In ieder geval geeft  het coherentie in het academisch discours 
over hun aard, status en praktische juridische implementatie. De argumentatie 
op basis van het beginsel van menselijke waardigheid heeft  duidelijk vastgesteld 
dat er een inhoudelijke verbinding is tussen de waarde van mensen en ESC rech-
ten. De argumenten uit de internationale ESC jurisprudentie maakten het ons 
mogelijk om de inhoud en implicaties van ESC rechten opnieuw te formuleren 
in termen van breed gedragen juridische beginselen. Daarom is het nauwelijks 
mogelijk voor de Staat om simpelweg ESC rechten als programmatische rechten 
af te doen en ook niet om de juridische kernverplichtingen te ontlopen door zich 
te beroepen op de ambiguïteit van de normen of het gebrek aan middelen.
Naast een algemeen wetenschappelijk belang voor de mensenrechten, kan de 
specifi eke bijdrage van deze studie als volgt geformuleerd worden. Ten eerste, als 
een degelijke rechtvaardiging voor gerechtshoven en tribunalen op alle niveaus 
om rechtsmacht te aanvaarden en ESC zaken betekenisvol te behandelen. Ten 
tweede, ter assistentie van mensenrechtenjuristen en -advocaten om een sterke 
zaak te hebben tegen de Staat betreff ende de juridische verplichtingen die 
volgen uit specifi eke ESC rechten. Ten derde, als bron van inspiratie in de strijd 
tegen armoede, discriminatie, ongelijkheid, uitsluiting en marginalisatie en in 
het bereiken van sociale rechtvaardigheid voor iedereen. Ten vierde, als gids 
voor vertegenwoordigers van Staten of andere besluitvormingsinstanties in 
de (her)beoordeling van de legitimiteit van hun sociaaleconomische keuzes en 
beslissingen aangaande ESC rechten; ten vijfde, als ondersteuning van nationale 
en internationale instellingen voor toezicht op mensenrechten bij het formuleren 
van een uitvoerbare en samenhangende benadering in het toezicht op de 
uitvoering door de Staat van deze rechten en bij het geven van trainingen aan 
relevante actoren die te maken hebben met ESC rechten.
Er is aan aantal vervolgstappen die ondernomen zouden moeten worden om 
de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek praktisch bruikbaar te maken, in het bijzonder 
op nationaal grassroots niveau. Meer specifi ek zou er een vergelijkend juridisch 
onderzoek binnen nationale rechtssystemen gedaan moeten worden naar de pro-
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cedurele en inhoudelijke beginselen die in deze studie zijn besproken. Ook zou 
er een verder academische debat moeten volgen gericht op het verrijken van de 
inhoud en gevolgen van elk van de beginselen. Voorts zouden deze beginselen 
moeten worden ontwikkeld in de vorm van toegankelijke en bruikbare gereed-
schappen, in het bijzonder voor beleidsmakers en maatschappelijke organisaties.
Intersentia 349
CURRICULUM VITAE
Getahun Alemayehu Mosissa (born in 1982) attended his fi rst Law Degree (LL.B) 
at the Addis Ababa University (Aug 2006) and his LL.M Degree in International 
Law and Law of International Organisations with specialization in Human Rights 
at the University of Groningen and graduated with distinction ‘cum laude’ (July 
2009). He started his PhD research in international human rights law in February 
2010. Aft er graduating from his LL.B Degree in August 2006, he joined the 
academia in September 2006 as Graduate Assistant II (till June 2007), as Assistant 
Lecturer (till July 2009) and Lecturer (till October 2019) at the Jimma University. 
In addition to teaching activities, he had also served as the deputy director of 
the School of Law Legal Aid Centre, as the research and postgraduate studies 
coordinator, as a chairperson of research and ethical review board, as chairperson 
of academic staff  disciplinary committee, as an editorial member of the Jimma 
University Journal of Law and as an associate editor of Jimma University Gadaa 
Journal. While conducting his PhD research at the University of Groningen, he 
also authored a book chapter on Ensuring the Realization of the Right to Health 
through the African Union (AU) System in the book edited by Toebes et al (2014) 
and a book review published on Th e Netherland International Law Review (Vol. 
59, 2012). He had also made paper and poster presentations on Legal Research 
Network Conference (Groningen 2010) and ILA Annual Conference (Hague 
2010) respectively. In addition, he had also attended summer courses on Method 
and Methods in Legal Science at Uppsala University (2010) and Intensive Course 
on Justiciability of ESC Rights at Abo Academy (2011). Between May 2007 and Aug 
2008, he had also served as the Judge of the Jimma Zone High Court in Oromia 
Regional State combining with his teaching activity at Jimma University. He is 





Th e Human Rights Research Series’ central research theme is the nature and meaning of 
international standards in the fi  eld of human rights, their application and promotion in the 
national legal order, their interplay with national standards, and the international supervision of 
such application. Anyone directly involved in the defi  nition, study, implementation, monitoring, 
or enforcement of human rights will fi  nd this series an indispensable reference tool.
Th e Series is published together with the world famous Netherlands Network for Human 
Rights Research (formerly School of Human Rights Research), a joint eff  ort by human rights 
researchers in the Netherlands.
Editorial Board: Prof. dr. Antoine Buyse (Utrecht University), Prof. dr. Fons Coomans (Maastricht 
University), Prof. dr. Yvonne Donders (Chair – University of Amsterdam), Dr. Antenor Hallo 
de Wolf (University of Groningen), Prof. dr. Kristin Henrard (Erasmus University Rotterdam), 
Prof. dr. Nicola Jägers (Tilburg University), Prof. Titia Loenen (Leiden University) Prof. dr. 
Janne Nijman (T.M.C. Asser Instituut) and Prof. dr. Brigit Toebes (University of Groningen). For 
previous volumes in the series, please visit http://shr.intersentia.com.
Published titles within the Series:
80. Marie Elske Gispen, Human Rights and Drug Control
 ISBN 978-1-78068-454-3
81. Bart van der Sloot, Privacy as Virtue: Moving Beyond the Individual in the Age of Big Data
 ISBN 978-1-78068-505-2
82. Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein, Situation Selection Regime at the International Criminal 
Court
 ISBN 978-1-78068-618-9
83. Yi Zhang, Advancing the Right to Health Care in China. Towards Accountability
 ISBN 978-1-78068-677-6
84. Diana Itza Odier-Contreras Garduño, Collective Reparations.Tensions and Dilemmas
 Between Collective Reparations and the Individual Right to Receive Reparations
 ISBN 978-1-78068-705-6
85. Daphina Misiedjan, Towards a Sustainable Human Right to Water. Supporting vulnerable 
people and protecting water resources
 ISBN 978-1-78068-612-7
86. Benedicta Deogratias, Trapped in a Religious Marriage
 ISBN 978-1-78068-842-8
87. Kasim Balarabe, Realising the Right to Water and Sanitation in Nigeria
 ISBN 978-1-78068-901-2
88. Leonie Huijbers, Process-based Fundamental Rights Review
 ISBN 978-1-78068-887-9
89. Vincent Willem Vleugel, Culture in the State Reporting Procedure of the UN Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies. How the HRC, the CESCR and the CEDAWCee use human rights as a sword to 
protect and promote culture, and as a shield to protect against harmful culture
 ISBN 978-1-83970-006-4
90. Laura Íñigo Álvarez, Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in  International 
Law
 ISBN 978-1-83970-004-0

